

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

**An Exploratory Mixed-Methodological Analysis of Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiation in the United Kingdom**

Grubb, Amy

*Award date:*  
2016

*Awarding institution:*  
Coventry University

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**An Exploratory Mixed-Methodological  
Analysis of Police Hostage and Crisis  
Negotiation in the United Kingdom**

**By**

**Amy Rose Grubb**

**July 2016**



**REGISTRY RESEARCH UNIT**  
**ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM**

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Name of applicant and Faculty/School: Amy Grubb, Psychology

Research project title: An exploratory study of modern-day police hostage (crisis) negotiation within the UK

Comments by the reviewer

1.	<b>Evaluation of the ethics of the proposal:</b>  A well written and detailed proposal which clearly explains the research to be undertaken; materials to be used; data collection techniques and participant group. There are no substantial ethical concerns identified by this research proposal that have not been addressed.
2.	<b>Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form:</b>  Both are clear and explains the study and consent/withdrawal etc
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**Name and signature of reviewer:** Gail Steptoe-Warren  
**Date:** 29<sup>th</sup> October 2009

# **An Exploratory Mixed-Methodological Analysis of Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiation in the United Kingdom**

**By  
Amy Rose Grubb**

**July 2016**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
University's requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy**

**School of Psychological, Social and Behavioural  
Sciences  
Coventry University**



# Acknowledgements

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I would like to take this opportunity to thank the people who have made this piece of work a reality. This feat would not have been achievable without the constant guidance and support from my Director of Studies, Professor Sarah Brown and my other supervisors, Dr Peter Hall, Professor Barry Mitchell and Professor Erica Bowen. I would also like to pay thanks to all of the hostage and crisis negotiators and police officers throughout the United Kingdom who gave up their time to support my research. Your input has been invaluable and has enabled me to produce a body of work that will hopefully help to bridge the gap between research and practice within modern-day policing. In addition to this, I feel that it is important to acknowledge those around me that have tirelessly supported me during the long and arduous journey that has constituted my PhD. I would, therefore, like to thank my parents, Doodie and Peter, for their continuous support and I would like to dedicate this thesis to my partner, without whom, this thesis would never have been completed.

*Per Ardua ad Astra*

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# Abstract

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Hostage and crisis negotiators are police officers who have been trained to respond to and resolve hostage and crisis incidents. They are often required to respond to highly-pressurised and emotive incidents that may last for protracted periods of time and are likely to encounter situations whereby their actions could play a role in whether individuals live or die. The first aim of the current thesis was to identify whether negotiators in the United Kingdom (UK) possess certain traits or characteristics that serve to enable them to perform their role effectively and differentiate them from the wider police population. The first phase of the research involved a quantitative cross-sectional comparison of a sample of hostage and crisis negotiators ( $n = 117$ ) with a sample of non-negotiator police officers ( $n = 118$ ) from 21 UK forces and a sample of students ( $n = 203$ ) utilising a psychometric test battery measuring five constructs previously identified within the literature as playing a role in success within occupational settings: *Personality*, *Coping Style*, *Cognitive Emotion Regulation*, *Decision-Making Style* and *Emotional Intelligence*. The findings refuted the existence of a “unique hostage and crisis negotiator profile” but confirmed the existence of a unique “police officer profile” by demonstrating significant differences between both police samples and the student sample in relation to all constructs measured. These findings are discussed with reference to the implications for the selection, training and CPD of UK negotiators.

Hostage and crisis negotiation is one of many options available to police incident commanders and is well-established as an effective means of resolving hostage and crisis incidents. Whilst there is a plethora of published literature relating to the entity of hostage and crisis negotiation, the majority of this literature has been developed within the United States of America (USA), on the basis of USA negotiator deployments and experiences. The second aim, therefore, was to provide an insight into the discipline of negotiation in the UK by conducting a constructivist grounded theory analysis of the experiences of negotiators as derived from semi-structured interviews with 15 negotiators from nine UK police forces. The findings allowed for the development of five grounded theoretical micro-models: a) The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, b) The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey, c) The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, d) The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience, and e) The Self-Perceived Successful UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile. These micro-models are discussed with reference to their implications for hostage and crisis negotiation policy and practice in a UK-centric context.

# Chapter 1: Introduction

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## 1.1. Thesis Rationale

Hostage and crisis negotiation (HCNn) as an entity has existed as a specific police tool since the 1980s, with the United States of America (USA) pioneering the development of HCNn teams within police departments (Fuselier 1981a). Since the implementation of the “negotiate first policy” (Bolz 1979), it has evolved and become more advanced and widespread internationally, with the majority of police forces/departments having at least some officers trained to act as hostage and crisis negotiators (HCNs). There has been a plethora of research studies that have established the discipline as a credible police tool; with some going so far as to purport that HCNn “has come to be known as one of law enforcement’s most effective tools” (Regini 2002: 1). The majority of these studies have been conducted in the USA, and most models were developed utilising US-based case studies/data and HCNs. To date, and to the author’s knowledge, there has been no published empirical research that has identified how HCNs in the United Kingdom (UK) operate, or what works in relation to the styles, strategies and techniques utilised. The rationale for the current research was, therefore, to shine a light on negotiation from a UK-centric perspective, as perceived by the experts themselves – current operationally active HCNs.

Whilst the current research was driven firstly by a need to document/describe/validate the current UK HCNn approach as a result of this narrative being lacking within the current literature base, it was also informed by the potential for UK HCNn to differ from HCNn carried out in other countries as a result of cultural differences that are likely to play a part in communication/language/negotiation style. Work by Giebels and Taylor (2010), for example, identified cultural differences that influenced the process of negotiation by analysing 25 audio-recorded HCNn situations that took part in the Netherlands or Belgium. They found that subjects from low-context cultures (i.e. individualistic Western societies) reciprocated rational arguments from a HCN more quickly; whereas subjects from high-context cultures (i.e. collectivistic non-Western societies) tended to reciprocate intimidation strategies more quickly, suggesting that culture plays a role within HCN incidents and more specifically, within the way HCN arguments/use of social influence/strategy are perceived by subjects from different cultural backgrounds. Giebels and Taylor (2010) suggest that these findings can be explained by cultural norms in relation to handling conflict, with intimidation (i.e. confrontation and assertiveness), for example, being perceived as a more appropriate way of handling conflict within low-context cultures (Fu and Yukl 2000). These findings provide a rationale to study

HNCn from different cultural perspectives, to identify whether HCNn as an entity differs in accordance with the country/culture in which it is situated. The current research, therefore, provides an insight into the way HCNn is conducted within the UK and may, therefore, provide a starting point for further/future comparison with HCNn carried out within other individualist or collectivist cultures to help provide a deeper understanding of the role of culture within HCNn.

Furthermore, there has also been a lack of empirical research identifying the characteristics and traits of HCNs (particularly within the UK), or whether HCNs differ from their non-negotiator colleagues in relation to socio-psychological constructs. HCNn is a role that involves dealing with incredibly stressful/volatile and emotive situations, sometimes for protracted periods of time, and as such, it would seem prudent to suggest that certain individuals are more suited to the role than others, when considering their psychological make-up. As such, the current research aimed to empirically address the question of whether HCNs possess a certain set of traits/characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the police population. These findings have potential implications in terms of the recruitment and selection of future trainee HCNs.

## **1.2. Context for the Selection of Hostage and Crisis Negotiators (HCNs)**

Whilst exact selection processes will vary slightly from police department to department within the USA, there are a number of established protocols/procedures for selecting new/trainee HCNs. The National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) recommended guidelines and policies for selecting HCNn team members (established in 2001), for example, suggest that consideration should be given to identifying officers that display the following competencies: they are volunteering for the role; they have a high level of self-control; they have a good ability to remain calm under stress; they demonstrate excellent interpersonal communication skills; they have a calm and confident demeanour; they are a good listener and interviewer; and they work well in a team concept (NCNA & FBI CNU n.d.). In a similar vein, the Canadian Police College stipulates the following selection criteria for trainee crisis negotiators: officers should be strong team players; have at least five years of operational police experience; possess above-average interviewing, communication and listening skills; and be able to perform under high levels of stress for long periods of time (Canadian Police College 2016). When selecting candidates who are suitable to

attend this training course, the Ontario Provincial Police, for example, assess candidates on the basis of behavioural competencies alone, including: commitment to organisational learning; communicating effectively; flexibility; impact and influence; learning from experience; problem solving; self-control; and team work (Ontario Provincial Police 2006).

There is also a fairly well-established selection model for trainee HCNs in the USA, as directed by McMains and Mullins (2014), which directs law enforcement agencies to follow a sequence of steps when selecting new HCNs. These steps include: 1) Advertisement of a HCN team vacancy that informs officers of the role requirements; 2) Officers should apply via an interest sheet/application which includes biographical/work data, details why they are interested in the position and provides evidence of their communication ability; 3) Officers should be subjected to a structured interview with the team leader, whereby they are rated/graded on the following aspects: the candidate's willingness to work unusual hours, be on call, views on teamwork and communication ability (amongst others); 4) Candidates should take part in a structured HCN team interview, whereby the team members have a chance to assess the candidate in relation to aspects such as: communication skills, adaptability, ability to think on one's feet, temperament, ability to cope with a variety of situations, team working skills/ability, ability to deal with stress and team fit (amongst others); 5) Use of a telephone role play scenario whereby the candidate is scored by team members on their performance in responding to a scripted/standardised crisis intervention situation (such as a barricaded suicidal subject). Optional additional steps include incorporation of a physical fitness/agility test (used by some departments) (Hogewood 2005) and utilisation of psychological testing/evaluation, as a means of assessing candidates' abilities to deal with stress, anger management, stability of personality, ability to solve problems creatively, ability to take orders and not be in charge, and frustration intolerance (McMains and Mullins 2014).

It is clear that there is some national guidance from a USA perspective<sup>1</sup> when selecting new HCN trainees, however, a similar tangible UK policy/set of guidance is lacking. Kennett's (2003) work identified limitations associated with the multi-faceted approach adopted by UK police forces when selecting HCNs, and it would appear that this issue has still not been addressed. Whilst ostensibly, UK forces follow a similar approach to that described above, current mandate dictates that individual territorial forces utilise their own selection procedures and this will vary in accordance with force HR policies and hostage negotiator coordinator (HCN) force/regional lead directives. An exemplar force recruitment method requires candidates to apply utilising a paper-based application form by demonstrating evidence to

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<sup>1</sup> There are likely to be other international police/law enforcement policies that govern the selection of HCNs, however, this information is not always publically available due to the security concerns within the policing arena.

support the following Policing Professional Framework (PPF) qualities: 1) Decision making; 2) Leadership – Leading People; 3) Professionalism; 4) Public service; and 5) Working with others (Anonymised at request of force 2016) but specific policies regarding the next steps within the selection process do not appear to be officially documented/publically available. Without access to each of the 43 specific individual UK force policies, it is impossible to state whether all forces assess against the same criteria at the initial application stage, or whether all forces utilise the same selection model in terms of the interview/assessment process. As such, the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model discussed in Chapter 7 attempts to bridge this gap by describing the current selection processes for HCNs in the UK, as identified within the interview data obtained as part of the qualitative phase of the research. It is worth noting here that the final (and most pertinent) stage of the selection process constitutes successful completion of the regional or national HCN training course, which some applicants may fail to achieve.

### **1.3. Thesis Structure and Chapter Outline**

Chapters 2 and 3 present the findings from two literature reviews and provide the theoretical grounding and rationale for the empirical research which is discussed in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 describes the method utilised to conduct the empirical research and provides a theoretical underpinning for the choice of methodology in relation to both the quantitative and qualitative phases of the research. Chapters 5 and 6 present the quantitative findings assessing and comparing the traits and characteristics of UK HCNs with non-negotiator trained police officers and a student sample utilising a psychometric test battery. Chapter 5 focuses on the findings in relation to three of the psychological constructs measured (*Personality, Coping Style and Cognitive Emotion Regulation*), whereas Chapter 6 focuses on the findings in relation to the remaining constructs: *General Decision-Making Style* and *Emotional Intelligence*.

Chapters 7-10 present the findings from the qualitative phase of the research, a grounded theory analysis of data collected via semi-structured interviews with 15 HCNs from nine territorial police forces across the UK. Five qualitative theoretical micro-models were developed: a) The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, b) The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey, c) The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation, d) The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience, and e) The Self-Perceived Successful UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile. These micro-models are discussed with reference to their implications for enhancing our understanding of HCNn.



Chapter 11 presents a discussion and evaluation of the findings with an emphasis on their significance, and recommendations in terms of policy and practice for HCNn in the UK. The thesis concludes by drawing together conclusions formed as a result of the two phases of research which provide a multi-perspective insight into the phenomenon of HCNn.

## **1.4. Terminology**

The following abbreviations are used throughout the thesis:

- HCN: hostage and crisis negotiator
- HCNs: hostage and crisis negotiators
- HCNn: hostage and crisis negotiation
- HNC: hostage negotiator coordinator

In addition to this, the term “subject” is utilised to refer to either a “hostage-taker” or “individual-in-crisis”, depending on the context of the hostage or crisis situation being referred to. Please refer to Appendix 1 for a full glossary of terms and to Appendix 2 for a full list of relevant abbreviations.

## **Chapter 2: Modern-Day Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation: The Evolution of an Art Form Within the Policing Arena**

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This chapter presents a review of the literature in relation to the evolution of HCNn as a police tool/discipline. The aim is to provide a contextual backdrop in terms of how HCNn developed as an entity and to provide an insight into the existing models of HCNn. The extant literature is utilised to identify gaps within the literature base and to generate a rationale for the current study. This review was published in the journal of *Aggression and Violent Behavior* in 2010. This chapter includes the pre-print version of the manuscript and the reference list has been embedded within the overall reference list section of the thesis.

Grubb, A. (2010) 'Modern-Day Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation: The Evolution of an Art Form Within the Policing Arena'. *Aggression and Violent Behavior* 15 (5), 341-348

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2010.06.002>

## **2.1. Introduction**

### **2.1.1. The Evolution of Modern Day Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation**

The concept of hostage negotiation is shrouded in a wealth of misperception. Hostage incidents are as old as recorded time and the evolution of hostage negotiation as both a criminal and socially acceptable act (e.g., in times of war) can be plotted throughout the ages. The earliest recorded incidents can be traced back to biblical times in the book of Genesis 14: 12-16 with the abduction, and subsequent rescue, of Abraham's nephew *Lot* by the armies of four kings. Abraham's use of 318 men to rescue his nephew is the first recorded account of the use of force to resolve a hostage incident (Soskis and Van Zandt 1986). Similarly, there are multiple accounts of Israelites and their enemies taking each other captive as spoils of war, to deplete the resources of opposing enemies and to attempt to convert potential enemies to the cause (McMains and Mullins 1996). Helen of Troy's abduction and the kidnapping of Julius Cesar for ransom in 51BC are also historically relevant events involving hostage scenarios.

In post-biblical times, pirates of many nationalities have used hostages to obtain money or goods from third parties who valued the lives of those being held captive. This form of hostage-taking by pirates preceded the instrumental use of innocent captives by modern terrorists for social, political, or religious goals. During the middle ages, hostages were taken by European nations to enforce the compliance of enemy nationals during the war. This conceptualisation of hostage-taking links to the origin of the word "hostage" which is derived from the Latin *hostis* meaning "guest". This derivation demonstrates the highly frequent political and military use of hostages in the past, whereby political authorities or generals would legally agree to hand over one or usually several hostages in the custody of the other side, as guarantee of good faith in the observance of obligations. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, hostage-taking for this purpose continued, with hostages being taken by one nation to coerce another. In 1942, for example, Germany took two million French hostages after the division of France in order to ensure compliance of the French people. From this conceptualisation of the hostage-taking incident, responses to such events have developed and evolved into what is now known as hostage or crisis negotiation.

The impetus for the development of modern hostage negotiation is debatable; however, one particular incident is cited by many law enforcement professionals as providing the driving force for the development of techniques to de-escalate crisis situations often involving hostages. This incident is commonly referred to as the "Munich Massacre" that occurred at the 1972 Olympic Games. During this incident, a group of Palestinian terrorists invaded an Olympic dormitory and seized 11 Israeli athletes as hostages. The incident was dealt with via force; and

once the terrorists political demands had been refused, the Munich police resorted to firepower, resulting in the death of 22 people: 1 policeman, 10 terrorists and all 11 of the hostages. This tragedy highlighted the distinct lack of protocol or procedure to deal with crisis situations in a controlled way and result in limited death/harm to hostages. In the wake of this tragedy, international law enforcement agencies began to criticise the lack of effective crisis management techniques for hostage situations and began to explore new techniques which could be employed within such situations (Soskis and Van Zandt 1986). Since then, several models of negotiation have been developed for use in hostage situations, based primarily on problem-solving approaches to response, management, and resolution of these incidents (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991, Lanceley 1999, McMains and Mullins 2001 and Webster 1998 cited in Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005).

In response to these tragic incidents, police agencies in the USA began implementing a “negotiate first” policy in dealing with both hostage-taking situations and perpetrators barricaded without hostages (Bolz 1979). This policy led to the development of specialised hostage negotiation teams that include a designated negotiator, tactical assault team (TAC), command structure, and support personnel (Fuselier 1981a) with the primary aim of resolution and guiding principle being to minimise and eliminate the loss of life (McMains and Mullins 2001).

### **2.1.2. Types of Hostage Situation**

Hostage negotiation as an entity evolved from the tragic result of the Munich Massacre in 1972 which has come to be known as an example of a ‘traditional hostage-taking incident’, however, research shows that hostage negotiation may be utilised within a variety of different scenarios and contexts. Literature which has examined the type of scenario which involves the deployment of negotiators has identified that while every situation has unique aspects, there are some general types of hostage situation that police typically encounter (Boltz, Dudonis, and Schultz 1996, McMains and Mullins 1996, Rogan 1997 and Russell and Biegel 1990). These data have been used to create classification systems or typologies of crisis event situations. Various authors have created different typologies or classification systems; an early system devised by Hassell (1975), for example, established that hostage-takers fell into one of four basic categories including a) *emotionally disturbed*, b) *criminal trapped in the commission of crime*, c) *prisoner in a revolt situation*, and d) *politically motivated*; with the ratios of each subtype varying internationally in accordance with more common types of crime.

More recently, Call (1996, 2003) has devised a more complex classification system based on hostage-taker typology. He states that there are six major types of hostage-taker: the

*emotionally disturbed, political extremist, religious fanatics, criminals, prisoner inmates* and a combination of two or more of the above. Call goes further by identifying multiple subtypes under these typologies. For example, under the emotionally disturbed category there are seven subtypes: *brain damaged, elderly/senile, depressed, paranoid, schizophrenic, substance abuser* and *personal/family disputes* (Fuselier 1988, Gist and Perry 1985, Kennedy and Dyer 1992, Pearce 1977 and Strentz 1986). Similarly, the political extremist can be further sub-divided into subtypes. Knutson (1980), for example, makes reference to the *reluctant captor* and the *deliberate hostage-taker* and suggests the former to be dreamers and philosophers whose violent act was part of an attempt to right a wrong and who indicated that they were unwilling to kill their hostages, whereas the latter, on the other hand is described as more instrumental in the act and is perfectly willing to kill his or her captives to obtain their perceived goal. The religious fanatic can also be further subdivided, dependent on the particular cult/religion's internal mores and values (Cooper 1981). Further subcategories also exist amongst the criminal and prison inmate typologies, with Call (2003) making particular reference to the subtype of criminal psychopath.

In addition to the development of typologies, research has identified a variety of common characteristics exhibited within crisis/hostage situations within the USA. This research has enabled a picture of the "common hostage situation" to be constructed, providing hostage negotiators with a model which conceptualises the characteristics of the hostage situation, including details relating to the hostage-taker's motivation, behaviour, and the resolution of the incident. Head (1990), for example, analysed 3330 incidents of domestic hostage-taking that occurred between 1973 and 1982 and created a database entitled Hostage Event Analytic Database (HEAD). Head identified ten common characteristics associated with domestic hostage-taking which included:

1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the criminal or prison inmate typology (52%).
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators were the political extremist/religious fanatic (21%) followed by the emotionally disturbed (18%).
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (25% below age 30), white (61%), male (80%) and acted alone.
4. The usual number of victims captured was one (47%) or two (15%).
5. The most common location for the crisis event was a form of transportation (35%) followed by a home (20%).
6. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was political/publicity (33%) followed by money (23%).

7. The most common weapon used was a firearm (31%).
8. The most common event duration was one day or less (53%).
9. The majority of incidents were non-lethal (87%). However, hostages were more at risk for injury than the hostage-taker.
10. The majority of incidents were negotiated (64%).

Similar research conducted at a later date by Feldman (2001) in Kentucky looked at 120 hostage/barricade incidents, and identified seven characteristic factors:

1. The majority of the perpetrators fit the personal/family dispute typology (31%).
2. The second largest typology of perpetrators was criminal (26%) followed by the emotionally disturbed (19%).
3. The majority of perpetrators were young (below age 30), male and acted alone.
4. The most common motivation for the perpetrator's actions was an interpersonal dispute complicated by an underlying psychiatric disorder as well as alcohol or drug use.
5. The most common weapon used was a firearm (75%).
6. The majority of incidents ended in injury or death to either some of the hostages or to the perpetrator (88%).
7. The majority of incidents were negotiated, but negotiations were successful in less than 40% of the time.

These findings illustrate the vast disparity in the characteristics of hostage/crisis incidents and suggest that although similarities exist, there is no one “typical hostage scenario”. This concept is also echoed within the literature focusing on classification systems and typologies of hostage situations, whereby systems and typologies are vast and disparate, with little convergence in terms of an established and agreed upon classification system. It is clear that the classification system is dependent upon the type and source of data which are used to devise it, i.e. crisis situations will vary from state to state and country to country, so it is likely that situations will arise that cannot be neatly slotted into one of the typologies. The nature of “crisis” situations dictates that no two scenarios will be exactly the same; therefore, the database of encountered crisis situations is ever expanding. As such, typologies and classification systems should be interpreted with caution, and negotiators must be careful not to respond to the situation as a specific type of crisis incident, as opposed to a unique crisis scenario which may develop in any number of possible permutations.

Interestingly, despite the terminology used to describe the phenomenon, hostage negotiation does not always involve hostages. While early research focused on what is referred

to as the “first generation of negotiations” whereby negotiators were typically responding to terrorist hostage situations with political or religious motivations, the “second generation of negotiations”, marked by the early 1980s demonstrated a clear shift in the types of incidents of greatest concern to the law enforcement agencies which involved emotionally disturbed individuals and trapped criminals. Gist and Perry (1985), for example, found that the majority incidents which involved negotiators being called out were those including domestic, barricaded and suicidal incidents. Research conducted by McMains (1988a cited in Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005) reflected this shift by revealing that less than 18% of the incidents dealt with by negotiation over a five year period in 15 of the largest U.S. cities actually involved hostages. In line with this, Hatcher et al. (1998) noted a change in the type of typical scenario with negotiators working more with emotionally disturbed individuals, trapped criminals and domestic incidents and less with terrorists and prisoners. Contrary to public misconception, negotiators are often being faced by people in the midst of an escalated personal crisis, as this quote from Noesner and Webster (1997: 13) demonstrates:

*“The majority of critical incidents to which law enforcement responds involve subjects who are motivated primarily by emotional needs...[and] these incidents may involve jilted lovers, disgruntled employees, or students, mood-disordered or psychotic subjects, suicidal individuals, or individuals, who, for whatever reason, believe that they or their beliefs have been threatened or demeaned by society”.*

This demonstrates the varied and diverse nature of the role of the negotiator and provides an explanation for the change in terminology from “*hostage negotiation*” to “*crisis negotiation*” (McMains and Mullins 1996) which is now commonly accepted amongst the negotiation literature.

### **2.1.3. The Role of Mental Health in Crisis Situations**

A key theme running throughout the literature highlights the increasingly common occurrence of crisis incidents involving individuals suffering from mental health problems. Individuals with mental health problems are disproportionately represented within those identified as hostage-takers. For example, an early analysis of 245 hostage-taking incidents reported to the FBI by USA law enforcement agencies from 1976 to 1983 revealed that 145 of these incidents (59%) were attributed to individuals who were apparently suffering from a mental health disorder or who were experiencing emotional turmoil arising from personal problems or emotional disputes (Strentz 1985 cited in Soskis and Van Zandt 1986). Similarly, Miron and Goldstein (1979) found that the majority of people who take hostages suffer from

some form of psychopathology, with hostage-takers typically falling into four diagnostic categories: *paranoid schizophrenia*, *bipolar disorder* (depressed type), *antisocial personality* and “*inadequate personality*” (Borum and Strentz 1992). The exact prevalence of mentally disturbed individuals committing hostage-taking incidents still remains unclear with research reporting varied prevalence rates. Research focusing specifically on the prevalence of emotionally disturbed individuals as perpetrators varies from 52% (Fuselier 1981a and Strentz 1987) to 88% (Butler, Leitenberg, and Fuselier 1993) with variability perhaps attributable to the size of the agency and multiple definitions of “emotionally or mentally disturbed”. It should be noted, that this correlation between hostage-taking incidents and the prevalence of mental health problems cannot be directly translated into a causal link. Specifically, while a high proportion of those involved in hostage incidents may be more likely to suffer from mental health problems or emotional difficulties, this does not mean that a high proportion of those suffering from mental health problems are likely to take hostages.

Historically, both psychologists and psychiatrists have been used to contribute to the development of negotiation techniques. In the 1970s, Psychiatrist Mulder (1976 cited in Hatcher et al. 1998) acted as a consultant to The Hague in the Netherlands and Scott (1976 cited in Hatcher et al. 1998) adopted a similar role in the UK, advising Scotland Yard. A number of psychologists also contributed to this field throughout the 70s and 80s (Bell et al. 1989, Miron and Goldstein 1979 and Stratton 1978). The role of mental health professionals as advisors within crisis incidents is, therefore, not a new one. However, the utilisation of such mental health professionals has developed in line with the increasingly prevalent role of mental health within such incidents. The existence of psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers within an advisory capacity is well established within hostage negotiation protocol in many parts of the USA. Researchers estimate that between 30% and 58% of agencies with a crisis/hostage negotiation team utilise a mental health consultant in some fashion and 88% of these tend to be psychologists as opposed to other mental health professionals (Butler, Leitenberg and Fuselier 1993, Delprinho and Bahn 1988 and Fuselier 1988). Utilisation of such advisors is also in existence within the UK, although on a much smaller scale. This acceptance of the usefulness of psychological knowledge/input within hostage negotiation teams is a demonstration and public acknowledgement of the role of mental health within crisis situations. Although the efficacy of mental health consultation within crisis/hostage situations has not been researched extensively, research conducted by Butler, Leitenberg and Fuselier (1993) found that the use of a mental health consultant to assess the perpetrator resulted in fewer hostage incidents leading to the serious injury or death of a hostage, more negotiated surrenders, and fewer incidents in which the SWAT team had to enter to arrest the suspect. Similar support for the use of mental



health professionals is also exhibited anecdotally by many of the major city police departments in the USA, including the Los Angeles, New York City, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Houston Police Departments, who report highly effective outcomes from their crisis/hostage negotiation teams with deaths to hostages and hostage-takers extremely rare (McMains 1988b).

The role of mental health within crisis situations is echoed by the terminology of “crisis” itself. And research indicates that mental health is likely to play a role in at least a proportion of the hostage or crisis incidents that negotiators are involved with for some time to come. This concept is resonated in line with the rising prevalence of mental health problems within society today, with recent research demonstrating a 46.6% lifetime prevalence rate of DSM-IV classified disorders - a figure which is higher than in previous cohorts (Kessler et al. 2005). These findings implicate and highlight the need for continued involvement of mental health professionals as advisors within the negotiation arena for the foreseeable future.

#### **2.1.4. Negotiation Strategy**

Crisis negotiation has come to be known as “one of law enforcement's most effective tools” and this statement is consistently supported by the successful resolution of tens of thousands of hostage, barricade, attempted suicide, and kidnapping cases throughout the world (Regini 2002: 1). Such a contention is also supported by data from the Hostage Barricade database System (HOBAS) established by the Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) of the FBI. HOBAS serves as a database on hostage/crisis incidents through the systematic collection of cases (post incident) from law enforcement agencies across the USA. An analysis of HOBAS data from 2002-2003 indicated that approximately 82% of reported incidents were resolved without death or injury to the subject or the victim (Flood 2003). Similarly, a considerable number of case studies and anecdotal reports further attest to the efficacy of crisis negotiation (see McMains and Mullins 2001 and Rogan, Hammer and Van Zandt 1997). However, despite this excellent success rate, the rapidly increasing phenomenon of hostage-taking continues to challenge law enforcement professionals worldwide (Call 1996, McMains and Mullins 2001 and Romano 1998). For this reason, it is essential to establish what makes a negotiator effective, and what strategies are effective within such situations, so as to improve the success rate of negotiations and minimise the loss of life for both hostages and hostage-takers.

The art of crisis negotiation has been described by some as a “complex verbal dance between the negotiator and the subject” (Kelln and McMurtry 2007: 30). Crisis negotiation exists on a spectrum of infinite situational variables, with scenarios and ‘key players’ shifting over time with each contextual change. Some situations involve hostages, while others do not. Some subjects are suicidal, some are homicidal, and in some cases the subject may display both

types of behaviour. Some incidents involve weapons or explosives, whereas others are deemed unmanageable by the barricade location or pragmatic logistics associated with the scenario. Given the infinite range of possible situations that may be encountered by hostage (crisis) negotiators internationally, it is unrealistic to think that specific strategies for each situation can be learned by the negotiator. Instead, what is required is a flexible working model of negotiation that can be adapted to each individual scenario, providing the best possible outcome for the crisis situation. In essence, a good working model of crisis negotiation must be flexible enough that it applies to virtually any situation regardless of the context, subject state-of-mind, or other constraints (Kelln and McMurtry 2007).

Although every hostage/crisis incident is different, and involves an infinite number of variables, research conducted by a number of researchers has managed to establish a basic consensual protocol for handling hostage crises at a macro level, as a result of training and experience (Call 2003, Greenstone 1995, 2005, Lanceley 1999, McMains 2002, 2003, McMains and Mullins 1996, 2002, Miller 2005, 2006, Noesner 1999, Noesner and Dolan 1992, Noesner and Webster 1997, Slatkin 1996, 2005 and Wind 1995). The basic elements of this protocol include:

- Isolate and contain the hostage-taker and secure the perimeter to keep the hostage-taker in and unauthorised persons out.
- Provide for scene control. This may involve mobilising medical service, controlling the local traffic, dealing with the media, and keeping the surrounding community sufficiently informed to protect their safety.
- Establish some form of communication with the hostage-taker, such as line phone, cell phone, bullhorn - even digital pager or email - as soon as possible.
- Employ socialised/pseudo-therapeutic communication strategies, such as rapport building and active listening.
- Respond appropriately to demands and deadlines, with the overriding goal being the safety of the hostages.
- Structure the surrender ritual and resolution of the crisis carefully and know when to employ a tactical response, if absolutely necessary.
- Utilise operational and stress debriefing techniques on hostages, hostage-takers, and crisis team members as appropriate.

This protocol provides an overall blueprint for managing the situation from both a tactical and negotiator perspective. Similarly, research has addressed the negotiation procedure on a more

micro level by exploring the strategies that have been used and have been found to be successful within the negotiation procedure. As a result of this, these strategies have been adopted by law enforcement professionals within their roles as negotiators with the aim of reducing/minimising the loss of life during such crisis situations. Many of these strategies have been born out of models of crisis negotiation. Some of the key models of negotiation are outlined below.

## **2.2. Models of Negotiation**

### **2.2.1. Principled Negotiation**

One of the earliest models of negotiation was proposed by Fisher and Ury (1981) and expanded upon by Fisher, Ury, and Patton in 1991. Principled negotiation focuses on what is referred to as an “interest-based” approach to conflict resolution. The model advocates four fundamental principles of negotiation: 1) separate the person from the problem, 2) focus on mutual interests instead of individual positions, 3) generate options for mutual gain, and 4) insist on using objective criteria to judge the effectiveness of the agreement. The initial principle works on the basis that people tend to become personally involved with the problem and therefore will often interpret outsiders’ responses as personal attacks. The second principle works on the basis that good agreements focus on the parties’ interests, rather than their positions. When individuals are focused on defining a problem in terms of positions, there will inevitably be one party who will “lose” the dispute. In contrast to this, when a problem is defined in terms of the parties’ individual underlying interests it is often possible to find a solution which satisfies both parties’ interests. The third principle focuses on the generation of options and is based on the concept that generation of options that will mutually benefit both parties will result in eventual successful resolution of the conflict.

The final principle relates to the importance of using objective criteria to judge the effectiveness of the agreement. This principle is particularly salient when parties’ interests are directly opposed. In such situations, Fisher and Ury’s (1981) model proposes that individuals should develop objective criteria which is appropriate for the situation and should use this criteria to govern agreements and resolution of the conflict. Examples of such criteria include scientific findings, professional standards, or legal precedent and adherence to such criteria helps to preserve the relationship between the parties, an aspect which is vital when negotiating crisis situations. This early model of negotiation was seen to be influential and provided negotiators with a framework for the utilisation of problem-solving techniques to respond to, manage and resolve crisis incidents. Although this model provided a useful tool for early negotiators, it has been critiqued for its lack of applicability to many crisis situations due to the

prerequisite for both parties involved to be functioning in a rational cognitive state. Many of the principles outlined by Fisher and Ury (1981) simply could not be implemented with an individual who was suffering from a severe mental illness or emotional conflict, as they would be unable to go through the processes outlined in a rational manner.

### **2.2.2. The "Getting Past No" Model of Negotiation**

Ury (1991) built upon previous work within the conflict resolution arena by developing a five-step model for people engaged in difficult negotiations and applied this to a variety of settings, including that of hostage negotiation. The first step is entitled "*Don't React - Go to the Balcony*" and Ury describes this stage as a shift from the negotiator as a participant in the process to an observer in the negotiation process. Ury utilises the analogy of the negotiator acting as a third party standing on a balcony watching actors perform a play on a stage, rather than being part of the play themselves. The negotiator needs to avoid any form of anger, confrontation and emotion, and this can be achieved by shifting the dynamics of the negotiator from participant to observer. The second step is entitled "*Stepping to Their Side*" and refers to the requirement for the negotiator to paint the hostage-taker in the light of an ally rather than an opponent. By making the subject a partner in the process and making them perceive that they are working together to form a resolution, this is more likely to result in successful peaceful resolution of the crisis situation. Echoing the recurring theme running throughout many of the crisis negotiation models, this step can be achieved by utilising active listening skills, such as mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labelling and summarising.

The third step is entitled "*Change the Game*" and refers to the concept of reframing subject demands so as to avoid rejecting the hostage-taker's demands which is likely to result in resistance. This step can be achieved by utilising open-ended questions which force the subject to think about possible solutions and alternatives, deflecting attacks from the subject and reframing problems to reveal future solutions. The fourth stage of Ury's model is entitled "*Build a Golden Bridge*" and this essentially relates to the negotiator's attempt to make it easy for the subject to say "yes" instead of "no". The negotiator has to make the hostage-taker a willing partner in the negotiating process by involving them in the decision-making process. If the negotiator attempts to force compliance, this is likely to result in resistance and continuation of unrealistic demands. Consequently, the aim is for the negotiator to help generate ideas from the subject to help them feel part of the process and encourage collaboration. It has also been suggested that in getting the hostage-taker to say yes, this has a mutually beneficial effect, as it benefits the negotiation process by encouraging successful resolution, but it also helps the

subject to save face - an element which plays a role in the successful resolution of crisis incidents (Mullins 2002).

The final stage in the model is entitled “*Make it Hard to Say No*” which expands upon the fourth stage by not only increasing the subject's desire to say “yes”, but also making it harder for the subject to say “no”, thereby increasing the chances of successful resolution of the incident. This model provides a toolbox of techniques to utilise within crisis situations, but again, relies on some element of cognitive rational processing on behalf of both parties, an aspect which is often lacking within the hostage-taker mentality. In line with the recurring theme of emotionally disturbed or mentally disordered individuals involved in crisis incidents, it is likely that these individuals will require a different negotiation approach, which is less systematic or hierarchical and more crisis-intervention based. Once cognitions and rationalisation have been restored somewhat, more cognitively based problem solving techniques, such as those discussed above can be employed.

### **2.2.3. The Crisis Bargaining Model**

Donohue et al. (1991) utilise a different model to describe strategies used by negotiators. Their model focuses on the type of bargaining that parties involved in the negotiation utilise and identifies and distinguishes between *crisis* (distributive) and *normative* (integrative) bargaining. The model incorporates the notion of both *relationship* (expressive) and *substantive* (material) issues being addressed with differing levels of preference at different stages throughout the negotiation process. The model works on the basis that the initial stages of negotiation tend to focus on relational issues, such as power, role, trust and status between police and hostage-takers. Once these issues become resolved, more attention or weight gets placed on substantive issues to resolve the problem. In essence, crisis bargaining is about relationships and normative bargaining is more focused on resolving material issues. Donohue et al. (1991) apply this model to hostage negotiation strategies by trying to move hostage-takers away from crisis bargaining and towards normative bargaining in order to resolve the crisis situation. Ideally, negotiation should progress in a step-wise manner from crisis to normative bargaining; however, Donohue and Roberto (1996) note that this is not always the case. Hammer and Rogan (1997) make a similar distinction in their communication-based negotiation model whereby they identify instrumental, relational, and identity issues within a negotiation, and specify the need for negotiators to steer hostage-takers away from crisis (i.e., relational and identity) bargaining modes (where relational and identity issues are prevalent) to normative bargaining modes (where instrumental needs are paramount), which is more likely to result in successful resolution of the crisis situation. Donohue et al.'s (1991) model focuses less on

specific techniques and more on adapting the style of negotiation to the appropriate needs of the perpetrator (i.e., by focusing on crisis or normative bargaining, respectively).

#### **2.2.4. The S.A.F.E. Model of Crisis Negotiation**

The S.A.F.E. model was developed by Hammer and Rogan (1997) and forms a key part of many negotiator toolboxes today. The model was devised on the basis of a combination of behavioural science research and insights of numerous operationally active crisis negotiators. The model creates a specific framework for de-escalating and resolving crisis situations by incorporating a variety of effective strategies within a communication plan to influence the behaviour of the subject (e.g., hostage-taker, suicidal individual) in a positive manner. The S.A.F.E. framework assesses and tracks what the authors refer to as four key “triggers” for de-escalating crisis situations. The authors propose that by assessing and monitoring these triggers, negotiators can adopt the appropriate strategy to respond to the situation which is more likely to result in a positive resolution. The four triggers are described as: “*Substantive Demands*”, “*Attunement*”, “*Face*” and “*Emotion*” with each functioning as a predominant ‘frame’ within which the subject and negotiator communicatively interact as a crisis incident unfolds.

The initial frame makes reference to *Substantive Demands* whereby the instrumental interests and needs expressed by the parties are identified. The S.A.F.E. model indicates that when the subject is in a substantive demands frame, the negotiator’s goal is to bargain or problem-solve with the subject to achieve a peaceful surrender. The second frame - *Attunement*, refers to the relational trust which has been established between the subject and the negotiator. The S.A.F.E. model states that the negotiator’s goal in this frame is to engage in cooperative behaviour to build trust and liking (without compromising safety or security concerns). This frame is akin to rapport building within the therapeutic relationship. The third frame - *Face*, refers to the projected self-image of the subject and the model proposes that the negotiator’s goal in this frame is to validate the face needs of the subject in order to promote face-honouring and de-escalation of the situation. The final frame - *Emotional Distress* refers to intense, negative emotions that compromise an individual's ability to cope with the stress of a crisis situation. The goal of the negotiator in this frame is to help subjects cope with their emotional distress in a way that permits them to re-assess the situation and then influence the subject towards a cooperative resolution.

The focus of the S.A.F.E. model refers to appropriate identification of the subject's current dominant S.A.F.E. frame, appropriate matching of communication style to the S.A.F.E. frame of the subject, and then utilisation of strategies in order to effectively facilitate resolution of the needs expressed by each frame or shift to another S.A.F.E. frame in order to de-escalate

the situation. Rogan and Hammer (1997) propose that the S.A.F.E. model offers a comprehensive approach for assessing, evaluating and developing effective response strategies to subject's behaviour in crisis incidents. They propose that the model should be incorporated into the toolbox utilised by crisis negotiation teams (Hammer 1997).

#### **2.2.5. The Behavioral Influence Stairway Model**

One of the most recent models of crisis negotiation is that of the Behavioral Influence Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi (2007 cited in Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008). The BISM is a model of behaviour change grounded in the principles of active listening that was adapted from a model developed by the FBI/CNU (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005). The BISM highlights the importance of the relationship –building process involving the negotiator and the subject in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis situation (Noesner and Webster 1997). This relationship has been found to be a key element for the successful resolution of both barricaded and crisis situations (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005). The BISM shares parallel concepts with models of Motivational Interviewing, with emphasis being placed on the utilisation of skills such as *empathy*, *rapport* and *active listening* in order to facilitate behaviour change. In line with this, the BISM consists of four elements: 1) *active listening skills*, 2) *empathy*, 3) *rapport*, and 4) *behavioural influence*. Progression from stage 1 to stage 4 occurs by utilising these skills (underpinned by active listening throughout) with the aim of building a relationship with the subject in order to facilitate behaviour change. The key element of active listening has been shown to facilitate behaviour change and crisis resolution (Lanceley 1999 and Noesner and Webster 1997) and hence justifies this underpinning. Research indicates that as this process is utilised effectively, the probability of positive behaviour change increases, thus becoming a building block towards the successful resolution of the crisis situation (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005). This statement is supported via anecdotal evidence whereby the heuristic value of the BISM has been documented in the resolution of a wide range of highly volatile crisis situations (Flood 2003); as such it demonstrates the applicability and efficacy of the BISM within the negotiation arena.

#### **2.2.6. The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications**

The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation was devised by Taylor (2002), who highlighted the complex nature of negotiation focusing on levels of interaction, motivational emphases, and behaviour intensity within negotiations. The model was compiled by utilising qualitative data from nine resolved cases of hostage negotiation in the USA with results of

analysis via nonmetric multidimensional scaling solution revealing clear empirical support for the cylindrical nature of communication behaviour (Taylor 2002). The model proposes there to be three general levels of interaction behaviour during negotiations ranging from *avoidance*, to *distributive*, to *integrative*, a concept which is analogous to the *crisis* vs. *normative* bargaining conceptualisation proposed by Donohue et al. (1991) and Donohue and Roberto (1996). Taylor's model proposes that negotiators aim to move subjects through these levels progressively in order to move subjects away from non-active participation (*avoidant*) interaction through to a degree of cooperation which may be based on self-interest (*distributive*) through to eventual normative and cooperative communication (*integrative*) that will result in reconciliation of the parties' respective divergent interests. Secondly, the model proposes the existence of three different motivational emphases within negotiation behaviour, and classifies these as *Instrumental*, *Relational*, and *Identity* themes. The first theme refers to behaviour which is linked to the subject's instrumental needs which can be described as tangible commodities or wants. The second theme refers to behaviour which is linked to the relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; and the third theme refers to the negotiating parties' concern for self-preservation or “face” (Goffman 1967).

Finally, the model proposes the existence of a third variable within negotiations, which Taylor refers to the intensity of negotiation behaviour. This concept relates to the degree to which intense behaviours are utilised within negotiations, with research indicating that a speaker's attitude towards a concept deviates more from neutrality with more frequent use of obscure metaphors, profanity, and dramatic changes in intonation (Bowers 1963, Donohue 1981 and Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1999). Similar research has shown that the use of such intense behaviours has a detrimental effect on negotiation, increasing the tendency for conflict and for negotiation break-down (Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton 1999). The strength of Taylor's model lies in its conceptualisation of negotiation behaviour as inter-related communication components, rather than discrete, mutually exclusive categories. As such, the cylindrical model avoids the criticism of early, static style-based frameworks for negotiation as it enables both researchers and negotiators to consider the changing pattern of communication behaviour across the whole negotiation process (Taylor 2002). Taylor's model provides a detailed micro-level analysis of crisis behaviour and provides a unique insight into the multi-dimensional existence of negotiation behaviour.

### **2.2.7. Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEPS) Model**

Kelln and McMurtry (2007) have recently devised the Structured Tactical Engagement Process Model. The model provides a framework for both understanding and influencing a



barricaded subject's behaviour in order to reach a peaceful resolution by utilising principles from the Transtheoretical Stages of Change Model (Prochaska and DiClemente 1986). Kelln and McMurtry propose that in line with any form of behaviour, a crisis situation has to go through four stages in order to reach successful resolution. The stages consist of *Precontemplation* (Step 0), *Contemplation* (Step 1), *Preparation* (Step 2) and *Action* (Step 3), with the final stage resulting in behavioural change that results in successful and peaceful resolution. The authors propose that a variety of skills/techniques can be utilised in order to help guide subjects through these four stages. The initial stage of any negotiation is characterised by the *Precontemplation* stage, whereby the subject is unwilling to acknowledge that the situation or their behaviour needs to change. The subject tends to be uncooperative and unrealistic at this point in the negotiation and it is the role of the negotiator to steer the subject away from this stage and into a *Contemplative* stage whereby they can begin to contemplate a change in behaviour or situation.

Research has implicated the role of *rapport* in facilitating behaviour change (Miller and Rollnick 2002) and application of this finding to the negotiation procedure indicates the benefit of the formation of a connection between the subject and the negotiator. As this connection grows, the individual is less likely to be defensive and more open to suggestion (Kelln and McMurtry 2007) and behaviour change becomes more likely. Once rapport has been established and the subject has moved from Step 0 to Step 1, the subject is likely to be realising that their behaviour and the current situation needs to change, but they are not quite sure how to go about implementing this. It is, therefore, the negotiator's job at this stage to gently affirm the need for a peaceful resolution while increasing the subject's confidence to move into Step 2. Once the subject is committed to working with the negotiator and his/her confidence has increased, the subject moves to the penultimate phase of Step 2 - *Preparation*. At step 2, the subject has identified that there is a problem and that their behaviour needs to change, and they are beginning to consider and possibly commit to a resolution. During Step 2, the negotiator's role becomes more proactive and directive with the key role being problem-solving in order to develop an appropriate exit strategy. The negotiator must then try to maintain a degree of motivation and confidence in the subject in order for them to progress to the final Step - *Action*. During the final stage, the subject should be carrying out the agreed-upon plan for peaceful resolution of the situation. It is vital that the negotiator remains supportive and directive throughout the final step, until resolution has been achieved.

The STEPS model incorporates many of the concepts of the transtheoretical model of change (Prochaska and DiClemente 1986) and motivational interviewing in order to facilitate and encourage behaviour change in an individual. There are parallels between the use of such

techniques in counselling, whereby active listening skills will be utilised in order to establish rapport and positive therapeutic relationships with clients (Evans et al. 1989 and Hersen and Van Hasselt 1998) which, in turn, increases the likelihood of behaviour change.

### **2.3. Negotiation Models: Synopsis and Comparison**

This chapter reviews/describes a range of different models of negotiation, with some having originally been developed out of the general negotiation (i.e. business negotiation) arena and others having been developed for more specific utilisation within the hostage/crisis negotiation arena. The principled negotiation model (i.e. the Harvard approach) (Fisher and Ury 1981) and the “getting past no” model of negotiation (Ury 1991) were not developed specifically for utilisation within hostage and crisis negotiation, but instead utilise principles/techniques that are broad enough to be applied to almost any type of conflict. As such, their principles (whilst developed for people engaged in difficult negotiations) have been applied to hostage and crisis negotiation settings. These models have stepped away from the traditional positioning negotiation approaches by placing more emphasis on parties’ interests (i.e. an interest-based approach), as opposed to a position-based approach which focuses on the status of each party in terms of winning/losing the negotiation. In doing so, principled negotiation tries to reframe the negotiation process so that both parties win, and both parties’ interests are fulfilled, as opposed to one party being the “winner” and the other, the “loser”. These initial models differ from the more traditional models of HCNn discussed later in the paper, as they have a more normative (i.e. integrative) focus, whereby there is an expectation that the subject will be able to engage in problem-solving in a calm and rational manner (which is often not the case when someone is experiencing a state of conflict or crisis). The latter models (i.e. the crisis bargaining model (Donohue et al. 1991); the S.A.F.E. model (Hammer and Rogan 1997); the BISM (Vecchi 2007 cited in Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008); the cylindrical model (Taylor 2002); and the STEPS model (Kelln and McMurtry 2007)) appear to have been developed with a contextual backdrop of the behavioural and emotional context of crisis/hostage scenarios and as such tend to identify the need to address crisis (i.e. distributive) needs prior/in addition to addressing normative (i.e. integrative) needs.

The majority of these models suggest that crisis (i.e. typically relational) issues need to be addressed first, prior to attempting to deal with substantive needs/specific demands, suggesting that forming a relationship between the negotiator and subject is a precursor to being able to deal with more substantive issues/engage in rational problem-solving. The latter models, whilst focusing more on relational issues, also tend to identify the emotional arousal and

conflict/crisis state that subjects are likely to be experiencing and address these issues as important in successfully resolving the incident. The BISM, for example, identifies the importance of active listening in terms of subjects being given space to talk about their current situation and what has led them to this crisis point; the S.A.F.E. model (Hammer and Rogan 1997) identifies “emotion” as it’s last frame within the model and highlights the importance of the negotiator helping subjects to cope with emotional distress that may be blocking rational thought in relation to their situation; the crisis bargaining model (Donohue et al. 1991) differentiates between the need for negotiators to address both crisis (distributive) and normative (integrative) needs, with crisis bargaining often taking precedence; the cylindrical model (Taylor 2002) equally identifies the need for subjects to progress through from distributive to integrative behaviour whereby initial dialogue/interaction tends to focus on subject self-interest and latter dialogue focusing on more cooperative (integrative) communication; and lastly, the STEPS model (Kelln and McMurty 2007) also focuses on building a relationship between the subject and negotiator as a tool to move subjects through from pre-contemplation to action in relation to behaviour change, further emphasising the importance of relational issues within the hostage and crisis negotiation setting. Broadly speaking, the latter models tend to take a more pseudo-therapeutic approach to hostage and crisis negotiation, with the emphasis being on crisis intervention, de-escalating emotion and building relationships between the two parties, whereas the first two models tend to take a more pragmatic and business-orientated approach that may not necessarily meet the emotionally-driven and multi-faceted situational context presented by hostage or crisis incidents.

## **2.4. Conclusion & Future Directions**

It is clear from the variety of models which have been devised to account for effective negotiation strategies that there is no singular theoretical blueprint which can be adhered to in order to achieve successful resolution of crisis situations. This toolbox or library of negotiation strategies and techniques has been built up via a combination of operationally successful negotiations and academic research and provide a set of resources which negotiators can refer to and adopt within their roles. It seems prudent to suggest that a combination of strategies or techniques may be useful depending on the circumstances of the crisis situation.

It is also important to note that the models discussed above relate specifically to the culture/society in which they were devised and as such may not be directly applicable cross-culturally. The majority of the research on crisis negotiation has been conducted in the USA and has particular relevance to countries which adhere to the right to bear arms. As a result,

research within cultures and countries which do not bear arms may reveal interesting comparisons in terms of strategies and techniques which tend to be effective. Of particular interest is police hostage negotiation in the UK, an aspect which has not been investigated to date. An analysis of hostage negotiation within the UK would enable a model of negotiation to be devised providing a forum for cross-cultural comparison with USA-based models of crisis negotiation.

Finally, analysis of the literature focusing on crisis negotiation has identified a common theme linked to effectiveness/success of negotiations. This theme has tended to focus on the techniques and strategies employed by the negotiators during the crisis. An aspect which has not been explored in such detail is that of the characteristics, traits and skills which may enhance a negotiator's ability to perform effectively within their role. In line with this, it is proposed that certain fixed and malleable traits, such as *personality*, *coping style*, *decision-making style*, *emotion regulation* and *emotional intelligence*, may play a role in the ability of individuals to successfully perform and cope with their role. Future research in this direction would have implications for both the selection and training of operationally active negotiators and may yield a tool to help select appropriate individuals for the role, identify specific training needs, and enhance operational skills in order to increase the successful resolution of hostage (crisis) incidents internationally.

## **Chapter 3: Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation: The Potential Role of Negotiator Personality, Decision-Making Style, Coping Style and Emotional Intelligence on Negotiator Success**

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This chapter presents a theoretical review of the literature in relation to a number of specific psychological constructs that may play a role within HCN performance/success. This review is used to generate a specific rationale for the quantitative phase of the research by assessing four specific constructs that have been linked to success within a variety of different occupational roles. This review was published in the *International Journal of Emergency Mental Health* in 2012. This chapter includes the pre-print version of the manuscript and the reference list has been embedded within the overall reference section of the thesis.

Grubb, A. and Brown, S. (2012) 'Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation: The Potential Role of Negotiator Personality, Decision-Making Style, Coping Style and Emotional Intelligence on Negotiator Success'. *International Journal of Emergency Mental Health* 14 (1), 41-55

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## Chapter 4: Method

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This chapter describes the rationale for the study along with the aims, objectives and research questions that were identified from the literature reviews presented in the previous two chapters. The epistemological, ontological and methodological justification for the choice of methodology is then described, followed by a discussion of the design and procedure adopted.

### 4.1. Rationale for the Study

Whilst reviewing the literature, a variety of gaps were identified in relation to our understanding of HCNn as an entity, including understanding what makes someone an effective HCN and empirically documenting/understanding the phenomenon within the UK. Firstly, for example, whilst there is a wealth of literature focusing on the concept of a ‘police personality’ (Black 2000, Chibnall and Detrick 2003, Detrick and Chibnall, 2002, 2006, Lau et al. 2006 and Varela et al. 2004), there is limited published research that applies this concept to police officers who work specifically as HCNs. The current research, therefore aimed to identify whether the concept of a ‘HCN profile’ exists amongst UK-based negotiators by identifying whether they possess traits and characteristics that are unique to them as a group.

Secondly, the review of the literature identified a dearth of published literature in relation to the experiences of HCNs, and to the author’s knowledge, there is no published research that focuses directly on the experiences of negotiators within the UK. This extrapolated further to a lack of understanding in relation to the procedural and operational underpinnings of the discipline of HCNn, with a specific emphasis on the procedures and processes employed by UK police forces/constabularies to recruit, select, train and support their negotiators. Hence, the following aims, objectives and research questions were developed.

### 4.2. Aims and Objectives

Three main aims were identified. The first was to compare HCNs with police officers (non-negotiator trained) and students in order to identify the traits, characteristics and skills that were required and found in UK HCNs. The second was to investigate the processes involved in the recruitment, selection, training and support of HCNs in UK-based police forces nationally. The third aim was to provide an insight into UK HCNn by exploring the experiences of operationally active negotiators from a number of rural and urban/metropolitan police forces.

In addition to these aims, a number of specific objectives were developed:

1. To assess the traits, characteristics and skills required and utilised by UK HCNs, looking specifically at:
  - a. Personality
  - b. Coping Style
  - c. Cognitive Emotion Regulation
  - d. Decision-Making Style
  - e. Emotional Intelligence.
2. To establish whether UK HCNs possess a unique “HCN” profile.
3. To provide a description of:
  - a. The HCN recruitment and selection process
  - b. The training and CPD of HCNs
  - c. The skills required and utilised during the negotiation process
  - d. The process of decision-making throughout the negotiation
  - e. The support structures and coping strategies utilised by HCNs following involvement in crisis situations.
4. To produce a model of the overall processes involved in the recruitment/selection/training and operational support of UK HCNs.
5. To develop a model of UK HCNn by providing an insight into the experiences of police HCNs.
6. To make recommendations for changes in policy/practice in relation to the selection, training and support of operationally active HCNs in the UK.

### **4.3. Hypotheses for Quantitative Research Phase**

A number of hypotheses were developed on the basis of the extant literature. Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.2.) and Chapter 6 (6.3.) for details of the specific hypotheses tested within the quantitative research phase<sup>2</sup>.

### **4.4. Research Questions for Qualitative Research Phase**

Broadly, the qualitative research phase aimed to generate of theory of HCNn based on the experiences of operationally active UK HCNs. More specifically, this phase of the research aimed to address the following research questions:

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<sup>2</sup> Please note that the results from the quantitative phase of the research have been written up in the form of empirical papers and, as such, the relevant chapters are referred to in order to avoid duplication of the narrative in the method chapter.

1. How do you become a HCN and what type of processes are in place for the recruitment, selection and training of HCNs?
2. What is it like to be a HCN?
3. What types of experiences do HCNs have and how does this impact on their identity?
4. What types of incident do HCNs get deployed to and what are the characteristics of such incidents?
5. How do HCNs operate when deployed to hostage/crisis incidents?
6. How do HCNs successfully resolve hostage/crisis incidents?
7. Do HCNs experience stress and what systems are in place to support operationally active HCNs?

#### **4.5. Mixed Methodology Research Paradigm**

The aforementioned aims, objectives and research questions could have been addressed utilising a number of different quantitative and qualitative research paradigms. In my opinion, the initial aim (i.e. identification of the characteristics/traits possessed by HCNs) lent itself more intuitively to a quantitative cross-sectional comparative method utilising psychometrics to measure the constructs identified as salient by the review of the literature; however, this aspect could also have been explored in a different manner by asking negotiators to identify the characteristics and attributes that they feel were important for individuals to be successful negotiators utilising a questionnaire format. By utilising a cross-sectional comparison of negotiators with non-negotiator trained police officers, I felt that this would allow for a more valid identification of any observed differences between the two police samples, i.e. one which was grounded in statistical rigour.

Similarly, the second and third aims could have been addressed by utilising a number of different methodological paradigms. Some of the specific research questions (i.e. RQ5 and RQ6), for example, would have been most effectively addressed utilising recorded live negotiation scenario data/transcripts, however, at the time of the data collection, I was unable to gain approval to access such data from the National Negotiator Group (NNG)<sup>3</sup>. These research questions were still addressed utilising a semi-structured interview paradigm that allowed the other objectives and research questions to equally be addressed. The approach adopted, in my opinion, allowed for a broader analysis of the HCNn discipline and overall process to be performed, as it allowed for the development of a model that encompassed the entire, wider

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<sup>3</sup> The NNG “is a national network of negotiators who share best practice and are able to provide mutual support in seeking to bring incidents to a successful conclusion. The group is responsible for exercising strategic oversight of police negotiation” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).



negotiation process (i.e. from deployment to debrief), as opposed to focussing solely on the aspect of dialogue/negotiation that occurs between the subject and HCN. I felt that the research questions identified as a whole, therefore, lent themselves more intuitively and appropriately to a qualitative research paradigm, whereby the theory and conclusions drawn would be deduced on the basis of the experiences of the HCNs themselves. In light of these considerations, the study utilised a combination of both quantitative and qualitative data analysis in order to provide a diverse analytical perspective of HCNn within the UK.

#### **4.5.1. Justification for Mixed-Methodological Approach**

Quantitative analysis adheres to the positivist philosophical paradigm as opposed to the interpretive paradigm adopted by qualitative research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). The positivist paradigm states that the social world exists externally and is objectively determined and, therefore, its properties can be measured objectively; whereas the interpretive paradigm states that the world and reality are socially constructed and influenced by people (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 1991). Interpretivists, therefore, are concerned with subjective, qualitative phenomena that are context-rich and aim to understand what is happening in the totality of each situation (Godfrey and Hill 1985 and Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003). Inductive processes are typically used in order to generate theory within the qualitative paradigm; whereas quantitative methods primarily utilise deductive processes in order to test pre-specified concepts, constructs and hypotheses (Liouka 2007). Although historical conceptualisations have constructed quantitative and qualitative methods as opposing and polarised views, they are commonly used in conjunction with one another in order to provide complementary contributions to research studies. The two paradigms can be used separately or together in accordance with their abilities to provide the best answer to the research question (Van Maanen 1979); the latter being the approach adopted within the current study.

Whilst quantitative and qualitative analyses have their own sets of advantages and disadvantages, a mixed-methodological approach that combines the two can often enhance the quality of the findings pertaining to a set of research questions. Quantitative analysis benefits from the validity and reliability of its findings, whereby validated psychometric measures should produce valid and consistent results; whereas qualitative techniques and interpretations enable researchers to provide a deeper understanding of a specific phenomenon. By utilising a combination of the two methodological approaches, the current study provides an insight into the phenomenon of HCNn from two differing perspectives, thereby enhancing the overall contribution of this body of work to our understanding of HCNn as a multi-dimensional entity.

For the purposes of the current research, quantitative analyses were used in order to empirically compare HCNs with police officers and students on a number of different constructs. A deductive analytical approach was adopted in order to test a number of hypotheses that were generated on the basis of pre-existing literature within the field of police and occupational psychology. Psychometric tests were utilised in order to identify a profile for each sample with reference to these constructs and in order to quantifiably compare such profiles, numerical or statistical procedures needed to be applied. Parametric statistics provide us with a way of validly identifying whether individuals or a group of individuals are significantly different from each other on a number of scales, measures or constructs and, as such, parametric statistics were utilised in order to empirically test the generated hypotheses.

In addition to identifying whether HCNs were a unique or homogenous group (with respect to a number of specific psychological constructs), a qualitative approach was also adopted in order to provide an insight into UK HCNs and the experiences of individuals who resolve hostage and/or crisis situations. This aspect of the research required an inductive approach, whereby theory could be generated about a phenomenon that can only be explained by the experiences of those who are involved, in line with the *Sine Qua Non* concept advocated by the qualitative research movement (Bryman 1984).

#### ***4.5.1.1. Justification for the use of a quantitative statistical approach and psychometric tests utilised.***

The positivist paradigm asserts that scientific knowledge must be free of metaphysics in order to provide a credible and rational contribution to knowledge. Proponents of this paradigm state that such a contribution must, therefore, rely on pure observation that is unbiased by the interests, values, purposes and psychological schemata of the individuals who seek such knowledge (Howe 1988). The initial stage of this research adopted a positivist deductive approach in order to identify data and test hypotheses on a purely observable basis, whereby the traits, skills and characteristics of police HCNs were identified by comparison with police officers (non-negotiator trained) and students. The utilisation of quantitative data collection and analyses enabled objective and direct comparisons to be made between the three samples in order to provide a credible and quantifiable analysis of the characteristics possessed by UK HCNs.

Self-report questionnaires/psychometric tests have been utilised to measure psychological constructs for many years; with the use of objective self-reports being prevalent in most areas of the social sciences, including personality assessment (Schwarz 1999). Research consistently demonstrates that self-report measures are the most frequently utilised

method when it comes to measuring personality (Kagan 2007, Robins, Tracey and Sherman 2007 and Vazire 2006), leading some researchers to suggest that “the questionnaire is central to measuring constructs” (McDonald 2008: 76). Not only are self-report based assessments deemed to be an accurate measure of personality, they are perceived by some as being the most valid/accurate measure of personality due to the fact that the information is “coming directly from the horse’s mouth” (McDonald 2008: 77) and no one else has access to/is more aware of the information in relation to these aspects than oneself (Paulhus and Vazire 2007). Other advantages of the self-report method include practicality, ease of interpretation, causal force, and richness of information (Lucas and Baird 2007 and Swann, Chang-Schneider and McClarty 2007). If self-report scales are constructed well, there is a suggestion that they can predict a variety of outcomes with both ease and efficiency (Paulhus and Vazire 2007), two aspects that were further factored into the decision-making process in relation to the choice of methodology for phase one of the study. As such, and in light of the amount of data that needed to be collected, self-report psychometrics were deemed to be the most efficient and accurate method of measuring the identified psychological constructs.

The review of the literature identified five salient constructs that could potentially discriminate HCNs from non-negotiator trained officers: personality, coping style, cognitive emotion regulation, decision-making style and emotional intelligence, each of which could be measured by a number of different validated/pre-existing measures. Suitable validated measures for each construct were identified from the literature, considering the following variables: levels of reliability and validity, number of scale items<sup>4</sup> and financial costs. The following measures were initially identified on the basis of these criteria:

- Personality: The Occupational Personality Questionnaire 32 (OPQ32; Bartram et al. 2006)
- Coping Style: The Coping Skills Test-Revised (CST-R; Jerabek 2001)
- Cognitive Emotion Regulation: The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002)
- The General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire (GDMS; Scott and Bruce 1995)
- The Genos Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EII; Gignac 2008)

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<sup>4</sup> This aspect was considered in relation to the length of time required to complete the psychometric test battery in order to minimise potential boredom/fatigue effects.

The aforementioned measures all demonstrated good psychometric properties in relation to reliability and validity<sup>5</sup> and were either free or available to the researcher at a viable cost<sup>6</sup>. Soon after ethical approval had been granted for the project, the test publishers of the OPQ32 raised a concern in relation to the use of the measure by an individual who had not completed the Level B in Occupational Testing<sup>7</sup> training (despite the fact that my Director of Studies was qualified to this level). As such, a decision was made to change the personality measure to the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue and Kentle 1991). The BFI was freely available, demonstrated good levels of reliability and validity and was deemed to be adequate for the purposes of the current study. This change resulted in the loss of an impression management scale (that was built into the OPQ32) and, as such, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus 1988) was incorporated to measure and control for social desirability within the samples.

#### ***4.5.1.2. Justification for the use of Grounded Theory.***

The choice of methodology for any piece of research is dependent on the research problem or question being investigated and the best methodological fit (Bryman 1989 and Patton 1990). A number of qualitative analytical approaches could have been adopted to address the aforementioned research questions, including Discourse Analysis (DA) and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). DA was considered to be too restricted in terms of depth of analysis as it refers to the language utilised by participants, as opposed to the meaning attached to that language (Giles 2002). IPA was considered to be less appropriate as the aspect being explored has never been investigated and required the adoption of an inductive methodology and generation of new theory grounded in the data. Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1965, 1967) was, therefore, selected as the method of analysis on the basis of the need to generate new theory from data that has not previously been explored. In line with exploratory research, Grounded Theory also allowed for the reformulation and evolution of the research question during the course of the research (Glaser and Strauss 1967), enabling an iterative theory generation process to be achieved.

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<sup>5</sup> Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.5.3.) and Chapter 6 (6.4.3.) for reliability and validity data for the measures finally selected.

<sup>6</sup> The CST-R and EII were purchased by the researcher from the test publishers and paid for by the School of Psychological, Social and Behavioural Sciences via means of an internal funding request. All other psychometric tests were freely available.

<sup>7</sup> The researcher had completed the Level A in Occupational Testing at this stage and original discussions with the test publisher had indicated that this would be sufficient for utilisation of the psychometric for research purposes.

Grounded theory is a methodology that seeks to construct theory about issues of importance in peoples' lives (Glaser 1978, Glaser and Strauss 1967 and Strauss and Corbin 1998) and is referred to as an inductive methodology for gathering, synthesising, analysing and conceptualising data (Charmaz 2001). Engaging in grounded theory generation requires the researcher to address a set of common characteristics: theoretical sensitivity, theoretical sampling, treatment of the literature, constant comparative methods, coding, the meaning of verification, identifying the core category, memoing and diagramming, and the measure of rigor (McCann and Clark 2003). The methodology involves a hierarchical coding system whereby three forms of coding are employed: open, axial and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Essentially, open coding refers to the process of generating initial concepts from the data, axial coding to the development and linking of concepts into conceptual families, and selective coding to the formalising of these relationships into theoretical frameworks (Strauss and Corbin 1998). A different coding system refers to a similar distinction of coding including open, theoretical and constant comparative coding (Glaser 1992). Within this model, open coding is the initial step of theoretical analysis, where codes are developed from the data. This form of coding ends when a core category is located. Theoretical codes are described as "conceptual connectors" that develop relationships between categories and their properties (Glaser 1992: 38). And finally constant comparative coding describes the method of constant comparison that imbues both open and theoretical coding (Glaser 1992). Regardless of the adopted coding system, the process is dynamic and multi-layered, whereby data is collected and then analysed and then more data is collected and then analysed in order to pursue emerging themes from the first wave of analysis (Wasserman, Clair and Wilson 2009). This process is repeated until saturation of the data has been completed and there is no new conceptual information emerging from the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Saturation of the data can be reached with a combination of adapted questioning and theoretical sampling of new respondents in order to explore the conceptual issues raised in previous interviews, in line with the concept of allowing data collection and analysis to "blur and intertwine continually" (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 43).

The adoption of grounded theory in the current study enabled the researcher to build up a picture of a phenomenon that has never been academically explored within the UK. Qualitative analysis enabled a detailed description and model of the processes involved in HCNn to be established, along with provision of an insight into the experiences of operationally active police HCNs. This choice of methodology enabled the researcher to adopt the *Sine Qua Non* approach advocated by the qualitative movement (Bryman 1984), whereby HCNn has been

explored through the eyes of the actors involved and thus provided a rich and detailed explorative account of this social phenomenon.

#### **4.5.1.3. *Epistemological and ontological positioning/stance.***

Constructivist grounded theory resides in the interpretivist stance whereby priority is placed “on the phenomena of study and sees both data and analysis as created from shared experiences and relationships with participants” (Charmaz 2006: 130). In line with the concept of the importance of developing a relationship between the HCN and subject within HCNn, I felt that development of the relationship between myself and the interviewee played a salient role in the theory generation by allowing the interviewee to feel at ease and to encourage disclosure, thereby leading to the development of a richer data set. As such, I adopted a constructivist grounded theory approach whereby I felt that the interaction between myself and the interviewee was as much a part of the development of theory as the data itself. The interpretivist epistemological stance adopted recognises that not only is the data a representation of the interviewees’ interpretation of their realities and experiences, but equally acknowledges the fact that the grounded theory is derived on the basis of the theorist/researcher’s interpretation of the data as it stands (Bryant 2002 and Charmaz 2000, 2002).

As an academic, researcher and someone who lectures on the topic, I arrived at the qualitative phase of the study with a fairly good level of knowledge and understanding in relation to HCNn. As such, it would have been impossible to completely disregard this knowledge/information when developing the grounded theory; instead, in line with the constructivist approach, this knowledge was utilised to guide my interpretation of the data and the meaning that it held for the interviewees. The data, was therefore, not considered in terms of a metaphorical vacuum, and instead was constructed iteratively as a result of the interaction between myself as the researcher, and the interviewees; a process that developed throughout the interviews, with interpretations of previous interview data being cross-referenced/validity checked within later interviews. I believe that this knowledge/understanding also allowed/guided me to ask further additional, appropriate (unscripted) questions as a means of delving deeper into the experiences and realities of the interviewees, thereby enhancing the overall richness of the data obtained and *ergo* the quality of the grounded theory developed. As such, I conceptualised myself as part of the research situation, with an awareness of the fact that my positions, privileges, perspectives and interactions would affect the overall theory developed (Charmaz 2000, 2006 and Clarke 2005, 2006) and enhance it, as opposed to the requirement for researchers to act as *tabula rasa*, as dictated by the objectivist or positivist stance (Charmaz 2008).

Throughout the qualitative research phase, I adopted a reflexive stance towards the research process and the overall grounded theory product and recognise that the analysis was contextually situated in time, place, culture and situation (Charmaz 2006). For example, I identified both during the interview and coding processes, that the three interviewees who were soon due to retire from the force (as a result of Regulation A19<sup>8</sup>) may have been coming from a different situational and emotional position when discussing their experiences when compared to those interviewees who still had a significant length of service left. HCNs that were being “forced to retire” may have felt some animosity towards the force as a result of this and, as such, may have been more honest/forthright within their interviews due to the fact that they were leaving. The researcher feels that this is likely to have enhanced the honesty and “reality” of the data obtained, as opposed to biasing it per se. Nevertheless, the potential emotional bias (and perhaps greater openness to discuss certain matters) was borne in mind throughout the analysis and reflected upon as part of the theory generation process (with caution, for example, being exercised when attempting to extrapolate certain findings pertaining to these specific interviewees to the entire sample, as opposed to removing their data from the dataset). In summary, as a constructivist grounded theorist, I believe that the theory generated was co-constructed on the basis of a combination of my interpretation of the data and resultant construction of categories and the interviewees’ interpretation of their own socially constructed realities in relation to their roles as HCNs.

## 4.6. Design

The research utilised a mixed-methodology design combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Phase one of the research involved a cross-sectional survey design whereby data gathered via questionnaire format in the form of a psychometric test battery were compared across three samples (HCNs, police officers and students). The psychometric test battery consisted of five pre-existing scales measuring the following constructs: *Personality*, *Coping Style*, *Cognitive Emotion Regulation*, *Decision-Making Style*, and *Emotional Intelligence*. The data from this stage of the study was analysed using a variety of parametric statistics including analyses of variance, discriminant function analysis and *t*-test comparisons with norm group data. Phase two of the research involved a qualitative grounded theory design

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<sup>8</sup> “Regulation A19 of the Police Pensions Regulations 1987 provides for the compulsory retirement of a police officer, (up to and including the rank of Chief Superintendent), on the grounds of efficiency of the Force, where the officer has accrued full pension entitlement. This will typically be after 30 years’ service, but may be prior to this where an officer has transferred benefits from a previous pension scheme. It also applies to those on the 30+ and 30++ schemes” (Bedfordshire Police 2012: 3). This Regulation resulted in police officers with > 30 years’ service being forced to take retirement regardless of whether they wanted to retire at this point in time.

which consisted of the qualitative analysis of data gathered during 15 semi-structured interviews with a sub-sample of the HCNs who took part in phase one of the research. The data obtained from the interviews were analysed using the process of Grounded Theory, whereby categories of meaning were progressively identified, refined and integrated using initial and focused coding in order to develop a theory that is grounded in the data (Charmaz 2006).

## **4.7. Recruitment of Participants**

### **4.7.1. Quantitative Research Phase**

#### **4.7.1.1. *HCN sample.***

Opportunity sampling was utilised to recruit the HCN sample. All 43 UK territorial police forces (plus the Garda Siochana (Police Force of Ireland), Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Scottish police forces) were offered the opportunity to take part via letter or email<sup>9</sup> to the Regional or Force Lead Hostage Negotiator Coordinator (HNC) (please see Appendix 3). A total of 54 police forces were invited (see Table 4.1 in Appendix 4) with 21 police forces agreeing to take part (38.9%).

Once Regional or Force Lead HNCs had agreed to take part in the research, the data was collected in a variety of formats. For the majority of forces, Lead HNCs were sent a set of paper-based test batteries to disseminate to individual HCNs at one of their quarterly meetings. HCNs were asked to complete the questionnaires either during the meeting or during their own time and were then asked to send the questionnaires back to the researcher in the freepost envelopes provided. The researcher also attended quarterly meetings for four of the forces in order to promote the research and request participation and questionnaires were completed by HCNs during these meetings. All participants were made aware of the voluntary nature of the research and self-selected whether to take part or not.

#### **4.7.1.2. *Police officer sample.***

The majority of police officers were recruited using snowball sampling, whereby each HCN who agreed to take part in the research was asked to disseminate a second questionnaire to

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<sup>9</sup> The request included a detailed description of the following in the form of a letter and short PowerPoint presentation: 1) *The aims and objectives of the study*, 2) *The proposed methodology and analysis*, 3) *The process for obtaining ethical approval for the study*, 4) *Confirmation of the anonymity of forces and individual officers*, and 5) *Confirmation of confidentiality of data obtained and secure storage of data*.



a non-negotiator police officer colleague for him/her to complete and return to the researcher in the freepost envelope provided. Each HCN was provided with instructions in relation to this next step via a debrief sheet/letter (see Appendix 5/6). Additional police officers were also recruited from a single force (the researcher's previous employer) via the opportunity sampling of ex-colleagues.

#### **4.7.2. Qualitative Research Phase**

All participants who took part in the first phase of the research (apart from HCNs from one force who requested to only be involved in the first phase) and completed the psychometric tests were offered the opportunity to take part in the second phase of the research, which consisted of a semi-structured interview about their role as a HCN. Participants were asked to state whether they would be willing to take part in an interview and to provide an email address in order for the researcher to be able to contact them. Purposive sampling was used to recruit the HCN sample in order to locate participants that were most relevant for the progress of data collection and development of theory (Morse 2007). A form of maximum variation sampling was utilised (Patton 1990) with the intention of catching a wide range of perspectives across the negotiator experience and identifying information-rich cases. This process involved identifying potential participants based on stratifying the data in order to provide data from a variety of HCNs with different perspectives and experiences (as advocated by Cohen and Crabtree 2006). The researcher therefore identified 15 participants that represented heterogeneity in relation to: *type of force (i.e. metropolitan and rural), gender, current role, current rank and length of experience as a HCN.*

### **4.8. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria**

#### **4.8.1. Quantitative Research Phase**

##### **4.8.1.1. HCN sample.**

Male or female police officers of any rank who had successfully completed the regional or national HCNn training course and were operational negotiators were eligible to take part in the research. The majority of participants were ranked at Sergeant level or above (due to most force policies stating that officers must be of at least Sergeant/Inspector rank to apply for HCN status). Please refer to Table 4.2 for details of the rank ratios of the HCN sample.

##### **4.8.1.2. Police officer sample.**

Male or female police officers of any rank were invited to take part in the research. The only exclusion criterion for this sample was that officers were not eligible if they were currently working as HCNs.

Table 4.2. *Number and Percentage of Ranks Represented in Each of the Police Samples*

<b>Rank</b>	<b>HCN Sample</b>		<b>Police Officer Sample</b>	
	<i>N</i>	Percentage (%)	<i>N</i>	Percentage (%)
Police Constable (PC)	5	4.3	64	54.2
Sergeant	48	41.0	28	23.7
Inspector	43	36.8	17	14.4
Chief Inspector	17	14.5	3	2.5
Superintendent	3	2.6	3	2.5
Chief Superintendent	1	0.9	0	0.0
Not Stated	0	0.0	3	2.5
Total <i>n</i>	117	100	118	100

*Note:* The modal rank represented for the HCN Sample is Sergeant and the modal rank represented for the Police Officer sample is Police Constable.

#### **4.8.1.3. Student sample.**

Male and female undergraduate and postgraduate students studying a variety of courses at Coventry University were eligible to take part in the research.

#### **4.8.2. Qualitative Research Phase**

All HCNs who took part in phase one of the research (apart from the negotiators from one force who requested to only be involved with the quantitative phase) were given the opportunity to take part in the qualitative research phase. Only those participants who specified that they would be happy to be interviewed were invited to take part in the semi-structured interview.

### **4.9. Ethical Considerations**

The study was devised and executed in line with Coventry University's Ethics Regulations/Code, the British Psychological Society's Code of Ethics and Conduct (The British Psychological Society 2009), and the Code of Human Research Ethics (The British Psychological Society 2014). An ethics proposal was submitted to the University Ethics Committee 22<sup>nd</sup> October 2009 and ethical approval was granted on 29<sup>th</sup> October 2009 (please refer to Appendix 7). The following relevant ethical issues were managed in accordance with

the guidance provided by the aforementioned codes: *Informed Consent; Deception; Debriefing; Withdrawal from Investigation; Confidentiality; Protection of Participants; Protection of the Researcher* (please refer to Appendix 8 for a full description).

## 4.10. Participants

### 4.10.1. Quantitative Research Phase

Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.3.2.) for socio-demographic and occupational details of the participants involved in the quantitative phase of the research<sup>10</sup>. Please see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for further information.

Table 4.3. *Number and Percentage of HCNs and Police Officers Represented from Each Police Force*

Force	HCN Sample		Police Officer Sample	
	<i>N</i>	<i>Percentage (%)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Percentage (%)</i>
1	0	0.0	23	19.5
2	5	4.3	3	2.5
3	11	9.4	5	4.2
4	5	4.3	4	3.4
5	10	8.5	3	2.5
6	2	1.7	6	5.1
7	14	12.0	18	15.3
8	3	2.6	0	0.0
9	5	4.3	5	4.2
10	5	4.3	4	3.4
11	12	10.3	2	1.7
12	1	0.9	2	1.7
13	5	4.3	5	4.2
14	4	3.4	2	1.7
15	6	5.1	2	1.7
16	10	8.5	13	11.0
17	1	0.9	2	1.7
18	5	4.3	3	2.5
19	1	0.9	0	0.0
20	0	0.0	1	0.8
21	5	4.3	4	3.4
22	4	3.4	4	3.4
23	2	1.7	3	2.5
Total <i>n</i>	117	49.8	118	50.2

### 4.10.2. Qualitative Research Phase

<sup>10</sup> The total number of participants was dictated by power analyses run using the G\*Power software. Please refer to Appendix 9 for details of the power analyses run to determine an adequate sample size when using Multivariate Analysis of Variance with an anticipated effect size of 0.0625 and a power of 0.95.

#### **4.10.2.1. *The HCN interview sample.***

The interview sample consisted of 15 male and female HCNs from nine of the police forces with a range of demographic and occupational characteristics as outlined in Table 4.4.

### **4.11. Measures**

#### **4.11.1. Quantitative Research Phase**

##### **4.11.1.1. *Psychometric test battery*<sup>11</sup>.**

Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.3.3.) and Chapter 6 (6.4.3.) for details of the psychometric test battery<sup>12</sup>.

#### **4.11.2. Qualitative Research Phase**

##### **4.11.2.1. *Semi-structured interview schedule.***

On the basis of the literature reviews, a semi-structured interview schedule was devised by the researcher as a means of addressing the research questions. The interview schedule (see Appendix 10) focused on the following aspects/themes:

1. The recruitment and selection process for HCNs (example questions: *“Can you tell me how you came to become a negotiator?”*; *“What did the selection process involve?”*).
2. The training and continuing professional development of HCNs (example questions: *“What training did you receive once you had been selected?”*; *“Do you have any continuing professional development/on-going training as a negotiator?”*).
3. The operational experiences of HCNs (example questions: *“Can you describe the first incident that you were involved in as a negotiator?”*; *“Can you describe the most recent incident that you have been involved in?”*).
4. The process of decision-making throughout the HCNn (example question: *“What are the decision-making processes involved in negotiating crisis incidents?”*; *“Do you naturally tend to use one process more than others?”*).
5. The strategies, styles and techniques used by HCNs to resolve incidents (example questions: *“Are there any specific strategies, styles or techniques that you use when you*

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<sup>11</sup> The questionnaires within the test battery were counterbalanced in order to avoid demand characteristics such as practice/fatigue effects.

<sup>12</sup> Please note that the pre-validated measures have not been included within the appendices due to copyright issues, however, the researcher can make confidential copies available to the examiners upon request.

Table 4.4. *Table Depicting the Demographic and Occupational Characteristics of Interviewees*<sup>13</sup>

Participant Reference	Gender	Age	Force Number	Type of Force	Uniform/ CID	Rank	Current Position	Length of Police Service (Months)	Length of Negotiator Service (Months)	~Number of Incidents	HNC	Force/ Regional HNC Lead	Level of Training Qualification
<b>A</b>	Male	45	1	Rural	Uniform	Supt	Territorial Policing (Commander)	284	156	89	Yes	Regional	R, N, RC
<b>B</b>	Male	54	2	Rural	Uniform	CI	Local Policing & Partnerships Deputy Commander	356	195	200	Yes	No	N, RC
<b>C</b>	Female	43	2	Rural	CID	DS	DS Integrated Offender Management Team	261	96	100+	No	No	R, N, RC
<b>D</b>	Male	52	3	Rural	Uniform	I	Service Delivery/Support	360	63	100	No	No	R, N, RC
<b>E</b>	Male	43	3	Rural	CID	DCI	Territorial Policing Unit	222	114	200	Yes	No	R, N, RC*
<b>F</b>	Male	47	4	Met	Uniform	I	Audit & Inspection, Strategic Development Department	354	111	40 – 50	No	No	R, N, RC
<b>G</b>	Male	48	4	Met	Uniform	CI	Head of Training Delivery	338	123	100+	Yes	No	N, RC
<b>H</b>	Female	41	5	Rural	CID	DS	Southern Intelligence Manager	274	50	40 – 50	Yes	Force	N, RC
<b>I</b>	Male	46	5	Rural	Uniform	CI	Operations Cadre	330	84	100	Yes	Force	R, N, RC*
<b>J</b>	Female	46	6	Rural	Uniform	S	Change Management Team	303	110	50 – 60	No	No	R, N, RC
<b>K</b>	Male	44	2	Rural	CID	DI	Major Crime Unit	195	111	200	Yes	Regional (Red Centre)	R, N, RC
<b>L</b>	Male	42	7	Rural	CID	DCI	Local Investigations	263	54	15	No		R, N, RC
<b>M</b>	Female	49	8	Rural	CID	DS	Investigative Training	344	24	8	No	No	R
<b>N</b>	Female	42	8	Rural	Uniform	I	Critical Incident Manager	261	34	20	No	No	R, RC
<b>O</b>	Female	47	9	Met	CID	DS	Supervision of Regional Asset Recovery Team	316	36	20+	No	Regional	R

*Note.* Rank: Supt = Superintendent; DCI = Detective Chief Inspector; CI = Chief Inspector; DI = Detective Inspector; I = Inspector; DS = Detective Sergeant; S = Sergeant. Training: R = Regional Training; N = National Training; RC = Red Centre Training. All participants were White British or White European. \*Also trained as a Gold Negotiator Advisor.

<sup>13</sup> This information was gathered via the use of a demographic questionnaire (please refer to Appendix 11).

*are negotiating?”; “If so, what do you feel is the most effective strategy, style or technique?”).*

6. The skills required and utilised during the HCNn procedure (example questions: *“What skills do you think you use whilst dealing with crisis situations?”; “What skills do you think are important to be an effective negotiator?”*).
7. The support structures and coping strategies utilised by HCNs following involvement in hostage/crisis situations (example questions: *“Do you feel that you are supported sufficiently in your role by the police?”; “What sort of help & support is available to you (both in theory and realistically)?”*).

## **4.12. Procedure**

### **4.12.1. Quantitative Research Phase**

Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.3.4.) and Chapter 6 (6.4.4.) for details of the procedure utilised within the quantitative phase of the research.

### **4.12.2. Qualitative Research Phase**

Selected participants were contacted via email to arrange a convenient time and venue for the interview. Convenient times were arranged with all HCNs who agreed to take part and all interviews were carried out at the HCN’s place of work (i.e. police station) in an interview or meeting room. All interviewees were fully debriefed at the end of the interview (please refer to Appendix 12 for a copy of the debrief sheet). The interviews took place between August 2011 and June 2012 and lasted between 45-130 minutes; with a mean interview length of 87 minutes (i.e. 1 hour and 27 minutes) (please refer to Table 4.5 for details of the interviews). The interviews resulted in a total of 1,301 minutes (i.e. 21.7 hours) of data.

## **4.13. Data Preparation**

### **4.13.1. Quantitative Research Phase**

#### ***4.13.1.1. Screening and cleaning the data.***

The data obtained from the psychometric test batteries were inputted into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Questionnaires with more than 20 missing values ( $n = 10$ ) were excluded from the research. Once all the data had been inputted, data were

then screened using the “Frequencies” and “Descriptives” functions to identify any errors. Identified typing errors were cross-referenced with the raw data on the test battery and were amended accordingly.

Table 4.5. *Interview Legend Displaying Interview and Transcript Details*

Interviewee Reference Code	Force Number	Interviewee Gender	Interviewee Age	Date of Interview	Length of Interview (minutes)	Length of Transcript (Pages)
A	1	Male	45	24.08.11	100	41
B	2	Male	54	19.12.11/06.02.11 <sup>14</sup>	121 (59 + 62)	72
C	2	Female	43	06.02.11	89	36
D	3	Male	52	21.03.12	45	17
E	3	Male	43	21.03.12 <sup>15</sup>	63 (21 + 42)	22
F	4	Male	47	11.04.12	102	38
G	4	Male	48	11.04.12	130	84
H	5	Female	41	16.04.12	117	113
I	5	Male	46	16.04.12	69	28
J	6	Female	46	18.04.12	83	33
K	2	Male	44	25.04.12	77	37
L	7	Male	42	15.05.12	80	26
M	8	Female	49	14.06.12	52	24
N	8	Female	42	14.06.12	58	47
O	9	Female	47	27.06.12	115	54

#### 4.13.1.1.1. *Dealing with missing values.*

Missing values for each of the measures were dealt with in the following way. In cases with two or less missing values, the missing values were replaced with the mean value for the scale for each participant (i.e. a new variable was computed that provided an average score by adding the score for each participant on each item and dividing the sum by the number of items in the measure; for example, for the CERQ, the scores for the participant on CERQ items 1–36 were summed and divided by 36). For cases with more than two missing values, the values were not replaced and were excluded from the analysis. Please refer to Tables 4.6–4.11 in Appendix 13 for details of the excluded cases for each measure.

#### 4.13.1.1.2. *Dealing with outliers and checking parametric assumptions.*

A number of descriptive statistics were calculated using the *explore* function in SPSS, to screen the data for any outliers and to check whether the data met the assumptions for parametric statistical tests, i.e. to check for univariate and multivariate normality of distribution,

<sup>14</sup> Interview conducted in two parts on two separate dates due to operational commitments of interviewee.

<sup>15</sup> Interview conducted in two parts on same date due to interviewee being on call and having to take a call during the interview.

univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and multicollinearity (please refer to Tables 4.12–4.16 in Appendix 14 for inter-correlation matrices).

There were a number of sub-scales where the data were not normally distributed and, therefore, the assumption of normality was violated. These sub-scales are indicated by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic or significance value of  $p < .05$  as detailed in Tables 4.6–4.11 in Appendix 13. The only sub-scales that met the assumption for normality demonstrating significance values of  $p > .05$  were: *CERQ Adaptive Strategies*; *Total BIDR*; *BIDR Self-Deceptive Positivity*; *BIDR Impression Management* and *Total EII*. In light of this violation, transformations were unsuccessfully performed on the data in an attempt to improve the normality of distribution scores, and therefore, the data was retained and analysed in its original format.

A number of outliers were also identified for the majority of the sub-scales. In order to decide whether cases needed to be retained or removed from the dataset, the mean and 5% trimmed mean for each sub-scale was compared. All of the mean and 5% trimmed mean figures were fairly similar with the majority of differences being  $< .70$ . This indicated that the outliers were unlikely to be having a strong influence on the mean and as such all cases were retained in the dataset. Please see details of existing outliers in Tables 4.6–4.11 in Appendix 13.

The majority of the aforementioned parametric assumptions were met and in instances where assumptions were violated, such violations were considered to be successfully counteracted by the large sample size ( $N = 438$ ), the number of participants in each cell exceeding 30 and the robust nature of the MANOVA test (see Field 2009 and Pallant 2007).

#### **4.13.2. Qualitative Research Phase**

The interviews were orthographically (i.e. verbatim) transcribed<sup>16</sup> by an external transcription company (Way With Words) who provide a secure and confidential transcription service<sup>17</sup>. The transcripts were emailed to each interviewee for verification and sanitisation (if necessary). Specific redactions were made within three of the transcripts to remove confidential/sensitive information and to protect the identity of the interviewee. The transcripts

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<sup>16</sup> This consisted of a word-for-word account of all verbal utterances including both words and non-semantic sounds - such as ‘erm’, ‘er’, ‘uhuh’, ‘mm’ and ‘mm-hm’ (Braun and Clarke 2013: 163). Names and other identifying language/discourse were edited out within the thesis using square brackets and replaced with the terms “anonymous” or “anonymous place” in order to protect interviewee identity and maintain anonymity.

<sup>17</sup> See: <http://waywithwords.net/transcription-services-faq/#Security & Confidentiality - transcription services faq> for more details.



were amended in line with interviewee requested amendments/redactions and were then printed as hard copy and coded/analysed as described below.

## **4.14. Data Analysis**

### **4.14.1. Quantitative Research Phase**

Please refer to Chapter 5 (5.4.) and Chapter 6 (6.5.) for details of the data analysis conducted for the quantitative research phase.

### **4.14.2. Qualitative Research Phase**

#### **4.14.2.1. *Data coding.***

The interview data was coded manually (i.e. by hand) in line with a grounded theory constructivist framework that sympathetically aligns with exploration of this type of data. A method of constant comparison was applied throughout the coding process, whereby phenomena, concepts and cases were iteratively compared in order to identify common and recurring themes throughout the data set (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Broadly speaking, a combination of initial and focused coding paradigms were utilised in order to synthesise and provide meaning to the data (Charmaz 2006). Initial coding involved a line-by-line coding process that enabled each word, line or segment of data to be provided with a name/phrase that synthesised the meaning associated with this section of narrative text (Charmaz 2006). Please refer to Appendix 15 for an example of the line-by-line coding completed. A vast number of initial codes were produced that were further reduced and refined within the focused coding phase, whereby the most frequently appearing initial codes were identified as a means of sorting, synthesising, integrating and organising the data (Charmaz 2006). As such, coding of the data represented the process by which data were broken down, conceptualised and reintegrated in order to depict and demonstrate theory associated with the phenomenon under investigation (Strauss and Corbin 1990). This process is also referred to as codifying the data, a process that permits data to be “segregated, grouped, regrouped and relinked in order to consolidate meaning and explanation” (Grbich 2007: 21).

##### **4.14.2.1.1. *Initial coding.***

Open coding was completed on the entire set of transcripts in chronological order. This form of coding was completed using highlighters and handwritten comments within the

margins of the transcripts (see Appendix 15 for an example of the open coding performed on Transcript A). Using the constant comparative method (Glaser and Strauss 1967), and comparing the data across the transcripts, the identified concepts were then further refined into broad level tentative categories that could be used to provide meaning to the data. This constant comparison involved identification of similarities and differences both within and across interview transcripts as a means of making analytic distinctions (Charmaz 2006) and thereby identifying concepts and categories that were relevant to overall theory generation.

The process of memo-writing/development of theoretical memoranda was utilised throughout the coding process in order to identify striking observations and thoughts relevant to the development of the overall theory (Flick 2009). Memos can be used to conceptualise the data in narrative form (as suggested by Lempert 2007) and can include references to the literature and the use of diagrams for linking, structuring and conceptualising concepts (Flick 2009). Memos were utilised as a form of both reflexivity (i.e. for the researcher to ask questions of the data) and to produce diagrammatic representation of categories in the form of clustering and mind maps. Clustering represents a non-linear, visual technique to help you to understand and organise your data (Rico 1983) and enabled me to produce a number of tentative and editable maps of my data as depicted by the hierarchical structure of the inter-connecting categories and sub-categories (Charmaz 2006). Clustering was completed using the Simple Mind<sup>18</sup> software application and initially completed on an iPad and further refined using Microsoft word. This consisted of creating spider diagrams/mind maps that depicted potential groupings of concepts and possible relationships between concepts and categories (please refer to Appendix 16–18 for examples). Open coding was performed in parallel with the clustering techniques described above in order to identify similar concepts that could be grouped together to form categories (Strauss and Corbin 1990). This process, therefore, resulted in a list of 320 concepts and tentative categories attached directly to the text that were then subjected to focused coding whereby more directed, selective and conceptual categories were generated (Glaser 1978).

#### *4.14.2.1.2. Focused coding.*

Focused coding was performed in a handwritten format using a colour-coding technique (similar to the colour-coding method described by Stottok, Bergaus and Gorra (2011) but using a manual as opposed to electronic format) whereby initial broad categories were further refined into 20 primary, 54 secondary, 89 tertiary and 23 quaternary categories (please refer to Table

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<sup>18</sup> Please refer to: <http://www.simpleapps.eu/simplemind/desktop> for more information about the Simple Mind software application.

4.22 in Appendix 19 for details of the refinement of categories for each micro-model). Coloured Post-it note labels were utilised to group concepts and meanings into categories that were further refined using the constant comparative technique described above (please refer to Appendix 15 for a coded transcript example). Refinement of the categories was achieved by identifying the most significant and/or frequently occurring concepts and selection of the categories that made the most analytic sense to categorising and synopsising the data (Charmaz 2006). An example of focused coding can be seen by presentation of concepts and categories from the HCN Journey Model described in Chapter 7. Initial open coding revealed 14 concepts that could be identified as motivations or reasons for being a negotiator (see Table 4.26 in Appendix 20). When these concepts were analysed more deeply, they could be further refined into four tertiary categories (*a desire to help people*; *vicarious pseudo-altruism*; *negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface”* and *self-aggrandisement/ego-boosting*). These tertiary categories were then further refined into two secondary categories (i.e. those which were conceptualised as *internally-orientated motivations* and those that were *externally-orientated motivations*). These two categories, when taken as a whole, were then further refined into the primary category of “*reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world*”. In line with Saldana’s (2009) suggestion, once I felt happy with the initial categorisation of the codes, they were transferred into an electronic file/data analysis matrix whereby further refinement was performed in the form of axial coding.

As a researcher immersing myself in the data as per the requirements of a constructivist grounded theory study, I felt the need to “touch the data” as suggested by Graue and Walsh (1998), by coding the printed transcripts manually, as this permitted a more tangible understanding of the codes and categories and their inter-connecting relationships, as opposed to working solely with the data electronically. The focused coding process was deemed to be complete once the cross-comparative process performed across the interview transcripts demonstrated pseudo-saturation of data and no further concepts or categories were identified. “Pseudo-saturation” of data for the purposes of this thesis is referred to, as in line with Strauss and Corbin’s (1998: 136) premise, I believe that the phenomenon under investigation represents an entity whereby the data obtained is both rich and thick, and as such, it is my belief that if I were to continue to examine the data, there would always be the potential for “the new to emerge”. Having said this, I feel that in relation to the specific models developed, the data was saturated to the point at which any new concepts/categories discovered would not add anything significant to the overall theory/model that had been developed and as such, data collection was ceased after the fifteenth interview (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 136). It is also worth noting that the theory generated/reported within the current thesis represents part of the theory generated as

a result of the data coding, as further theory/model development was beyond the remit of this particular thesis, thereby further validating my explanation of the data as having been “pseudo-saturated”. This restriction in terms of what can be feasibly achieved within a PhD thesis is also a well-documented constraint of doctoral research, as identified/acknowledged by Strauss and Corbin (1998: 292), who note that “sometimes the researcher has no choice and must settle for a theoretical scheme that is less developed than desired”.

#### 4.14.2.1.3. Axial coding.

Axial coding was utilised as a means of refining the categories specifically into primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary subordinate categories and identifying how these categories relate to one another in a hierarchical sense. This process enabled the data that had been deconstructed as a result of the initial/open coding process to be reassembled in a manner that provides coherence and meaning to the emerging analysis and theory (Charmaz 2006). Axial coding was utilised to elaborate each category and conceptual maps/diagrams were used to help integrate categories and sub-categories and to produce substantive theory (as suggested by Clarke 2003, 2005) in relation to HCNn. Axial coding was utilised as suggested by Charmaz (2006), as a means of developing subcategories and identifying potential links between them, as opposed to the more stringent and prescriptive method encouraged by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Axial coding in the latter sense has been criticised for making grounded theory cumbersome (Robrecht 1995) and is not always considered to be necessary for the development of a robust grounded theory (Charmaz 2006). Axial coding was therefore performed as a reflective process whereby links between categories and sub-categories were identified in order to make meaning of the data and to ‘metaphorically’ build the models utilised to conceptualise and depict the theory being developed. A particular example of this coding process can be seen in the linking of four of the secondary categories represented in the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model described in Chapter 8. Within the model, the first category (*information/intelligence gathering*) informs the second category (*risk/threat assessment*), and the second category (*risk/threat assessment*) then informs the third category (*scene control/sterilisation and management*) (i.e. information/intelligence gathered is used to assess potential risk posed to all parties within the scenario, and this level of risk is then used to inform the scene control process and the negotiator cell setup in terms of negotiator positioning etc.). This relationship between categories is represented visually via the use of two downward-facing vertical arrows connecting the three secondary categories within the conceptual map of the model (see Figure 8.1). Please refer to Tables 4.23–4.27 in Appendix 20–24 for a copy of the data analysis matrices/coding tables utilised to refine the categories hierarchically.

#### 4.14.2.1.4. *Theory generation.*

Data analysis resulted in the development of five grounded theoretical micro-models that can be used to depict and portray five specific aspects in relation to HCNn within the UK: 1) The nature and extent of HCNn<sup>19</sup>, 2) The HCN journey, 3) The HCN experience, 4) The HCNn procedure and 5) The successful HCN profile; as discussed in Chapters 7-10.

#### 4.14.2.1.5. *Methodological rigour.*

Throughout the coding and analysis process, a number of strategies were employed as a means of enhancing the methodological rigour of the qualitative theory and models generated. This included the following:

- The development of an early familiarity with the culture of the organisation (i.e. police service) and specific discipline being investigated (i.e. HCNn) (Shenton 2004). As an ex-member of police staff, I was already familiar with the police culture and many of the processes/procedures utilised. In addition, during the initial phases of the research, I made significant efforts to understand the way HCNn works in the UK by obtaining relevant ACPO policy documents and speaking to a member of my supervisory team, who was a police HCN/HNC for many years. I also spent time at the beginning of each interview building a rapport with each interviewee as a means of enhancing disclosure and *ergo* the richness and credibility of the data obtained; a tactic which is proposed by Shenton (2004) as a means of helping to ensure honesty in informants when contributing data.
- Engaging with other researchers to reduce research bias (Slevin and Sines 2000) and frequent debriefing sessions between the researcher and his/her superiors (Shenton 2004); this included iterative discussions with three members of my supervisory team in relation to the validity of the coding of the data and the development of the categories and theoretical models. This process enabled me to utilise others as a “sounding board” and *ergo* test the validity of my interpretations and theory development.
- Respondent validation (Long and Johnson 2000) and member checks (Guba and Lincoln 1989 and Shenton 2004); this included providing all interviewees with an opportunity to firstly validate/comment on the interview transcript and secondly with an opportunity to confirm whether the final categories and models created adequately reflected the phenomenon being investigated.

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<sup>19</sup> Please refer to Appendix 25 for a discussion of this model.

- Peer scrutiny of the research project (Shenton 2004); opportunities for peer scrutiny by colleagues, peers and academics were encouraged throughout completion of the research which included scrutiny of written chapters by members of the supervisory team (and internal subject experts) at annual Progress Review Panels<sup>20</sup> and presentation of findings at internal and external conferences which enabled me to refine methods and strengthen arguments in relation to comments made and conclusions drawn.

#### *4.14.2.1.6. Researcher reflexivity statement.*

In addition to the methods described above, I feel that it is important for me to contextualise my own journey within this doctoral research, as a means of helping to validate the findings and provide context for the reader in terms of the evolution of this thesis. My interest in negotiation was catalysed by a negative experience that I encountered many years ago, at the very beginning of my career within Psychology. Whilst working as a Nursing Assistant on an acute ward within a low secure psychiatric hospital, I was confined in a room by a floridly psychotic male patient (albeit for a short period of time). During the five or so minutes that I was prevented from leaving the room by this patient and due to me not being provided with a personal attack alarm on this particular day due to “resourcing issues”, I realised that the only weapon I had at my disposal was my voice. I started to think, “what can I say to this individual that will make them stop what they are doing and allow me to leave?” In this scenario, mainly due to the psychosis the patient was experiencing, dialogue was not sufficient and force was utilised to resolve the situation, with several staff members forcing the door open in time for me to be able to exit the room. Luckily, I was not injured as a result of this encounter, however, the experience made me reflect upon whether there was a way of resolving such situations utilising “words as weapons”, as opposed to having to resort to the use of force. A couple of years after this, whilst working for a police force, I met several officers who were trained as HCNs and learned that there were, in fact, individuals who utilised dialogue in this way to resolve incidents involving hostages or individuals-in-crisis. Discussions with these officers about their role piqued my interest and catalysed the research that you see before you today. This experience is likely to have played a role in my own interpretation of the data by providing one of the only personal reference points that I have in relation to the concept of HCNn. However, albeit an experience that was initially a negative one, I believe that this experience failed to colour my view of negotiation in a negative light and

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<sup>20</sup> Progress Review Panels are “mini” *viva voce* examinations that need to be completed and passed by PhD students at Coventry University on an annual basis in order to progress to the next level/year of study.

instead, instilled a drive in me to understand academically and empirically, how negotiators can be successful in these types of scenarios and it is this theoretical backdrop that has been utilised throughout the duration of this research.

## **Chapter 5: Quantitative Phase Results Chapter 1: Personality Traits and Coping Styles in UK Police Officers. Do Negotiators differ from their Non-Negotiator Colleagues?**

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The aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings from the quantitative phase of the research in relation to three of the constructs measured: Personality, Coping Style and Cognitive Emotion Regulation. This paper was published in *Psychology, Crime and Law* in 2015 and this chapter includes the pre-published version of the manuscript. The references from this paper are embedded into the references section of this thesis.

Grubb, A. Brown, S., and Hall, P. (2015) 'Personality Traits and Coping Style in UK Police Officers. Do Negotiators Differ from their Non-Negotiator Colleagues?' *Psychology, Crime and Law* 21 (4), 347-374

This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in *Psychology, Crime and Law* on 27th November 2014, available online:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/1068316X.2014.989165>



## **5.1. Introduction**

### **5.1.1. Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the United Kingdom (UK)**

UK HCNs are police officers who have been trained to perform this specialist function. The negotiator role differs from other specialist roles, such as dog handling, criminal investigation and firearms, as it does not constitute an officer's main operational function; rather, the role operates on an on-call basis, performed alongside day-to-day duties. Entry requirements for the role differ across police forces but generally officers must be of sergeant rank or higher (or inspector rank or higher in some metropolitan forces). Officers who successfully apply for the role complete a one-week regional training course followed by a two-week national course to equip them with the skills to respond to both crisis and hostage situations. Negotiators are considered to be beneficial within the following incidents: suicide intervention; missing persons; political protest; people in crisis; supporting incident commanders in firearms operations; offences of kidnap and/or extortion; criminal sieges and terrorist hostage incidents (ACPO and NPIA 2011). This helps to exemplify the diverse nature of situations that hostage crisis negotiators are likely to encounter within the UK. However, it is worth noting that anecdotal evidence proffered by negotiators themselves (Grubb, Brown, Hall and Bowen 2016), suggests that the majority of incidents that they respond to relate to individuals experiencing some form of personal, emotional or psychological crisis, as opposed to the latter, more sensationalist categories above. This suggestion is also reinforced by individual territorial force policies which reaffirm the fact that "not all types of incidents involve the taking of hostages but all are life threatening or display the potential for significant harm/damage to the community, a person or commercial enterprise" (West Mercia Police 2009: 2).

It is difficult to provide a clear and accurate picture of the nature and prevalence of HCNn in the UK due to the territorial nature of police forces and the lack of a centralised database which collates national data in relation to HCN deployments. Whilst individual forces will record negotiator deployments, the exact nature of this recording will vary from force to force in terms of detail and content, making it difficult to directly compare such data. Similarly, the number and frequency of deployments will vary from force to force and will be dependent on factors such as size of geographical force area and whether the force is metropolitan or rural. To provide some context, data provided by one metropolitan police force in the UK indicates that negotiators were deployed/utilised on 93 occasions in 2013. The most common incident type involved suicide intervention (74%), followed by 'other' incidents (9%), criminal incidents (9%) and domestic incidents (8%) (Source Anonymised at Request of Force 2013). Scottish

data provided by Alexander (2011) provides an insight into the prevalence of HCNn in Scotland, with Alexander reporting 315 deployments across all Scottish police forces over a three year period between 2005-2008. Official police recorded data can also provide an indication in terms of the number of kidnapping incidents that occur per annum within the UK on a national level (i.e. there were 1727 offences of kidnapping recorded by the police in 2013/2014) (Office for National Statistics 2014), however, negotiators may not have been involved in responding to all of these incidents and as such, it is difficult to ascertain a clear and coherent picture of the exact nature and prevalence of HCNn in the UK.

The selection processes for police officers have been subject to research that has informed the selection criteria utilised by law enforcement agencies internationally. The measurement of personality traits has typically dominated the research and the existence of the 'police personality' is well established empirically (Abrahamsen and Strype 2010, Lefkowitz 1975 and Twersky-Glasner 2005). However, there is a lack of research relating to the competencies and characteristics that are important for performance within specialist roles, including that of HCNn. The identification of which could be used to inform recruitment and selection processes, and *ergo* facilitate selection of appropriate candidates for these roles. It remains to be established, for example, whether certain personality traits in police officers result in them being more effective as negotiators. In many instances, negotiators can play a significant role in whether an individual lives or dies and as such, there is a need for a better understanding of the competencies and characteristics that are inherent in effective negotiation.

### **5.1.2. The Police Personality**

Research within police populations has demonstrated the importance of personality traits as significant predictors of police performance (Black 2000, Chibnall and Detrick 2003, Detrick and Chibnall 2002, Detrick and Chibnall 2006, Lau et al. 2006 and Varela et al. 2004), with higher levels of Conscientiousness and lower levels of Neuroticism being identified as the most significant predictors of police population membership and performance (Abrahamsen and Strype 2010, Barrick and Mount 1991, Barrick, Mount and Judge 2001, Cortina et al. 1992, Detrick and Chibnall 2006 and Mount and Barrick 1995). Conscientiousness is thought to reflect dependability, whereby individuals tend to be careful, thorough, responsible, organised and planful (Botwin and Buss 1989 and John 1989). When extrapolating these findings to the context of police work, individuals displaying such traits would logically appear to be well suited to a role which involves taking responsibility for protecting the public and goal-orientated tasks in relation to enforcement of the law. Neuroticism tends to reflect negative emotionality and nervousness whereby individuals demonstrating lower N scores tend to be more

emotionally stable, calm and not easily upset (John, Naumann and Soto 2008) than those with higher N scores. When considering the interpersonal conflict that inevitably arises as a result of police work, it is likely that those who are able to react calmly in the 'heat of the moment' and respond in a more emotionally stable way after experiencing a potentially traumatic event are more likely to cope with the pressure associated with police work and perform more effectively within their role. Abrahamsen and Strype (2010) confirmed the importance of both Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability within a Norwegian police sample, and also identified the role of Agreeableness. Agreeableness characteristics such as being good-natured, cooperative and trustful may be linked to conflict resolution skills within policing (John, Naumann and Soto 2008) and therefore beneficial in de-escalating crisis situations.

### **5.1.3. The Role of Personality and Socio-Psychological Constructs in Hostage Negotiation**

Researchers investigating negotiator characteristics have tended to take one of two stances: identifying the characteristics of operational negotiators; or asking negotiators to describe the characteristics that they perceive are important for effective negotiators. The studies that have been conducted are outlined in Table 5.1 in Appendix 26. Much of the research has been conducted in the USA with a potential lack of cross-cultural validity or applicability to other contexts. The studies are varied in terms of the variables measured, type of measurement tools/methods and samples utilised, such that it is difficult to compare findings or attempt to synthesise a single list of qualities/characteristics that HCNs possess. In three studies (e.g. Allen, Fraser and Inwald 1991, Gelbart 1979 and Gettys and Elam 1988), psychometric profiles of negotiators were produced using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) and/or the California Personality Inventory (CPI), but comparison or control samples of non-negotiator officers were not included, so it cannot be determined whether the characteristics are unique to negotiators. Other researchers (e.g. McMains and Mullins 2010, Regini 2002 and Slatkin 2010) relied upon discussions with, or observations of, the crisis negotiation teams. However, the lists of characteristics generated do not appear to have been empirically validated and it is unclear exactly how these attributes were measured. Self-report studies in which negotiators were asked to identify the characteristics of effective negotiators by selecting characteristics from a standardised list of adjectives (e.g. San Jose 1995, 2004 cited in Strentz 2012) lack credibility due to the fact that they only provide insight into the *perceived* characteristics of effective negotiators and do not necessarily depict the *actual* characteristics. The findings from the studies are far from generalisable as a result of

sampling limitations, including limited sample sizes and differences in the levels and lengths of operational experience of negotiators in different studies.

#### **5.1.4. The Role of Coping Style in Police Settings**

Coping is referred to as the conscious use of cognitive or behavioural strategies to reduce perceived stress (Lazarus and Folkman 1991). The way in which individuals cope with stressful events can broadly be dichotomised into *adaptive* and *maladaptive* coping styles. The most commonly discussed conceptualisation of these styles describes coping strategies as either *problem-focused* or *emotion-focused* (Folkman 1984). Problem-focused coping refers to responses that are geared towards directly altering or resolving the stressful situation, while emotion-focused coping refers to efforts to manage and regulate one's emotional reactions to the stressful situation (Folkman et al. 1986). In general, problem-focused coping strategies are considered to be more functional than emotion-focused coping strategies (Billings and Moos 1984, Hart, Wearing and Headey 1995 and Thoits 1995), because they focus on actively addressing the problem (Masel, Terry and Gribble 1996), as opposed to dealing with the emotions associated with the problem.

The ability to cope with stress has been highlighted as a significant factor within police settings, with poor coping skills significantly predicting stress experienced in police work (Anshel 2000 and Beehr, Johnson and Nieva 1995). Law enforcement has been recognised as one of the most stressful occupations worldwide (Dantzer 1987 and Loo 1984) and the use of maladaptive coping strategies in police work has been found to lead to chronic, long term stress (Hurrell 1995 and Nordlicht 1979); increased rates of heart disease, stomach disorders, divorce, alcohol/drug abuse, suicide (Lord, Gray and Pond 1991 and Rogers 1976); job burnout and leaving the profession (Burke and Deszca 1986 and Malloy and Mays 1984). The use of coping strategies by police officers has been empirically investigated by a number of researchers (Anshel 2000, Anshel, Robertson and Caputi 1997, Biggam, Power and MacDonald 1997, Bishop et al. 2001, Burke 1994, Fain and McCormick 1988, Haarr and Morash 1999, Kirkcaldy, Cooper and Ruffalo 1995 and Leonard and Alison 1999) showing that police officers utilise maladaptive coping strategies (Burke 1993, Dietrich and Smith 1984, Evans et al. 1993, Graf 1986, McCafferty, F. McCafferty, E. and McCafferty, M. 1992, Richmond et al. 1998 and Violanti, Marshall and Howe 1985) to deal with occupational stress. Strategies include aloofness, alcoholism, authoritarianism, cynicism, depersonalisation, emotional detachment and suspiciousness (Bonifacio 1991, Davidson and Veno 1980, Kroes 1985, Niederhoffer 1967 and Violanti and Marshall 1983); with one of the most consistently reported maladaptive coping strategies being the use of alcohol and/or drugs (Burke 1993, Dietrich and Smith 1984 and

Richmond et al. 1998). The findings from these studies conducted across different cultures are inconsistent. The reasons behind this are unclear but suggest that cultural components play a role. It may be the case, for example, that some strategies are less acceptable within certain cultures (i.e., the use of alcohol) and, therefore, are used less. The implications of maladaptive coping are far from benign, with those who utilise such coping mechanisms being far more likely to suffer from health problems than those utilising more adaptive forms of coping (Burke 1993).

Research focused on direct comparisons of problem and emotion-focused coping has identified more frequent use of problem-focused coping within police samples (Bishop et al. 2001 and Evans et al. 1993). Other research indicates that both strategies are used (Alexander and Walker 1994, Beehr, Johnson and Nieva 1995, Fain and McCormick 1988 and Larsson, Kempe and Starrin 1988), with Larsson, Kempe and Starrin (1988) revealing problem-focused coping in 100% of the situations and emotion-focused coping in 97% of the scenarios officers were asked to evaluate. Whilst these findings provide an insight into police officer coping, they have often been identified using police samples in isolation so it is difficult to assess whether these strategies are unique to police officers. Moreover, there is no published research to date that investigates coping strategies utilised by specific divisions within the police (i.e. HCNs) who may be exposed to intense and potentially emotionally traumatic incidents that may extend over fairly protracted periods of time. Identification of the cognitive and behavioural coping mechanisms utilised by negotiators would have a number of implications for police selection processes, probationary officer training and on-going operational policing. Identification of applicants who have a tendency to utilise less adaptive strategies could be used to inform selection of probationary officers, or provide an opportunity for additional resilience training to be implemented prior to completing their probationary period. Equally, operational officers frequently exposed to traumatic or emotionally challenging scenarios (as a result of a specific police role, for example), could be provided with bespoke dedicated training packages designed to enhance their utilisation of adaptive cognitive and behavioural coping strategies in an attempt to prevent potential problems associated with maladaptive coping in police settings.

#### **5.1.5. Gender, Personality and Coping Style**

Limited research has focused on direct comparisons of personality attributes of male and female police officers; however, research that has been conducted outside of police settings has found that gender impacts upon personality (Costa, Terracciano and McCrae 2001 and Feingold 1994). Amongst other trait differences, women tend to possess higher levels of neuroticism and agreeableness, whereas men tend to score more highly on assertiveness and

openness (Costa, Terracciano and McCrae 2001). With reference to coping style and stress responses, generic occupational empirical studies indicate that there are significant differences in the coping skills of male and female employees (Barnett, Biener and Baruch 1987), with females tending to utilise more emotion-focused coping strategies and males more problem-focused strategies (Billings and Moos 1981 and Stone and Neale 1984). This finding also extrapolates to police settings, with female officers coping with stress differently compared to male officers (Brown and Campbell 1990, Haarr and Morash 1999 and Pendergrass and Ostrove 1984). There is, however, a paucity of research in which direct gender comparisons of coping styles and strategies are made, and gender in relation to HCNn has not been examined.

## **5.2. Rationale, Aims and Hypotheses**

To date, there is limited literature which examines negotiator characteristics when placed in a comparative context of the wider police population. In addition to this, research which analyses the potential impact of gender on HCN characteristics is also lacking. The aim of the current study, therefore, was to compare UK police HCNs with police officers and students on three constructs (personality, coping style and cognitive emotion regulation) that may influence the way individuals negotiate and/or cope with high levels of stress, whilst also taking account of gender. It was proposed that police negotiators would display a unique and consistent 'HCN profile', distinct from the profiles of non-negotiator trained police officers and non-officers, that enables them to perform and cope under highly stressful situations, and that there would be gender differences observed across the sample. The constructs were selected on the basis of empirical evidence linking them to occupational performance within police settings, or commonsensical application of the constructs to performance within highly stressful occupations and roles (Grubb and Brown 2012). A student comparison group was employed to establish differences between police and non-police populations. Whilst the authors acknowledge that a sample of students may not fully represent the general population, this type of sample is frequently utilised within social science research. Comparisons with norm group data (where available) for the tests employed were also carried out.

Despite this not being a focus of the current research, the authors acknowledge the interactive play between personality and coping style and the notion that certain personality traits are more conducive to the utilisation of adaptive and functional coping styles. For a full discussion of the literature relating to the relationship between personality and coping style and a theoretical analysis of how this may play a role within HCNn environments, please refer to (Grubb and Brown 2012).

The following hypotheses were generated on the basis of the extant literature:

- 1a) HCNs will score significantly more highly on *Extraversion and Conscientiousness* than police officers and students;
- 1b) HCNs will score significantly lower on *Neuroticism* than police officers and students;
- 1c) There will be a statistically significant difference between the *Agreeableness* and *Openness* scale scores exhibited by HCNs, police officers and students;
- 1d) Female participants will score significantly more highly on the *Neuroticism* and *Agreeableness* scales than male participants;
- 1e) Male participants will score significantly more highly on the *Openness* subscale than female participants;
- 2a) HCNs will display significantly higher levels of *problem-focused coping* and significantly lower levels of *emotion-focused coping* than police officers and students;
- 2b) HCNs will use *maladaptive coping strategies* (i.e. 'Hang Ups') significantly less frequently than police officers and students;
- 2c) Female participants will score significantly more highly on *emotion-focused coping strategies* than male participants;
- 3a) HCNs will use *adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies* significantly more frequently than police officers and students;
- 3b) HCNs will use *maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies* significantly less frequently than police officers and students;
- 3c) Female participants will score significantly more highly on the use of *maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies* than male participants.

## **5.3. Method**

### **5.3.1. Design**

A cross-sectional survey design was utilised, whereby data were collected in the form of a psychometric test battery. The independent variables consisted of group membership with three levels (HCN, Police Officer and Student) and gender with two levels (male and female). The battery consisted of four pre-validated scales measuring the following dependent variables: *a) Personality, b) Coping Style, c) Cognitive Emotion Regulation* and *d) Social Desirability*.

### **5.3.2. Participants**

The *HCN Sample* consisted of 117 (77% Male; 23% Female) police HCNs from 21 UK-based police forces with a mean age of 43 years ( $SD = 6.1$ ) and an age range of 29–61. Most of the participants were White British ( $n = 115$ ; 98%), one participant (1%) was Other White and one participant (1%) was Pakistani. Participants lengths of service within the police ranged from 30–400 months, with a mean of 244 months ( $SD = 76.7$ ) and their lengths of service as negotiators ranged from 0–192 months, with a mean of 64 months ( $SD = 45.5$ ). The number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator ranged from 0–300 incidents, with a mean of 43 incidents ( $SD = 52.0$ ).

The *Police Officer Sample* consisted of 118 (63% Male; 37% Female) police officers from 21 UK police forces with a mean age of 41 years ( $SD = 7.5$ ) and an age range of 21–57 years. All 118 (100%) of the participants were White British. Participants' lengths of service within the police ranged from 28–480 months, with a mean of 182 months ( $SD = 92.6$ ).

The *Student Sample* consisted of 203 (45% Male; 55% Female) undergraduate and postgraduate students from Coventry University with a mean age of 22 years ( $SD = 5.9$ ) and an age range of 18–50 years. The majority of the participants were White British ( $n = 124$ ; 61%) and the remainder of the sample consisted of students from a variety of different ethnicities: Other White ( $n = 18$ ; 9%); Indian ( $n = 19$ ; 9%); Pakistani ( $n = 12$ ; 6%); Bangladeshi ( $n = 1$ ; 1%); Other Asian ( $n = 1$ ; 1%); Black African ( $n = 14$ ; 7%), Other Black ( $n = 3$ ; 2%), Chinese ( $n = 1$ ; 1%); and Other Ethnicity ( $n = 10$ ; 5%). The majority of students were studying psychology at undergraduate level ( $n = 107$ ; 53%) or postgraduate level ( $n = 18$ ; 9%), with the remainder studying a variety of courses across the Health and Life Sciences, Engineering and Business Faculties.

### 5.3.3. Measures

*The Demographic Questionnaire*<sup>21</sup> contained questions relating to personal characteristics and work history within the police force, including: *age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, force, rank, length of service as an officer, length of service as a negotiator and number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator*.

*The Big Five Inventory* (BFI; John, Donahue and Kentle 1991) was used to measure personality and consists of 44 items measuring each of the big five personality dimensions. Personality theory stipulates that personality can be defined on the basis of five broad factors: *Extraversion* (talkative, assertive, active, energetic, outgoing), *Agreeableness* (sympathetic, kind, appreciative, affectionate, soft-hearted), *Conscientiousness* (organised, thorough, planful,

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<sup>21</sup> Please refer to Appendix 27–29 for full details of the demographic questionnaires completed by each sample.



efficient, responsible), *Openness* (wide interests, imaginative, intelligent, original, insightful) and *Neuroticism* (tense, anxious, nervous, moody, worrying) (John 1990). The items on the BFI consist of short phrases or statements that describe certain ways of behaving (e.g. *I am someone who is talkative*). Respondents are required to assess the degree to which they agree with each statement with the items being scored on a 5 point Likert scale where 1 = *disagree strongly* and 5 = *agree strongly*. The BFI scales have excellent psychometric properties, demonstrating substantial internal consistency, retest reliability, clear factor structure, and impressive convergent and discriminant validity with other longer Big Five measures (Benet-Martinez and John 1998 and John and Srivastava 1999). The Cronbach's alpha scores for each of the subscales using the current dataset also demonstrated good levels of internal consistency (please refer to Table 5.2 for subscale alpha coefficients).

***The Coping Skills Test - Revised*** (CST-R; Jerabek 2001) was used to measure coping style and consists of a 45-item questionnaire that is answered on a Likert-based scale ranging from *Almost Never* to *Most of the Time*. The questionnaire consists of an overall coping scale and three subscales: *Problem-Focused Coping*, *Emotion-Focused Coping* and *Hang-Ups*. High scores on the overall coping scale indicate an ability to cope well with problems and utilisation of more effective coping strategies rather than ineffective ones. A high score on each of the three subscales indicate that participants tend to utilise problem-focused strategies (*Problem Solving*, *Information Seeking* and *Negotiation*), emotion-focused strategies (*Social Support*, *Positive Cognitive Restructuring*, *Emotional Regulation* and *Distraction*) or hang-ups/maladaptive strategies (*Rumination*, *Avoidance*, *Helplessness*, *Social Withdrawal* and *Opposition*), respectively, when coping with stress. The CST-R has high internal consistency with a Cronbach's alpha score of .94 (PsychTests AIM Inc. 2009) (please refer to Table 5.3 for subscale alpha coefficients for the current dataset).

***The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire*** (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002) was used to measure cognitive coping style and emotion regulation. The CERQ is a 36-item multidimensional questionnaire constructed in order to identify the cognitive coping strategies someone uses after having experienced negative events or situations. The CERQ specifically differentiates between behavioural and cognitive forms of emotion regulation and refers exclusively to an individual's thoughts after having experienced a negative event as opposed to their actions. The nine subscales demonstrate good internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha scores ranging from .68-.86 (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002). Items are scored on a Likert-based scale ranging from 1 = *Almost Never* to 5 = *Almost Always* and a score is obtained for each of the nine subscales (*self-blame*, *acceptance*, *rumination*, *positive refocusing*, *refocus on planning*, *positive reappraisal*, *putting into perspective*,

*catastrophising* and *other blame*) indicating the degree to which an individual engages in each specific cognitive emotion regulation strategy. For the purposes of this research, in addition to the nine subscales, the cognitive emotion regulation strategies have been combined into two larger subscales indicating the use of Adaptive (*acceptance, rumination, positive refocusing, positive reappraisal* and *putting into perspective*) and Maladaptive (*self-blame, rumination, catastrophising* and *other blame*) Cognitive Emotion Regulation Styles. The Cronbach's alpha scores for the sample utilised within this research demonstrated good levels of internal consistency (please refer to Table 5.4 for subscale alpha coefficients).

***The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding*** (BIDR; Paulhus 1988) consists of 40 items that are scored on a Likert scale of 1 = *Not True* to 7 = *Very True*. Respondents are asked to rate the items according to their level of agreement with the item and one point is added for each extreme response of 6 or 7. The BIDR is used to measure two constructs: *Self-Deceptive Positivity* (the tendency to give self-reports that are believed but have a positivity bias) and *Impression Management* (deliberate self-presentation to an audience). The scores from items 1-20 (with even items reversed) are summed to create a Self-Deceptive Positivity scale score; the scores from items 21-40 (with odd items reversed) are summed to create an Impression Management scale score and all items are summed (with appropriate scores reversed) to create an overall social desirability score. The BIDR has good levels of internal consistency: .83 for the total measure; .68-.80 for the Self-Deceptive Positivity scale and .75-.86 for the Impression Management scale (Paulhus 1988) and the Cronbach's alpha obtained for the current sample was .81 (.71 for the Self-Deceptive Positivity subscale; .79 for the Impression Management subscale), so the scale was deemed to be reliable. The BIDR was used to screen for socially desirable responding whereby a cut-off point of greater than 30 ( $n = 2$ ) was used to exclude responses from the analysis.

#### **5.3.4. Procedure**

Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the University Research Ethics Committee prior to data collection. Permission to take part in the research was provided by the Assistant Chief Constable or lead HNC for each police force. Lead HNCs for each force were provided with a set of questionnaires that were disseminated to negotiators to complete either at one of their quarterly meetings or within their own time. Each HCN was provided with a second questionnaire to disseminate to a non-negotiator police officer colleague to complete. Student participants were recruited mainly via a research participation scheme whereby psychology students are allocated research credits for taking part in research studies. Additional non-psychology students were recruited from other faculties within the University to enhance

the number of male participants in the student sample. All participants were provided with a participant information sheet detailing the nature and aims of the research and were asked to provide written consent prior to completing the test battery. Participants were provided with a debrief sheet at the end of the questionnaire that included the researchers' details should they require any further information or wish to withdraw their data from the study. Scales were completed in paper format and returned to the researcher in a freepost envelope.

## **5.4. Results**

Statistical analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Cronbach's alpha coefficients were used to assess the internal consistency of the scales utilised (Clark and Watson 1995). Descriptive statistics, Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA)<sup>22</sup> and *T*-Tests were used to analyse the data and effect sizes were calculated using the guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988).

### **5.4.1. Personality**

A three (group: HCN, police officer and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between groups MANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of group membership and gender on the big five personality trait scores. Five dependent variables were used: Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C), Openness (O) and Neuroticism (N). There was a statistically significant difference between the three groups on the combined dependent variables ( $F(10, 858) = 15.43, p < .001; V = 0.31, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .15$ ). This effect was large and accounts for 15% of the variance observed. Univariate analyses of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01, revealed significant differences for four of the five variables (E, A, C and N). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that both HCNs and police officers scored significantly higher than students on E, A and C and significantly lower than students on N, however, there were no statistically significant differences observed between any of the mean subscale scores for negotiators and

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<sup>22</sup> DFA was chosen in lieu of logistic regression for the current study. Whilst logistic regression is often cited as being a more suitable test when assumptions of normality are violated, such violations are not considered to be 'fatal' and the resultant significance tests are still considered to be reliable/trustworthy (Hill and Lewicki 2006 :161). There is also some evidence to suggest that linear DFA still frequently achieves good performance even when the assumptions of normality are violated (Duda, Hart and Stork 2001), thereby further justifying the utilisation of DFA in this case.

police officers (please refer to Table 5.2 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes). On this basis, the first three hypotheses have been rejected. Fifteen triangulation  $t$ -tests were conducted to compare the norm data mean subscale scores with those of the three samples. The findings revealed that the mean scale scores obtained for HCNs and police officers on all five constructs (E, A, C, N and O) were significantly different ( $p < .01$ ) to the norm data mean scores providing further evidence for the differences observed above. In addition to this, only one of the five subscale scores (N) was found to be significantly different when comparing the norm data and student sample means, suggesting that the student sample provides a fairly representative comparison sample (please refer to Table 5.2 for  $t$ -test values).

The MANOVA was followed up with DFA that revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising E, A, C, N and O as predictor variables (canonical  $R^2 = 0.31$ ;  $\lambda = 0.68$ ,  $\chi^2(10) = 162.00$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The discriminant function plot depicted in Figure 5.1 demonstrates that the function successfully discriminates the student sample from the two police samples (combined) with N ( $r = 0.63$ ) and C ( $r = -0.60$ ) contributing most significantly to group separation/discrimination. In this case, relatively higher levels of N and relatively lower levels of C predict membership of the student sample as opposed to the police samples. Overall, the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome in 55% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 48% of HCNs, 20% of police officers and 79% of students. These prediction rates demonstrate a higher 'hit-ratio' than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 33%) in all but one of the predicted groups (the police officer sample).


Gender also had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of personality ( $F(5, 428) = 9.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ;  $V = 0.10$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .10$ ). This effect was large and accounts for 10% of the variance observed. Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01 revealed significant differences for three of the five variables (E, C and N). Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that females scored significantly higher on E, C and N than males (please refer to Table 5.2 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes), thereby providing some support for Hypothesis 1d but leading to rejection of Hypothesis 1e. Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function utilising E, A, C, N and O as predictor variables ( $\lambda = 0.85$ ,  $\chi^2(5) = 69.55$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and revealed that N ( $r = 1.10$ ) and E ( $r = 0.50$ ) were the best predictors of gender in this case, with female participants more likely to possess higher levels of both traits than male participants. Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 66% of cases, representing a hit rate higher than would be predicted by chance alone (33%).

Table 5.2. Summary of the Means, Standard Deviations, Univariate ANOVA and T-Test Results for Scores on the BFI across the Groups and Genders

DV	Cronbach Alpha	Norm Group (N = 132,515)^	HCNs (n = 117)		T-Test (Norm*HN)	Police Officers (n = 118)		T-Test (Norm*PO)	Students (n = 203)		T-Test (Norm*Student)	Univariate ANOVA (Group)		Males (n = 255)		Females (n = 183)		Univariate ANOVA (Gender)	
	<i>α</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (116)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (117)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (202)	<i>F</i> (2, 432)	<i>η</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 432)	<i>η</i> <sup>2</sup>
<b>E</b>	.84	3.18	3.69	0.70	7.95**	3.68	0.75	7.40**	3.37	0.76	3.58	12.79*	.06 <sup>M</sup>	3.50	0.75	3.60	0.77	7.85*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
<b>A</b>	.76	3.65	4.07	0.54	8.45**	4.06	0.62	7.76**	3.74	0.60	2.16	17.07*	.07 <sup>M</sup>	3.90	0.62	3.93	0.58	2.45	.01 <sup>S</sup>
<b>C</b>	.84	3.55	4.25	0.55	13.59**	4.16	0.68	12.30**	3.55	0.69	-0.06	64.81*	.23 <sup>L</sup>	3.89	0.68	3.90	0.72	9.88*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
<b>N</b>	.86	3.04	2.00	0.63	-17.93**	2.20	0.76	-12.15**	2.90	0.81	-2.47**	52.51*	.20 <sup>L</sup>	2.27	0.76	2.79	0.89	7.71*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
<b>O</b>	.73	3.98	3.63	0.52	-7.27**	3.55	0.57	-7.85**	3.47	0.58	-12.38	1.16	.01 <sup>S</sup>	3.60	0.57	3.44	0.56	4.07	.01 <sup>S</sup>

*Note.* E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; N = Neuroticism and O = Openness. Possible scores for each subscale ranged from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5. Italicised font = Most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA. Bold Font = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA. Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large). Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVA = .05 / 5 = .01. Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for T-Test = .05 / 15 = .003.  $\eta^2$  = Partial eta Squared. \*Statistically significant at the  $p < .01$  level. \*\*Statistically significant at the  $p < .003$  level. ^Norm data obtained from Srivastava et al. (2003).

There was no statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender ( $F(10, 858) = 1.75, p = .066, V = 0.04$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ ) suggesting that the effect of group membership on personality traits is independent of gender and vice versa.



*Figure 5.1.* Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant functions utilising the BFI subscales as predictor variables.

#### 5.4.2. General Coping Style

A three (group: HCN, police officer and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between groups MANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of group membership and gender on Coping Style. Dependent variables used within the analysis and descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 5.3. There was a statistically significant difference between the three groups on the combined dependent variable of coping style ( $F(32, 836) = 5.93, p < .001; V = 0.37$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .19$ ). This effect was large and accounts for 19% of the variance observed. Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .003,

showed significant differences for 15 of the variables. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that both HCNs and police officers scored significantly lower than students on: Rumination, Avoidance, Helplessness, Social Withdrawal, Opposition, Hang-Ups and Maladaptive Coping Strategies; and significantly higher than students on: Overall Coping Skills, Problem Solving, Negotiation, Positive Cognitive Restructuring, Emotional Regulation, Problem-Focused Coping, Emotion-Focused Coping, and Adaptive Coping Strategies. For the Distraction subscale, police officers alone scored significantly lower than students. There were no statistically significant differences observed between any of the mean subscale scores for negotiators and police officers (please refer to Table 5.3 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes). On this basis, Hypotheses 2a and 2b have been rejected. Triangulation  $t$ -tests were conducted to compare the norm data mean subscale scores with those of the three samples. The findings revealed that the mean scale scores obtained for HCNs and police officers on the majority of the constructs (12 out of 16 for negotiators; 14 out of 16 for police officers) were significantly different ( $p < .001$ ) to the norm data mean scores providing further evidence for the differences observed above. Only one of the 16 student subscale mean scores (Helplessness) was significantly different from the norm data means, suggesting that the student sample provides a fairly representative comparison sample (please refer to Table 5.3 for  $t$ -test values).

The MANOVA was followed up with DFA and revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising the variables identified in italicised text in Table 5.3 (canonical  $R^2 = 0.61$ ;  $\lambda = 0.62$ ,  $\chi^2(26) = 207.21$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The discriminant function plot depicted in Figure 5.2 demonstrates that the function successfully discriminates the student sample from the two police samples (combined) with Problem-Focused Coping ( $r = -1.26$ ), Information Seeking ( $r = 0.75$ ), Rumination ( $r = 0.59$ ) and Avoidance ( $r = 0.54$ ) contributing most significantly to group separation/discrimination. In this case, relatively higher levels of Information Seeking, Rumination and Avoidance and relatively lower levels of Problem-Focused Coping predict membership of the student sample as opposed to the police samples. Overall, the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome in 60% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 54% of HCNs, 46% of police officers and 71% of students. These prediction rates therefore demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 33%).

Gender also had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of coping style ( $F(16, 417) = 2.67$ ,  $p = .001$ ;  $V = 0.09$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .09$ ). This effect was moderate and accounts for 9% of the variance observed. Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .003 revealed only significant differences for the Information Seeking and Social Support variables ( $F(1, 438) = 9.66$ ,  $p = .002$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ ;

$F(1, 438) = 27.72, p < .001$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .06$ ). Inspection of the mean scores indicated that females scored significantly higher than males on measures of Information Seeking and Social Support, however, no significant differences were observed for emotion-focused strategies thereby leading to rejection of Hypothesis 2c (please refer to Table 5.3 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes).

Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function utilising the italicised variables in Table 5.3 ( $\Lambda = 0.85, \chi^2(12) = 71.42, p < .001$ ) and revealed that Problem-Focused Coping ( $r = -1.59$ ), Overall Coping Skills ( $r = 0.97$ ), Problem Solving ( $r = 0.77$ ) and Social Support ( $r = 0.75$ ) were the best predictors of gender in this case, with male participants more likely to display higher levels of Overall Coping Skills and female participants more likely to display higher levels of Problem-Focused Coping, Problem Solving and Social Support. Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 67% of cases, representing a ‘hit ratio’ higher than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 50%). There was no statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender ( $F(32, 836) = 0.95, p = .549, V = 0.07$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .04$ ) suggesting that the effect of group membership on coping style is independent of gender and vice versa.




Figure 5.2. Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant functions utilising the CST-Revised subscales as predictor variables.



Table 5.3. Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, Univariate ANOVA and T-Test Results for Scores on the CST-Revised across the Groups and Genders

Dependent Variable	Cronbach Alpha	Norm Group (N = 8998)^	HCNs (n = 117)		T-Test (Norm*HN)	Police Officers (n = 118)		T-Test (Norm*PO)	Students (n = 203)		T-Test (Norm*S)	Univariate ANOVA (Group)		Males (n = 255)		Females (n = 183)		Univariate ANOVA (Gender)	
	$\alpha$	M	M	SD	t (116)	M	SD	t (117)	M	SD	t (202)	F (2, 432)	$\eta^2$	M	SD	M	SD	F (1, 432)	$\eta^2$
<b>Problem Solving</b>	.85	62.96	74.92	14.29	9.05**	73.81	15.30	7.71**	67.04	17.32	3.36	12.95*	.06 <sup>M</sup>	70.55	15.72	71.55	17.34	4.90	.01 <sup>S</sup>
<i>Information Seeking</i>	.74	56.84	52.70	17.20	-2.60	55.25	18.32	-.941	56.68	18.20	-.125	0.93	.00 <sup>S</sup>	52.45	18.05	59.11	17.26	9.66*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
Negotiation~	.64	62.48	76.14	10.67	13.85**	74.37	11.40	11.34**	64.09	14.98	1.53	36.68*	.15 <sup>L</sup>	71.82	12.22	67.65	16.19	0.04	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<b>Social Support</b>	.74	49.58	47.90	15.52	-1.17	48.73	16.92	-0.55	50.76	16.01	1.04	0.02	.00 <sup>S</sup>	45.77	16.16	54.57	14.82	27.72*	.06 <sup>M</sup>
PC Restructuring~	.86	63.00	76.21	13.10	10.90**	75.25	14.38	9.25**	65.96	17.75	2.38	20.42*	.09 <sup>M</sup>	71.87	15.60	70.27	17.55	0.92	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Emotional Regulation	.65	56.85	60.84	15.80	2.73	62.69	15.85	4.01**	53.95	16.01	-2.58	13.79*	.06 <sup>M</sup>	59.01	16.38	56.94	16.38	0.12	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Distraction~	.67	58.76	62.57	13.04	3.16	63.95	15.12	3.73**	58.14	15.93	-0.55	7.19*	.03 <sup>S</sup>	61.72	15.01	59.73	15.38	0.17	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<i>Rumination</i>	.87	50.78	30.16	16.19	-13.78**	31.88	16.49	-12.45**	52.75	19.08	1.47	70.59*	.25 <sup>L</sup>	37.19	19.41	46.54	21.27	2.50	.01 <sup>S</sup>
<i>Avoidance</i>	.73	33.93	18.03	9.91	-17.34**	19.15	11.33	-14.16**	36.97	18.97	2.28	71.71*	.25 <sup>L</sup>	24.57	15.88	30.65	19.32	0.23	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Helplessness	.72	36.59	15.15	12.32	-18.83**	16.49	11.92	-18.32**	31.45	16.69	-3.92**	46.83*	.18 <sup>L</sup>	19.99	15.20	27.35	19.19	2.57	.01 <sup>S</sup>
Social Withdrawal	.76	39.97	27.18	12.12	-11.42**	27.43	12.79	-10.65**	36.30	18.35	-2.85	19.53*	.08 <sup>M</sup>	31.84	14.89	30.96	17.64	4.17	.01 <sup>S</sup>
Opposition~	.86	38.98	25.50	13.77	-10.59**	25.08	14.95	-10.10**	38.84	18.67	-0.11	32.35*	.13 <sup>L</sup>	29.33	17.03	34.70	18.43	0.60	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<b>Problem Focused Coping</b>	.89	60.77	67.90	11.29	6.83**	67.85	12.28	6.26**	62.60	13.55	1.92	11.32*	.05 <sup>M</sup>	64.94	12.48	66.10	13.43	5.39	.01 <sup>S</sup>
Emotion Focused Coping	.88	57.08	61.83	10.19	5.04**	62.62	11.55	5.21**	57.15	10.95	0.09	14.84*	.06 <sup>M</sup>	59.54	11.18	60.34	11.21	6.40	.02 <sup>S</sup>
Hang Ups	.93	39.83	23.15	9.88	-18.27**	24.00	10.07	-17.07**	39.24	14.89	-0.57	75.53	.08 <sup>M</sup>	28.53	13.07	34.05	16.25	0.49	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Adaptive Coping Skills~	.80 <sup>§</sup>	N/A	64.47	9.59	N/A	64.87	11.08	N/A	59.52	10.95	N/A	15.73*	.07 <sup>M</sup>	61.88	10.78	62.83	11.13	7.15	.02 <sup>S</sup>
Maladaptive Coping Skills~	.88 <sup>§</sup>	N/A	23.21	9.85	N/A	24.01	10.13	N/A	39.26	14.90	N/A	75.44*	.26 <sup>L</sup>	28.58	13.09	34.04	16.26	0.43	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<b>Overall Coping Skills</b>	.94	59.20	69.58	8.17	13.75**	69.52	9.52	11.78**	60.01	10.98	1.06	49.86*	.19 <sup>L</sup>	65.85	10.21	64.13	11.90	1.77	.00 <sup>S</sup>

Note. Italicised type = Most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA. Boldface type = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA. ~ = variables that were not included within the DFA. Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large). Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVAs = .05/18 = .003. Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for T-Tests = .05/48 = .001.  $\eta^2$  = Partial eta Squared. N/A = Norm data not available for these subscales as they were created by the researcher. ~ = Positive Cognitive Restructuring. Cronbach's alpha data provided by PsychTests who retained the raw data, apart from those marked with a <sup>§</sup> which are based on the current dataset. ^Norm group data taken from PsychTests AIM Inc. (2009). \* Statistically significant at the  $p < .003$  level. \*\*Statistically significant at the  $p < .001$  level.

### 5.4.3. Cognitive Emotion Regulation Style

A three (group: HCN, police officer and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between groups MANOVA was performed to investigate the influence of group membership and gender on Cognitive Emotion Regulation Style. Dependent variables used within the analysis and descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 5.4. There was a statistically significant difference between the three groups on the combined dependent variable of cognitive emotion regulation style ( $F(18, 840) = 8.21, p < .001; V = 0.30, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .15$ ). This effect was large, accounting for 15% of the variance observed. Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, found significant differences for six of the variables. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that both HCNs and police officers scored significantly lower than students on: Self-Blame, Acceptance, Rumination, Catastrophising and Maladaptive Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies; whereas HCNs alone scored significantly higher than students on the Positive Reappraisal subscale. There were no statistically significant differences observed between any of the mean subscale scores for negotiators and police officers (please refer to Table 5.4 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes). On this basis, Hypotheses 3a and 3b have been rejected. Triangulation  $t$ -tests were conducted to compare the norm data mean subscale scores with those of the three samples. The findings revealed that the mean scale scores obtained for HCNs and police officers on the majority of the constructs (five out of nine) were significantly different ( $p < .002$ ) to the norm data mean scores providing further evidence for the differences observed above. However, eight out of nine of the student subscale mean scores were also significantly different from the norm data means, suggesting that the students also utilise cognitive emotion regulation strategies differently to those participants on which the norm data is based ( $N = 611$ ) (please refer to Table 5.4 for  $t$ -test values).


Follow-up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising all variables apart from those marked with a ~ in Table 5.4 (Canonical  $R^2 = 0.54; \lambda = 0.67, \chi^2(8) = 24.52, p = .002$ ). The discriminant function plot depicted in Figure 5.3 demonstrates that the function successfully discriminates the student sample from the two police samples (combined) with Rumination ( $r = 0.42$ ), Catastrophising ( $r = 0.37$ ) and Self-Blame ( $r = 0.35$ ) contributing most significantly to group separation/discrimination. These variables were positively correlated with the discriminant function value, therefore relatively higher scores on each of these variables predict membership of the student sample, as opposed to the police samples. Overall, the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome in 58% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 54% of HCNs, 55% of police officers and 62% of students.

Table 5.4. Summary of Means, Standard Deviations, Univariate ANOVA and T-Test Results for Scores on the CERQ across the Groups and Genders

Dependent Variables	Cronbach Alpha	Norm Group (N = 611)^	HCNs (n = 117)		T-Test (norm*HN)	Police Officers (n = 118)		T-Test (norm*PO)	Students (n = 203)		T-Test (norm*S)	Univariate ANOVA (Group)		Males (n = 255)		Females (n = 183)		Univariate ANOVA (Gender)	
	$\alpha$	M	M	SD	t (116)	M	SD	t (117)	M	SD	t (202)	F (2, 427)	$\eta^2$	M	SD	M	SD	F (1, 427)	$\eta^2$
<i>Self-Blame</i>	.73	8.29	8.17	2.01	-0.64	8.29	1.97	-0.01	10.53	3.20	10.05**	35.28*	.14 <sup>L</sup>	8.86	2.65	9.87	3.02	1.55	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Acceptance	.71	10.66	11.83	3.37	3.75**	11.11	3.11	1.57	13.10	3.21	10.72**	15.52*	.07 <sup>M</sup>	12.21	3.27	12.22	3.42	1.26	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<b>Rumination</b>	.75	10.15	9.44	3.14	-2.46	9.27	2.91	-3.28**	12.46	3.49	9.09**	42.07*	.17 <sup>L</sup>	10.19	3.31	11.59	3.83	2.62	.01 <sup>S</sup>
Positive Refocusing	.82	9.75	9.45	3.38	-0.95	10.39	3.57	1.95	10.29	3.42	2.08	1.12	.01 <sup>S</sup>	9.95	3.38	10.29	3.57	0.65	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Refocus on Planning	.77	12.84	14.18	3.02	4.80**	14.14	3.14	4.51**	13.70	3.41	3.64**	1.73	.01 <sup>S</sup>	14.01	3.12	13.87	3.40	0.44	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Positive Reappraisal	.79	12.16	15.52	3.01	12.07**	14.31	3.38	6.91**	13.87	3.54	6.84**	6.40*	.03 <sup>S</sup>	14.60	3.42	14.21	3.43	0.12	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Putting into Perspective	.79	11.46	14.06	3.64	7.72**	14.12	3.37	8.58**	13.44	3.63	7.77**	1.19	.01 <sup>S</sup>	14.05	3.48	13.43	3.67	1.46	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<i>Catastrophising</i>	.74 <sup>§</sup>	6.15	5.92	2.03	-1.21	6.29	2.27	0.66	8.64	3.32	10.60**	42.15*	.17 <sup>L</sup>	6.95	2.72	7.71	3.36	0.01	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<b>Other-Blame</b>	.79	6.37	8.03	2.45	7.31**	8.06	2.19	8.40**	8.54	2.99	10.38**	3.76	.02 <sup>S</sup>	8.53	2.65	7.91	2.63	9.09*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
Adaptive CER Strategies~	.70	N/A	13.01	2.16	N/A	12.81	2.26	N/A	12.88	2.41	N/A	0.18	.00 <sup>S</sup>	12.96	2.26	12.81	2.36	0.03	.00 <sup>S</sup>
Maladaptive CER Strategies~	.70	N/A	7.89	1.65	N/A	7.98	1.53	N/A	10.04	2.30	N/A	57.47*	.21 <sup>L</sup>	8.63	2.03	9.27	2.39	0.00	.00 <sup>S</sup>

*Note.* Possible scores on each subscale ranged from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 20. Italicised type = Most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA. Boldface type = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA. ~ Variables not included within the DFA. Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large). Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVA = .05/11 = .005. Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for T-Test = .05/27 = .002. <sup>§</sup> The original Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the Catastrophising Subscale was .69. In order to enhance the reliability of this scale, item 8 on the questionnaire was removed and the internal consistency of the subscale increased to a satisfactory level of .74.  $\eta^2$  = Partial eta Squared. \*Statistically significant at the  $p < .005$  level. \*\*Statistically significant at the  $p < .002$  level. ^Norm data taken from Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven (2002).

These prediction rates therefore demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 33%).



*Figure 5.3.* Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant functions utilising the CERQ subscales as predictor variables.

Gender also had a significant impact on the combined dependent variable of cognitive emotion regulation style ( $F(9, 419) = 2.21, p = .02; V = 0.05, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .05$ ). This effect was moderate and accounts for 5% of the variance observed. Univariate analysis of each dependent variable, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .005, only revealed a significant difference for the Other Blame variable ( $F(1, 427) = 9.09, p = .003, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .02$ ). Inspection of the mean scores indicated that females scored significantly lower on measures of Other Blame than males, thereby leading to rejection of Hypothesis 3c (please refer to Table 5.4 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes). Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function ( $\Lambda = 0.97, \chi^2(9) = 37.56, p < .001$ ) and revealed that Other Blame ( $r = -0.64$ ), and Rumination ( $r = 0.50$ ) were the best predictors of gender in this case, with male participants more likely to display higher levels Other Blame and female participants more likely to display higher levels of Rumination. Overall, the discriminant function successfully

predicted outcome for 58% of cases, representing only a slightly higher 'hit ratio' than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e. 50%). There was no statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender ( $F(18, 840) = 1.45, p = .101, V = 0.06, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .03$ ) suggesting that the effect of group membership on cognitive emotion regulation style is independent of gender and vice versa.

## **5.5. Discussion**

The findings of this study provide evidence for the existence of a 'police profile' by revealing statistically significant differences between both of the police samples (HCNs and police officers) and the student sample. The study revealed a relatively greater level of extraversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness and a relatively lower level of neuroticism within both police samples compared to the student sample. The empirical literature relating to police personality, whereby police officers have typically demonstrated higher levels of conscientiousness and agreeableness and lower levels of neuroticism than the general population (Abrahamsen and Strype 2010) has, therefore, been supported. DFA revealed that higher levels of extraversion and lower levels of neuroticism were in fact the best predictors of police sample membership, further reinforcing the importance of such traits within law enforcement settings.

The data, however, fail to support the predicted existence of a unique 'HCN profile' as negotiators did not demonstrate significantly different personality traits or cognitive/behavioural coping styles when compared to their non-negotiator counterparts. Although it could be hypothesised that HCNs would be a more extraverted and gregarious group of individuals due to their role as 'professional persuaders' and their requirement to interact with people for sometimes prolonged and protracted periods of time, the findings from this study suggest that this is not necessarily the case.

The results are reassuring with regards to police selection within the UK, when considered in line with the research indicating that higher levels of conscientiousness and extraversion and lower levels of neuroticism are the most significant predictors of police population membership and performance (Barrick and Mount 1991, Barrick, Mount and Judge 2001, Black 2000, Cortina et al. 1992 and Detrick and Chibnall 2006). It can also be argued that police officers (as a generic group) possess the appropriate personality characteristics to perform specialist roles, such as HCNs, and that the 'police personality profile' serves as an appropriate grounding on which to develop specific skills for officers to become trained as negotiators. Many of the day-to-day situations that are encountered by operational police officers involve basic conflict management and resolution skills and it is therefore likely that the

police personality characteristics in combination with police training equip the majority of officers to deal with such situations.

With reference to coping style, the findings provide a reassuring and positive outlook. Despite much of the existing research literature suggesting that police officers are frequent users of dysfunctional or maladaptive coping strategies, the current findings indicate that this is not representative of UK-based police officers (or at least those sampled within the current research). In line with the findings relating to personality, although no significant differences were observed between HCNs and police officers, both police samples demonstrated significant differences in their use of both adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies when compared with the student sample. Police samples used adaptive coping strategies significantly more and maladaptive coping strategies significantly less than students. Police officers and negotiators also used all of the individual maladaptive cognitive and behavioural coping strategies far less than students. Such strategies included cognitive coping strategies such as Rumination, and Helplessness, and behavioural strategies such as Avoidance, Social Withdrawal and Opposition. With regards to the adaptive strategies, the police samples used Problem Solving, Negotiation, Positive Cognitive Restructuring and Emotional Regulation to a far greater extent than students. Interestingly, both HCNs and police officers scored more highly on Problem-Focused and Emotion-Focused coping than the students; however, the DFA indicated that the use of Problem-Focused Coping was in fact the best predictor of the police sample membership, thereby highlighting the importance of this style of coping within police work. Despite the fact that this finding is in contrast to that which was predicted, it is worth noting that emotion focused coping can also be considered to be adaptive, and that both styles of coping have in fact been observed within police populations (Alexander and Walker 1994, Beehr, Johnson and Nieva 1995, Fain and McCormick 1988 and Larsson, Kempe and Starrin 1988). These findings suggest that UK police officers are employing appropriate coping strategies to deal with the stresses associated with their role, which is vital when considered in the context of the pre-established positive correlational relationships between poor coping skills and stress, burnout and physical/psychological problems (Hurrell 1995, Lord, Gray and Pond 1991, Nordlicht 1979 and Rogers 1976).

The CST-Revised is designed to explore coping style from both a cognitive and behavioural context, whereas the CERQ includes a number of cognitive coping strategies used to regulate emotions when experiencing a stressful event. The current findings indicate that UK police officers use fewer maladaptive cognitive strategies to regulate their emotions and cope with stress, suggesting that they are adept at avoiding those strategies that are negative and dysfunctional. However, the data failed to demonstrate uniqueness with regards to HCNs

specifically. Interestingly, despite the difference observed with reference to maladaptive cognitive coping strategies, there is limited indication that police officers use adaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies to a greater extent than students. Specifically, police officers employed Self-Blame, Acceptance, Rumination and Catastrophising significantly less than students and HCNs alone utilised Positive Reappraisal significantly more than students. While these findings are suggestive of appropriate non-utilisation of the more dysfunctional coping strategies, they also highlight a potential training need for officers to utilise more adaptive and functional methods of cognitive coping when trying to regulate emotions in response to stressful events. The only strategy that appeared to discriminate the HCNs from the other two samples was Positive Reappraisal, which negotiators appear to use far more frequently. This variable was also the most discriminating variable when differentiating between group membership, indicating the importance of Positive Reappraisal as a cognitive coping tool within the negotiator repertoire. Therefore, it would appear that the ability to positively reappraise or reframe a situation is a beneficial tool for negotiators to help the person in crisis/hostage-taker see the situation in a different light and also for negotiators to deal with the stress that is often associated with negotiation by focusing on the positive aspects of the situation as opposed to the negative. This finding is particularly relevant to negotiator stress when considered in line with the research that indicates that Positive Reappraisal has been demonstrated to act as a protective factor against psychopathology (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002). The results are also reassuring regarding the potential for police officers generally to experience different forms of psychopathology, as research demonstrates that maladaptive forms of cognitive coping (particularly Rumination, Catastrophising and Self-Blame) are positively correlated with certain forms of psychopathology (particularly depression, anxiety and suicidality). Research demonstrates that the use of adaptive cognitive coping strategies can act as a protective factor against such symptomology (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002) and therefore, there is obvious scope to enhance the use of adaptive cognitive coping strategies within both HCNs and police officers as a result of dedicated training packages. Research indicates that such strategies can in fact be learned and unlearned (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002), suggesting potential for the development of bespoke cognitive coping strategy training within UK-based police forces in order to reduce the potential likelihood of negative psychological impact within their staff.

The findings relating to gender were fairly limited in scope in terms of application to police settings, and HCNn selection and practices specifically. Gender differences were observed for personality, with females demonstrating higher levels of extraversion, conscientiousness and neuroticism than males, a finding which is supportive of previous

research (Schmitt et al. 2008). This finding is interesting, when considered in line with the police personality literature, and suggests that females may in fact possess higher quantities of two of the personality traits that are correlated with performance in police settings (E and C) and therefore, provides ratifying evidence for the increased number of female officers who are now working within law enforcement, compared to a decade ago. Women, however, still, only constitute 27% of the total police strength/workforce within England and Wales (Home Office 2012), and these findings implicate the potential for this percentage to increase. Women also reported higher levels of social support and information seeking indicating more frequent utilisation of certain adaptive general coping strategies than males. They also demonstrated lower levels of blaming others, suggesting that they utilise certain maladaptive cognitive emotion regulation strategies less frequently than men. Although significant differences were observed for male and female participants across the whole sample, there were no significant interactions observed between gender and group membership. This indicates that male and female participants from within each of the three groups were similar in terms of personality, coping style and cognitive emotion regulation and suggests that gender is not necessarily a variable that mediates the effect of group membership on the dependent variables in this study.

The current study has provided an insight into the traits and characteristics possessed by UK police HCNs; however, it is not without limitations. While the sample size ( $N = 438$ ) is fairly acceptable for a study of this kind, its main limitation relates to the use of the student sample as a control/comparison sample. This resulted in comparison between three groups with a considerable difference in mean age, which is likely to have reduced the validity of the findings to some extent. The student population is also considered to be a fairly homogeneous group which is likely to have a higher level of intelligence and socio-economic status than the general population and therefore may not provide a perfect sample to act as a comparison group for police officers who generally recruit without degree level education. In order to try and account for this limitation, the mean scores for both the HCN and police officer samples on each of the variables tested was compared with norm group data (where available) using *t*-tests. The majority of the findings indicated that the police officer (combined) sample subscale means were significantly different to the norm group data means, thereby reinforcing the uniqueness of the 'police profile' observed. In addition, the majority of the student subscale means (with the exception of the CERQ subscales) were also statistically similar to the norm data means, thereby reinforcing the validity of the student sample as a comparison/control sample in this study. Nevertheless, in order to fully account for this limitation, future research could draw upon a general population sample that is more comparable in terms of age, level of education and socio-economic status to the police samples in order to further validate the current findings.



A further sampling limitation includes different proportions of rank representation across the two samples, with the negotiator sample demonstrating a relatively higher rank profile than the police officer sample. However, even when controlling for the effect of rank using MANCOVA, no significant differences were observed between the HCN and police officer samples on any of the dependent variables, thereby suggesting that rank is not confounding the current findings. Nevertheless, this limitation could be avoided in future research by ensuring that participants are matched in terms of rank across the two police samples, thereby reducing the potential impact of rank as a confounding variable. It is also worth noting that while a fairly large sample of HCNs ( $n = 117$ ) from approximately 50% of the territorial forces in the UK were included in the current study, this figure represents only a proportion of the total HCN population (~800) and the findings would therefore be validated further by replicating the study with a larger number of negotiators and police officers from more forces within the UK and internationally. Work in this domain has already begun, with Young (2016) having completed a partial replication of the current study using a sample of HCNs from the USA.

This research provides one of the first insights into the traits and characteristics of police HCNs within the UK. While the findings fail to provide evidence to support the notion of a unique HCN personality or profile, they add weight to the pre-established concept of a police personality. They suggest that police officers possess personality traits and coping styles that are unique and distinct from the general population and it is proposed that these characteristics serve to help them perform effectively within their police roles. The study also highlights potential individual police officer training needs that could be identified and developed in order to reduce possible negative impact on the psychological wellbeing and functioning of operational police officers. The findings, therefore, provide support for the development of a bespoke cognitive coping style training package which is designed to enhance effective utilisation of adaptive cognitive coping strategies and minimise the use of maladaptive coping strategies within police officers in the UK.

# **Chapter 6: Quantitative Phase Results Chapter 2: Exploring Decision-Making Style and Emotional Intelligence in UK Police Hostage and Crisis Negotiators**

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The aim of this chapter is to discuss the findings from the quantitative phase of the research in relation to the remaining two constructs measured: General Decision-Making Style and Emotional Intelligence. At the time of writing, this paper is currently under review by the *Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology*. The references for this chapter are embedded in the references section of this thesis.

## **6.1. Introduction**

Police HCNs may encounter an infinite number of varying situations during the performance of their role, which may range from dealing with an individual-in-crisis to negotiating with someone who has taken a person, or persons hostage. There is accumulating evidence to suggest that negotiation is an effective police tool (McMains and Mullins 2001 and Regini 2002) and that the use of negotiation can result in an increased likelihood of successful peaceful resolution of both hostage and crisis incidents (Flood 2003). However, there is little published empirical research in relation to the skills and characteristics required by HCNs in order to perform within this specific and often complex role. HCNs need to be able to respond effectively and efficiently within a variety of stressful and often highly emotive environments and it is likely that a number of constructs/characteristics help to mitigate the stress experienced by HCNs during such situations. This research explores whether decision-making style and emotional intelligence are important aspects within the HCN profile and aims to identify whether these constructs differentiate HCNs from their non-negotiator police officer counterparts and a non-police sample of students.

In addition to this, the current study incorporates the variable of gender, in order to explore whether profiles differ between male and female negotiators, police officers and students in terms of these constructs. Whilst the number of female police officers (and HCNs) has increased over the past five to ten years, there are still fewer serving female police officers within UK police forces. Data indicates that females represented 27.9% of police officers across the 43 UK police forces in 2014 (Home Office 2014). In light of the ‘softer skills’ that have been anecdotally identified as vital for successful negotiation (i.e. ability to demonstrate empathy, actively listen and develop rapport), the authors suggest that females may, therefore,

represent ideal candidates for the role of HCN. As such, the current study attempts to identify whether there are differences between the profiles of male and female HCNs (and police officers) in terms of their decision-making style and levels of emotional intelligence as this information has implications for the recruitment and selection of new HCNs.

The current study is being conducted in the absence of published research which identifies the characteristics and competencies of police HCNs and the findings, therefore, have implications for both the selection and training of HCNs and police officers. The successful identification of an effective 'HCN profile' would enable police forces to perform targeted recruitment for trainee HCNs and enhance the selection of appropriate candidates to complete training as HCNs.

## 6.2. Review of the Literature

### 6.2.1. Decision-making style

Scott and Bruce (1995: 820) described decision-making style as 'the learned, habitual response pattern exhibited by individuals when confronted with decision situations', suggesting that decision-making style is not a personality trait, but a habit-based propensity to react in a certain way. The premise is that when encountered with a stressful situation, individuals are likely to respond in a fairly consistent habitual manner when deciding how to react to the situation, but that the style of decision-making adopted may also be context-dependent. Scott and Bruce (1995) developed a classification system for individual decision-making style that consists of five distinct styles that are not mutually exclusive (see also Thunholm 2004). Individuals tend to utilise more than one style and consistently display a primary and secondary decision-making style (Driver, Brosseau and Hunsaker 1990). The five styles are described as 1) **Rational**: whereby logical and structured approaches to decision-making are employed (e.g., '*My decision-making requires careful thought*'). Rational decision-makers assess the long-term effects of their decisions and have a strong fact-based orientation to decision-making. 2) **Intuitive**: whereby individuals rely upon hunches, feelings and impressions when making decisions (e.g., '*I generally make decisions that feel right to me*'). Intuitive decisions are made relatively quickly, with limited information, and are often changed if the intuition was in error. 3) **Dependent**: which relies upon the direction and support of others (e.g., '*I use the advice of other people in making important decisions*'). A dependent style of decision-making is characterised by the use of advice and support from others in making decisions. 4) **Avoidant**: whereby decision-making tends to be postponed or avoided (e.g., '*I postpone decision-making whenever possible*'). The avoidant style is characterised by delay and denial, the opposite of

decisiveness. 5) *Spontaneous*: exemplified by impulsive and ‘spur of the moment’ decisions (e.g., ‘*I often make decisions on the spur of the moment*’). The spontaneous style is characterised by a strong sense of immediacy and an interest in getting through the decision-making process as quickly as possible.

The style of decision-making adopted by individuals is likely to contribute to performance/success within any occupational role and researchers have identified that certain decision-making styles are more effective than others (Anderson 2000, Nutt 1990, Russ, McNeilly and Comer 2001 and Sadler-Smith 2004). For example, rational decision-making styles have been found to be positively correlated, and avoidant styles negatively correlated, with assessments of managerial performance (Russ, McNeilly and Comer 2001). Other researchers have linked the intuitive decision-making style to performance within business settings (Anderson 2000 and Sadler-Smith 2004). However, although decision-making ability has been demonstrated to constitute a vital skill within the business and managerial context (Barnard 1938, Simon 1947, 1960, Taylor 1965 and Ivancevich, Szilagyi and Wallace 1977), there is very limited research that has been conducted to assess this construct within law enforcement or emergency services personnel. In light of the ‘high stakes’ scenarios that HCNs typically encounter, it seems prudent to suggest that decision-making style is likely to play a role in performance within such settings (i.e. a negotiator who is dealing with a hostage situation that may be bound by time-specific deadlines is unlikely to perform well if they display a primarily avoidant decision-making style).

The limited research which has been conducted focusing on the role of decision-making style within such personnel has tended to be linked to the physiological stress response. Research by Thunholme (2008) conducted with Swedish army officers indicates that individuals who utilise certain decision-making styles are more likely to respond negatively to stress and exhibit higher stress responses in certain situations, particularly those involving military or operational decision-making. Thunholme found that the avoidant decision-making style correlated significantly with higher levels of cortisol release during test sessions, indicating that individuals utilising this style experienced a higher level of negative stress when asked to make decisions under test conditions. This finding has implications for individuals working within highly stressful situations, as it implies that certain decision-making styles may be related to more effective coping. To date, there is no empirical research that explores decision-making styles among police officer populations and as such, it is unclear whether decision-making style is a construct which bears relevance to policing, or more specifically whether it plays a role in specialist police activities, such as that of HCNn.

### 6.2.2. Emotional intelligence

Salovey and Mayer (1990: 189) define Emotional Intelligence (EI) as ‘the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ emotions, to discriminate among them and to use the information to guide one’s thinking and actions’, whereas, Bar-On (1997: 16) defines EI as ‘an array of non-cognitive capabilities, competencies and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures’. There are a number of different models of EI; probably the most widely accepted model is that of Salovey and Mayer (1990) who divided EI into four dimensions and proposed that these dimensions exist sequentially (Mayer et al. 2001). These four dimensions can be summarised as: The *perception of emotion*, the *integration and assimilation of emotion*, *knowledge about emotions* and *management of emotions* (George 2000 and Mayer, Salovey and Caruso 1999). The first stage refers to the accuracy with which a person can identify emotions in themselves and others; the second refers to the process whereby an individual uses or assimilates emotions to facilitate thought (i.e., the use of emotions to guide thinking); the third refers to an individual’s understanding of how his/her emotions change; and the final stage refers to the management of one’s own mood and emotions along with the emotions of others. The construct of EI has been suggested to play a vital but multifaceted role in aspects of life including work, health and happiness and research indicates that individuals who are higher in EI, tend to be more successful in their careers, have higher levels of general life satisfaction and are healthier (Grewal and Salovey 2005). It is clear, therefore, that EI is a salient construct within the human psyche and one that contributes positively to individual success and satisfaction in a number of domains.

There is a vast amount of psychological research focused specifically on the role of EI in occupational settings, with respect to both work-place performance/success and academic performance (Nowicki and Duke 1992, Shoda, Mischel and Peake 1990 and Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2004). Some researchers have even gone so far as to suggest that EI is a more important predictor of work-place performance/success than IQ (Bar-On 1997, Goleman 1995 and Dulewicz, Higgs and Slaski 2003); and EI has been consistently and empirically linked to both occupational performance and success (Carmeli and Josman 2006, Christiansen, Janovics and Siers 2010, Cote and Miners 2006, Goleman 1995, Lam and Kirby 2002, Law, Wong and Song 2004, Semadar, Robins and Ferris 2006 and Sy, Tram and O’Hara 2006).

EI has also been conceptualised as a protective factor in terms of resilience to negative life events and is thought to buffer the effects of aversive events on mental health (Ciarrochi, Forgas and Mayer 2001). A relationship between EI and resilience has been demonstrated, with Armstrong, Galligan and Critchley’s (2011) findings demonstrating that high scores on all four dimensions of EI successfully predict higher levels of resilience in a general population sample

of 414 participants from across the world (including the USA, Australia, the UK and Canada). Emotionally intelligent behaviour has been suggested to be particularly adaptive when individuals are confronted by stressful situations (Armstrong, Galligan and Critchley 2011) and Salovey et al. (1999: 161) have proposed that individuals with higher levels of EI cope better with the emotional demands of stressful encounters as a result of their abilities to 'accurately perceive and appraise their emotions, know how and when to express their feelings, and effectively regulate their mood states'.

Research also indicates that EI may influence the performance of individuals within specific occupational roles (Bar-On et al. 2000). Bar-On et al. (2000) investigated the differences in EI between two distinct occupational groups in Germany, both of which suffered high levels of occupational stress: Police officers and paraprofessional personnel in mental health and child care professions. They found that police officers scored significantly higher than either of the care worker practitioner groups on most of the primary measures of EI, suggesting that the abilities of police officers to be emotionally more aware of themselves and of others makes them more adaptable to stressful events and equips them with more efficient/effective coping strategies. Due to the stress that is likely to be experienced by negotiators when dealing with hostage or crisis situations, it seems prudent to suggest that high levels of EI would not only serve to facilitate their negotiating skills, but also to enhance their resilience and protect them from the adverse effects of the stresses experienced as a result of negotiation deployments.

It is clear that EI contributes positively to individual success within a variety of settings, however, research has also implicated the role of EI within team/group performance (Jordan and Lawrence 2009, Jordan and Troth 2004, Quoidbach and Hansenne 2009 and Stough, Saklofske and Parker 2009). This suggests that the ability to identify and regulate your own and others' emotions is a skill that works to positively enhance the performance of a number of individuals within a team. This also has implications for HCNs who exist as part of a cadre and typically work within a team format (i.e. the negotiator cell). The ability, therefore, to effectively manage the emotions of the parties involved (including that of the hostage-taker/individual in crisis and secondary negotiator) is consequently proposed to constitute a vital part of HCNn and highlights the potential importance of the EI construct within such settings.

Although there is a plethora of research studies where the role of EI in a number of occupational settings has been investigated, the empirical research focused on police settings is limited. However, the idea of EI as a contributing factor within police organisations is gaining momentum, and those researchers that have measured EI within police officers have demonstrated positive findings that promote the benefits of EI within law enforcement settings

(Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 2010, Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012, Aremu and Tejumola 2008 and Lev 2005). Al Ali, Garner and Magadley (2012), Afolabi, Awosola and Omole (2010) and Lev (2005), for example, all found a positive correlation between EI and police officer performance within their samples of police officers in the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria and Israel, respectively. Furthermore, there is strong evidence to indicate that EI is particularly beneficial within occupations that involve regular interpersonal contact with people, particularly where such contacts are the basis for effectiveness (Caruso, Bienn and Kornacki 2006). This criteria is congruent with the majority of police officer roles, particularly that of HCNs, who spend the vast majority of their time communicating and interacting with hostage-takers or individuals-in-crisis.

In addition to the small cluster of studies that support a link between EI and police performance, there are a number of specific facets of EI that would appear logically to be associated with, and particularly pertinent to, the role of HCNn. The first relates to the concepts of appraisal and expression of emotion, which are described by Mayer and Salovey (1997) as the ability to recognise emotion in other people's facial and postural expressions and the ability to recognise honest and dishonest expressions of emotions. These abilities are particularly relevant to the HCNn situation, as the ability to accurately detect an individual's emotional state is vital for consistent communication (Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012) and therefore, the negotiator's ability to draw upon these skills may facilitate the negotiation process and enhance the likelihood of a successful and peaceful resolution. The concept of empathy also falls within this facet of EI and relates to the ability to demonstrate an awareness of other people's feelings, concerns and needs (Gardner 2005). Empathy is considered to be one of the main underpinning processes within the HCNn context and it is specified as a key component within the Behavioural Change Stairway Model developed by the Crisis Negotiation Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (CNU/FBI) (BCSM; Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005) and the adapted version of the BCSM, the Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM: Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008, Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005 and Vecchi 2007 cited in Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008) utilised by negotiators worldwide. The ability to display empathy in this context forms a key component of active listening that is used to help create a relationship between the HCN and individual-in-crisis or hostage-taker. This process has parallels with the therapeutic alliance observed within the psychotherapeutic context (Grubb 2010) and is thought to play a vital role within the successful resolution of negotiation incidents. The second facet of EI that would appear to be particularly relevant to HCNn is that of emotion regulation. Cherniss (2000) demonstrated that enhancement of EI skills within police officers, as a result of training to effectively manage emotions, has positive outcomes in terms of helping

regulate individual's reactions and those of others, particularly in conflict, dangerous and difficult situations.

To date, there is no specific published academic research that focuses on the role of EI within HCNn; however, the construct has been implicated within the more generic negotiation literature (Barry, Fulmer and Van Kleef 2004, Fulmer and Barry 2004 and Thompson, Nadler and Kim 1999) and has more recently been applied to the concept of international negotiation (see Caruso 2015) and negotiation/mediation of legal disputes (see Kelly and Kaminskiene 2016). Fulmer and Barry (2004), for example, suggested that the benefits from EI in other occupational and academic contexts are likely to extrapolate to negotiation contexts by providing greater sensitivity to emotional cues, minimising the negative effects of emotion on decision-making and facilitating the implementation of emotion-based tactics in negotiation. They proposed that EI is a vital concept within the negotiation process as emotional expression is a pervasive tool within human communication. Researchers have identified that aspects of EI, such as negotiator's emotional expression (verbal or non-verbal) assist in providing important informational cues that help to propel the negotiation through its various phases (initiation, influence, problem solving and conclusion) (Morris and Keltner 2000). Caruso (2015) suggests that emotionally intelligent negotiators are more likely to: 1) demonstrate accurate self- and other-awareness of emotions, 2) connect emotionally with others and match the mood to the task, 3) utilise excellent emotion vocabulary and conduct accurate affective forecasting, and 4) stay focused and calm and keep other parties calm. On the basis of extrapolation of these findings, it is therefore prudent to suggest that EI is an important element within HCNn, due to the nature of the highly emotive situations that typically require the expertise of police negotiators and the need for negotiators to manage both their own and others' emotions effectively.

### **6.2.3. Gender, decision-making style and emotional intelligence**

Gender differences have been observed within the broad decision-making literature, particularly with reference to risk-taking behaviour (Dwyer, Gilkeson and List 2002, Powell and Ansic 1997 and Turner and McClure 2003); and in this context, men tend to demonstrate higher levels of risk-taking than women, a trend confirmed by Byrnes, Miller and Schafer's (1999) meta-analysis. There is, however, limited research that focuses specifically on gender differences in decision-making *style*. Some researchers have implicated the role of intuition within decision-making gender differences, with findings suggesting that women are more intuitive than men (Agor 1986, Pacini and Epstein 1999 and Parikh, Neubauer and Lank 1994). Lieberman (2000), for example, found that female decision-makers more efficiently access



intuition than men, as a result of superior encoding and decoding skills that are partly thought to be due to higher levels of oestrogen.

The literature associated with EI and gender is somewhat contradictory and is likely to be influenced by the use of different constructs/tools to measure EI and cross-cultural variability. There is strong empirical support for women possessing higher levels of EI compared to men (Day and Carroll 2004, Mayer, Caruso and Salovey 1999, Schutte et al. 1998 and Van Rooy and Viswesvaran 2003 cited in Van Rooy, Alonso and Viswesvaran 2005); however, other researchers have found the opposite (Bindu and Thomas 2006) or no significant differences (Bar-On 1997 and Petrides and Furnham 2000). Published research which explores the potential existence of such differences within police populations is lacking, and as such, the current study aims to identify whether gender differences in decision-making style and EI extrapolate to police settings and to HCNs, specifically.

### **6.3. Aims, Objectives and Hypotheses**

The main aim of the current study is to compare police HCNs with non-negotiator trained police officers and a non-police sample of students to identify the decision-making styles and levels of EI demonstrated by police HCNs in the UK. This will help to establish whether negotiators utilise certain types of decision-making style to a greater extent or display higher levels of EI than the comparative groups. Research evidence implicates the importance of EI within police work and extrapolation of this evidence suggests that EI is a vital skill for HCNs, with particular reference to the elements of appraisal/expression of emotion and regulation of other people's emotions. The authors therefore propose that the abilities to identify and modulate both their own and other people's emotions are skills that are vital to de-escalating hostage and crisis situations. It is predicted that HCNs possess higher levels of EI than the general population on this basis. Similarly, decision-making style has been linked to performance within a number of occupational roles and a lower stress response in certain environmental conditions. The authors therefore propose that certain types of decision-making style may serve to be more beneficial for those deployed as HCNs by enabling them to cope more effectively with role-related stress. A further aim is to establish whether there are differences between male and female decision-making styles and levels of EI within the HCN, police officer and student samples. This latter analysis will provide insight into potential gender differences within police populations which may have implications for police officer selection, training and performance. The following hypotheses have been generated on the basis of the extant literature:

- 1a) HCNs will employ *rational* decision-making styles significantly more frequently than police officers and students;
- 1b) HCNs will employ *intuitive* decision-making styles significantly more frequently than police officers and students;
- 1c) HCNs will employ *avoidant* decision-making styles significantly less frequently than police officers and students;
- 2a) HCNs will score significantly higher on measures of EI than police officers and students;
- 2b) Police officers will score significantly higher on measures of EI than students;
- 2c) HCNs will score significantly higher than both police officers and students on measures of EI that specifically involve the identification and regulation of other people's emotions (i.e., the *Emotional Awareness of Others* (EAO) EI subscale and the *Emotional Management of Others* (EMO) EI subscale);
- 3a) There will be a significant difference between male and female HCN decision-making style scores;
- 3b) There will be a significant difference between male and female police officer decision-making style scores;
- 3c) There will be a significant difference between male and female student decision-making style scores;
- 4a) There will be a significant difference between male and female HCN EI scores;
- 4b) There will be a significant difference between male and female police officer EI scores;
- 4c) There will be a significant difference between male and female student EI scores.

## 6.4. Method

### 6.4.1. Design

The current study utilised a cross-sectional survey design whereby data were collected in the form of a psychometric test battery. The battery consisted of six pre-validated scales measuring the following constructs: a) *Personality*, b) *Coping Style*, c) *Cognitive Emotion Regulation*, d) *Decision-Making Style*, e) *Emotional Intelligence* and f) *Social Desirability*. Constructs d and e were considered as dependent variables within the current paper<sup>23</sup> and the independent variables were group membership with three levels (HCN, Police Officer and Student) and gender with two levels (male and female).

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<sup>23</sup> Please refer to Chapter 5/Grubb, Brown and Hall (2015) for results relating to a, b and c.

### 6.4.2. Participants

The *HCN Sample* consisted of 117 (77% Male; 23% Female) negotiators from 21 UK police forces with a mean age of 43 years ( $SD = 6.1$ ) and an age range of 29 - 61. The vast majority of participants ( $n = 115$ ; 98%) were White British, 1 (1%) participant was Other White and 1 (1%) was Pakistani. Participants' lengths of service within the police ranged from 30 to 400 months, with a mean of 244 months ( $SD = 76.7$ ) and their lengths of service as negotiators ranged from 0 to 192 months, with a mean of 64 months ( $SD = 45.5$ ). The number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator ranged from 0 to 300, with a mean of 43 ( $SD = 52.0$ ).

The *Police Officer Sample* consisted of 118 (63% Male; 37% Female) officers from 21 UK police forces with a mean age of 41 years ( $SD = 7.5$ ) and an age range of 21 – 57 years. All 118 (100%) participants were White British. Participants' lengths of service within the police ranged from 28 to 480 months, with a mean of 182 months ( $SD = 92.6$ ).

The *Student Sample* consisted of 203 (45% Male; 55% Female) undergraduate and postgraduate students from Coventry University, with a mean age of 22 years ( $SD = 5.9$ ) and an age range of 18 – 50 years. The majority of participants were White British ( $n = 124$ ; 61%) and the remainder of the sample consisted of students from a variety of different ethnicities: Other White ( $n = 18$ ; 9%); Indian ( $n = 19$ ; 9%); Pakistani ( $n = 12$ ; 6%); Bangladeshi ( $n = 1$ ; 1%); Other Asian ( $n = 1$ ; 1%); Black African ( $n = 14$ ; 7%), Other Black ( $n = 3$ ; 2%), Chinese ( $n = 1$ ; 1%); Other Ethnicity ( $n = 10$ ; 5%).

### 6.4.3. Measures

#### 6.4.3.1. *Demographic Questionnaire*<sup>24</sup>.

Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire that was sample specific and contained questions relating to personal characteristics, work history within the police or course of study. Demographic questions included: *age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, course and year of study, force, rank, length of service as an officer, length of service as a negotiator and number of incidents dealt with as a negotiator*.

#### 6.4.3.2. *The General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire (GDMS)*.

The GDMS (Scott and Bruce 1995) is used to classify individuals as having one of five independent decision-making styles: *rational* (logical and structured approaches to decision-

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<sup>24</sup> Please refer to Appendix 27–29 for full details of the demographic questionnaires completed by each sample.

making); *avoidant* (postponing or avoiding making decisions); *intuitive* (reliance upon hunches, feelings and impressions); *dependent* (reliance upon the direction and support of others); or *spontaneous* (impulsive and prone to making ‘snap’ or ‘spur of the moment’ decisions). It consists of 25 items, scored on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 5 = *Strongly Agree*, with five items identified for each decision-making style. Each decision-making style can obtain a maximum of 25 and a minimum of 0 and the highest score from each of the subscales is used to classify participants in terms of their decision-making style. E.g., If a participant scores 25 on the avoidant subscale they will be classified as an avoidant decision-maker. Examples of items relevant to each decision-making style include: ‘*I postpone decision-making whenever possible*’ (Avoidant); ‘*I use the advice of other people in making important decisions*’ (Dependent); ‘*When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts*’ (Intuitive); ‘*I make decisions in a logical and systematic way*’ (Rational); and ‘*I generally make snap decisions*’ (Spontaneous). The scales of the GDMS have been shown to be reliable with military officers, students, engineers and technicians, with reported Cronbach’s alphas ranging from: .77-.85 for the Rational Scale; .78-.84 for the Intuitive Scale; .62-.86 for the Dependent Scale; .84-.94 for the Avoidant Scale and .83-.87 for the Spontaneous Scale (Loo 2000 and Scott and Bruce 1995). The Cronbach’s alphas obtained for the current sample ranged from .70-.90 (please refer to Table 6.1 for specific subscale alphas), thereby demonstrating an adequate level of internal consistency.

#### **6.4.3.3. The Genos Emotional Intelligence Inventory - Full Version (EII).**

The EII (Gignac 2008) consists of 70 items designed to measure the frequency with which an individual displays emotionally intelligent behaviours across seven dimensions. The items are scored on a five-point Likert scale, from 1 = *Almost Never* to 5 = *Almost Always*. The inventory provides scores that are representations of the relative frequency with which an individual engages in emotionally intelligent behaviours. The EII provides a *Total Emotional Intelligence* (Total EI) score, along with seven EI sub-scale scores that measure the demonstration of EI skills across the following seven different dimensions: *Emotional Self-Awareness* (ESA); *Emotional Expression* (EE); *Emotional Awareness of Others* (EAO); *Emotional Reasoning* (ER); *Emotional Self-Management* (ESM); *Emotional Management of Others* (EMO); and *Emotional Self-Control* (ESC). The Total EI score is based on an equally weighted composite of the seven Genos EI dimensions defined above. The Total EI score therefore represents the frequency with which an individual engages in a diverse variety of emotionally intelligent behaviours relevant to the identification of emotions (relating to both self and others), reasoning with emotions, and the general management of emotions (self,

others, and emotional control). The Genos EII demonstrates a high level of internal consistency with the overall EII scale displaying a Cronbach's alpha score of  $>.90$  across a variety of nationalities (including American, Asian, Australian, Indian, and South African) (Gignac 2008). The subscale scores are also associated with respectable levels of internal consistency with alpha scores ranging from  $.71-.85$  (Gignac 2008). The Cronbach's alphas obtained for the current sample ranged from  $.71-.83$  (please refer to Table 6.2 for specific subscale alphas), thereby demonstrating an adequate level of internal consistency.

#### **6.4.3.4. *The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR).***

The BIDR (Paulhus 1988) consists of 40 items that are scored on a Likert scale of 1 = *Not True* to 7 = *Very True*. Respondents are asked to rate the items according to their level of agreement with the item and one point is added for each extreme response of 6 or 7. The BIDR is used to measure two constructs: *Self-Deceptive Positivity* (the tendency to give self-reports that are believed but have a positivity bias) and *Impression Management* (deliberate self-presentation to an audience). The scores from items 1-20 (with even items reversed) are summed to create a self-deceptive positivity scale score; the scores from items 21-40 (with odd items reversed) are summed to create an impression management scale score and all items are summed (with appropriate scores reversed) to create an overall social desirability score. The BIDR reports good levels of internal consistency:  $.83$  for the total measure;  $.68-.80$  for the self-deceptive positivity scale and  $.75-.86$  for the impression management scale (Paulhus 1988) and the Cronbach's alpha obtained for the current sample was  $.81$  ( $.71$  for the self-deceptive positivity subscale;  $.79$  for the impression management subscale), demonstrating an adequate level of internal consistency. The BIDR was used to screen for socially desirable responding whereby a cut-off point of  $>30$  ( $n = 2$ ) was used to exclude responses from the analysis.

#### **6.4.4. Procedure**

Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the Coventry University Research Ethics Committee. Permission to take part in the research was provided by the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) or Force Lead HCNn Coordinator (HCNC) for each police force. All participants were provided with a participant information sheet which provided details of the research and were asked to sign a consent form prior to taking part. HCNCs for each force were provided with a set of questionnaires that were disseminated to negotiators to complete either at one of their quarterly meetings or within their own time. Each negotiator was provided with a second questionnaire to disseminate to a non-negotiator police officer colleague to complete.

Student participants were recruited mainly via a research participation scheme whereby psychology students are allocated research credits for taking part in research studies. Additional non-psychology students were recruited from other faculties within the University to enhance the number of male participants in the student sample. All questionnaires were completed in paper format and all participants were provided with a debrief sheet at the end of the questionnaire which included information on how to withdraw their data from the study.

## **6.5. Results**

Statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS. Descriptive statistics, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), discriminant function analysis (DFA)<sup>25</sup> and *t*-tests were used to analyse the data. The data were screened and parametric assumptions were tested prior to analysis taking place. Any violated assumptions were considered to be successfully counteracted by the large sample size ( $N = 438$ ), the number of participants in each cell exceeding 30 and the robust nature of the MANOVA test (see Field 2009 and Pallant 2007). Effect sizes were calculated using the guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988: 22) and are indicated by the terms small, medium or large in brackets after the partial eta squared figure ( $\eta^2$ ) and the superscript letters “S”, “M” and “L” in the tables.

### **6.5.1. Decision-Making Style**

#### **6.5.1.1. *Effect of group membership.***

To investigate the influence of group membership and gender on decision-making style, a three (group: HCN, police office and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between groups MANOVA was performed using the five decision-making style subscales as dependent variables (please refer to Table 6.1 for means, standard deviations, *F* values and effect sizes). A main effect of group was observed on the combined dependent variables,  $F(10, 858) = 9.62, p = .000; V = 0.20; \text{partial } \eta^2 = .10$  (large) indicating a significant difference between the decision-making style subscale scores obtained for each group. Univariate ANOVAs (using a Bonferroni

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<sup>25</sup> DFA was chosen in lieu of logistic regression for the current study. Whilst logistic regression is often cited as being a more suitable test when assumptions of normality are violated, such violations are not considered to be ‘fatal’ and the resultant significance tests are still considered to be reliable/trustworthy (Hill and Lewicki 2006 :161). There is also some evidence to suggest that linear DFA still frequently achieves good performance even when the assumptions of normality are violated (Duda, Hart and Stork 2001), thereby further justifying the utilisation of DFA in this case.

adjusted alpha level of  $p < .01$ ) revealed significant differences for the *Dependent*, *Spontaneous* and *Avoidant* decision-making styles when considering the separate dependent variables. Separate post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD) revealed that both HCNs and police officers scored significantly lower than students on *Dependent* and *Avoidant* decision-making and police officers scored significantly lower than students on *Spontaneous* decision-making. No statistically significant differences were observed between HCNs and police officers on any of the subscales, thereby leading to rejection of Hypotheses 1a and 1b.

Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising the five decision-making style subscales as predictor variables (canonical  $R^2 = 0.45$ ;  $\lambda = 0.80$ ,  $\chi^2(10) = 98.74$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The function explains 98.4% of the variance with *Avoidant* ( $r = 0.85$ ) and *Dependent* ( $r = 0.36$ ) decision-making styles contributing most significantly to group separation/discrimination (please refer to Figure 6.1 for the Discriminant Function Plot). In this case, higher levels of both *Avoidant* and *Dependent* decision-making styles predict membership of the student sample. Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 51% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 34% of HCNs, 19% of police officers and 79% of students. These prediction rates demonstrate a higher ‘hit-ratio’ than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e., 33 %) in all but one of the predicted groups (police officers).

#### **6.5.1.2. Effect of gender.**


A significant main effect of gender was observed on the combined dependent variables,  $F(5, 428) = 7.29$ ,  $p = .000$ ;  $V = 0.08$ ;  $\eta^2 = .08$  (medium) (please refer to Table 6.1 for means, standard deviations and  $p$  values) with univariate ANOVAs (using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of  $p < .01$ ) revealing significant differences between male and female participants on the *Spontaneous* decision-making style alone, with females scoring significantly lower on the *Spontaneous* decision-making subscale than males. Follow up DFA using the five sub-scales of the GDMS as the predictor variables revealed a single significant discriminant function ( $\lambda = 0.89$ ,  $\chi^2(5) = 49.39$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

Table 6.1. *Summary of the Means, Standard Deviations, T-Tests and Univariate ANOVA Results for Scores on the GDMS*

Dependent variables	Cronbach alpha	Norm group ( <i>N</i> = 400)^	HCNs ( <i>n</i> = 117)		<i>t</i> -Test (norm*HN)	Police officers ( <i>n</i> = 118)		<i>t</i> -Test (norm*PO)	Students ( <i>n</i> = 203)		<i>t</i> -Test (norm*S)	Univariate ANOVA (Group)		Males ( <i>n</i> = 255)		Females ( <i>n</i> = 183)		Univariate ANOVA (Gender)	
	<i>α</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (116)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (117)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (202)	<i>F</i> (2, 432)	<i>η</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 432)	<i>η</i> <sup>2</sup>
<b>Intuitive</b>	.77	3.62	3.51	0.66	-1.72	3.54	0.67	-1.29	3.63	0.67	0.14	0.38	.00 <sup>S</sup>	3.50	0.42	3.66	0.58	5.21	.01 <sup>S</sup>
Rational	.70	3.50	3.91	0.43	10.48**	3.91	0.50	8.88**	3.88	0.65	8.33**	0.24	.00 <sup>S</sup>	3.91	0.04	3.87	0.05	0.48	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<i>Dependent</i>	.73	3.48	3.09	0.61	-7.01**	3.15	0.68	-5.36**	3.51	0.73	0.60	13.99*	.06 <sup>M</sup>	3.17	0.04	3.33	0.06	4.56	.01 <sup>S</sup>
<b>Spontaneous</b>	.78	2.89	2.64	0.64	-4.30**	2.56	0.68	-5.27**	2.79	0.83	-1.67	5.66*	.03 <sup>S</sup>	2.76	0.05	2.55	0.06	7.13*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
<i>Avoidant</i>	.90	2.54	1.77	0.61	-13.61**	1.86	0.67	-11.13**	2.55	1.02	0.15	40.74*	.16 <sup>L</sup>	2.07	0.05	2.00	0.07	0.64	.00 <sup>S</sup>

*Note.* Possible scores for each subscale ranged from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5. Italicised font = Most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA. Bold Font = Most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA. Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large). Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVAs = .05 / 5 = .01. Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for *t*-Tests - .05 / 15 = .003. \*Statistically significant at the  $p < .01$  level. \*\*Statistically significant at the  $p < .003$  level. ^Norm data taken from Spicer and Sadler-Smith (2005).  $\eta^2$  = Partial eta Squared.





*Figure 6.1.* Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant functions utilising the GDMS subscales as predictor variables.

Correlations between predictor variables and the discriminant function suggested that *Spontaneous* and *Intuitive* decision-making styles were the best predictors of gender in this case, with female participants more likely than males to display higher levels of *Intuitive* decision-making and male participants more likely than females to display higher levels of *Spontaneous* decision-making. Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 64% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 65% of male participants and 62% of female participants. These prediction rates represent ‘hit-rates’ that are higher than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e., 50%). There was no statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender,  $F(10, 858) = 1.71, p = .359, V = 0.03$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .01$  (small), which indicates that the effect of group membership on decision-making style is independent of gender and vice versa. On this basis, Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c have been rejected.

## 6.5.2. Emotional Intelligence

### 6.5.2.1. *Effect of group membership.*

To investigate the influence of group membership on EI, a three (group: HCN, police office and student) by two (gender: male and female) way between groups MANOVA was performed utilising the eight EII subscales as dependent variables. A statistically significant difference was observed between the three groups on the combined dependent variables,  $F(14, 824) = 8.39, p = .000; V = 0.25; \text{partial } \eta^2 = .13$  (large) (please refer to Table 6.2 for details of means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes). Separate univariate ANOVAs (using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of  $p < .006$ ) revealed significant differences for all eight variables. Separate post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD) revealed that both police samples scored significantly higher than students on all measures of EI, thereby providing support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. No statistically significant differences were observed between any of the mean sub-scale scores for negotiators and police officers, thereby leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 2c.

Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function variate utilising seven of the EII subscales as predictor variables (*Overall Emotional Intelligence* was removed from the analysis due to exceeding the minimum tolerance level for the analysis) and significantly discriminated the three groups/samples (canonical  $R^2 = 0.25; \Lambda = 0.74, \chi^2(14) = 128.65, p < .001$ ). The function explains 93.0% of the variance and successfully discriminates the student sample from the two police samples (combined), with *Emotional Management of Others* ( $r = 0.14$ ), *Emotional Reasoning* ( $r = 0.12$ ) and *Emotional Self-Management* ( $r = -0.08$ ) contributing most significantly to group separation/discrimination (please see Figure 6.2 for the Discriminant Function Plot). High scores on each of these variables therefore predict membership of one of the two police samples. Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted 59% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 58% of HCNs, 22% of police officers and 83% of students. These prediction rates demonstrate a higher 'hit-ratio' than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e., 33%) in all but one of the predicted groups (police officers).

Table 6.2. *Summary of the Means, Standard Deviations, T-Tests and Univariate ANOVA Results for Scores on the EII*

Dependent variables	Cronbach alpha	Norm data ( <i>N</i> = 4775) <sup>^</sup>	HCNs ( <i>n</i> = 117)		t-Test (norm*HN)	Police officers ( <i>n</i> = 118)		t-Test (norm*PO)	Students ( <i>n</i> = 203)		t-Test (norm*S)	Univariate ANOVA (Group)		Males ( <i>n</i> = 255)		Females ( <i>n</i> = 183)		Univariate ANOVA (Gender)	
	<i>α</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (116)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (117)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i> (202)	<i>F</i> (2, 417)	<i>η</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 417)	<i>η</i> <sup>2</sup>
ESA	.77	41.94	41.56	4.07	-1.02	41.38	3.92	-1.32	38.19	5.19	-10.26**	29.16*	.12 <sup>L</sup>	39.79	4.83	40.29	4.98	7.84*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
<b>EE</b>	.78	39.53	40.24	4.01	1.91	39.28	4.82	-0.34	35.86	5.17	-10.03**	37.26*	.15 <sup>L</sup>	37.81	5.29	38.30	4.98	9.66*	.02 <sup>S</sup>
EAO	.82	40.22	41.38	3.89	3.21	39.74	4.15	-1.18	37.04	5.22	-8.87**	31.77*	.13 <sup>L</sup>	38.85	5.11	39.17	4.72	6.39	.02 <sup>S</sup>
<b>ER</b>	.73	39.29	39.29	4.16	0.00	37.34	4.37	-4.81**	34.24	4.49	-16.06**	42.09*	.17 <sup>L</sup>	36.71	5.08	36.16	4.53	0.84	.00 <sup>S</sup>
ESM	.71	38.36	38.44	3.85	0.21	37.82	4.29	-1.11	35.36	4.68	-9.14**	19.09*	.08 <sup>M</sup>	37.08	4.78	36.61	4.23	0.37	.00 <sup>S</sup>
<i>EMO</i>	.83	40.29	42.02	3.95	4.74**	40.47	4.22	0.73	36.67	5.15	-10.16**	51.46*	.20 <sup>L</sup>	39.16	5.38	39.23	4.82	6.05	.01 <sup>S</sup>
ESC	.72	39.51	40.26	3.86	2.16	39.42	4.20	0.08	36.78	5.23	-7.28**	18.84*	.08 <sup>M</sup>	38.78	4.85	38.03	4.85	0.06	.00 <sup>S</sup>
OEI	.83	279.13	283.18	22.16	1.98	275.45	24.30	-1.63	268.01	28.81	-12.01**	48.49*	.19 <sup>L</sup>	268.17	29.80	267.79	27.41	4.72	.01 <sup>S</sup>

*Note.* ESA = Emotional Self Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self Control; OEI = Overall Emotional Intelligence. Minimum and maximum scores unavailable as scale scores were provided by test publisher and scoring algorithm is not publicly available. Italicised variables represent the most significant predictors of group membership as specified by DFA. Boldface type represents the most significant predictors of gender as specified by DFA. Superscript text = Effect Size (S = Small; M = Medium; L = Large). Adjusted probability level (Bonferroni) for ANOVAs = .05 / 8 = .006. Adjusted probability level for *t*-Tests = .05 / 24 = .002.  $\eta^2$  = Partial eta Squared. \*Statistically significant at the  $p < .006$  level. \*\*Statistically significant at the  $p < .002$  level. <sup>^</sup>Data taken from Gignac (2008).




Figure 6.2. Discriminant function plot depicting group centroids on the two discriminant functions utilising the EII subscales as predictor variables.

#### 6.5.2.2. *Effect of gender.*

A significant main effect of gender was observed on the combined dependent variables,  $F(7, 411) = 3.17, p = .003; V = 0.05$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .05$  (medium) (please refer to Table 6.2 for means, standard deviations,  $F$  values and effect sizes) with separate univariate ANOVAs (using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of  $p < .006$ ) revealing significant differences for two of the eight variables (*Emotional Self Awareness* and *Emotional Expression*). Females scored significantly higher on measures of *Emotional Self Awareness* and *Emotional Expression* than males. Follow up DFA revealed a significant discriminant function utilising seven of the variables (*Overall Emotional Intelligence* was not included – see above) as predictor variables ( $A = 0.96, \chi^2(7) = 17.19, p = .016$ ) and revealed that *Emotional Expression* and *Emotional Reasoning* were the best predictors of gender in this case, with female participants more likely

than males to display higher levels of *Emotional Expression* and male participants more likely than females to display higher levels of *Emotional Reasoning*. Overall the discriminant function successfully predicted outcome for 59% of cases, with accurate predictions being made for 60% of male participants and 58% of female participants. These prediction rates represent ‘hit-rates’ that are higher than would be predicted by chance alone (i.e., 50%). No statistically significant interaction between group membership and gender,  $F(14, 824) = 1.19, p = .280, V = 0.04$ ; partial  $\eta^2 = .02$  (small), was observed which indicates that the effect of group membership on emotional intelligence is independent of gender and vice versa. On this basis, Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c have been rejected.

### **6.5.2.3. Comparisons with norm group data.**

One way independent sample *t*-tests (utilising appropriate Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels) were performed in order to compare the norm data means with those obtained from the three samples in order to triangulate the findings (please see Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for *t*-test and significance values). The findings revealed that the police sample means were significantly different to the norm data means in four of the five GDMS subscales and that the student sample means were remarkably similar to those provided by the norm dataset (significant differences were observed between student and norm data mean scores on one of the five subscales). This suggests that the police samples do in fact differ from the general population in regards to their decision-making styles and this further supports the differences observed within this study. The findings also support the assertion that the student sample provides a fairly representative comparison group when comparing decision-making style in light of the similar subscale scores obtained on the GDMS. With regards to EI, however, the *t*-tests revealed a lack of significant differences between the mean scores obtained for the majority of the EII subscales and those reported for the norm dataset (one out of eight for both police officer samples) and significant differences between all of the student mean subscale scores and the norm dataset scores. This suggests that while statistically significant differences were observed between the police samples and students in this case, the findings are limited to some extent by the fact that these differences were not reflected/corroborated by comparisons with the norm data utilised to validate the scale.

## **6.6. Discussion**

The results demonstrate firstly that HCNs and police officers utilise different decision-making styles to students and secondly that they employ emotionally intelligent behaviours

more frequently than students. As such, they provide substantial evidence to suggest that police officers are a fairly distinct and homogeneous group from the general population. However, the findings have failed to discriminate HCNs from non-negotiator trained officers and therefore, do not support the concept of a unique 'HCN profile'. The results of the current study, therefore, suggest that HCNs possess similar traits and characteristics to the wider police population when considering decision-making style and EI.

The findings relating to decision-making indicate that all three groups utilise the *rational* decision-making style as their primary style and the *intuitive* decision-making style as their secondary style, suggesting that these two styles are the most commonly utilised styles of decision-making (a finding corroborated by the norm data provided by Spicer and Sadler-Smith 2005). This finding is reassuring as it indicates that all three groups tend to utilise those decision-making styles that are positively correlated with performance in academic and occupational settings (i.e., rational and intuitive styles) (Anderson 2000, Russ, McNeilly and Comer 2001 and Sadler-Smith 2004). Despite the lack of observed significant differences between HCNs and police officers on their utilisation of the five decision-making styles; there were, however, differences between both police samples and the student sample that clearly differentiate the groups and provide evidence of a unique 'police officer profile'. Both police samples report utilising the *dependent* and *avoidant* decision-making styles to a significantly lesser degree than students, thereby suggesting that police officers are much more independent, and reactive/decisive when making decisions. These findings are commonsensical when applied to police settings, as despite the rank structure, police officers often attend incidents that require immediate action and they do not have time to wait for someone else to make decisions for them. There is no doubt that operational policing is a role that requires non-avoidant and reactive decision-making, in order to apprehend perpetrators and protect victims of crime, so these findings appear logical in this sense.

The relatively lower utilisation of the *avoidant* decision-making style by both police samples is perhaps the most interesting finding, when considered in combination with the previous literature relating to decision-making styles and the physiological management of stress. Thunholme's (2008) findings demonstrated the negative effects of avoidant decision-making within military officers, whereby those utilising *avoidant* styles were more likely to respond negatively to stress and experience higher stress responses (as measured by increased release of cortisol). It is therefore reassuring that police officers within the UK are utilising decision-making styles that are less positively correlated with negative stress responses and cortisol release. The lack of significant differences between negotiator and non-negotiator officers, in terms of *avoidant* decision-making style is of particular interest, however, when

considering the nature of the HCN role. Avoidant behaviour or decision-making in this context is likely to result in potentially fatal consequences and therefore needs to be circumvented by individuals in the HCN role. The findings suggest that decision-making style could be targeted as a training need to enhance the utilisation of more effective decision-making styles and to further reduce the likelihood of *avoidant* decision-making within HCNs. Decisiveness (i.e., the opposite of avoidance) has also previously been identified as a key characteristic within American HCNs (Allen, Fraser and Inwald 1991), which indicates the importance of decisive decision-making within the negotiation role and provides further support for training or enhancement work focusing on decision-making style and processes within UK-based police negotiator teams.

The second important finding relates to that of the *spontaneous* decision-making style, whereby there was only a significant difference between the police officer and student samples. The findings indicate that police officers utilise the *spontaneous* decision-making style to a lesser extent than students but that this trend does not apply to HCNs specifically, who appear to utilise this style to the same extent as police officers and students. Police officers are perhaps less likely to utilise *spontaneous* styles of decision-making as a result of the extensive training they receive regarding responding to incidents. As a result of the types of incident that officers are deployed to and the risks associated, it is likely that a methodical form of decision-making is utilised based on their training and experience, as opposed to a *spontaneous* or *ad hoc* style. However, if this is the case, it is unclear why this finding does not extrapolate to HCNs, who also receive the same initial police officer training. The lack of a significantly lower negotiator score on the utilisation of *spontaneous* decision-making can potentially be explained by considering the role, context and nature of HCNn; negotiators are frequently confronted by situations that sometimes involve spontaneous decision-making and they must be able to adapt their negotiation strategies quickly and often with little time to prepare. This is often a direct result of the emotionally charged and potentially dangerous situations that negotiators are often required to respond to, and it could be argued that spontaneous decision-making links to intellectual/mental agility, which anecdotally has also been suggested to play a role within HCNn. Spontaneous decision-making in this context could therefore be framed as a positive, rather than a negative attribute as it enables the decision maker to ‘*think on their feet*’, a concept that is important within the resolution of hostage/crisis incidents which are likely to have an infinite number of possible outcome variations and scenario trajectories. This assertion would benefit from further empirical exploration to identify whether spontaneity in this context may serve to benefit police HCNs.

The findings relating to EI indicate that both police samples possess a significantly higher level of EI than students. This finding confirms previous research findings where higher levels of EI in police officers as compared to other occupational groups has been found (Bar-On et al. 2000). Within the current research, both police samples demonstrated significantly higher scores on the overall measure of EI and the seven sub-scale measures of EI, suggesting that the increased level of EI is a consistent one across the different facets of EI. This finding is again reassuring when considered in line with the research indicating a positive correlation between EI and police performance, in a number of cross-cultural settings (Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 2010, Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012 and Lev 2005); and the potential influence of EI on resilience and protection from the negative effects of stress (Armstrong, Galligan and Critchley 2011 and Salovey et al. 1999). Although the findings are reassuring with regards to confirmation that police officers within the UK demonstrate the use of self-reported emotionally intelligent behaviours at work to a greater extent than students, there is no evidence to suggest that HCNs are more adept at utilising emotionally intelligent behaviours than police officers generally. In addition to this, the negotiator sample did not demonstrate higher levels of EI specifically relating to the awareness and management of other people's emotions, as originally predicted. This finding is particularly surprising and suggests that EI enhancement, particularly within the facets mentioned above, is a potential area of development and training for police HCNs, who often deal with individuals-in-crisis or emotional turmoil and, as such, need to be adept at identifying and managing such emotions.

Although the findings suggest that the police population possess higher levels of EI and suggest that EI is an important component within police work, it is difficult to identify whether EI is a construct that is enhanced as a result of police training and operational experience, or whether it is an existing construct that attracts individuals to the role of police work in the first place. Within the UK, EI is not currently utilised as a selection criterion; however, research indicates that the construct is important and predicts performance within police settings (Afolabi, Awosola and Omole 2010, Al Ali, Garner and Magadley 2012 and Lev 2005). There is potential, therefore, for the development of EI-based psychometric testing to be incorporated within UK police selection procedures, if further research were conducted to confirm/establish the role of EI within police populations and to support predictive validity of a specific EI measure which could be utilised in this format.

EI enhancement/training for police officers is used within the USA and is accepted as a core component within policing (Saville 2006) and findings indicate that such training has positive benefits within a number of contexts (Cherniss and Goleman 2001, Ricca 2003, Sala 2001, 2006 and Slaski and Cartwright 2003). Chapman and Clarke (2002), for example, found



that EI training resulted in lower levels of reported stress by officers and Ricca's (2003) study concluded that EI awareness training significantly reduced police officer burnout. In addition to this, findings from a study by Sala (2001) (not using a police population) suggest that EI training improved self-confidence, conflict management, communication and conscientiousness, factors that intuitively would be beneficial within HCNn contexts. These findings, therefore suggest that there is potential for similar application of EI training within police contexts in the UK.

There are a number of possible explanations for the lack of differences observed between the two police samples. On a macro level, it is important to consider that police officers who are trained to be HCNs tend to perform this role in addition to their day-to-day role within the police force. This means that HCNs in the UK may not, in fact, spend a significant amount of time acting as operational negotiators. Further research is therefore warranted to explore whether individuals who work 'full time' as negotiators within law enforcement agencies (i.e., the FBI) represent a more unique group characteristically than their non-negotiator counterparts. More specifically, it could be suggested that police officers (in a number of different roles) are constantly encountering crisis situations and having to utilise emotionally intelligent behaviours in order to resolve conflict and effectively manage the public. Police officers as a population, therefore, are trained to deal with pressurised situations and in how to deal with conflict and as such are likely to possess a certain level of EI in order to effectively analyse and respond to an infinite number of potential crisis/conflict situations. It could be proposed, therefore, that the majority of police officers demonstrate a higher level of EI than the general population (and students in the case of the current study) and that this baseline acts as a starting point, on which specific negotiation training can build. With reference to decision-making style, it could be argued that police officers utilise a typical style of decision-making that is functional for police work on a variety of levels (i.e., lower levels of *dependent* and *avoidant* decision-making) and do not need to adapt this when negotiating. It is, of course, impossible to decipher whether such decision-making styles are present prior to individuals joining the police, or whether they are adopted as a result of training and operational police work. This is an argument which is also debated heavily within the police personality literature.

The findings in relation to gender suggest that whilst generic gender differences exist in relation to certain decision-making styles and domains of EI, these differences fail to extrapolate when looking at each sample in isolation. No significant interaction effects were observed between group and gender suggesting that male and female decision-making style and EI scores were not significantly different for HCNs, police officers or students. These findings imply that

both male and female police officers display similar traits and profiles in terms of decision-making style and EI and that in particular, no significant differences exist between the profiles of male and female officers currently working as HCNs. It is, however, important to note that caution should be taken when interpreting gender differences due to the unequal numbers of males and females within the HCN and police officer samples.

The current study benefits from the inclusion of a control/comparison group as it enabled the researchers to obtain an understanding of HCN/police officer characteristics within the wider context of a non-police population. Despite the fairly robust sample size ( $N = 438$ ), the findings are limited to some extent by the nature of the comparison sample. Although students are frequently utilised within social psychological research, they represent a fairly homogenous group as they typically represent a much smaller age range and higher mean level of socio-economic status than the general population. In addition to this, there was a disparity in the mean age and ethnic background of the two police samples and the student sample, which may have influenced the findings. In particular, the police samples were disproportionately White British in ethnicity, and as such, comparisons between two ethnically homogenous samples and a more ethnically heterogeneous sample may have therefore introduced some form of bias. Such bias could potentially be avoided by conducting follow-up research utilising a matched-pairs design across all three samples in future. The choice of sampling strategy may also limit the findings to some extent, as the snowball sampling method adopted (whereby HCNs were asked to locate a non-negotiator colleague to complete the psychometric test battery) was not random and as such, may not have provided a truly representative 'control group' of police officers for comparison.

These limitations are further compounded, to some extent, by the results of the independent *t*-tests conducted with the norm data means. Although the GDMS results corroborate the differences observed between the police samples and students, comparisons using the EII norm data means failed to replicate this finding – which suggests that the police samples demonstrate a similar level of EI as the general public population utilised to validate the EII. Comparisons between the police officer groups and the student sample would, therefore, have been enhanced by the utilisation of a more representative control group and further research would benefit from the utilisation of a general population sample with a more similar mean age, ethnic background, education and socio-economic status to that of the police samples. In addition to this, it is difficult to directly compare current findings to those of previous research, as previously published studies have either not incorporated a comparison group/sample or have utilised different psychometrics to measure the constructs in question. There are, of course, numerous different tools that have been developed to assess decision-

making and EI and it is therefore often difficult to directly compare findings across studies utilising different methodologies and data collection tools.

Despite these limitations, the research benefits from a fairly large and robust sample size and from the range of officers (i.e. in terms of rank, role and length of service) included within the study. Many researchers investigating police practice tend to utilise participants from a single geographical force or region, whereas the current study has included both negotiators and officers from 21 forces within the UK, which equates to a representation of approximately 50% of the forces throughout the country. This breadth of coverage helps to provide a more generalisable picture of both HCNs and police officers in the UK and applies to both small/large and rural/metropolitan forces and constabularies. Future/follow-up research which adopts an even greater proportion of the total HCNn population within the UK (~800) as a comparative group/sample may also provide a greater insight into these two police populations and a more robust conclusion in relation to whether differences do exist in relation to their decision-making style and levels of EI.

In light of the current findings, it is equally prudent to suggest that future research would benefit from a cross-cultural application, in order to establish whether the findings are unique to a UK HCN context. Partial replication of the current study (Young 2016) has also recently been conducted within the USA with this intention in mind, to establish whether USA HCNs present as a unique and homogenous group within the police population or exhibit different decision-making styles to their non-negotiator counterparts. One final salient point of note is to highlight that whilst the findings may suggest that differences exist in relation to the police officer samples (in comparison to the student sample), it remains to be established whether these differences directly translate into improved performance. Future research, therefore needs to explore the potential link between certain decision-making styles/higher levels of EI and police performance in order to provide a potential model that could be utilised for police recruitment in the UK.

## **6.7. Conclusion**

The findings from the current study suggest the need to reject the predicted existence of a unique 'HCN profile' but provide evidence to support the notion of a distinct 'police officer profile'. The findings indicate that police officers tend to utilise less *dependent*, *spontaneous* and *avoidant* decision-making styles and demonstrate significantly more emotionally intelligent behaviours than students. Whilst the current findings indicate a lack of support for the use of psychometric testing of certain constructs within the selection process for HCNs specifically, there is potential for the incorporation of specific psychometric testing within the selection of

trainee police officers within the UK if further research is conducted to empirically validate such a procedure. Further research is also needed to explore the exact role of decision-making style and EI within the negotiation process and to establish/verify the effectiveness of training to develop certain decision-making styles and facets of EI which may enhance police HCN/officer performance.

## Addendum to Chapter 5 and 6: Superficial Analysis of Correlations between Construct Variables for the HCN and Police Officer Samples

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Tables 4.17 – 4.21 in Appendix 14 provide a synopsis of the correlations between all variables within the dataset as applied to the HCN and police officer samples in isolation/separately. Initial analysis of the correlation matrices suggest that there are differences between the two samples in relation to the specific combinations/constellations of variables as displayed by each sample, as discussed below. These differences may serve to differentiate the two samples in a way that was not achieved by direct comparison on individual constructs and this is an aspect that will be explored further by the author within follow-up research.

### 6.8. Correlations between personality traits and cognitive emotion regulation strategies

Whilst both samples utilise similar strategies to regulate their emotions, there are differing relationships between the five personality traits and the utilisation of certain emotion regulation strategies. When deciphering the different inter-correlations between the two samples, the key observable difference appears to be that there are a greater number of significant correlations between the personality traits of police officers and adaptive emotion regulation strategies than within the HCN sample. *E*, *A* and *C*, for example, are all significantly positively correlated with the use of *Positive Reappraisal* in both samples, however, police officers displaying the same traits, are more likely to utilise a number of adaptive coping mechanisms (including *Positive Reappraisal*, *Refocus on Planning* and *Putting into Perspective*), suggesting that police officers displaying these traits are more likely to draw upon a broader range of coping mechanisms, than HCNs displaying these traits. *N* was significantly positively linked to maladaptive coping strategies in both samples (including *Self-Blame*, *Rumination* and *Catastrophising*), however, *N* was also significantly negatively correlated with *Positive Reappraisal*, *Refocus on Planning* and *Putting into Perspective* within the police officer sample alone, thereby suggesting that those police officers low in *N* are more likely to utilise adaptive emotion regulation strategies. *O* was also significantly positively correlated with *Positive Refocusing*, *Positive Reappraisal*, *Refocus on Planning* and *Putting into*

*Perspective*, within the police officer sample, thereby suggesting that police officers scoring high on *E*, *A*, *C* and *O* and low on *N* are more likely to utilise a range of positive and adaptive strategies to regulate their emotions, whereas there is limited evidence of this occurring within the HCN sample. Correlations between variables within the police officer sample were also more likely to be stronger in nature than those within the HCN sample suggesting more substantial relationships between personality traits and coping strategies within the former sample (see Table 4.17).

## **6.9. Correlations between personality traits and coping style strategies**

The most obvious differences in profile between the two samples (see Table 4.18) relate to the greater number of significant correlations between personality domains and coping strategies within the police officer sample; with *E*, *A* and *C*, for example, being significantly positively associated *Overall Coping Skills*, along with a number of individual adaptive coping strategies (e.g. *Problem Solving*, *Negotiation* and *Positive Cognitive Restructuring*). Whilst the relationship between the *N* domain and coping portrays a similar picture across both samples (with *N* being typically positively associated with maladaptive coping strategies and negatively associated with adaptive coping strategies), the police sample demonstrated a greater number of significant negative relationships between *N* and adaptive coping strategies overall, suggesting that police officers scoring relatively lower in this domain are more likely to utilise a broader range of adaptive coping mechanisms in order to regulate emotions and deal with stress. The findings also indicate a weaker relationship between personality domains and the utilisation of maladaptive coping strategies within the HCN sample, with far fewer significant negative correlations observed in relation to these strategies (i.e. five significant medium correlations observed for HCNs versus 15 significant medium/large correlations observed for police officers).

## **6.10. Correlations between personality traits and decision-making styles**

For the HCN sample, *E* was significantly positively associated with *Intuitive* and *Spontaneous* decision-making and significantly negatively associated with *Avoidant* decision-making; whereas for the police officer sample, *E* was only found to be significantly negatively correlated with *Avoidant* decision-making. *A* was found to be significantly negatively

associated with both *Spontaneous* and *Avoidant* decision-making for the police officer sample, however this was not observed in the HCN sample. A similar pattern was observed in relation to *C*, with both HCNs and police officers demonstrating significant positive correlations with *Rational* decision-making and significant negative correlations with *Spontaneous* and *Avoidant* decision-making. *N* was not found to correlate significantly with any of the decision-making styles in the HCN sample, however it was found to be significantly positively associated with *Spontaneous* and *Avoidant* decision-making and significantly negatively associated with *Rational* decision-making in the police officer sample. Differences were also observed in relation to *O*, whereby HCNs displayed significant positive associations with *Intuitive* and *Rational* decision-making, however, no such associations were observed within the police officer sample, suggesting that the two samples may be differentiated by a combination of their personality traits and their decision-making styles. Please refer to Table 4.19 for details of the correlations.

## **6.11. Correlations between cognitive emotion regulation strategies and emotional intelligence**

All EII subscales were significantly positively correlated with *Positive Reappraisal* in both HCNs and police officers (see Table 4.20). All EII subscales (apart from Emotional Self Control) were significantly positively correlated with *Refocus on Planning* in HCNs and all EII subscales (apart from *Emotional Self-Awareness* and *Emotional Awareness of Others*) were significantly positively correlated with *Refocus on Planning* in the police officer sample. Police officers also demonstrated a correlation between certain EII subscales and the utilisation of additional specific adaptive emotion regulation strategies (such as *Putting into Perspective* and *Positive Refocusing*). All EII subscales (apart from *Emotional Self Awareness* and *Emotional Self Control*) were significantly positively correlated with *Putting into Perspective* and *Positive Refocusing* was significantly positively correlated with *Emotional Expression*, *Emotional Self-Management* and *Overall Emotional Intelligence* in the police officer sample. EII subscales were also significantly negatively correlated with a number of maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, however, differences in these correlations can be observed across the two samples. The use of *Self-Blame* as a coping strategy was significantly negatively correlated with *Emotional Awareness of Others*, *Emotional Self-Management* and *Overall Emotional Intelligence*; *Rumination* was significantly negatively correlated with *Emotional Self-Management* and *Catastrophising* was significantly negatively correlated with *Emotional Self-Awareness* within the HCN sample. Whereas in the police officer sample, *Catastrophising* was

also significantly negatively associated with *Emotional Awareness of Others*, *Emotional Self-Management* and *Emotional Self-Control*. Lastly, *Self-Blame* was significantly negatively associated with most EII subscales (apart from *Emotional Reasoning*, *Emotional Management of Others* and *Emotional Self Control*) in the police officer sample. The strongest correlations across both groups relate to the *Positive Reappraisal* strategy and suggest that police officers who possess higher levels of EI are more likely to utilise this strategy to regulate emotions (regardless of whether they are trained as HCNs or not).

## **6.12. Correlations between coping style strategies and decision-making styles**

The correlation coefficients are similar across both samples, with the most significant relationships being observed between the *Avoidant* decision-making style and coping strategies (see Table 4.21). *Avoidant* decision-making appears to be significantly negatively correlated with all forms of adaptive coping strategy and significantly positively associated with all forms of maladaptive coping strategy within the police officer sample. The same trend is observed within the HCN sample, however, no significant correlations are observed for *Social Support*, *Emotional Regulation*, *Distraction* or *Rumination*. *Intuitive* decision-making is significantly positively correlated with *Social Support*, *Avoidance* and *Opposition* in the HCN sample, suggesting that *Intuitive* decision-making in this sample alone is linked to use of both adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies. A similar pattern of relationship is observed across both samples in relation to *Rational* decision-making, whereby this style is associated with both *Overall Coping Skills* and a number of individual adaptive coping strategies (e.g. *Problem-Focused Coping* and *Problem Solving*). *Spontaneous* decision-making is also differentially correlated across the two groups, with police officers demonstrating a significant positive association with three of the maladaptive coping strategies (*Hang Ups*, *Rumination* and *Opposition*) and a significant negative association with *Overall Coping Skills*, *Problem Focused Coping*, *Problem Solving* and *Emotional Regulation*; whereas HCNs only demonstrated a significant positive association with the use of *Avoidance* as a coping strategy.



# Introduction to Qualitative Phase Results

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The following four chapters present the findings from the qualitative phase of the research whereby semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 HCNs from nine UK police forces. Chapters 7-10 synthesise and describe four of the five theoretical micro-models that were developed as a result of the grounded theory analysis conducted (please refer to Appendix 25 for a discussion relating to the “Nature and Extent of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation” model). Chapter 7 discusses the first of these micro-models: “The Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey” which provides a narrative of the UK HCN journey from the initial selection process and HCN training through to the operational support of HCNs during/after deployment. Chapter 8 describes the second micro-model: “The Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience” which provides a synopsis of what it is like to be a HCN along with identification of the positives, negatives and ambivalences associated with HCNn in the UK. Chapter 9 presents the third micro-model developed: “The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation”, which provides a theoretical blueprint of the processes and protocols that HCNs follow when successfully resolving hostage/crisis incidents in the UK. Lastly, Chapter 10 describes the fourth micro-model: “The Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile” which presents a model that can be used to depict the characteristics, attributes and skills that police officers need to possess in order to be successful HCNs. These models are discussed sequentially in line with reference to how the findings can be situated within the current HCNn literature base and their potential implications for HCNn policy and practice.

## Chapter 7: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 3: The Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model

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This chapter outlines the grounded theory identified as the “hostage and crisis negotiator journey” in which the processes involved in the selection, training and operational deployment of UK HCNs are detailed. A conceptual model was developed on the basis of the categories that emerged from the transcript data and includes 5 primary, 12 secondary and 32 tertiary categories (please refer to Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1). The negotiator journey could be clearly divided into five main primary categories: ‘Why? Reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world’; ‘Who and how? The negotiator profile and selection’; ‘Negotiator training’; ‘Operational negotiator roles’; and, ‘Negotiator welfare and support’. One further final category was identified as a resultant category: ‘Confidence enhancement as a result of increased negotiator deployment’. Each of these categories will be discussed sequentially below.

### **Why? Reasons for Entering into (and Remaining within) the Negotiator World**

A variety of motivations were identified by negotiators as catalysts for entering into, or motivations for remaining within, the ‘negotiator world’. A total of ten different motivations were identified, with four categories being corroborated most frequently within the sample. Two of these motivations were identified as externally-orientated and two were identified as self-orientated, thereby creating the secondary categories of ‘Externally-orientated motivations’ and ‘Internally-orientated motivations’.

**Externally-orientated motivations.** Two tertiary categories were identified within the externally-orientated motivations category and these consisted of: ‘Desire to help people’ and ‘Vicarious pseudo-altruism’<sup>26</sup>.

***Desire to help people.*** The most frequently cited motivation for becoming a negotiator was identified as a desire to help people in crisis: “...*I think it is genuinely to... kind of try and help people...* (H:F:5:50); protect the public, save lives and make a difference: “*Why do I do it?*

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<sup>26</sup> Whilst this tertiary category contains elements of internal motivations, the external motivations were perceived as being the primary motivator (with the personal reward acting as a secondary consequence of their negotiator role) thereby justifying its presence within the externally-orientated motivations category, as opposed to the internally-orientated motivations category.

Table 7.1. *Table Depicting the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Categories within the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model*

Primary Categories	Secondary Categories	Tertiary Categories
Why? Reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world	Externally-orientated motivations	Desire to help people Vicarious pseudo-altruism
	Internally-orientated motivations	Negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface” Self-aggrandisement/ego boosting
Who and how? Negotiator profile and selection	Not every police officer could be a negotiator	“It isn’t for everyone” Negotiators are a “certain type of person/police officer”
	Three tier selection process	Paper-based application Role play scenario based assessment Traditional panel interview
Negotiator training	Nature and context of negotiation training	Combining theory with practice Training as intense and incremental in nature
	Negotiator training objectives	Training designed to test resilience Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating
	No substitute for the “real thing”	On-the-job training/experience as increasing negotiator ability and skills Learning by doing/baptism by fire
	Continuing professional development	Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it you lose it”) Use of formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect on performance and share best practice
Operational negotiator roles	Negotiator cadre roles	Level 1 negotiator Level 2 negotiator Hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC) Red negotiator
	Negotiator cell roles	The primary negotiator (“Number 1”/“The communicator”) The secondary negotiator (“Number 2”/“The supporter and advisor”) The hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC) (“The supervisor and command liaison”)
Negotiator welfare and support	Force specific formalised support mechanisms	Debriefing procedures Buddying/shadowing system Occupational health/welfare provision “Stepping off the rota”
	Self-directed negotiator coping strategies	Peer support from other members of the cadre Social support from family/friends/colleagues Exercise and/or sport Drinking alcohol
Underpinning mechanism:	Confidence enhancement as a result of increased negotiator deployment	




Figure 7.1. Figure depicting conceptual map of the HCN journey model.

Note: The underpinning mechanism is represented by the “confidence circles”.

*...I make a difference... I genuinely care about people who are in crisis... and sometimes they're there because they can't help themselves and need a helping hand out... I don't mind being that helping hand..."* (G:M:4:123).

Two thirds of the sample [ $n = 10$ ] identified this category as their reason for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world. Some negotiators referred to a desire to protect/safeguard the public and felt that their negotiator role acted as an extension of the oath that they had taken when becoming a police officer (i.e. to serve and protect the public): *"I find it very... interesting work, because it's about what policing should be. It's about saving lives"* (A:M:1:156). One negotiator described her role as allowing her to *"give something back"* to people in a way that was not possible in her main police (training) role (M:F:8:24). This category links commonsensically to a number of competencies identified within the negotiator profile model discussed in Chapter 10, whereby negotiators are perceived as having to be both empathic and caring/compassionate in order to succeed/perform well within the role.

***Vicarious pseudo-altruism.*** Just over half of the negotiators [ $n = 8$ ] within the sample described a form of 'selfish altruism' whereby the motivation for them becoming and remaining a negotiator was double sided. Negotiators tended to specify that their reason for doing the role was to help people or to make a difference to people's lives, however, this was often followed by a self-serving reward-based statement identifying the personal reward that they also obtained for performing the role/helping people in crisis:

*"That genuine personal satisfaction that you've done the right thing... done something really positive and changed somebody's direction in life. Stopped them ruining not just their life, but many others', people they sort of know and love them... it's a huge buzz"* (L:M:7:54).

In other words, whilst it would appear that negotiation is a role that is performed for selfless/altruistic reasons, the current data indicate that it is not a completely altruistic activity as negotiators reported having received personal rewards/benefits as a result of their actions: *"I also then get to be involved in incidents whereby I'm saving people's lives... I'm preventing serious harm to individuals, protecting vulnerable people... which is incredibly rewarding"* (E:M:3:114). This concept was discussed by Honeycutt (1981) who suggested that altruistic behaviours may in fact incur delayed or vicarious rewards on the part of the actor thereby suggesting that altruism can still result in a form of personal reward which may be experienced vicariously through the receiver. This form of positive reward as a result of doing something to help others is also referenced within the counselling and volunteering literature as "the helpers high" (Luks 1988), whereby people experience positive emotions (which are rewarding) as a

result of helping others: “...then there’s the really... positive things... that sometimes you come away and you think, gosh, I really did make a difference today... and... that’s a great feeling” (J:F:6:110).

**Internally-oriented motivations.** Negotiators described a number of motivations for being a negotiator that could be perceived as self-serving or internally-orientated. Two tertiary categories were identified within this category and included: ‘Negotiation as self-aggrandising/ego-boosting’ and ‘Negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface”’, as discussed below.

***Negotiation as self-aggrandising/ego-boosting.*** For some negotiators [ $n = 6$ ] it became clear that negotiation provided them with an ego-boost or feelings of self-aggrandisement.

*“...I think there’s possibly a bit of... self-aggrandisement, if you like, in that you’ve been called out in the middle of the night to a situation that a bunch of other bobbies have found really difficult, and I turn up with my colleague, and sometimes, quite quickly, we’ve sorted it all out... because then you get...there’s probably, if I’m totally honest, there’s a bit of an ego thing there... I’ll admit to that” (F:M:4:111).*

Negotiators referred to feelings of importance/satisfaction from performing a role that is perceived as being complex and “special” to some extent: “...that real satisfaction that you’ve played a significant role in what is really complex and difficult in policing terms” (E:M:3:114); some negotiators even stated that they felt important as a result of successfully performing a role that others could not and specialising in a fairly niche area of policing: “...I get a lot of satisfaction from specialising in a bit of business” (G:M:4:111).

***Negotiation as an opportunity to be “down the coalface”.*** For a sub-section of negotiators within the sample [ $n = 7$ ], negotiation provided an opportunity for more hands on/operational policing: “...well first of all, I get to deploy operationally, periodically... which takes me away from the managerial role that I do” (E:M:3:114). There were a number of negotiators who had experienced a reduction in direct public interaction as a result of either promotion to higher ranking (i.e. more managerial) positions or a change of role to a position which involved less operational policing (i.e. training, child protection, financial investigation etc.):

*“...I do find my training role... lacking in... I deal with the police officers – I don’t deal with the public anymore and I do miss that side of policing, actually, so it seemed to be a natural thing for me to do...” (M:F:8:24).*

For these officers, being a negotiator provided them with an opportunity to be “*down the coalface*” (A:M:1:156) and one negotiator joked that “*...it’s the only time I see fresh air these days [Laughter]*” (F:M:4:111); indicating that negotiation served the purpose of enhancing their opportunities to be involved with operational policing and experience public interaction.

### **Who and How? Negotiator Profile and Selection**

The second primary category related to the second phase in the negotiator journey in terms of who negotiators are and how they are selected. Interviewees described a belief that negotiators are unique within the police officer population and suggested that they tend to be a specific type of person/police officer, with the first secondary category being identified as ‘Not every police officer could be a negotiator’ (please refer to Chapter 10 for a more detailed discussion of the HCN profile). The second secondary category, entitled ‘Three-tier selection process’, depicts the three stage process adopted by the majority of UK territorial police forces when selecting new negotiators.

**Not every police officer could be a negotiator.** The vast majority of negotiators [ $n = 14$ ] felt that negotiation is a role that not every police officer could easily perform and two tertiary categories emerged within this category, including ‘It isn’t for everyone’ and ‘Negotiators as a certain type of person/police officer’.

*“...a lot of police officers could. Not any police officer. There are some I know who... God bless them, good people for certain roles, but they wouldn’t do this role very well... Some of them rub people up the wrong way when they talk to them... And some of them don’t think quickly enough on their feet to be able to... adapt their style to what’s needed” (D:M:3:63).*

Interviewees felt that whilst the role is a specialist one that requires intensive training, not every police officer could be successfully trained to be a negotiator, as not every officer is suited to/or possesses the right attributes for the role. They described the role as requiring a specific type of person, who could commit to the demanding nature of the role and possessed the self-perceived “right” characteristics/attributes to be a successful negotiator.

***It isn’t for everyone.***

*IV: “...would you recommend the role to others?”*

IE: *"I do... if I judge that they're sort of the kind of people who'd... enjoy it, and bring benefit to it, you know, it's not for everybody"* (F:M:4:111).

Several negotiators described incidences where colleagues had become negotiators and then felt that it was not right for them and had ended up relinquishing their role because they could not cope with either the on-call commitments or the nature/pressure of the role: *"...because a lot of people come on the rota and then think, perhaps think this isn't for me... And they'll get off the rota..."* (H:F:5:50). Others described colleagues that they felt would be excellent negotiators but would *"take it all home with them"* (F:M:4:111) and struggle to cope with the emotional aspect of the role, exemplifying the belief that negotiation is a role that is not suited to every police officer.

***Negotiators need to be a certain type of person/police officer.*** *"...by and large it gets it right, and there's one or two that I just think [sighs] shouldn't be negotiators"* (B:M:2:195). Interviewees consistently referred to negotiators as being a certain type of person/police officer and when asked whether they would recommend the role to others, they frequently stated that they would, but only to 'certain' colleagues, on the basis of whether they felt that they were the right type of person for the role.

IV: *"...Would you recommend the role to others?"*

IE: *"Only some [laughs]. I have... a couple of my colleagues, I've said, you need to look at this team. I've got one officer who's working with me at the moment. She's thought about it for a while, but she'd be really good. You can just see it in people; people that talk and people that can communicate; people that can get information from others that other people would never have extracted; your deep thinkers really"* (C:F:2:96).

Some felt quite strongly that some of their colleagues would not make good negotiators on the basis of a number of factors:

*"...no, because people are more direct and some people will want that quick solution. Some people are not necessarily more physically threatening but are certainly more imposing in their need to get things done and get things done quickly. I absolutely recognise those skills, and in the majority of cases that's exactly what we want for a quick and safe resolution. But where it doesn't work they are the last people that you would want in a protracted negotiation"* (I:M:6:84).

Others suggested that some police officers lacked the right mind-set/attitude (i.e. they rubbed people up the wrong way; they saw themselves as a hero; they wanted to use force to resolve incidents: *"...it's not for the sort of up and at them, biff, bash, boom, bosh"* (L:M:7:54); and



others suggested that some police officers were lacking in the appropriate/necessary attributes for them to be a successful negotiator (i.e. they weren't patient/empathic enough; they lacked the ability to reserve judgement/compassion). There was a strong feeling amongst participants that only certain police officers would make successful negotiators: "...*there are a few... that I wouldn't allow anywhere near the team*" (K:M:2:111) and that these individuals (i.e. those who would make successful negotiators) constituted a unique sub-group within the police population.

**Three-tier selection process.** The majority of negotiators described having to take part in a three-tier selection process. This typically involved the completion of a paper-based application or expression of interest, a role-play scenario-based assessment and a traditional panel interview: "*It's a... three tier process, where there's a written application form, there is... an exercise – a scenario to deal with – and then finally, there's an interview*" (D:M:3:63). The selection process was used as a means of identifying suitable candidates who could go on to complete the regional or national HCNn training course (i.e. police officers need to successfully complete one of the training courses in order to be fully qualified and work operationally as a negotiator<sup>27</sup>).

**Paper-based application.** Negotiators described a process whereby a paper-based application/application book/expression of interest was submitted that required them to demonstrate certain competencies (such as communication/decision-making skills, flexibility and resilience) and that this document was then used as a shortlisting mechanism for candidates to be invited to the next selection stage (i.e. the assessed role play exercise and panel interview).

*"...we ask them... to look at the role profile and put in... an application... so you look at effective communication... decision-making... problem solving... flexibility... and resilience... they put in their written application against those headings... and then we mark them between... nought and three, depending on how much evidence for each one. And there's a weighting, and then we total it all up. And... the top... depending on how many we need, depends on how many we call for interview"* (B:M:2:195).

**Role play scenario-based assessment.** The second stage of the selection process typically involved candidates taking part in an assessed role play whereby they would be required to demonstrate their natural abilities to deal with an individual in crisis.

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<sup>27</sup> Please refer to the mortar board icon in Figure 7.1 which represents the point at which negotiators become fully qualified and operational.

*“...then we will... invite those individuals along to a practical exercise, and typically that will be a simple... scenario of... you’ve got 30 minutes to negotiate with someone who is behind that door, but really simple, so it will be like a domestic incident, or an easy role play” (A:M:1:156).*

This tended to involve responding to a suicidal subject (role played by a qualified negotiator) either on the telephone or through a door. This role play was observed by senior negotiators (i.e. HNCs) within the cadre and was assessed in terms of how well the candidate performed. One negotiator described this process as being *“quite intuitive”* (F:M:4:111) on the basis of the fact that candidates were observed in terms of their instinctual response to an individual in crisis and were provided with no preparation prior to the assessment.

*“You’re given no other preparation... the time is now... you are a negotiator, the phone’s going to ring, and they took you through a role play scenario with an actor playing somebody who was in crisis or was threatening harm to somebody” (F:M:4:111).*

Once candidates had completed the role play component, they were required to take part in a traditional panel interview.

***Traditional panel interview.*** The final stage of the selection process involved a traditional panel interview: *“...the second stage was a sit down sort of formal interview”* (L:M:7:54), described by those negotiators involved in the selection of new negotiators as a means of trying to identify whether candidates possessed the appropriate skills/competencies for the role and whether they were fully committed to the role: *“...the second part is a more structured approach just to make sure you can commit to the on-call arrangements and to drop everything at short notice...”* (I:M:6:84). The interview process was also used as a forum to discuss the way the candidate performed during the role play assessment and to offer an opportunity for reflexivity and feedback: *“...after that [the role play], there was an interview where they discuss how you dealt with it...”* (F:M:4:111).

## **Negotiator Training**

At the time of the data collection, negotiators within the UK were required to complete either a regional or national training course before they could be operationally deployed in their role. The regional course was a one-week intensive course that tended to focus mainly on crisis negotiation and was run by a number of police forces across the UK; whereas the national course was a two-week course run by the Metropolitan Police at Hendon Police College<sup>28</sup>. Four

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<sup>28</sup> Hendon Police College is the principle training centre for London’s Metropolitan Police Service.

secondary categories emerged within this category, including: ‘The nature and context of negotiation training’, ‘Negotiator training objectives’, ‘No substitute for the real thing’ and ‘Continuing professional development’.

**Nature and context of negotiation training.** When discussing their experiences of the training courses, interviewees described the nature and context of the training by highlighting a number of specific elements, including the characteristics of the training as involving a combination of both theory and practice components and the perception of the training as being both intense and incremental in nature. The two tertiary categories: ‘Combining theory with practice’ and ‘Training as intense and incremental in nature’ are described below.

***Combining theory with practice.*** Throughout the transcripts, negotiators consistently referred to the training courses as having involved a combination of both academic theory (i.e. academic inputs/lectures) and practice (i.e. role play based scenarios/exercises):

*“My initial training... classroom-based for some of the day and then you go... out of the classroom environment and actually practise your skills in a scenario-based... learning exercise. And that’s pretty consistent for the week... a morning in the classroom and afternoon learning scenario” (D:M:3:63).*

This combined method of training was perceived by negotiators as providing a means for trainees to learn the necessary theories/methods of negotiation and then to put this academic knowledge into practice via the use of practical exercises or role-play based scenarios: “...there was a lot of... lectures initially and then there was practical role-plays and you rotated your roles. And then very much after a week’s course... you are qualified as a level two negotiator...” (C:F:2:96). This combination method is one that is applied within other countries (such as the USA), with particular emphasis being placed on the use of role-play as an integral component within HCNn training courses (Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008).

***Training as intense and incremental in nature.*** Both the regional and national training courses were described as being both intense and incremental in nature. One negotiator described the national course as the “most intensive course I’ve ever dealt with, in the Police Service” (L:M:7:54) and another felt that the course was “a four weeks course, crammed into two” (G:M:4:123). Negotiators referred to the courses as involving “phenomenally long hours” (L:M:7:54) and recounted having experienced 14 or 15 hour days during the training.

*“So the course... fortnight residential at Hendon, structure of the course very gruelling, in that you’re in the classroom from half eight having inputs all day, short break for*

*tea, and then you're straight back... in the evening... for six o'clock, for exercises that will run through till they finish. And then at ten, eleven, midnight, you'll then have a debrief process, where you'll go, in an informal setting with a beer... but have a formal debrief of the... event, get individual feedback, and then...you go to bed about midnight, one o'clock, and then you're back in class the next morning. Yes, I think there's an element of machismo about that, to be honest... because it's a tough course"* (F:M:4:111).

Negotiators also referred to the incrementality of the training, whereby it tended to increase in severity in terms of the context of the exercises/role-play scenarios that they were required to complete throughout the course of the training.

*"...so it will build up from a very simple domestic violence incident, to a more complicated incident where there's perhaps two people that you've got to negotiate with, so the complexity of negotiations... develops as you go through the course..."* (A:M:1:156).

The initial phase of the training tended to involve more basic crisis intervention/engaging with individuals-in-crisis and as the training progressed, the scenarios tended to become more complex and involve hostage-taking incidents, culminating in the depiction of a politically motivated terrorist siege involving a plane hijacking within the national course.

*"...they got you out of bed very early in the morning and... got you working on the theory and knowledge leading towards some sort of demonstration... that you understood what you'd been given and then could apply it... There was some... quite intensive debriefing... And gradually as the two weeks went on, the scenarios that we used... become slightly more intense... So for instance, you start with the basic suicide intervention... And we would finish with a massive terrorist hijacking at... Heathrow Airport"* (B:M:2:195).

**Negotiator training objectives.** In addition to the fact that the training was particularly intensive, negotiators also felt that the training had been designed with a number of objectives that were particularly beneficial to the trainees once they became operational. Two secondary categories emerged within this primary category and included: 'Training designed to test resilience' and 'Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating'.

***Training designed to test resilience.*** Negotiators felt that the training courses were structured in a way that specifically tested and encouraged resilience. There was a perception that the courses tested trainees' abilities to cope under pressure and *ergo* their levels of

resilience: “Yes, sleep deprivation, getting cold out during the night, it’s all part of the psychology, behind the scenes...” (L:M:7:54). Due to the on-call nature of the role, negotiators may be called out at any point during a seven day period, regardless of whether this is in the middle of the night after they have completed a long shift for their day job, or during their day off. As such, negotiators need to be able to operate/performance when they may be tired or sleep deprived and the training is thought to tap into this requirement for trainees to be resilient and able to cope well under pressure/within non-optimal conditions. There was also an impression that the training was utilised as a means of identifying whether negotiators were “cut out” for the commitment involved with the negotiator role.

*“...four weeks ago, I ended up doing 21 hours at work, because we had a kidnap running. And all of that took place after my day job had finished. I was tired... but you learn techniques of resilience... I’m certain... it was an unintentional objective of the course. Maybe it wasn’t, but you learn the techniques of being resilient... and rising to the challenge when you’re tired... And that’s quite important... Three o’clock in the morning when that phone goes off, you’re awake and you’ve got to operate straight away” (G:M:4:123).*

**Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating.** Negotiators also felt that the training was designed to specifically simulate the reality of negotiating, which typically involves negotiators having to respond to calls/be deployed outside of normal working hours (i.e. typically during evenings and weekends) when they may have already completed a full day’s work, for example: “...it simulates that long day, the tiredness, and if you like, you’ve done your day job in class, and then you’ve been called out in the evening to do something for real...” (F:M:4:111). There was a perception that the training attempted to mimic/simulate the typical conditions that negotiators would be working under when qualified, as a means of testing trainee ability to respond in such conditions: “So they are probably fourteen to fifteen hour days in any event to try and simulate the tiredness” (I:M:6:84).

**No substitute for the real thing.** Operational experience as a negotiator was perceived as a vital component within the negotiator journey. Negotiators were quick to praise the training that they received as part of the regional and national training courses, but they also felt strongly that there was no substitute for “the real thing” or “live scenarios”. On-the-job training/experience was therefore identified as a vital component in the negotiator journey that enhanced both negotiator skills and ability. In addition to this, negotiators felt that learning by doing was a necessary extension to the training courses and that “baptism by fire” was an

important part of the negotiator journey. Training was therefore conceptualised as an iterative process that started during completion of the regional and/or national training course and was further built upon via observation and completion of live operational deployments.

***On-the-job training/experience as increasing negotiator skills and ability.***

Negotiators consistently referred to the importance of on-the-job training or operational negotiator deployment as a method of increasing negotiator skills and ability: “...yes well experience is a great thing... it certainly contributes towards you... developing some expertise around it...” (E:M:3:114). They described instances where they had observed other negotiators and picked up tips and strategies that they could utilise themselves or where they had simply managed to put the training into practice by being deployed and having to negotiate at an incident. There was a strong perception that negotiation is a skill that is developed over time and as a result of many operational deployments:

*“Especially when you are new to it. Because... like everything in the police... as soon as you... qualify, there’s an assumption by the public that you’re an expert at what you do. You’re far from it. And it takes years... to learn it really”* (O:F:9:36).

One senior negotiator even described how he felt it was important to let more junior colleagues take the lead as the primary negotiator so that they got the exposure and experience needed to develop their skills and confidence.

*“My view is... no matter what role I am, my junior... colleague is going to speak... And I’ll always put them in to bat... Because I’m at the stage now, where I feel comfortable enough to do that and I want them to have the exposure... I’ve got two years left doing the job, before I go and find something else; they are the future beyond that... And unless we give them that exposure and that experience... Then they’re going to feel uncomfortable and unready for it... Sometimes it’s a brutal, brutal... experience”* (G:M:4:123).

***Learning by doing/baptism by fire.*** Negotiators also described a process whereby they fine-tuned the theoretical skills that they had learned during the training by actually negotiating at live incidents:

*“I was very fortunate that once I’d... done the initial course and gone onto a rota we went through a busy period, so I had a lot of early jobs to allow me to practise those skills in a live situation without having to rely on the theory side of it solely”* (I:M:6:84).

They felt that “learning by doing” was a core part of the negotiator journey: “...*I think it’s very powerful to learn, actually on the job and do the scenario*” (D:M:3:63); and some described a sense of “baptism by fire” when talking about the first incident that they were deployed to after having qualified: “*When you get that first one out of the way, because it’s a difficult one... you feel all right, I now know what to do*” (N:F:8:34). One negotiator described how he had to “*crack on*” with being the primary negotiator as the geography of the force meant that he was the first one on the scene and therefore had to start negotiating, despite being newly qualified (K:M:2:110) and another negotiator described being “*thrown in the deep end and just got on with it*” when her colleague (the primary negotiator) was unable to negotiate due to him being phobic of blood/unable to deal with the fact that the subject had cut himself and there was blood everywhere (N:F:8:34).

**Continuing professional development.** Negotiators described a plethora of CPD opportunities throughout the transcripts and emphasised the importance of CPD as an underpinning mechanism within the negotiator journey. CPD was conceptualised as an on-going form of training that provided an opportunity for negotiators to maintain/hone and develop their skills. Two tertiary categories were identified within this secondary category: ‘Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it you lose it”)’ and ‘The use of formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect upon performance and share best practice’.

**Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it you lose it”).** Many negotiators referred to the concept of negotiation as a skill that is honed by regular use and atrophied by infrequent use: “*It’s a perishable skill though. Unless you actually do the do, then... it does die off*” (G:M:4:123). Some negotiators used the phrase “if you don’t use it you lose it” when referring to negotiation skills and some described a lack of confidence when they had not been deployed for a period of time.

*“...you go through periods where you get quite a few calls, and then you kind of have... four, five months with nothing, and you then find yourself on call, and you think, I’m just going to have a look through my bag, and just refresh my mind, so actually... the more you’re doing it, the more comfortable and confident you feel”* (J:F:6:110).

CPD opportunities allowed negotiators to maintain skills to some extent (i.e. by using role play and training exercises), however, regular deployment appeared to be the preferred option for negotiators to hone and maintain their core negotiation skills: “*...there’s no substitute for actually getting back and getting in there and start using it... Or else you’ll lose it*” (B:M:2:195).

***Use of formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect upon performance and share best practice.*** Negotiators described a variety of different CPD opportunities including: quarterly in-force negotiator team meetings, regional quarterly negotiator meetings, annual call out training exercises (in collaboration with firearms teams), regional conferences, use of in-force deployment records, use of POLKA<sup>29</sup>, peer-to-peer mentoring/learning from more experienced negotiators, acting as stooges in negotiator selection/training exercises and self-directed learning/reading.

*“...those training days always include... a team meeting. Separate to that, we also have... regular meetings of the coordinators on the force where we share... good and bad practice and lessons learnt... we also have our own... site on the force intranet and that includes... a list of incidents of note where negotiators have been deployed and also includes a deployment form where, after every deployment, we submit a form to say we’ve been deployed, what the outcome was, what lessons there were, if any, what issues there were... I should mention also we’ve got the POLKA website, which is national” (K:M:2:111).*

These opportunities provided a forum for negotiators to reflect upon their performance in recent deployments and to share best practice. Negotiators referred to the importance of reflexivity and reflection on previous incidents and how they were managed, as a tool for learning and improving their performance in future deployments. They also described how CPD forums would be used to discuss “incidents of note” and in particular, to identify any “lessons learned” or elements of best practice to be shared with the cadre (or more widely if appropriate): *“And at each of those meetings... similar to the force meeting, we will go round the table and say, right, lessons learned” (A:M:1:156).*

### **Operational Negotiator Roles**

Once qualified, negotiators perform a variety of roles, both within the cadre generally and within the negotiator cell specifically. Negotiators typically adopted roles within the cadre in accordance with the type/level of training they had completed. Negotiators also adopted different roles within the negotiator cell during hostage/crisis incidents and this varied in line with negotiator level of training, the context of the incident and the practicalities of who was on-call at the time. Two secondary categories emerged within the operational negotiator roles category, in the form of ‘Negotiator cadre roles’ and ‘Negotiator cell roles’.

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<sup>29</sup> POLKA = Police Online Knowledge Area (please see glossary in Appendix 1 for more information).



**Negotiator cadre roles.** Each negotiator cadre contains individuals who have been trained to different levels. Due to the existence of both regional and national negotiator training courses, each cadre is likely to contain a combination of both level 1 (i.e. national) trained and level 2 (i.e. regional) trained negotiators. In addition to this, some (normally more senior) negotiators will have gone on to complete training in the form of HNC training and red centre (i.e. kidnap and extortion) training. Some negotiators on the cadre may, in fact, have completed all four of these training courses and as such can operate within any of the four roles listed below. These roles are conceptualised incrementally, whereby each additional training course/qualification builds upon the previous one in order to produce negotiators who are more highly qualified to deal with hostage/crisis incidents of increasing complexity.

**Level 2 negotiator.** Negotiators who had completed one of the regional HCNn training courses in the UK were referred to as level 2 negotiators and were perceived as having been trained to mainly respond to crisis (as opposed to hostage) incidents: “...*the selection is geared mainly towards selecting people to go on the regional course and join the team at that level; dealing mainly with domestic sieges or suicide interventions*” (K:M:2:111). Three of the negotiators within the current sample were level 2 negotiators having only completed a regional training course, and as such, these negotiators were, therefore, not qualified to deal with incidents involving ‘true’ hostages:

*“I certainly think the regional was a good introduction... but... the caveat with the regional course is that they wouldn’t expect you to go and start dealing with a hostage situation anyway... you could go in as support, but you wouldn’t be the number one or two negotiator”* (J:F:6:110).

To counteract this, most teams operated a system whereby level 2 negotiators were paired with level 1 negotiators (as far as possible) when on call, so as to provide an appropriate level of coverage for most types of incident: “...*traditionally... if you get called out, you’ve got your national and you’ve got your NSO*<sup>30</sup>” (N:F:8:34).

**Level 1 negotiator.** The majority of negotiators within the sample were level 1 trained negotiators [ $n = 12$ ]. Negotiators who had completed the two-week national training course at Hendon were referred to as level 1 negotiators and were qualified to respond to all types of crisis and hostage situation, apart from kidnap and extortion cases which are handled by ‘red negotiators’ (see below). The national training was described as equipping level 1 trained negotiators with the skills required to deal with more complex crisis/conflict situations which

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<sup>30</sup> NSO = Negotiator Support Officer.

may involve hostages, terrorism and politically motivated conflict<sup>31</sup>. Level 1 negotiators were typically perceived as the negotiators who took the lead during most deployments, with level 2 negotiators taking a support (or Negotiator Support Officer) role: *“I would respond to anything I get called out to, really... but I would say, having not done the National Course, that if there was a hostage... I’d let... the National chaps then... sort of take the lead, really...”* (M:F:8:24).

**Red negotiator.** The majority of negotiators within the sample [ $n = 13$ ] had completed further training in the form of Red Centre training that qualified them as “red negotiators”: *“I’m also red centre trained for kidnap...”* (B:M:2:195). Negotiators described this course as *“the next stage”* of negotiator training (G:M:4:123) or as a *“bolt on”* to the national training course for more experienced negotiators (F:M:4:111). Red negotiators were trained to specifically respond to kidnap and extortion situations (i.e. to negotiate covertly).

*“There’s something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a kidnap or a hostage environment... because effectively, in an overt world, the subject in crisis knows that you’re there and knows that you’re working for the cops. In a kidnap world where there’s a threat to life, very often they can’t know that the police are involved, so there’s different techniques in how you deal with them... So that’s the Red Centre world”* (I:M:6:84).

Kidnap and extortion scenarios often require the police to remain incognito, to the point where the kidnappers are not aware that the police are involved. This form of covert negotiation is incredibly complex and will often require negotiators to negotiate through a third party intermediary (TPI):

*“The victim communicator, we call them... they act as the, they’re the number, you’re their number one... But they do the talking... And obviously the... aggressor doesn’t know... The police are in the room with them, and the set up and everything”* (H:F:5:50).

As such the techniques, strategies and processes are different to those utilised within overt negotiation. The red centre training is, therefore, designed to equip negotiators with the appropriate skills required to negotiate in covert, kidnap and extortion situations.

**Hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC).** Some of the interviewees [ $n = 7$ ] had completed further training which qualified them as HNCs: *“And then moving on again, you then*

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<sup>31</sup> In some (mostly metropolitan) forces, all negotiators on the cadre are level 1 trained as they do not operate regional courses within some regions. In these regions, candidates who are successful at the selection phase will go on to complete the national course as opposed to completing the regional course and then the national course (as is the case in majority of forces/regions).

*have the coordinator training which is again separate, which is another... three days I think*” (K:M:2:111). HNCs tended to take a more supervisory/management role both within the cadre and the negotiator cell. In terms of their role within the cadre, HNCs were often responsible for the daily management of the cadre, including organisation of on-call rotas and deployment of negotiators when calls come in. In some forces, HNCs performed a direct line-management role which involved the management and supervision of a number of negotiators (the number varied in accordance with the size of the cadre and number of HNCs). This process involved ensuring that negotiators were “fit to deploy” and the provision of a CPD forum whereby negotiators could discuss incidents with their HNC and receive feedback in relation to their performance:

*“We have a line management structure... I line manage at the moment one, two, three active negotiators. So there’s an opportunity there to discuss one-on-one with them the learning points or significant points that have come out of an incident”* (B:M:2:195).

In addition to this, in many cases, the HNC performed a welfare/mentoring role by providing advice and support to less experienced negotiators.

*“...I was the coordinator, on for the day and... my number one rang me and she said... I’ve got this issue... she’s one of our more junior negotiators, so she rings me and she goes, oh, what do I do? I say, okay, calm down. So there’s a bit of mentoring and teaching...”* (G:M:4:123).

In addition to the four negotiator cadre roles described above, two negotiators (E:M:3:114; I:M:6:84) within the sample were also qualified as a Gold Negotiator Advisors<sup>32</sup> (GNAs) which is the highest level of qualification that a negotiator can achieve within the UK. GNAs are qualified to advise the Gold Commander<sup>33</sup> in relation to the negotiation strategy and tactics that should be utilised in order to resolve the hostage/crisis situation.

**Negotiator cell roles.** In addition to the roles that negotiators adopted within the cadre, negotiators also adopted different roles within the negotiator cell/during operational deployment: *“I’m one of six coordinators, so at any one time we have a coordinator on-call... and two other people on-call to go as a team of three”* (I:M:6:84). For more details in relation to the negotiator cell, please refer to Chapter 8 where the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of negotiation is described. The data revealed the existence of three main roles within the

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<sup>32</sup> Gold Negotiator Advisors (GNAs) are “experienced negotiator coordinators trained to support Gold Commanders with advice on negotiation. GNAs are likely to provide support for Gold Commanders in response to more complex incidents such as criminal or terrorist sieges” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).

<sup>33</sup> The Gold Commander is the individual who is in overall strategic organisational control of resources in order to resolve an incident. They will be responsible for formulating a strategy to deal with the incident and tend to be off site/scene. “The Gold Commander is in overall strategic command of the operation and sets the overarching strategy that all other plans must take account of” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).

negotiator cell, with each actor playing a different part within the negotiation process. Negotiators described a process of symbiotic team-working, whereby each role was redundant without the support of the others (much like cogs within a machine). These three roles consisted of: 'The primary negotiator'; 'The secondary negotiator' and 'The hostage negotiator coordinator' and each category is discussed sequentially below.

***The primary negotiator ("Number 1"/"The communicator").*** The primary negotiator was also referred to as the "Number 1" and took on the role of "the communicator" or "mouthpiece"; whereby they were the individual who formed the direct link between the police and the subject: "...my colleague was the number one negotiator, so talking; and he was talking to him as we were driving down" (C:F:2:96). The primary negotiator's role was therefore to engage in dialogue with the subject and to attempt to de-escalate and resolve the hostage/crisis situation. It is important to note that whilst the primary negotiator was the individual who did the speaking, they were heavily supported by the secondary negotiator and guided by the HNC in terms of specific tactics that they employed or strategies that they utilised within their communication with the subject. Negotiators also described instances whereby the primary negotiator became a 'pseudo' secondary negotiator. A third of negotiators [ $n = 5$ ] for example, had taken on an advisory/support role when they had arrived at a scene and the first responder (i.e. a non-negotiator trained police officer) had already established a rapport with the subject and was successfully de-escalating the crisis situation. One negotiator referred to this adaptation as a means of acting as a "*safety blanket*" and "*coaxing*" the first responder through the negotiation process (J:F:6:110) in order to prevent breaking a rapport that had already been established between the first responder and the subject.

*"...if you turn up, and the first responder, to use the jargon, is doing well, has established a good rapport, well, you... we have the number one, number two, and number three roles, in an ideal world, actually, you assume number two then, and you support the untrained responder. Because if they're doing well, why disrupt it all?"* (F:M:4:111).

***The secondary negotiator ("Number 2"/"The supporter and advisor").*** The secondary negotiator was also referred to as the "Number 2" and typically adopted the role of the "supporter and advisor" within the negotiator cell: "...I was the supporting person; I was the number two, so the main role was – stand by my colleague" (C:F:2:96). The secondary negotiator tended to monitor the negotiations/listen to the dialogue that was occurring between the primary negotiator and the subject, take notes and make suggestions to the primary in terms

of potential strategies that could be utilised or points for discussion that may act as hooks/de-escalators for the subject: *“It’s easier when you’ve got a second negotiator with you because you can sotto voce, you can just... exchange a few views... get a triangulation on what’s going on and, on occasion, swap negotiator as well”* (D:M:3:63). Post-it notes were frequently used by secondary negotiators as an effective and simple means of passing information to the primary negotiator or making suggestions in terms of tactics/strategies etc.

In some forces, the secondary negotiator was referred to as a “Negotiator Support Officer” (N:F:8:34) which succinctly synopsis the objective of the secondary negotiator role which is to support the primary negotiator. In addition to operational support, negotiators also referred to providing emotional support (i.e. providing an emotional checkpoint), or simply acting as a “sounding board” to cross reference ideas/strategies that might be utilised within the negotiation.

*“It’s one of the reasons we try to always have... a secondary negotiator there sort of monitoring for that. There are certain situations... I’ve certainly felt it myself and I’ve certainly pulled other negotiators for it where they reach a point where actually, they get really annoyed with the person they’re talking to... so... one of the roles really is to... look for that in the primary, pull them away, engineer a bit of development time and say to them look, this is what’s happening... if necessary change them. But usually, pull them and say right, this is what it is, he’s getting under your skin and this is why. Then it’s okay and they can go back in. They recognise it and they deal with it”* (K:M:2:111).

This role was depicted as a vital one within the negotiator cell and the findings reiterated the importance of negotiation being a team discipline and the importance of trying to avoid “negotiating solo” (please refer to Chapter 9 for a discussion of the problems associated with negotiating alone). The secondary negotiator also sometimes acted as a conduit between the primary negotiator and silver<sup>34</sup>/bronze command<sup>35</sup> in the absence of a HNC. This involved updating the silver/bronze commander on the progress of the negotiations and/or taking requests from the commander in terms of the strategy that needed to be applied to the hostage/crisis incident.

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<sup>34</sup> The Silver Commander “coordinates the individual strategies developed by the Firearms and Public Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold’s overarching strategy.” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).

<sup>35</sup> Bronze command can refer to either the Firearms Strategic Commander or the Public Order Strategic Commander (or both), depending on the situation. The Firearms Strategic Commander (Bronze) is “responsible for developing the firearms strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009). The Public Order Strategic Commander (Bronze) is “responsible for developing the public order strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).

***The hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC) (“The supervisor and command liaison”).***

The third role within the negotiator cell was that of the HNC who takes on the role of “supervisor and command liaison”:

*“...the idea of the coordinator, really, is to provide advice to the silver commander. So there’s a little bit of cross over with the team leader role, but... the coordinator really should be... assessing the progress of negotiation, making recommendations to the silver and... ideally... providing written updates to the silver as well” (K:M:2:111).*

The HNC was responsible for monitoring the content/progress of negotiations, overseeing and informing negotiation strategy and liaising with the silver/bronze command and firearms commander (if required/appropriate). The HNC acted as a conduit between the negotiators and the on-scene commanders who make the wider operational decisions in relation to how the incident is going to be resolved. They typically advise the bronze/silver command on the use of strategies/tactics that can be offered by negotiators and may also complete position papers<sup>36</sup> throughout the course of the negotiation.

*“Position papers are effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw up a position paper which says, at this time this is what’s happening, these are the considerations, these are the issues that seem to escalate it, these are the issues that de-escalate it, this is the way that I think that the negotiation strategy should go... that kind of thing” (E:M:3:114).*

In addition to the operational liaison/advisory role, the HNC also performed a management/welfare role to ensure that negotiators were fit to continue negotiating and/or were appropriate to negotiate in the specific circumstances that were presented: “...we look at welfare of staff...” (E:M:3:114). The HNC role within the UK bears some resemblance to that of the crisis negotiation team (CNT) leader within the USA; however, some aspects of the CNT leader role would be performed by the force negotiator coordinator lead<sup>37</sup> within the UK (see Regini 2002 for a description of the CNT leader role).

### **Negotiator Welfare and Support**

The final stage within the negotiator journey model related to the welfare and support of operationally active negotiators. The negotiator role can be incredibly demanding and place negotiators under immense amounts of pressure and in circumstances where their actions can

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<sup>36</sup> Negotiation position papers are used by negotiation teams to help summarise and synthesise the hostage and/or crisis incident currently being dealt with. They typically include information relating to the status (an overall description of the incident), assessment (an analysis of the incident) and recommendations (guidance and strategy) in relation to the incident (Dalfonzo and Romano 2003).

<sup>37</sup> Force Negotiator Coordinator Leads “work with the regional negotiator coordinator to support operational readiness of negotiators within the region” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).

have an impact on whether individuals live or die. As such, it is vital that negotiators receive adequate levels of support from their respective forces in order to ensure that they are psychologically stable enough to be able to continue within their role. Two secondary categories emerged from the data in relation to the support of negotiators, in the form of 'Force-specific formalised support mechanisms' and 'Self-directed negotiator coping strategies'. These categories are discussed sequentially below.

**Force specific formalised support mechanisms.** Methods of support and welfare offered and utilised by specific forces differed to some extent, depending on the policies and procedures adopted by each force. The five tertiary categories below represent some of the formalised support mechanisms that were in place for negotiators (although some existed in different forms/permutations within different forces). It is important to note also that some of these support mechanisms were not unique to negotiators but were available to police officers/police staff as a matter of course. The mechanisms that were unique to the negotiator cadre (in this context) are identified with an asterisk below.

**Debriefing procedures.** Debriefing within police terms refers to a process whereby incidents are discussed with the aim of identifying good practice and areas for improvement (College of Policing 2013). Debriefing processes should be followed after any critical incident, and this concept is, therefore, not unique to hostage and crisis incidents. Negotiators referred to both formal and informal debrief mechanisms and described debriefing as having a number of objectives, including to ensure that negotiators involved do not have any unresolved issues (if these have arisen as a result of the negotiation): *"We always insist that the negotiators themselves after an incident... have their own little debrief, because sometimes you might get a little bit of conflict between two negotiators dealing with it, so you might have dealt with a certain something"* (A:M:1:156); to ensure that negotiators are psychologically well enough to either drive home (or continue working) and to identify aspects of operational learning/good practice.

*"...the people who just dealt with that situation, if they've got a supervisor, if there's anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she'll regroup everybody, and they'll talk through the process. One is a debriefing... for learning. And the other one, just to check that everybody's behaving as they normally do [Laughs]"* (O:F:9:36).

Whilst the exact mechanisms of debriefing differed from force to force, most negotiators referred to the debriefing process as important from both an individual and organisational perspective, particularly when the incident had resulted in a negative outcome.

**Buddying/shadowing system.\*** Some negotiators referred to a buddying/shadowing system that allowed newly qualified negotiators (i.e. those who had just completed their regional or national negotiation training course) to shadow more experienced negotiators during the initial phase of operational activity: “...we basically get paired up with somebody of more experience, and whenever there’s a job on, we try to go out and get involved, learning from the more experienced person” (L:M:7:54). This process was described by negotiators as being an important support mechanism, particularly for those who had limited experience of dealing with hostage or crisis incidents as a first responder, for example. This mechanism appeared to serve a dual purpose, whereby new negotiators noted the value of being able to observe live incidents and learn from their more experienced colleagues prior to dealing with their first deployment as the number one negotiator:

*“...we had one [newly qualified HCN] work with us on Tuesday... She said, it’s great to listen, because she’d done her regional course but it was nothing like the live scenario. She’s eyes open, ears open, and she was looking at me and [Anonymised HCN]; what we were doing; how we did it; what we were thinking about. She was able to listen, read the log, give her opinion on things” (C:F:2:96).*

Equally, HNCs noted the value of this system for “quality assuring” new negotiators in terms of ensuring that they had the appropriate skill set and they were ready to deploy operationally as a negotiator:

*“But what we do now is a mentoring scheme, whereby you’re effectively shadowed by an operational negotiator, who will deploy with you on a number of occasions and then make an assessment whether or not you are ‘match fit’, and able to deploy individually” (E:M:3:114).*

**Occupational health/welfare provision.** Negotiators also referred to the provision of occupational health services as part of the normal police service formalised welfare and support mechanisms. The specific service provided differed slightly across forces/regions and a number of different welfare services were discussed, including occupational health provision, access to force medical advisors, access to in-house/external counselling services, the Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) programme<sup>38</sup>, and the Employee Assistance Programme<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> “TRiM (Trauma Risk Management) is a welfare led process intended to assess the response of a member of staff (including certain affiliated groups such as special constables) exposed to a potentially traumatic incident” (Kent Police 2014).

<sup>39</sup> Each force may operate a different Employee Assistance Programme. Employee Assistant Programmes normally consist of a free, confidential counselling and advice service which employees can access for support.



*“If, for example, tonight, I got called out and there was a fatality at an incident... and this has happened to somebody else quite recently, I know... the very next day, if not at the time... I’d have... my phone would be going, and it’d be... is everything okay, is there anything you need? They’d point me in the direction of occupational health, and the critical incident debriefing and all the rest of it... So... I’ve got a lot of confidence that there would be people coming to me from all sides, checking that I had everything I needed” (F:M:4:111).*

Some negotiators [ $n = 3$ ] also referred to a process whereby they had to take part in mandated annual psychological welfare checks: *“Ah, mandated, we should go... once every 12 months to see occupational health; we don’t have to talk to them when we get there, but we do have to go” (I:M:6:84).* This typically involved attending an appointment with a mental health professional in order to ensure that they were psychologically stable enough to continue being deployed as a negotiator.

***“Stepping off the rota”.***\* Many of the HNCs described a welfare process that enabled negotiators to temporarily “step off the rota” if they were experiencing difficulties in terms of being able to commit to negotiating or in terms of being in the right “frame of mind” to perform within the negotiator role: *“...some of my colleagues have been off the rota for one reason or another, for a period of time, and we’ll put them back into the rota when they’re ready and we will give them support” (D:M:3:63).* The option to temporarily be removed from the rota was referred to as a means of allowing negotiators to deal with any issues that they may be experiencing and then return to the cadre once they were ready to be deployed again and provided negotiators with the time and space that they needed in order to deal with the pressures of negotiating. HNCs were clear to stress that negotiator welfare was paramount and that negotiators needed to be in good psychological and emotional health in order to perform effectively and safely within their role.

*“...one of them, when she first qualified... she had a job which was putting an awful lot of pressure on her, so she was working long hours, it was in an area of work... where there was a high stress level to do with child protection issues and so on, and she was taking her work home, married to a... serving officer as well, and there were concerns about her performance at work from her own day job, if you like, so this was fed to me. I spoke with her... and we agreed mutually that she wouldn’t get deployed just for then, and then we made some further contact, things had improved greatly, her workload had reduced... I was being put under pressure to say that’s she’d still got problems, she shouldn’t be deployed, but she was coming to me saying I want to be deployed, why am*

*I not being deployed? So we ended up... by mutual agreement she went to the force medical advisor... who works here on behalf of the force... he looked at the issues and said no, from what she says and from what I can observe she is deployable, in fact it would do her good, so she has been deployed a couple of times and she's coming on quite well. So we have a flexible, reactive system to that..." (B:M:2:195).*

**Self-directed negotiator coping strategies.** In contrast to the formalised welfare mechanisms, negotiators also described a variety of self-directed coping strategies that helped them to deal with the stress/pressure experienced as a result of negotiating. These coping strategies were categorised into four tertiary sub-categories including: 'Peer support from other members of the cadre'; 'Social support from family/friends/colleagues'; 'Exercise and sport' and 'Drinking alcohol'. Coping strategies were utilised differentially by negotiators with some typically using one particular coping strategy and others utilising a combination of the strategies discussed below.

**Peer support from other members of the cadre.** Most negotiators described feeling incredibly supported by their colleagues and other members of the negotiator cadre: *"Often, within the negotiator group we support each other straightaway anyway..." (E:M:3:114); "...usually, after a job... if there are a couple of you, you'll sit down and have a cup of tea together and talk it through, and that helps a lot" (J:F:6:110).* They described an ethos whereby they felt supported and mentored by their colleagues.

*"The big... coping strategy, as far as negotiating is concerned, is the team... they all know what we go through when things have been difficult. Talking to other team members, ring you up, you ring them up. That's... the best way of coping" (D:M:3:673).*

Support received from those negotiators in the cadre who were more senior/experienced was perceived as particularly helpful: *"We've got our own... mentor, which is one of the... coordinators... So if I've got any issues, I know I can go and speak to them" (N:F:8:34).* Whilst some negotiators described a process whereby they actively sought support from their colleagues, this relationship appeared to be bi-directional as they also described an atmosphere whereby negotiators would also offer support to their colleagues automatically if they felt that they needed it:

*"I know when we did have one [a fatality] that other team members sent those colleagues... supportive messages; text messages or emails or picked up the phone..."*

*and I think that made them feel not isolated; not on their own and that they could talk if they needed to” (C:F:2:96).*

***Social support from family/friends/colleagues.*** In addition to seeking support from the cadre, negotiators also typically sought support from family members, friends or colleagues (non-negotiators):

*“...my wife is absolutely great. I will offload to her and she’ll sit down and nod, make a cup of tea if it needs it, tell me not to be stupid if I’m getting things out of proportion... So I think just kind of having somewhere to offload and not bottle-up” (G:M:4:123).*

Some negotiators found it helpful to discuss incidents that they had dealt with and to “verbalise” some of the feelings that they had around the way the incident was resolved:

*“I’m quite a private person... But I wouldn’t keep things inside like that... I’d be saying to one of my mates... Even mates not in the job, I’d be saying I had an absolutely horrendous job today... Somebody jumped, or somebody did this... Just to talk about it...” (H:F:5:50).*

The utilisation of social support differed within the sample, with some preferring not to discuss their negotiation role with family members (and choosing friends or colleagues as their forum for social support) and others preferring to utilise their family members/friends as a mechanism for social support (but choosing not to discuss with colleagues): *“Yes, probably just go home and speak to my other half... really... because you can’t speak to the people that you work with especially being an inspector” (N:F:8:34).* For others, their choice of confidant was context-dependent: *“Talk about it with other colleagues. Sometimes the wife, sometimes not, depends on the situation” (L:M:7:54).*

***Exercise and/or sport.*** Approximately half of the negotiators interviewed [ $n = 7$ ] described using exercise or sport as a form of coping strategy/mechanism to help deal with stress (either as a result of their negotiation role or more generally): *“I cope with stress by... sport, walking in the countryside, things like that, you know” (F:M:4:111).* Negotiators utilised a variety of different forms of exercise including going to the gym, running, walking, hiking, biking or playing sport: *“I do sport as my number one... exercise to blast out the adrenalin” (C:F:2:96); “...I’ve got two black Labradors, and I do a lot of mountaineering and hiking... and... I go out and bike with my boys...” (O:F:9:36).* The use of exercise has been recognised as one of a number of healthy coping mechanisms used by police officers to combat work-related stress (Alexander and Walker 1994); and is described as a form of adaptive avoidance-

behavioural coping which can distract the individual from thinking about negative past experiences and improve psychophysiological tolerance to stress (McAuley 1994); an aspect that is alluded to in the following excerpt: *“I go for a really long run... It just lets you think things through, let’s a bit of fresh air around you, and I find it personally... really good for clearing your brain out”* (I:M:6:84).

**Drinking alcohol.** Approximately a third of negotiators [ $n = 4$ ] mentioned using alcohol as a coping strategy: *“I’ve had a number of coping strategies over the years, including drinking far too much...”* (E:M:3:114); *“...there’s the classic of going home and having a drink. Well, I will do that... I hate having headaches, so it won’t be too much [Laughter]”* (J:F:6:110). This coping strategy was referred to as something which should not really be done: *“Again, they say you should never do it, but me, I go to the pub, have a beer”* (L:M:7:54); and some were reluctant to admit that they used drinking as a coping mechanism, potentially due to the stigma attached to the use of alcohol to deal with problems: *“...I’d better not say drinking, had I? No... it is nice, sometimes, to have a drink and just talk about it, as in have a... beer or a glass of wine, and to... talk about it...”* (H:F:5:50). The use of alcohol was mostly referred to as a means of relaxing and unwinding and “the pub” was conceptualised as a forum to informally debrief the situation with friends/colleagues which was perceived in a positive, as opposed to a negative light.

### **Underpinning Mechanism: Confidence Enhancement as a Result of Increased Negotiator Deployment**

Negotiators described an increased level of confidence as they progressed through their individual journey and there appeared to be a direct positive correlation between the number of deployments and their levels of confidence.

*“...the first time you get a call about a kidnap; your stomach just falls completely, from the sky... Crime in action, fact of life, massive, massive, massive risk. Now, okay, I can see clearly, exactly where it is we’re going with this one, what it is that we’re doing... there’s always an adrenalin rush when they... come in and there’s always that initial, ah, flipping heck, what are we dealing with? ...but I guess what the experience does, is it calms that more quickly”* (G:M:4:123).

One negotiator described how she was *“absolutely trembling”* when she went to her first deployment (O:F:9:36) and another simply stated *“...the more you do, the more comfortable... you feel”* (H:F:5:50). Others felt that experience served to reduce feelings of anxiety more quickly once they had received the initial call and helped them to feel more confident about

their role as a negotiator and the actions that they needed to take: “...it’s *always... a challenge... because people are always slightly different but you... the situation itself doesn’t faze you as much as perhaps it might have done in the past*” (K:M:2:111). The findings suggest that negotiation skill and confidence is something which is developed as the negotiator navigates their journey through the negotiator world. They also implicate the importance of regular utilisation (and practising) of negotiation skills as a means of enhancing and maintaining both skill and confidence levels within operational negotiators.

### **Model Synopsis**

The findings provide an insight into the procedural aspects of HCN selection, training, operational deployment and support in the UK and help to depict the journey that negotiators navigate as a result of entering into the negotiator world. In addition to these categories, the findings also revealed an underpinning mechanism in the form of ‘Confidence enhancement as a result of increased negotiator deployment’ thereby highlighting the importance of continuous operational deployment for negotiators to remain confident in their abilities to successfully resolve incidents. These findings validate the current practices of HCNn cadres and can be used to inform the recruitment, selection, training and operational support of UK HCNs. The following chapter outlines the operational and procedural processes utilised by negotiators when deployed to an incident and describes the UK-centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of hostage and crisis negotiation.

## Chapter 8: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 2: The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation

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In this chapter, the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of successful police HCNn within the UK will be outlined. Initial, focused and axial coding of the data revealed 3 primary, 9 secondary, 22 tertiary and 16 quaternary categories that depict the procedural and operational aspects of UK HCNn (please refer to Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1). Whilst the indication is that these stages are completed sequentially, there is a recognition that negotiators may have to complete certain tasks at different stages, depending on the context and characteristics of the subject and/or crisis/conflict scenario. In addition to these categories, three mechanisms were identified as core underpinning components within the model. The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym has been utilised to provide a mnemonic mechanism for the key aspects of the procedural model:

- **D**eployment
- **I**nformation/Intelligence gathering
- **A**ssessment of risk/threat
- **M**ethods of communication
- **O**pen dialogue with subject
- **N**egotiator toolbox/repertoire to resolve incident
- **D**ebriefing procedures

### **Stage 1: Initial Negotiator Deployment Tasks**

The first stage of the procedural model can be divided into four subcategories that relate to the tasks performed by negotiators during the initial phase of deployment: 'Information /intelligence gathering', 'Risk/threat assessment and management', 'Scene control/sterilisation and management' and 'Negotiator cell setup'.

**Information/intelligence gathering.** Broadly speaking, intelligence gathering refers to the process of collecting information (Intelligence Gathering n.d.). This process constitutes a key role within policing and forms part of the National Decision Model that is utilised by police forces within the UK (College of Policing 2014b). Negotiators consistently described the process of intelligence gathering, or the collation of information relating to the subject (whether that is a hostage-taker or individual in crisis) as one of the initial actions

Table 8.1. *Table Depicting the Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Quaternary Categories within the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation*

Primary Categories	Secondary Categories	Tertiary Categories	Quaternary Categories
Stage 1: Initial deployment tasks and roles	Information/intelligence gathering	Information/intelligence gathering as immediate  Information/intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation strategy	
	Risk/threat assessment and management	Assessment of risk of harm to negotiator  Continuous dynamic risk assessment of subject, colleagues and wider community	
	Scene control/sterilisation and management	Incident scene control, containment and management  Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment	
	Negotiator cell setup	Identification of roles within the negotiator cell Liaison with bronze/silver command	
Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident resolution	Engaging with the subject	Initiation of communication/dialogue with subject  Utilisation of a variety of communication media as necessary	Initiate communication with the subject as soon as possible Any communication/dialogue is better than none Face-to-face dialogue  Telephone conversation Megaphone/loudhailer Text message Email/internet/social networking websites
		The negotiator toolbox/repertoire  Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication techniques  Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques	Use of active listening principles and techniques Use of person-centred therapy principles Establish why the subject is in the situation Honesty Identification of hooks and triggers Matching of negotiator and subject Adapt strategy in line with

			situation/subject Use of concessions and positive police actions Perseverance/persistence Use of time as a tactic/“playing it long” Disassociation from the police Generate options available to subject/encourage problem solving Identify commonalities/common ground Encourage dialogue/allow subject to vent
	Incident resolution	Use of enhanced persuasion Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change Liaison with operational teams and subject to orchestrate exit plan/surrender ritual	Discuss and mutually agree surrender ritual/exit plan with subject Allow subject to save face
Stage 2: Underpinning mechanism	Rapport building/development of the pseudo-therapeutic alliance	Express/demonstrate empathy Establish trust between negotiator and subject	
Stage 3: Post-incident protocol	Operational debriefing procedures	Debriefing as an important component of negotiation Debriefing as a means of CPD/therapeutic process/welfare check	
Entire model underpinning mechanism 1	Formal record keeping [Written/Electronic/Audio]		
Entire model underpinning mechanism 2	Defensible decision-making and accountability		






Figure 8.1. Conceptual model depicting the categories within the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model. Note. F2F = Face-To-Face; SNS = Social Networking Sites.

carried out when they had been deployed to an incident<sup>40</sup>. Within this category, two tertiary categories emerged as core themes within the transcripts: ‘Information/Intelligence gathering as immediate’ and ‘Information/Intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation strategy’.

***Information/intelligence gathering as immediate.*** Negotiators described information/intelligence gathering with a sense of immediacy and referred to this process as one that began as soon as the initial deployment call had been received. This process involved a variety of different methods that included checking police records, previous negotiator deployment logs, gathering information from call handlers/first responders/witnesses and speaking to the family and friends of the subject. Information/intelligence gathering was even carried out by negotiators on the way to the incident and some described speaking to various different information sources whilst driving (or being driven) to a scene: “...*then get more details when I’m on the way*” (K:M:2:111); “...*usually en route I try to get details about any background on them*” (L:M:7:54).

“...*what you need and what I often try and seek is what do we know about this person? Let’s speak to their family, let’s speak to their doctors, let’s speak to their... carers to find out about what we call intelligence – I’d say it was just information really... I suppose I... use those techniques to try and find out as much as possible about the person before engaging with them*” (B:M:2:195).

The information/intelligence gathering process was seen as a vital tool that allowed the negotiator to establish some sort of context for the scenario and to inform the approach that was going to be taken with the subject once communication was initiated.

“...*you’re able to draw on other things from his life and other detail which often in negotiating situations we completely don’t have because there’s no Intel on the system. So we rely on our negotiators if we can. If we’ve negotiated with him before... for colleagues to have put in what worked last time; what didn’t work*” (C:F:2:96).

***Information/intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation strategy.*** All negotiators described the information/intelligence gathering process as a vital component of negotiation whereby the information gathered was used to directly inform the

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<sup>40</sup> Information gathering in this sense refers to the collation of general information about the subject, whereas intelligence gathering refers to the collation of information that may relate specifically to the subject’s criminal history or background. Negotiators described engaging in both processes of information gathering and intelligence gathering as necessary/appropriate. An incident involving a subject who did not have a criminal history and was not “known to police”, for example, would require negotiators to gather information, as opposed to intelligence *per se*.

negotiation strategy, technique or approach utilised when either entering into dialogue with the subject, or within continued negotiation/communication with the subject. One negotiator described this process as a means of “*delving into their background to find the buttons to press to actually get them to come down*” (D:M:3:63). Examples of information/intelligence gathering in this context included identifying how the subject presented and the situational circumstances around the hostage/crisis event; identifying the existence of existing mental health problems/history of substance abuse; identification of criminal history or outstanding arrest warrants (“*Usually they’ve done intelligence checks. I dealt with one who had actually recently been arrested for sex offending, so obviously... initially it’s a no go area, you wouldn’t say, are you wanted by the police for anything? See you later...*” (L:M:7:54)); identification of previous negotiator call out history; identification of conciliatory and aggravating parties; and identification of precipitating factors to the crisis situation.

The data also indicated that negotiators utilised information/intelligence that had been gathered about the subject to directly inform risk assessment processes<sup>41</sup>. One negotiator described how intelligence gathering was used to assess risk in relation to a suicidal subject and axial coding linked the two secondary categories of information/intelligence gathering and risk/threat assessment as a result of this relationship<sup>42</sup>:

*“...yes, he could commit suicide. There’s always that possibility, but I think you get a feeling reasonably early on from... his demeanour, his actions, and his comments as to whether or not this is someone who is... actually going to carry out that threat. You obviously look at their criminal past, and all their past, you’ll obviously try to find out... from associates or friends or family, has he done this before? And how does he react to drink, etc.”* (A:M:1:156).

**Risk/threat assessment and management<sup>43</sup>.** Information/intelligence gathering was described as directly leading into one of the next initial deployment tasks that involved the assessment and management of potential risk/threat to all parties involved in the negotiation. Assessment of threat and risk constitutes the second stage within the National Decision Model (College of Policing 2014b) and, as such, negotiators appeared to be implementing this model within the process of negotiation.

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<sup>41</sup> The use of intelligence in this way has also previously been identified by McMains and Mullins (2010).

<sup>42</sup> This relationship is represented by a downward-facing vertical connecting arrow between the information/intelligence gathering and risk assessment categories in Figure 8.1.

<sup>43</sup> Whilst risk/threat assessment forms a vital component within the first stage of the model (i.e. initial negotiator deployment tasks), this process is also one which continues throughout the duration of the negotiation process and as such, this stage of the model is represented by a dashed outline/border in Figure 8.1.

*“My initial thing is safety of myself, that’s the primary thing. Safety of other officers that are there, and then safety of, I’m talking about incidents of people in crisis here, safety of them. My training and whatever has taught me that if they’re going to jump, they jump anyway, and what I don’t want to be doing is grabbing somebody and them taking me with them. Luckily... I’ve never grabbed anybody, but you... look for an area where you can talk to them safely, where you know that you’re not going to be harmed. So that’s the first thing I do” (L:M:7:54).*

Negotiators described risk assessment as a component of negotiation that was vital to ensuring the safety of all parties involved and tended to refer to this concept in terms of assessing risk of harm to the negotiator and a continuous dynamic risk assessment of the subject, colleagues and the wider community.

***Assessment of risk of harm to negotiator.*** Negotiators were typically deployed to scenarios that involved potential risk of harm to not only the subject, but also to the negotiator and other police personnel. This often involved working ‘at height’ or in precarious positions whereby the negotiator may be putting him or herself at risk in order to communicate with the subject. Negotiators specified that whilst they were there to try to successfully negotiate/resolve an incident and to try and prevent injury or loss of life, their safety was paramount and was always considered as the primary risk assessment in relation to the scenario: *“You assess it yourself so you don’t put yourself at immediate risk” (N:F:8:34).* Some negotiators described wanting to get closer to a subject to make communication and developing rapport easier, but they were cognisant of the fact that their safety was the most important requirement: *“It is better to be able to talk with someone if there’s no barriers, but you’ve got to balance it with your own safety” (B:M:2:195).*

*“I feel that you can really get drawn into that dialogue, and you can put yourself in danger... you get that creeping, and you move closer and closer... if you’ve got someone who’s going to jump, actually, you don’t want them to take you off, as well” (J:F:6:110).*

***Continuous dynamic risk assessment of subject, colleagues and wider community.*** Negotiators described a process by which risk/threat was continuously and dynamically assessed. This involved evaluation of risk posed to all parties, including the negotiator, subject, colleagues and the wider community. One negotiator described risk as something that he had to *“continually reassess” (A:M:1:156)* and another referred to being *“constantly aware of your own and their [subject] safety” (B:M:2:195).*

*“...the first thing is, is there a threat to life? If so, whose life; how can that be mitigated against? ...are there any other tactics that the ground commander might want to consider to keep the public safe? To keep me safe? To keep his staff safe? ...so those are kind of the initial dynamic risk assessment” (G:M:4:123).*

**Scene control/sterilisation and management.** The final task identified within the initial phase of the model referred to the concept of scene control/sterilisation and management which aligns sympathetically with Poland and McCrystle’s (1999) “containment and stabilisation” phase of hostage-taking. Two tertiary subcategories emerged: ‘Incident scene control and management’ and ‘Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment’. These factors were described as tasks that may not necessarily be performed by negotiators *per se* (i.e. they may be operational tasks performed by HNCs, scene commanders or police colleagues present at the scene) but were considered to be vital components in relation to the negotiation process.

***Incident scene control, containment and management.*** Negotiators described having to initially control the scene upon their arrival or having to direct others (i.e. police colleagues) to do this. This activity ensures that the public are safe, that there is no third party intervention and that subjects are contained within a certain area: *“...the police need to close down the immediate area for us to be able to do our bit” (I:M:6:84).* Negotiators referred to a number of activities that fell under the “scene control umbrella” as outlined in the following extract:

*“...if you’re then having to set up a negotiating scenario. By that you’re... having to set up a sterile environment, and... you... may well be evacuating people... so you’re going to look at a physical... sterile zone, in which there will be proper cordoning’s; you can look at, in certain situations, getting the assistance of technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries...” (A:M:1:156).*

***Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment.*** The importance of creating and maintaining a sterile environment was consistently described throughout the transcripts. Sterility in this sense as refers to a process that enabled negotiators to complete their role to best effect, by ensuring that the subject was only receiving input/dialogue from the negotiator and thereby preventing external influence from bystanders or third parties.

*“The actual... atmosphere that you’re... negotiating in can be a problem. It needs to be kept sterile. I’ve had negotiations going on where... the chap’s mates are all across the back, there, shouting the odds, which aren’t helping. Or we get people... perhaps, who*

*may not know the individual, but... are fed up with the inconvenience being caused to them, shouting jump or whatever*" (D:M:3:63).

One negotiator referred to the interference received from bystanders as "*diluting your efforts*" as it was incongruent with the premise of keeping the subject focused on the negotiator and what they are saying (A:M:1:156). Another referred to the negative impact of "*not being able to isolate the person*" (K:M:2:111), thereby emphasising the importance of sterility within the negotiation procedure.

**Negotiator cell setup.** In line with the national negotiator deployment model (ACPO and NPIA 2011), negotiators typically set up a negotiator cell<sup>44</sup> (if appropriate) once they had arrived at the scene of a hostage/crisis incident. A full negotiator cell consists of a team leader (an experienced negotiator) and four negotiators (ACPO and NPIA 2011); however, the majority of incidents do not require the implementation of a full cell. Two tertiary categories were identified within this category: 'The identification of roles within the negotiator cell' and 'Liaison with bronze<sup>45</sup>/silver command<sup>46</sup>'.

**Identification of roles within the negotiator cell.** Negotiators are typically deployed in pairs, with the intention of adopting the roles of primary (number 1) and secondary (number 2) negotiator. The primary negotiator is the one who engages directly with the subject, whereas the secondary negotiator tends to adopt a supporting/advisory role throughout the process. Negotiators described the process of having to identify who was going to perform which role during the initial deployment phase: "*...if there's two of us for instance, we decide who is going to lead, who's not... who's going to be number two and if there's a third one, obviously who's going to provide that link*" (K:M:2:111). This decision was dictated by a number of factors, including the nature and context of the scenario and a feeling for who was best placed to engage with the subject/develop a rapport: "*...what role do you play, are you actually playing an advisory role... or are you playing an actual negotiating role; and... that depends on the incident*" (E:M:3:114). In addition, negotiators who were trained as HNCs<sup>47</sup>, described having

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<sup>44</sup> For the purposes of this research 'negotiator cell' could refer to a scenario which only involves two negotiators (i.e. the primary and secondary negotiator) and a HNC acting either remotely or at the scene.

<sup>45</sup> The Firearms Strategic Commander (Bronze) is "responsible for developing the firearms strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it" (ACPO and NPIA 2009). The Public Order Strategic Commander (Bronze) is "responsible for developing the public order strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it" (ACPO and NPIA 2009).

<sup>46</sup> The Silver Commander "coordinates the individual strategies developed by the Firearms and Public Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold's overarching strategy" (ACPO and NPIA 2009).

<sup>47</sup> "Hostage Negotiator Coordinators are experienced negotiators trained to provide specialist support for incident commanders by advising on the development and implementation of negotiation plans and

to identify whether they were going to take on a HCN role or a HNC role at this stage in the process: “*Then it also depends which role I’m taking on; am I taking on a negotiator role or am I taking on a negotiator coordinator role?*” (E:M:3:114).

***Liaison with bronze/silver command.*** Negotiators also highlighted the importance of forming an early link between the negotiator cell/negotiators and the command structure (i.e. silver command or tactical firearms commander) in order to receive instructions in relation to how the incident was going to be approached/managed:

*“...the first thing you usually do is... find out who’s in charge... which isn’t always as obvious as it should be and... have a word with them, find out what it is they want... what they need and... usually give them some advice about what we’re going to do”* (K:M:2:111).

Negotiators described the decision-making process as being removed from the negotiators themselves and being firmly placed within the remit of the command structure: “*...what does the commander, whether it be silver or whether it be the senior PC on the ground, what do they want from the negotiator?*” (J:F:6:110); “*...you just have to feed in your view and then accept the decision*” (C:F:2:96). These excerpts resonate appositely with the “negotiators negotiate and commanders command” concept discussed in Chapter 9.

## **Stage 2: The Negotiation Process and Incident Resolution**

The second stage of the model relates to the actual negotiation process whereby the negotiator attempts to resolve the situation by engaging with the subject, employing a variety of negotiation strategies and positively facilitating subject behaviour change. Three secondary categories were identified within this stage of the model: ‘Engaging with the subject’, ‘The negotiator toolbox/repertoire’ and ‘Incident resolution’.

**Engaging with the subject.** Once negotiators had completed the initial deployment tasks referred to above, they described the next step in the process as engaging with the subject. Two tertiary categories emerged within this category which included: ‘Initiation of communication/dialogue with the subject’ and ‘Utilisation of a variety of communication media as necessary’.

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tactics. HNCs are more likely to provide additional specialist support for incident commanders when there is an immediate risk of serious harm or death, or in response to more complex or prolonged incidents. The HNC is also responsible for ensuring that the negotiating plan that has been agreed with the incident commander is implemented by the Negotiator Cell” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).

***Initiation of communication/dialogue with the subject.*** In order to identify the reasons behind the crisis/hostage scenario, negotiators needed to establish communication with the subject and encourage bi-directional dialogue. Negotiators described a typical “default” approach that involved introducing themselves and explaining to the subject that they were “there to help”. It was identified as particularly important for negotiators to initiate communication with the subject as soon as possible and that to some extent, any communication was better than none.

*Initiate communication with the subject as soon as possible.* Negotiators described attempting to contact the subject as quickly as possible to limit the risks associated with the critical period/initial hours of the crisis event. The “Golden Hour” has been referred to within medical science and crisis management literature and in this sense refers to the importance of acting quickly in order to reduce/minimise the potential harm/injury to parties involved (Israel Crisis Management Group 2016).

*“...when you get there, the first thing I want to do is just to find out exactly what this is about and try and get a little bit of background so we’ve got something to start off with. And then it’s just, I want to get on with it and start talking to these people”* (N:F:8:34).

The situations that negotiators are involved in can be extremely volatile and negotiators have to operate on tight timeframes and initiate communication with the subject quickly in order to minimise risk. They described having to contact the subject via telephone whilst on the way to a scene “...if you’re going to a job you need to communicate on the way” (C:F:2:96) or having to put a call in “from the kitchen table” (I:M:6:84); and made reference to the importance of trying to establish a rapport with the individual straight away, even if this is before the negotiators arrive at the scene.

*“...I was on call and it was a job that was at the opposite end of the country, but needed to be done by... phone because we didn’t know where this lady was. So all I say is, to the control room, if need be, you’ll need to get the other two that are on-call to come to my home, and they will join me and do it that way, because otherwise you’ve got an hour of somebody in crisis who just isn’t going to get the contact...”* (I:M:6:84).

*Any communication is better than none.* Negotiators described a belief that simply engaging in dialogue with the subject early on in the process was important, regardless of what was said or who was doing the communicating *per se*: “Just by being there and talking is better than not being there at all... So get in there, start talking, see what you’re dealing with” (B:M:2:195). Some negotiators described a resistance from non-negotiator trained officers/staff



to engage in dialogue with the subject prior to the arrival of the negotiators, however, there was a general consensus that it is important to engage in some form of dialogue with the subject as soon as possible, and that any communication (albeit from first responder police officers or call handlers) is better than none.

***Utilisation of a variety of communication media as necessary.*** Negotiators described having to utilise a variety of different methods of communication/media including face-to-face dialogue (which was often perceived as the most advantageous/efficacious method), telephone conversation, text message, email/internet/social networking websites and the use of a megaphone/loudhailer<sup>48</sup>: “...we’d tried... communicating ourselves by phone with him... there were family members and so on that turned up on the cordon and we tried going through their phones... and then we tried going face-to-face” (K:M:2:111). Decisions were based on the situation in terms of utilising the most appropriate method, an element of personal preference and/or being directed by the commander in terms of the specific approach required: “...a lot of the time, it’s going to be my choice, but depending on the job, it might be an instruction about, this is the way we want it done” (J:F:6:110).

***Face-to-face dialogue.*** Negotiators described engaging with subjects face-to-face where possible: “...if you’re face-to-face that’s best of all” (B:M:2:195). Most negotiators described a preference for this method: “I don’t like the phone call ones... I prefer face-to-face” (H:F:5:50). Some felt that this method was ideal as it allowed the negotiator to read the subject’s body language and provided the negotiator with a more suitable environment to display empathy and develop rapport/a relationship with the subject.

*“I prefer to do it face-to-face... then the personality comes into it, whereas you don’t... pick up people’s personality and they don’t pick up my personality as well... Whereas they could think... actually... she’s quite genuine... She does mean that, whereas on the phone, you don’t always get that” (N:F:8:34).*

***Telephone conversation.*** In scenarios where face-to-face communication wasn’t possible (due to not being able to get close enough to the subject, siege/barricade situations, or not having information in relation to a subject’s whereabouts), negotiators described having to communicate via telephone: “Yeah, all via the phone. A lot of ours are, to be honest. Because one, the geography of the force... you know, it’s really difficult” (C:F:2:96); “Face-to-face is good, but obviously, if there’s any threat or risk, close to the proximity... it is... a problem... so

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<sup>48</sup> Loudhailers/megaphones are typically referred to as “bullhorns” within the United States.

*mobile phones are used often*” (F:M:4:111). They referred to utilising a number of different telephone methods including contacting the subject via a landline or mobile telephone and the use of a field/throw phone. It is important that the conversation/dialogue is restricted/contained as far as possible, so the police may prefer to utilise a field/throw phone that can only accept calls from specified police telephone numbers: *“it’s all monitor-able, it’s a secure line of communication”* (F:M:4:111) or to block incoming/outgoing calls on the subject’s mobile phone to ensure sterility of the environment and prevent dilution of the negotiator’s efforts as a result of interaction/interference from third parties.

*Megaphone/loudhailer.* A few negotiators referred to having utilised (or their colleagues having utilised) a megaphone/loudhailer to communicate with subjects. This method was typically resorted to as a result of difficulties getting access to the subject during siege/barricade scenarios, or due to the risk associated with negotiators establishing face-to-face contact with subjects.

*“...I know a colleague had to... go... up the gas towers... Somebody was up there, at the top of one of those. And he went up. But I think he quickly realised... if he decides to come flying down here, I’m off... or, if he starts throwing stuff at me, or whatever... and he came down, and then communicated through a loudhailer”* (O:F:9:36).

The use of megaphones has long been established within the field of negotiation, with McMains and Mullins (2014: 102) going so far as to suggest that “a bullhorn should be one of the first items obtained by a negotiating team”. Whilst megaphones can provide a vital tool for making contact with subjects when face-to-face/telephone contact is not possible, it has also been suggested that there are difficulties associated with developing rapport using such a method (Fuselier 1981b) as the use of intonation and specific tone of voice is likely to be impeded via the megaphone, so negotiators may have to resort to alternative methods if the use of a megaphone is acting as a barrier to rapport building.

*Text message.* Negotiators described having to utilise alternative methods of communication in some instances, including the use of text messages. This was described as a fairly recent development in the role as a result of enhancements within technology and represents another method of communication that can be utilised by negotiators to establish contact with subjects: *“...negotiation fell dead at about ten o’clock. And I was texting him still and sometimes he would respond to that”* (C:F:2:96). The use of text messages was described as being particularly beneficial within cases involving MISPERs and was also identified by one negotiator as a helpful method of engaging with certain subjects as a result of perceived cultural

aspects: “...it seems that culturally, people are more likely to respond to texts than they will to your phone call for instance” (B:M:2:195). The use of text messages within crisis negotiation scenarios is becoming more common, with negotiators from different countries citing the use of this method of communication in addition to the more traditional communication formats (Almond and Budden 2012).

*Email/internet/social networking websites.* Negotiators also described the use of email, the internet or social networking sites to contact subjects, such as those who were classified as MISPERs, or the organisers of protests/marches/demonstrations.

*“...it’s all about negotiating with protestors, recognising that they actually have the lawful right to... we have to facilitate protests, but it’s all about communicating with the individuals. It’s all social networking stuff. And sometimes we utilise a negotiator for that” (A:M:1:156).*

The emphasis appeared to be on utilising the appropriate method of communication for the specific contextual scenario, with one negotiator referring to a blackmail case which was running at the time of the interview and “...all the communication’s through the internet... and through email and so on...” (K:M:2:111).

**The negotiator toolbox/repertoire.** This part of the model relates to the specific skills, tools and strategies used by negotiators in order to form a relationship with the subject and successfully resolve crisis/hostage scenarios. The set of skills utilised by negotiators whilst engaged in dialogue with subjects is referred to as ‘the negotiator toolbox’ as a means of describing a repertoire of skills which can be selected (as appropriate) in order to resolve hostage/crisis incidents. Two secondary categories were identified within this stage of the model: ‘Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication techniques’ and ‘Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques’.

***Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication techniques.*** Negotiators described employing a number of different basic therapeutic communication techniques when communicating with subjects who were either in crisis or conflict states. All negotiators emphasised the importance of utilising active listening principles and described a variety of different techniques that they had used in different negotiation scenarios. In addition to this, they described frequently utilising or adopting a person-centred approach to their communication with the subject which included adherence to some of the core principles/constructs within person-centred counselling/therapeutic approaches. These

communication techniques are well established within the literature and demonstrate a parallel with the techniques utilised within psychotherapeutic/counselling settings in order to form the therapeutic alliance between the therapist (i.e. negotiator) and client (i.e. subject).

*Use of active listening principles and techniques.* Active listening was perceived by all negotiators to be a core skill utilised within HNCn and examples of active listening were explicitly described by most negotiators throughout the interviews.

*“...you will actually say to them... to me, you sound really angry... because they’ll either come back and say, what are you on about? Or it’ll be like, too bloody right... so you get your confirmation or whatever, but also, it’s part of your trust building, because it’s showing that you’re listening to them and you’re understanding what’s going on with them” (J:F:6:110).*

This form of listening was described by some as “effective” or “enhanced” listening but this construct is typically referred to within the negotiation literature as “active listening”. Active listening refers to a range of multi-purpose communication tools which can be applied to hostage and crisis negotiations (Call 2003, Lanceley 1999, McMains 2002, McMains and Mullins 1996, Noesner 1999, Noesner and Webster 1997 and Slatkin 1996, 2005). It typically involves a number of techniques which demonstrate to the recipient (i.e. subject) that the negotiator is listening and that they understand what the subject is saying to them; it may also implicitly encourage the subject to continue talking/disclose further information. Examples of active listening techniques include the use of emotional labelling, paraphrasing, reflecting/mirroring, minimal encouragers, silences and pauses, “I”-messages, and open-ended questions (Miller 2005). Almost all of these specific techniques were demonstrated across the interviews with specific examples provided for open-ended questions (G:M:4:123); labelling of emotions/reflection of feelings (J:F:6:110); paraphrasing/summarising (M:F:8:24); mirroring (H:F:5:50); and the use of “I” messages<sup>49</sup> (B:M:2:195).

*Use of person-centred therapy principles.* Use of person-centred therapy principles were demonstrated throughout the transcripts, with negotiators referring to three of the core conditions described by Rogers (1957) as necessary for therapeutic growth and personality change. These conditions consist of: ‘congruence’, whereby the therapist is congruent or

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<sup>49</sup> “I” Messages refer to statements that start with “I” or “we” as opposed to “you”; they are non-directive and are typically used to explain the way you are feeling without including any element of blame or judgment. “I” messages can be helpful within crisis/conflict situations as people under extreme stress can become suspicious and defensive and as such, statements that are overly directive can become perceived as an attack or insult. An example of the “I” message typical format is: “I feel... when you... because”; this allows the subject to understand the negotiator’s perception of the situation, whilst also allowing some personalisation of the negotiator (Miller 2005), which ultimately helps to build rapport between the subject and negotiator.

integrated in the relationship with the client (Rogers 1957); ‘unconditional positive regard’ (Rogers 1957), whereby the therapist “experiences a warm acceptance of every aspect of the client’s experience” (Rogers 1959: 209) and ‘empathy’, whereby the therapist experiences an empathic understanding of the client’s internal frame of reference (Rogers 1957). In the context of the current research, the terms ‘therapist’ and ‘client’ can be replaced by ‘negotiator’ and ‘subject’, respectively, to represent a micro/condensed version of the client-therapist relationship. Examples of such a humanistic or client-centred approach to communication were displayed by a number of negotiators when describing their style of negotiation or the way they engaged with subjects who were in crisis/conflict.

Examples of congruence or authenticity were displayed by negotiators demonstrating genuineness, and being themselves: “*I think it’s important to just be yourself*” (O:F:9:36); being prepared to say sorry: “*...prepared to say sorry, honesty with them... there are times when I’ve said I got that wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family... because they’re worried. You’ve then gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I’m sorry*” (I:M:6:84); and in forms of personal self-disclosure: “*So occasionally I’ll... disclose something just to try and help things along... to try to really build that empathy with the person as quickly as possible*” (B:M:2:195). Unconditional positive regard was demonstrated by some negotiators by displaying respect for others; having a non-judgemental attitude: “*...don’t judge*” (O:F:9:36); and expressing warmth for subjects: “*I would say yes, you are always trying to build up some sort of relationship, and with rapport, you tend to think of... some sort of warmth...*” (J:F:6:110). Displaying empathy for subjects during the negotiation process was described by negotiators as a means of trying to understand why they were in the situation and attempting to form a rapport/relationship with them. This mechanism appears to be in line with the core condition of empathic understanding within person-centred therapy/counselling (Rogers 1957).

*“It’s all about active listening... It’s trying to understand what’s brought them to that position where they’re on top of a roof, top of a bridge, whatever, and they’re going to jump, and then being empathetic is a big thing... telling them that you understand... I think negotiating is such a difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what you say, and not be judgemental, and be open minded, actively listen, and you know, try to be there, supportive, empathic, also”* (L:M:7:54).

***Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques.*** Negotiators described the utilisation of a variety of different strategies and techniques during the negotiation process.

Twelve strategies<sup>50</sup> were identified as the most commonly utilised techniques and these strategies are discussed in order of most to least frequently utilised, below<sup>51</sup>.

*Establish why the subject is in the situation.* Most negotiators [ $n = 12$ ] described trying to establish why the subject was in the situation and trying to get to the ‘root of the problem’ as one of the key/initial strategies they used once they had entered into dialogue with the subject. This was conceptualised as a stepping stone towards resolving the situation by trying to build a picture of what had led the subject to be in the situation and what had precipitated the crisis/conflict event. One negotiator described the process as establishing “*what’s actually at the real heart of this?*” (B:M:2:195). This strategy allowed negotiators to contextualise the situation that the subject was in and guided the way the negotiator approached the dialogue with the subject: “*You’re... trying to find the buttons to press. You’re trying to find what’s made them where they are, and if you can find that, you can generally help them find a solution*” (D:M:3:63).

*Honesty.* Most negotiators [ $n = 12$ ] described the use of honesty as a strategy and never lying to the subject/keeping any promises made was seen as core tenet of the negotiation process: “*Being truthful – always be truthful....*” (M:F:8:24). One exception to this rule was identified in relation to Red Centre/kidnap and extortion scenarios, whereby lying may be necessary as a means of ensuring that covert negotiations remain covert and that police involvement is not identified by the kidnappers: “*...they tell us not... to lie... You’re away on it for the Red Centre, you can tell them anything you want... That’ll work basically. So it’s a different tactic*” (H:F:5:50).

*Identification of hooks (de-escalators) and triggers (aggravators).* Most negotiators [ $n = 11$ ] referred to the use of ‘hooks’, which is a term that is well established within the negotiation literature. ‘Hooks’ are described by Slatkin (2009) as important themes or potentially fruitful areas to pursue further with the subject; whereas Strentz (2013) refers to them as topics/persons that can be used to extract the subject from the crisis. Hooks are, therefore, essentially either topics that serve to perform a de-escalatory function (i.e. de-escalators) or individuals who act as conciliatory parties for the subject. Negotiators described a

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<sup>50</sup> The frequency of strategy utilisation is represented by the thickness of the dashed oval line surrounding each strategy in Figure 8.1. In this case, the thicker the dashed line, the more frequent the utilisation of the strategy.

<sup>51</sup> All strategies were corroborated by at least five out of the fifteen negotiators interviewed.

variety of different topics/individuals that acted as hooks for subjects including pets, hobbies/interests and family members. It is important to note that hooks were not always consistent. With reference to individual family members, for example, they sometimes acted as hooks and were therefore a positive addition to the conversation and on other occasions acted as triggers and served to escalate levels of emotion/crisis. Equally, for subjects who had been encountered on previous occasions, the same hooks were not always appropriate/relevant on different occasions: “...none of the previous hooks and levers that worked the week before were working” (C:F:2:96). Negotiators therefore needed to identify potential hooks carefully and adapted their conversation in line with escalatory or de-escalatory cues received from the subject.

*“It was trying to establish what his issue was, what his problem was, who he was, why he was there... what the big issues were for him... and you’re looking for the hook, then, all the time, aren’t you? The thing that... he’s actually interested in, the thing that’s at the heart of his problem”* (F:M:4:111).

‘Triggers’ constitute the exact opposite of ‘hooks’ and have also been referred to in the literature as ‘touch points’ (Slatkin 2010) or ‘hot buttons’ (Strentz 2013). These tend to relate to topics/individuals that negotiators need to avoid: “issues that you should never raise with this individual...” (A:M:1:156) as they serve an aggravating/escalatory function by increasing emotional/arousal levels in subjects: “...I didn’t really get onto the girlfriend side of things because obviously I think that might have antagonised him” (N:F:8:24).

*Matching of negotiator and subject.* Most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ] described utilising a strategy which involved matching the negotiator to the subject in some way. This included trying to match the two parties in relation to personality, gender, culture or background. Whilst idealistic matching may not always be logistically feasible, negotiators described instances where they felt it was important to try and match the negotiator and subject in order to achieve a successful and peaceful resolution. One negotiator synthesised the concept of personality matching with a commonsensical statement: “...if you get on better with that individual, then you end up being the number one” (N:F:8:34). Other negotiators described instances whereby personality clashes between the negotiator and subject had resulted in a lack of rapport being developed and therefore required a change in the primary negotiator in order to try and build a relationship which would lead to the negotiator being able to exert influence/behavioural change and resolve the situation: “There’ve been times when you’re just getting nowhere; the person’s getting right fed up with you. So, let’s give someone else a go. Swap over” (D:M:3:63).

With reference to gender, sometimes it was more effective for the subject and negotiator to be same-sex matched and in other cases opposite-sex matched (i.e. some subjects would only speak to a male or female negotiator as a result of previous experiences and/or belief systems) and *ergo* it was perceived as an important tool for negotiation teams to have the option to utilise a negotiator of either gender, as dictated by the situational characteristics of the incident.

*“...there’s only one thing that I haven’t really mentioned and that’s a gender issue... I think you have to have that in your toolkit. So if you’ve got a woman who hates women, why are you then putting a woman negotiator or... if you’ve got a domestic situation then the bloke might not want to speak to a woman” (C:F:2:96).*

Identifying some sort of commonality/common ground between the two parties should also be considered as a possible tool in terms of matching the negotiator and subject. One negotiator, for example, described how one of his fellow negotiator’s military background acted as a facilitator to rapport building when dealing with an individual in crisis and this was particularly pertinent when negotiators were dealing with subjects who were dealing with ex-military personnel who were experiencing PTSD/mental health problems: *“...[anonymised HCN] had been in the army and there was, there was that sort of bond...” (M:F:8:24).*

*Adapt strategy in line with situation/subject.* Negotiators described the importance of responsivity, or being able to adapt their strategy in line with the situation and/or subject. Most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ] described utilising this technique in terms of adapting their style of communication, choice of narrative, or use of language<sup>52</sup>. This adaptation was seen as a vital mechanism for developing rapport and building a relationship with the subject. One negotiator described adapting her negotiation strategy or dialogue in line with the subject’s personality profile or behaviour displayed in line with dysfunctional personality traits: *“So you’re looking at personality... profiles and how to respond to... somebody who’s anti-social, somebody who’s despondent, somebody who’s... psychopathic, somebody who’s sociopathic...” (C:F:2:96);* and another highlighted the role of culture in communication: *“...if you were negotiating... with a male in... a very strict Muslim country, then you need to know your way around, a little bit around the culture....” (B:M:2:195).* Other negotiators highlighted the importance of being able to adapt their strategy in line with the subject’s background, with one negotiator identifying that authority acted as a successful strategy with an ex-military subject.

*“I’ve known a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone who was ex-services. He might come across as likeable, as well, but his eventual resolution was reached*

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<sup>52</sup> For a discussion relating to use of language within HNCn, please refer to Taylor and Thomas’s (2008) work on Linguistic Style Matching.



*because... my colleague was a sergeant, he'd got stripes on and he actually ordered the guy to come down. And that worked, in the end. So, there are... times when other strategies work. There's no fixed rule" (D:M:3:63).*

Negotiators also specifically identified that they adapted their use of language and style of communication to the subject they were dealing with, highlighting that certain types of language are more appropriate for certain subjects/situations. One negotiator highlighted the importance of matching her style of language to each individual subject in order to successfully develop a rapport:

*"...I can be on a bridge with a girl of 19, or I can be on a bridge with a male who's in his sixties, from a far greater academic background than I am, you know? And the same style will not work with both of them. So that rapport building... I wouldn't go in straight away and say, right, lovey, what's wrong with you? Because... they'll look at me as if I'm a bit deranged, really" (O:F:9:36).*

*Use of concessions and positive police actions*<sup>53</sup>. Most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] described the use of concessions as a means of encouraging reciprocity from the subject: *"...I've done this for you. You do this for me" (H:F:5:50)* and encouraging behavioural change. Negotiators typically referred to the use of 'positive police actions' as opposed to concessions and these were conceptualised as actions that the negotiators/police performed which helped to develop rapport between the negotiator and subject and encouraged the subject to 'give something back': *"...you're giving them something so maybe they'll give back to you" (M:F:8:24)*. This system appeared to operate on a *"quid pro quo"* basis and aligns sympathetically with the 'reciprocation' weapon of influence described by Cialdini (1984). Examples of such actions ranged from assuring subjects that they would be taken in peacefully (i.e. without force) when they 'come down', to providing 'deliveries' (i.e. food, drink, cigarettes, clothing etc.). One of the main concessionary tools identified by negotiators related to the provision of cigarettes, with one negotiator (J:F:6:110) going so far as to keep a box of cigarettes in her 'call out/go bag', despite being a non-smoker.

The decision to provide such concessions always remained with the incident commander, as opposed to the negotiator but this was also utilised to the negotiators advantage, as if a request to provide a concession was denied by silver command, the negotiator was removed from this decision and this helped not to damage the relationship between the negotiator and subject.

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<sup>53</sup> This strategy shares similarities with the "exchanging" (content) strategy described within Giebels' (2002) Table of Ten.

*“Do you want a smoke? Tell you what, let me see what I can do for you and relay that back... And then if the answer’s no, then it’s not you and me... It’s not me that said no to you... All I am doing is relaying the message... So that kind of preserves... that relationship” (G:M:4:123).*

*Perseverance/persistence.* Most negotiators ( $n = 9$ ) described having to utilise a very basic strategy which involved perseverance or persistence: *“...he didn’t want to engage first of all but, being persistent, perhaps sounds a bit pushy, but, persevering, perhaps a better word, persevering with him, I eventually got it so he was talking to me” (D:M:3:63).* Negotiators reported often turning up to a scene or putting in a call to a subject and receiving little or no response, despite their efforts: *“I’ve spent two hours talking to a loft hatch...” (I:M:6:84).* They also described having to continually talk as a means of simply letting the subject know that they were still there or persevering with communication when the subject didn’t want to, or didn’t feel ready to engage.

*“...I was negotiating with this woman... for about four hours we were there and she barely said a word in the whole four hours – and that was a new one for me... I’d never had... that was quite... challenging... so I suppose it’s hard talking to people who don’t want to communicate... But... you have to just always focus on the fact that they’re listening... they can hear what you’re saying” (B:M:2:195).*

On the other end of the spectrum, negotiators also described receipt of a barrage of verbal abuse from some subjects; identifying how perseverance was sometimes necessary as a means of allowing subjects to vent their emotions and/or direct their anger/frustration towards the negotiator without them reacting in any way:

*“...other people can be so rude and horrendous to you, and tell you that you look like a bag of shit, and that you’re fat, and you’re this, and you’re that. And you just stand there, and you just take it all” (O:F:9:36).*

Negotiators had learned not to take the abuse personally and reported that simple perseverance often resulted in the subject engaging with them, once their emotional/arousal levels had de-escalated.

*Use of time as a tactic/“playing it long”.* Most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] referred to the use of ‘time as a tactic’, ‘playing it long’ or ‘playing the long game’. Time is seen as a tool within negotiation and tends to play to the advantage of the negotiator as it can allow emotion to de-escalate: *“...you’re really... trying to buy time and let them diffuse the anger really, the emotion” (K:M:2:111);* allow subjects to sober up if under the influence of drugs or alcohol:

*“...it’s just about spending a bit of time with them until they’ve got sober” (O:F:9:36); and can enhance fatigue within subjects: “...my belief is that people can’t stay angry forever, because they’re tired... And they burn themselves out” (G:M:4:123). All of these aspects can act to increase rationality in subjects and therefore make the negotiation process easier. One negotiator stated that “negotiation is not a quick business” (B:M:2:195) and another stated “we’ve got all the time in the world” (C:F:2:96). Two other negotiators referred to incidents where they felt they had “bored the subject into submission” (F:M:4:111) and the subject had simply “run out of steam” (J:F:6:110). In addition to this, negotiators felt that time served to increase confidence and trust between the two parties and encouraged the development of a rapport/relationship between the negotiator and subject.*

*“They know the negotiators are coming; they know they’re in for a long haul... so I think the confidence and the trust is what we work on during this whole tactic every time, but you really can’t be in a rush to get there” (I:M:6:84).*

*Disassociation from the police.* Most negotiators [ $n = 8$ ] referred to use of a strategy that involved them disassociating themselves from the police when negotiating with hostage-takers/individuals-in-crisis: *“...introduce yourself just by name and then really, never say I’m a police officer. And generally I turn up not in police uniform; I wouldn’t turn up in uniform ever actually” (M:F:8:24).* Negotiators were eager to explain that they never lied to subjects in relation to being a police officer, but that they would simply ‘downplay’ the association with the police, or would only identify themselves as a police officer if they were specifically asked by a subject. This disassociation was explained by negotiators on the basis of the police affiliation acting as a barrier to relationship building for some subjects. This was particularly relevant for subjects who had previous experience with the police (i.e. had past convictions or a previous arrest record) and as such may not have viewed the police in a positive light: *“If they’ve got a problem with the police, then you’re trying to disassociate yourself, us, them and the police” (K:M:2:111).* This disassociation from the police was exemplified by negotiators typically deploying in civilian clothing: *“...turning up in uniform is another blockage” (F:M:4:111)* and by an introductory statement that explained they were ‘with the police’ as opposed to ‘a police officer’.

*Generate options available to the subject/encourage problem solving.* Some negotiators [ $n = 7$ ] described how generating options available to the subject: *“I’m not going away, and there are two choices...” (H:F:5:50)* could be used as a strategy and described a method whereby the subject would be encouraged to problem-solve/identify potential solutions

to their current situation. This strategy is in line with many models of negotiation that have been used to inform negotiation training and practice historically. In fact, the majority of existing models of negotiation include reference to problem solving (i.e. the standard model of hostage negotiation (Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991); the crisis bargaining model (Donohue et al. 1991); the S.A.F.E. model (Hammer and Rogan 1997); the S.T.E.P.S. model (Kelln and McMurtry 2007)); and according to Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005), regardless of which model of negotiation is employed, the final stage of crisis intervention within a negotiation context always involves problem-solving of some incarnation.

Negotiators were clear to specify that they did not try to solve the subject's problems but instead facilitated or encouraged the subject to consider solutions to the problem by generating or identifying a number of options that were available to the subject: *"...you've got to try and get to the crux of the problem, and then you've got to try and get them to come to some conclusion about how they're going to deal with that problem"* (O:F:9:36). When an individual is in crisis, it is difficult for them to see that they have a number of options due to 'tunnel vision' (i.e. they may feel that the only solution to their problem(s) is to kill themselves) and one negotiator referred to this option generating process as *"...trying to get them to see another path"* (L:M:7:54).

*Identify commonalities/common ground*<sup>54</sup>. Another strategy identified by some negotiators [ $n = 6$ ] involved identifying commonalities/common ground/a common alliance between the negotiator and subject. Negotiators described trying to establish or identify common areas of interest/hobbies etc. that could be used to generate conversation between the two parties: *"...trying to find that little thing that's going to give you some kind of rapport... with somebody who you otherwise might have nothing... in common with at all"* (F:M:4:111); *"...and it tends to be on really sort of innocuous stuff like... I love walking, or I've got dogs... those sorts of things... I will use those, relentlessly just to try to build up that... common ground"* (J:F:6:110). This 'common denominator' was conceptualised as a tool which helped negotiators to develop a rapport with the subject and eventually to exert influence and change the subject's behaviour in a positive manner.

*"...it's constantly searching for... that common thread between the two of you, the place where you might... different as anything, one might be... you can be different genders, different ages, different life scenarios, different skills, different health, but there is*

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<sup>54</sup> This strategy shares similarities with the "being equal" (relational) strategy described within Giebels' (2002) Table of Ten.

*usually a place where you can... hook and bond with the person, and I think that's important... to get to influence"* (B:M:2:195).

*Encourage dialogue/allow subjects to vent.* The last strategy identified was described by some negotiators [ $n = 5$ ] as simply encouraging subjects to communicate or engage in dialogue:

*"...I really just like to try and get people talking, and find something to talk about, even if it doesn't seem directly related... to almost buy the time to start letting people blow off that head of steam, or just settle down enough to start reconsidering"* (J:F:6:110).

This communication was often seen as a means of the subject providing context to their crisis situation or allowing them to verbalise their emotions or 'vent/ventilate'<sup>55</sup>: *"...and when the venting comes out, let him vent"* (G:M:4:111). This venting is often seen as a method to diffuse emotion or de-escalate emotion/arousal levels which then allows the negotiator to engage in more rational/problem-solving conversations with the subject. One negotiator described how she encouraged subjects to *"talk as much as possible and offload it all"* (O:F:9:36) and another described how she tried to keep a subject talking *"about absolutely anything"* (N:F:8:34) as a means of encouraging dialogue and de-escalating the subject's emotion.

**Incident resolution.** The third secondary category within Stage 2 of the model relates to the successful resolution of the hostage/crisis incident. The aim of negotiation is to reduce injury or minimise potential loss of life and in order to achieve this, negotiators have to successfully and positively influence the way a subject is behaving (i.e. facilitate behavioural change). Negotiators described this part of the negotiation process as involving three elements: 'Use of enhanced persuasion', 'Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change' and 'Liaison with operational teams and subject to orchestrate surrender ritual/exit plan'.

*Use of enhanced persuasion.* Negotiators referred to the successful resolution of incidents as involving a form of 'enhanced persuasion' whereby they 'persuaded', 'convinced' or 'influenced' subjects to change their behaviour in a positive manner: *"...he was... tiring and more amenable to... discussion and I persuaded him to turn around, go back and give himself up to the officers, which he did"* (D:M:3:63); *"...I think that is, for me, it seems to be my bread and butter... just sort of persuading people..."* (F:M:4:123); *"...even though you go to a house*

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<sup>55</sup> Ventilating is a means that allows and promotes the subject giving voice to his/her grievances, and emotions. It is a communication technique that allows the subject to discharge and de-escalate emotional tension and moves the subject toward greater emotional control and a frame of mind where problem solving is possible (Slatkin 2010).

*and maybe you're not getting in because they've barred their way or you want to contain it with firearms, you're still calling and asking them, look... Trying to convince them to come outside..."* (N:F:8:34).

The use of persuasion within HCNn is well-established, with negotiators being trained to utilise a number of techniques to influence subject behaviour (i.e. Cialdini's (1984; 2001) weapons of influence/principles of persuasion<sup>56</sup>). Some of the strategies described above tap into these principles and allow the negotiator to persuade the subject to positively change their behaviour (i.e. the use of *positive police actions* aligns with the "reciprocity" principle and the use of *honesty* aligns with the "commitment and consistency" principle). Similarities can also be drawn between some of the aforementioned strategies and the concept of "influence tactics" developed by Giebels (2002), and further discussed by Giebels and Noelanders (2004) and Giebels and Taylor (2010).

***Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change.***

*"And you won't always gain rapport... but ideally that's what you're working towards. But in any case, you're then trying to move to a point where you can influence the behaviour"* (K:M:2:111).

Negotiators described a process whereby they would utilise the aforementioned techniques (i.e. use of active listening principles and techniques, use of person-centred therapy principles) and the underpinning mechanism of rapport building/development of the pseudo-therapeutic alliance (discussed below) to get to a point whereby they could exert influence over the subject and facilitate behavioural change in a positive manner: "...you are always trying to build up some sort of relationship, and with rapport, you tend to think of... some sort of warmth... so you build up trust, and you can influence the behaviour..." (J:F:6:110). This was described as a process of getting the subject to do what the negotiator wanted them to do (i.e. to modulate their behaviour in a manner which reduced risk of harm to the subject): "...the strategy you will take is always going to be the same: It's build their confidence, influence their views and get them to do what you want them to do" (D:M:3:63). This category bears substantial resemblance to the behavioural influence stage of the BISM developed by the FBI (Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005) and demonstrates the successful incorporation of the BISM within UK HCN training.

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<sup>56</sup> Cialdini's (1984) weapons of influence consist of reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority and scarcity.

***Liaison with operational teams and subject to orchestrate surrender ritual/exit plan.***

Once negotiators had successfully de-escalated the situation and managed to positively influence the subject's behaviour to a point whereby the subject had agreed to come out of the situation that they were in (i.e. to come out of a barricaded building, end a siege or come down from the edge of a tall building or bridge), they emphasised that the process still required further steps in order to ensure that the incident was fully and successfully resolved. Negotiators described a collaborative system whereby they needed to discuss and mutually agree a surrender ritual<sup>57</sup> or exit plan<sup>58</sup> with the subject and explained the importance of this step to ensure that any potential risk (to the subject or police personnel) was managed right up to the point where the subject is either in police custody, or safely removed from the crisis situation. They also highlighted the importance of allowing the subject to save face as a key element within the successful resolution of the incident, as discussed below. This phase of the model aligns sympathetically with the "surrender" phase in Madrigal, Bowman and McClain's (2009) Four-Phase Model of Hostage Negotiation.

*Discuss and mutually agree surrender ritual / exit plan with subject.* Negotiators described a collaborative arrangement which involved discussing and agreeing upon a surrender ritual (if the situation involved hostages or victims) or an exit plan (if the situation involved an individual in crisis). This process often involved logistical aspects, such as ensuring that subjects followed the appropriate steps specified by the police in order to minimise potential risk to hostages/victims or police personnel: "...looking at putting in place appropriate plans to deal with certain situations... So, for example, in a siege, how we might deal with a hostage being released safely" (E:M:3:114), or simply planning how an individual in crisis was going to get from one position to another without causing injury/harm to themselves: "...eventually he agreed to come down... we had to negotiate how he was going to get down... and... we used a fire service cherry picker, and went up and... and got him" (F:M:4:111). Negotiators described having to liaise with operational teams (i.e. firearms) and incident commanders in order to ensure that the surrender ritual/exit plan was executed safely and appropriately and were cognisant that the risk had never truly been completely reduced until the exit plan/surrender ritual had been successfully executed.

*"We have a few of those as well, where we've got somebody that we think's got... a gun in the house, and we talk them out, you know, I want you to come out. The surrender*

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<sup>57</sup> In this context, a surrender ritual refers to the process taken by a subject in order to give themselves up to police custody and come out of a hostage situation (or a situation involving victims).

<sup>58</sup> In this context, an exit plan refers to the process taken by a subject (i.e. individual in crisis) in order to successfully and safely exit a crisis situation.

*plan basically... And that's all sorted out beforehand... So we say to the bronze commander on the ground... what's your surrender plan? And they'll say to us... well, we'll do the, want you to come out the front door... Arms in front of you, like a blind man. Not carrying anything. No baggy clothing, and... I'll talk you right out..."* (H:F:5:50).

*Allow subject to save face.* Orchestration of a successful surrender ritual/exit plan often involved negotiators enabling/allowing subjects to save face. The concept of 'face-saving' or 'face-honouring' is one which is well established within the negotiation literature and is included as a core tenet within many models of negotiation (Hammer and Rogan 1997, Mullins 2002 and Taylor 2002). The term 'face' refers to the projected self-image of the subject and the S.A.F.E. model of negotiation, for example, suggests that negotiators need to validate the face needs of a subject in order to promote face-honouring and de-escalation of the situation (Hammer and Rogan 1997). Negotiators described a range of techniques that they utilised as a means of allowing subjects to save face or protect their reputation, which often involved subjects being allowed to peacefully surrender themselves:

*"Sometimes it'll just be a face-saving thing, so I might think well actually, he's ready to surrender but you don't want to lose face... if I agree to let him have a fag or if I agree that he isn't going to be taken to the ground or... things like that, then he'll come on board"* (K:M:2:111).

For most subjects, saving face involved allowing them to maintain some sort of dignity or reduce the potential embarrassment that may have been caused by the situation: *"...sometimes it's just literally got to be... well I might hate your guts, but that is a reasonable solution out of here... so you're offering them the least embarrassing option out... keep your pride and all the rest of it"* (J:F:6:110).

**Stage 2 Underpinning Mechanism: Rapport Building/Development of the Pseudo-Therapeutic Alliance.** Rapport building or the development of a relationship between the subject and negotiator was described as a vital component within the negotiation process. This concept shares similarities with the notion of the therapeutic alliance within the counselling/psychotherapeutic literature and the author perceives the negotiator-subject relationship to exist on a similar, but micro-level scale to that of the therapist-client relationship within therapeutic contexts. Negotiators have far less time to develop this alliance and have to establish such a relationship under intensely pressurised conditions; however, the data reveals that negotiators utilise the same skills/underpinning mechanisms as counsellors/therapists when



developing a therapeutic alliance within a therapeutic context. Negotiators described two core sub-mechanisms that they utilised to build rapport and develop this pseudo-therapeutic alliance: 'Express/demonstrate empathy' and 'Establish trust between negotiator and subject'. These components are conceptualised as running in parallel with the processes described in Stage 2 of the procedural model and are represented by downward-facing vertical arrows in Figure 8.1.

***Express/demonstrate empathy.*** Most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ] described expressing (or at least demonstrating) empathy for the subject when negotiating with them: "...*being empathic is a big thing... telling them that you understand...*" (I:M:6:110). Expression of empathy was perceived by negotiators as a vital component within the negotiation process and it was described as a pre-cursor to developing rapport with the subject: "...*decisions are based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to understand... what the individual's going through, or empathise with their situation... It's a lot about that empathy and rapport building...*" (A:M:1:156). The expression of empathy was also perceived as necessary to help the negotiator build trust and be viewed by the subject as genuine and trustworthy: "...*it's part of your... trust building, because it's showing that you are listening to them, and you're understanding what's going on with them*" (J:F:6:110). One negotiator referred to the process of demonstrating empathy as a means of developing/building a "*stairway of trust*" (D:M:3:63) between the negotiator and subject and another compared it to "*opening an instant can of friendship*" (G:M:4:123).

It is worth noting that two negotiators indicated that they found it difficult to empathise with certain subjects due to the context of the crisis situation. Negotiators referred to having to deal with "*some quite unsympathetic characters*" (F:M:4:111), which included individuals who may have committed quite emotive/serious crimes or individuals who they felt were wasting police time (and had no intention of harming themselves).

"...*it's also a challenge... in getting the enthusiasm to do it because what you want to do is grab them by the scruff of the neck and, and tell them not to be so stupid... You can't do that. That's not effective. You've got to bite your tongue and you've got to play the game*" (D:M:3:63).

In these instances, some negotiators described an ability to demonstrate (or feign) empathy as opposed to a genuine/true expression of empathy and this was portrayed as another part of their negotiator repertoire:

"*I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily... deserving of it... and if that's just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is... but I'm not*

*going to get anywhere... not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy... with the individual” (F:M:4:111).*

***Establish trust between the negotiator and subject.***

*“...negotiation is entirely based on emotions. It’s about being able to... build up enough of a rapport to be able to... exert some influence, which in turn would change behaviour... and the only way that you can do that is by building a trusting relationship between the two parties” (E:M:3:114).*

The establishment of trust between the negotiator and subject was described by most negotiators [ $n = 12$ ] as an important and necessary pre-cursor to the development of a rapport and *ergo* the ability to influence or change the subject’s behaviour: “...you’re trying to just build on that rapport... trying to build trust... and then you’re looking at basically using some influence really...” (K:M:2:111). The building of trust between the two parties was not only perceived as vital for the successful resolution of the situation they were currently negotiating, but was also considered to be important for potential future scenarios involving the same subject, as if trust had not been established (or had been broken in some way) then the subject would be unlikely to engage with the negotiator(s) again in the future or see them as a credible entity.

**Stage 3: Post-Incident Protocol**

The third and final stage of the model relates to the procedures carried out by negotiators and wider police personnel once the crisis/hostage incident had been successfully resolved and any threat posed to the subject/other parties had been neutralised. This category includes a single secondary category in the form of ‘Operational debriefing procedures’ and refers to the debriefing processes that negotiators take part in post-incident.

**Operational Debriefing Procedures.** The final component within stage three of the model refers to the debriefing process which follows resolution of the incident. This is a process that is described by negotiators as important regardless of whether the incident has been resolved successfully (i.e. no injuries/fatalities) or not. To debrief is “to officially question (someone) about a job that has been done or about an experience” (Debrief n.d.) and the College of Policing (2013) states that the purpose of debriefing is to “identify good practice and areas for improvement, which could include organisational learning”. Within the context of HCNn, negotiators described debriefing as being an important part of the process and one which should be consistently and thoroughly applied to all incidents. Negotiators also described debriefing as

serving a continuing professional development (CPD) purpose, whereby debriefing provided a forum for negotiators to learn from mistakes or identify aspects of good practice.

***Debriefing as an important component of negotiation.*** The College of Policing (2013) Briefing and Debriefing Policy makes recommendations in terms of how police personnel should be debriefed. Most negotiators referred to having experienced some form of debriefing as a result of their role, ranging from “*hot debriefs*” (I:M:6:84) that occurred on scene, once the incident had been resolved, to more extended operational debriefs which often occurred as a result of a negative outcome. The importance of debriefing was also highlighted by negotiators describing a lack of consistent or adequate debriefing. Some described incidents whereby debriefing had either not been carried out appropriately at the time of the incident, or, as in the case of the excerpt below, had not involved all necessary parties, resulting in some important information not being shared:

*“I think sometimes what we’re not very good at doing, and you won’t be surprised by me saying this, is that sometimes we’ll go from job to job to job. We will always have a debrief... of the incident. Or we should have a debrief of the incident. It’s rare that we don’t, although it’s dependent on certain partners. But sometimes that debrief doesn’t quite pick out all the issues, and I remember, we had a gentleman a few years ago, who became a negotiator, and who was extremely unlucky, because I think it was the first two incidents that he went to, each ended up in a death, and it was obvious he hadn’t been properly debriefed... and that’s something we’re not very good at doing... So just a small example of that was that... we dealt with this long siege back in 2004... We had a media debrief, and we had a debrief, so that was... quite well done, but we never actually debriefed with any of the Firearms officers. They then subsequently came to one of our further debriefs, and they were talking to us about some of the things that they found in this gentleman’s house, such as the fact that there was a shotgun cartridge strategically placed on each step of the staircase. That was an amazingly important thing for us, as negotiators, to know about so sometimes we’re a bit rubbish at debriefing” (A:M:1:156).*

***Debriefing as a means of CPD/therapeutic process/welfare check.*** For some negotiators, the debrief process was conceptualised as a means of CPD, whereby the discussion held within the debrief exercise once the incident had been resolved allowed negotiators to reflect upon their (and other negotiators’) performances during the incident, to identify mistakes made/lessons learned and to highlight areas of good practice:

*“...whereas the people who just dealt with that situation, if they’ve got a supervisor, if there’s anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she’ll regroup everybody and they’ll talk through the process. One is a debriefing, for learning. And the other one, just to check that everybody’s behaving as they normally do” (O:F:9:36).*

Debriefing was also conceptualised by a couple of senior negotiators (i.e. HNCs) as a therapeutic forum for negotiators to discuss any issues that may have been raised or for HNCs to check that their team members are functioning appropriately and are safe to either go home or continue with their current duties/shift:

*“...the closedown process for me then, which is about extracting my team, bringing them back here, debriefing them... making sure that they’re in a fit state to drive home, because their adrenalin... Will have sapped a lot of energy... so in terms of... the welfare stuff, a lot of that was taken care of by where we set it up, but there was still that debriefing and learning and they had concerns that we needed to unpick” (G:M:4:123).*

### **Model Underpinning Mechanisms**

In addition to the three stages outlined above, two categories were identified as core underpinning mechanisms for the UK negotiation process. These categories consisted of the completion of formal record keeping and the use of defensible decision-making and accountability throughout the entire negotiation process. These underpinning mechanisms are described below and are represented by horizontal arrows at the top and bottom of the model depicted in Figure 8.1.

#### **Underpinning mechanism 1: Formal record keeping [written/electronic/audio].**

Negotiators consistently referred to the need for and importance of formal record keeping throughout the interviews: *“...some of the external scrutiny... in terms of the... recording what we do, showing an audit trail and what we’ve done and why we’ve done it, that’s changed” (K:M2:111).* This process has been conceptualised as an underpinning mechanism throughout the negotiation process model as it is a theme that emerged at all stages of the model. Negotiators described utilising a variety of different methods of record keeping, including the use of written/electronic notes/records/deployment logs: *“...when you’ve been deployed on a job you do a deployment form” (C:F:2:96)* and position papers:

*“...policy logs; so we’ll keep a record, particularly as a coordinator, of decisions that have been made, but also... are you aware of position papers? Position papers are*

*effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw up a position paper which says, at this time this is what's happening..."* (E:M:3:114).

Probably most saliently, it was also reported as common practice for negotiators to record the negotiation using digital Dictaphones: *"We all have digital recorders... and our routine, now pretty much, is just to record everything"* (F:M:4:111) and this process was perceived as a means of record keeping and accountability<sup>59</sup>. These findings are in line with the guidance provided by the National Decision Model which specifies that there is a requirement for decision-making around the resolution of an incident to be recorded (College of Policing 2014b) and echo the suggestions of McMains and Mullins (2014: 423) in the USA who state that "negotiations should be taped and copies should be made of the tapes".

**Underpinning mechanism 2: Defensible decision-making and accountability.** Due to the nature of the role and the high-risk scenarios that they were typically involved with, negotiators felt that their actions were always open to scrutiny and that they needed to be able to justify their actions/be accountable at all times. They were cognisant that their actions could be subject to scrutiny at coroner's court or within IPCC<sup>60</sup> procedures if the outcome of a negotiation was negative:

*"...because if I go to my 84<sup>th</sup> incident tomorrow, and someone falls off that building, and they die, and I'm held liable for what I said, I need to go through those 83 incidents, and depict my experiences as a negotiator, and that is absolutely crucial"* (A:M:1:156).

As a result of this, negotiators described many of their actions as having an underpinning ethos of defensible decision-making:

*"...so I think you do worry about negative consequences and, oh my God, there might be an inquest later and, have I done everything that I should have done? Have I got records that I can take and people can read and they can understand? Will I be able to justify the decisions that I make?"* (C:F:2:96).

This concept mirrors that of the National Decision Model utilised by UK police forces which specifies that "decision-makers are accountable for their decisions and must be prepared to provide a rationale for what they did and why" (College of Policing 2014b).

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<sup>59</sup> The recording of the dialogue/conversation held between the negotiator and subject plays a number of roles within the negotiation process. It provides an audit trail to verify what was said between the negotiator and subject throughout the negotiation process; it enhances negotiator accountability and defensible decision making by providing a concrete record of the negotiator's comments and actions (to some extent) and it can be used as evidence within coroner's court or legal proceedings that may follow hostage or crisis incidents (particular in instances where the outcome is negative) to justify the actions taken/verbatim used by negotiators.

<sup>60</sup> IPCC refers to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

## **Model Synopsis**

The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. model has been used to outline the procedure that is followed when resolving hostage and/or crisis incidents in the UK. It contains three stages that are normally progressed through sequentially and identifies the core tasks that need to be completed by negotiators throughout the deployment process. The model identifies the actions performed by negotiators and enables a picture of successful HCN deployment to be formulated based on the experiences of operationally active HCNs. These findings are helpful as they demonstrate one of the first attempts to validate the actions taken and procedures followed by negotiators from initial deployment all the way through to debriefing after the incident has been resolved. This model can be used to inform the training and CPD of both new and existing HCNs and, as such, has a bearing on the practice/discipline of UK HCNn. The next chapter outlines the hostage and crisis negotiator journey model which provides insight into the processes involved in the recruitment, selection, training and operational support of UK HCNs.

# Chapter 9: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 1: The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model

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The current chapter synthesises the UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model, providing an insight into what it is like to be a HCN in the UK and the types of experiences HCNs have whilst being part of a police HCN cadre.

## **The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model**

The experiences of UK police HCNs are described below, with reference to a theoretical model that has been derived from the interview data. This model consists of 3 primary, 7 secondary and 23 tertiary categories, which are listed in Table 9.1 and are discussed sequentially below.

**Negotiation positives.** The first primary category that emerged from the data relates to the positive aspects associated with the role of negotiation, which were divided into two secondary categories: ‘The negotiator family’ and ‘Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding’. Each secondary category was further divided into smaller tertiary categories as outlined below.

***The negotiator family.*** The language used to describe negotiator experiences suggests that the negotiator cadre acts or operates as a family, with negotiators feeling heavily supported by other team members. The cadre is portrayed as a small, closely knit group that has a strong team ethos. Negotiation was conceptualised throughout the interviews as a team discipline that is reliant on effective teamwork in order to be successful. Three tertiary subcategories emerged within this category.

Table 9.1. *Table Synopsising the Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Categories within the UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model*

Primary Categories	Secondary Categories	Tertiary Categories
Negotiation positives	The negotiator family	Cadre as supportive Camaraderie and comradeship Negotiation as a team discipline
	Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding	Negotiation as challenging Opportunity for public interface and interaction Negotiation as emotionally rewarding Feeling good from helping others
Negotiation negatives	Operational issues	Operational rank/role conflict Lack of operational discipline Competing tactical orientations Negotiating solo
	Organisational issues	Dual role conflict Lack of awareness and support within the force Lack of standardisation and professionalisation of the discipline Negotiation as a Cinderella role
	Personal sacrifices	Disruption to family life Impact on personal/social life
Negotiation ambivalences	Negotiator stress/eustress	Negotiation as non-stressful Negotiator eustress Negotiation as a “different type of stress”
	The evolution of UK negotiation as an entity	Changes in deployment frequency and nature Impact of Taser on negotiation deployment Broader use of communication mediums within negotiation



*The cadre as supportive.* Most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ]<sup>61</sup> described feeling supported by other negotiators and portrayed an environment whereby negotiators looked out for each other and “*watch each other’s back*” (G:M:4:123)<sup>62</sup>. This support was particularly apparent when negotiators experienced a negative outcome and was viewed as a vital coping mechanism that enabled negotiators to deal with the trauma associated with fatalities. One negotiator specifically described the support provided by the cadre when he had not successfully resolved an incident that had resulted in the death of a subject: “*...when we’ve had people die... people who’ve jumped, or committed suicide, or hung themselves... we support each other and we kick in and everyone checks everyone’s ok...*” (B:M:2:195).

*Camaraderie and comradeship.* Camaraderie is defined as a form of “mutual trust and friendship among people who spend a lot of time together” (Camaraderie n.d.). This type of relationship was described by most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] and it was highlighted as a positive and important component within the discipline.

*“...we’re quite a close bunch... we sort of work all over the place and in different departments... but we’re forever sort of in touch with each other by email and text message... we work in groups of three at the moment... so when you have your week on call... you work with the same team... and you tend to link in with those quite closely... we know each other quite well... we’re all pretty much friends, really”* (F:M:4:111).

One negotiator described how the team ethos served to supersede the rank structure of the police (i.e. a metaphorical removal of epaulettes) and enabled all team members to be viewed on an equal footing (something that appears to be unique compared to the rest of the police organisation).

*“...it’s a very close team... and the guy who runs us... he’s a... very shrewd, but inclusive individual... and the decisions and the direction of the craft, is, very much... we all have an equal say. Rank doesn’t exist... we’re all first names. There’s a... chief super sitting in there... couple of superintendents, chief inspectors, inspectors and we’re all on first name terms and we will all react to support whoever... And that’s quite unique within this organisation”* (G:M:4:123).

*Negotiation as a team discipline.* Negotiation was portrayed as something that would not function without the support of individual team members. The role and importance of the

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<sup>61</sup> Most negotiators = theme/category corroborated by 8 or more negotiators; the exact number of interviewees is represented in square brackets after the statement (i.e. [ $n = 9$ ]).

<sup>62</sup> Each interviewee is depicted by an alphanumerical code which represents their interview letter, gender, force number and length of service in months as a negotiator (i.e. A:M:1:156 refers to Interview A; Male HCN; Force Number 1; and 156 Months of Service as a HCN).

team and teamwork was consistently referred to throughout the transcripts by most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] and was conceptualised as a positive component.

*“They’re [my colleagues] brilliant... one of the first things they say on your national course is this... ‘have we got any individuals here?’ If we’ve got any individuals, you might as well get up and leave, because it’s not about you; it’s about the team thing”* (C:F:2:96).

Team members played a number of roles within the negotiation process that included supporting the primary negotiator in terms of ensuring his/her welfare: *“You know... making sure people have got drinks, people have got something to eat, people are warm enough; do they need a break?”* (C:F:2:96). It often also involved providing suggestions or advice in terms of how the primary negotiator might approach the next part of the negotiation. Some negotiators [ $n = 4$ ]<sup>63</sup> described a form of reflective working whereby they would often bounce ideas off each other in order to direct the negotiation effectively:

*“...I think then it’s quite useful, because you’ve got the team round you, so you come off the phone, and you’ve had someone who’s... been making a note of what’s been said, right, where are we? And you have that team discussion... which helps deal with your own internalised [feelings] ... because you’ve got that help”* (J:F:6:110).

***Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding.*** The perceived rewards cited by negotiators could be clearly categorised into four sub-categories described below:

***Negotiation as challenging.*** Negotiation was conceptualised by some negotiators [ $n = 5$ ] as being a rewarding role on the basis of providing individuals with some form of intellectual challenge. One negotiator described a *“constant battle of wits”* (G:M:4:123) that was personally rewarding, whereas another referred to the enjoyment obtained from the challenge of trying to successfully negotiate a positive outcome:

*“...I genuinely do care about the outcome, and... I want the best outcome for this individual, and some of them are pretty unsympathetic characters to be fair, and trying to find that little thing that’s going to give you some kind of rapport... with somebody who you otherwise might have nothing... in common with at all... the challenge I actually enjoy is... finding that thing that you can both talk about...”* (F:M:4:111).

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<sup>63</sup> Some negotiators = theme/category corroborated by 2 – 7 negotiators; the exact number of interviewees is represented in square brackets after the statement (i.e. [ $n = 5$ ]).

*Opportunity for public interface and interaction.* For negotiators [ $n = 6$ ] who found themselves with less public interaction (as a result of either promotion to more managerial positions, or roles with less operational policing activity), negotiation was perceived as a rewarding activity that provided them with an opportunity to interact with the public. The role, for example, was described by one senior-ranking officer as an opportunity for him to be “*down the coalface*” (A:M:1:156) and get involved with “hands on policing”.

*“...as a PC you will go to people in lots of different crises... I don’t get to those jobs. So I don’t get to practise those skills in a day-to-day environment because the rank and the role change means that it’s... unless I fall across it, it’s probably not appropriate... So what it personally gives me is the reminder of how to speak to people, how not to speak to people and just that snapshot into what is reality for their life”* (I:M:6:84).

*Negotiation as emotionally rewarding.* Most negotiators [ $n = 8$ ] reported experiencing a variety of positive emotions, often referring to the excitement and thrill experienced when negotiating. One negotiator described the “*massive high*” and “*great feeling*” he experienced (A:M:1:156); whereas others described the “*adrenalin rush*” (J:F:6:110) or “*elation*” (O:F:9:36; H:F:5:50) felt when an incident had been successfully resolved. The findings indicate that there is an element of thrill seeking involved that is likely to be due to the high stake/risk scenarios to which negotiators are often deployed. The input of a negotiator may be pivotal in whether a person lives or dies, and as such is likely to evoke a number of emotions.

*“...it was quite exciting to feel that you’re part of something that big... very exciting to feel that you’re pivotal in something that big... And... if you asked us all to be totally honest, there is that element of thrill. And buzz. And adrenalin rush that comes with it...”* (G:M:4:123).

One negotiator even described the emotions experienced as unique to the discipline, further exemplifying the emotional rewards associated with negotiation.

*“...when you’re a police officer, and you’re arresting people, and you’re putting them in court, it’s a nice feeling and you think, great, I’ve done a good job today. But when you actually can say, genuinely you’ve saved somebody’s life, it’s like a whole new level, so it’s a buzz that you can’t get in any other area of business I don’t think... You get a fantastic buzz from it, it’s so unique, that there’s nothing that can compare to it, nothing, in the police service”* (L:M:7:54).

*Feeling good from helping others.* Whilst it is clear that negotiators receive some form of short-term positive reinforcement that appears to have a mainly self-serving function, it was

also apparent that they obtained positive rewards as a result of helping others whilst performing this role.: *“I always get a tremendous sense of achievement... that I’ve really made a difference to that person at that moment in time”* (B:M:2:195). The main intention was to help people in crisis/conflict and to resolve hostage/crisis situations, however, in doing so, negotiators also experienced personal reward in the form of positive emotions. This phenomenon is well established within the counselling literature and is described as the “helpers high” (Luks 1988). Negotiating may, therefore, serve to provide some form of longer term positive impact on negotiators’ self-esteem, egos and identities. Most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ] described experiencing some form of positive emotion as a result of helping individuals-in-crisis and this was perceived by some as a reason/motivating factor for performing the role. *“...there have been times when I’ve come away and thought, I think I have saved someone’s life today... and that is such a wonderful feeling...”* (J:F:6:110).

**Negotiation negatives.** The second primary category that emerged related to the negative components associated with negotiation, which were categorised into three secondary categories: ‘Operational issues’, ‘Organisational issues’ and ‘Personal Sacrifices’. Each secondary category was further subdivided into smaller tertiary subcategories that are described below. These negatives often served to counteract the positives and lend themselves to a number of recommendations in terms of improving the discipline of HCNn within the UK<sup>64</sup>.

**Operational issues.** Operational issues refer to the difficulties experienced while negotiating at a scene, which were categorised into four tertiary categories: ‘Operational rank/role conflict’, ‘Negotiating solo’, ‘Lack of operational discipline’ and ‘Competing tactical orientations’.

*Operational rank/role conflict.* Negotiators have to work closely with tactical teams and the commanders on the ground to successfully resolve incidents. Negotiators are responsible for establishing and maintaining contact with the subject with the intention of de-escalating the subject’s emotional state and resolving the crisis situation, whereas the tactical teams are responsible for ensuring the negotiators’ safety and implementing a tactical response if required. The on-scene commander is responsible for making the decisions that oversee the whole police operation. This includes establishing perimeters and traffic control, directing the activity of the negotiators, deploying tactical teams and liaising with emergency services (Miller 2015).

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<sup>64</sup> See Chapter 11 (11.5.2.1).

Various forms of operational rank/role conflict were reported by some negotiators [ $n = 7$ ]. Although the basic premise is that “*negotiators negotiate and commanders command*” (A:M:1:156; D:M:3:63), conflict often arose as a result of dual roles and a lack of clear and enforceable boundaries in relation to these roles.

*“...as soon as I rock up, someone says, thank God you’re here boss and what do I do? Well hold on, I’m not the ground commander, I’m the negotiator; I work for you in these circumstances... And there is always, and I guess that’s something to do with the fact that we only negotiate at rank... kind of, that tension... there’s only one occasion really, that I’ve had to intervene, to overturn the ground commander’s actions okay?... So sometimes it gets... a bit messy round the edges... But there is this... role, rank issue”* (G:M:4:123).

The majority of conflicts discussed appeared to have arisen as a result of rank/role issues. As UK HCNs “negotiate at rank” (i.e. have to be of at least Sergeant/Inspector rank), this means that on many occasions, the silver commander at the scene will actually be of a lower rank than the negotiator. As a result of the chain of command hierarchy that is strictly observed within the police service, this often means that commanders will expect negotiators (of higher rank than themselves) to make command decisions, thereby resulting in conflict. This particular form of conflict was reported by some negotiators [ $n = 4$ ] within the sample (who tended to be higher ranking officers).

*“I’m an inspector. I could turn up at an incident being run by a sergeant, and he or she would then look to me to then command the incident. And negotiators negotiate; commanders command. You’ve probably heard that several times... and it’s just not helpful, so the first thing I do now is, if I am on duty, is actually put my civvy jacket on and go down... with badges of rank covered up. Very often, people will know who I am anyway, but it... somehow takes the edge off the situation”* (D:M:3:63).

This rank/role conflict appears to be double sided, however, as other negotiators [ $n = 3$ ] described conflict experienced as a result of senior ranking officers taking on command roles when they should not (i.e. high ranking officers making command decisions when they are there in a negotiator/non-command role/capacity):

*“Who’s silver command? Sergeant so and so. Right. So he or she is in command. We’ve got some negotiators in this force who just don’t get that... They make command decisions... It’s just down to you as an individual really... I make it quite clear and always have done. That I’m there to negotiate”* (B:M:2:195).

*Lack of operational discipline.* Another operational difficulty described by most negotiators [ $n = 11$ ] relates to a lack of discipline, in terms of colleagues not behaving appropriately on scene. Typically, negotiators described two forms of disciplinary issues. Firstly, some [ $n = 5$ ] described incidents whereby police officers either behaved unprofessionally by saying or doing things that were not appropriate, or wanted to get involved with the negotiation (despite the fact that trained negotiators were in attendance at the scene): “...it may be that they [the subject] pick up on stuff from... police officers on the cordon who maybe aren’t as... careful as they should be about what they say or do” (K:M:2:111). The second relates to a lack of scene control and ensuring that the environment is sterile for negotiators to deal with the incident.

*“The ones that are more difficult to negotiate... is when we haven’t... set our cell out correctly... for example... ones where you’re trying to negotiate with someone, but we haven’t created a sterile environment, and we’ve got a load of people from the estate that are also talking to him on the roof, and we haven’t got the cordons up properly. That’s a nightmare, and that is where it really can go horribly wrong, because... you’re speaking to them at the front of the house on the roof, their mates are speaking to... them, at the back of the house, and they’re telling him to jump. And we’re telling him to stay up there”* (A:M:1:156).

Sterility in this sense refers to ensuring that the subject is only communicating with the negotiator(s) and nobody else. This is an important component of negotiation as the involvement of third parties can serve to exacerbate the crisis situation and increase risk of harm to the subject and/or hostages/victims. Most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ] referred to the problems associated with a lack of scene control and the negative impact that this had on the negotiation.

*“...poor self-discipline... it’s supposed to be in a sterile, quiet room, and you are talking and other people are chipping in or pissing around... so lack of team discipline would be really [the most difficult/stressful scenario]”* (C:F:2:96).

*Competing tactical orientations.* The third operational issue related to the concept of competing tactical orientations and the resultant conflict experienced between ‘play-it-long’ negotiators and ‘tactically minded’ commanders who were keen to get the situation resolved as quickly as possible. Negotiators are trained to utilise time as a tactic and to “*play the long game*” (F:M:4:111) to allow subjects the time to decrease emotional arousal levels; however, commanders are often concerned with the potential impact of a long police operation on police and public costs. Examples of such conflict were described by most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ]. One negotiator, for example stated: “...sometimes there will be increasing pressure for the

negotiators to be used and then withdrawn, because commanders want to get the situation resolved quickly” (A:M:1:156) and these opposing ethea sometimes resulted in on-scene conflict, as demonstrated by the following incident.

*“...we negotiated him, talked to him over a period of two or three hours and got him down to the steps... by which time everyone was panicking because it was daylight and there’s trains running and the road was closed and the fire brigade are there and ambulance and police. But we managed to get him to the top of the steps so he was about, sort of fifteen feet above us... then I remember... a colleague who I still know who was the local... uniformed inspector at the time. So he was like... the incident commander, the silver commander. And he suddenly disappeared having been there getting quite frustrated at how slow we were at getting this bloke off the bridge. He came back and he’d been... to put on a harness with all the ropes from the fire brigade who were there and just suddenly started going up the steps to grab this bloke. He said, ‘if you don’t come down, I’m coming to get you’. He started to go up and of course you can guess what happened – the bloke decided to climb back up onto the bridge. So it took us another forty-five minutes to get him back again” (B:M:2:195).*

*Negotiating solo.* Negotiation training dictates that negotiators should never negotiate on their own, and this concept was identified early on within the negotiation literature (i.e. Fuselier 1981b: 13); however, due to logistical difficulties associated with reaching the scene, it is often the case that negotiators will attend an incident (or respond to an incident via telephone) on their own in the initial stages of deployment. Having to negotiate with a subject without any support (or a “number 2”) was described by some [ $n = 5$ ] as a negative experience that goes against the grain of the team ethos associated with the discipline: “...that’s I think where your back up is needed. Because I have been on my own quite a bit... it is, that immense, you’re thinking everything is on me” (H:F:5:50); “Quite often, you’d be there on your own for quite some time before another one turned up. There was quite a lot of... pressure on you initially...” (K:M:2:111).

One negotiator described how having to negotiate with a high-risk MISPER who was suicidal on the phone caused her to experience increased stress levels as a result of feeling isolated and not being able to relay information back to the silver commander, a job that is usually performed by the secondary negotiator or HNC.

*“And I was on my own... Nobody had really arrived and you could hear... initially she was in a café, so... that was fine; I was quite happy to carry on talking to her... but then I heard the stream outside and she was walking and she was on her way to the edge of*

*the river and she was going to go. That was really hard... you could feel your stress level rising, because I'm thinking... where's my support? How do I... you're speaking to somebody on the phone; how do you then give that information to... the inspector or the units out there?"* (C:F:2:96).

**Organisational issues.** Issues that negotiators experienced as a result of organisational structure, policies or procedures resulting in negative negotiator experiences were categorised into four tertiary categories: 'Dual role conflict', 'Lack of awareness and support within the force', 'Lack of professionalisation and standardisation of the discipline' and 'Negotiation as a Cinderella role'.

*Dual role conflict.* Negotiators were typically required to be on-call for a period of one week in five (or six) dependent on the specific force and the size of the cadre. It is, therefore, inevitable that they would be called out at some point during their "normal" working hours and this often (described by most negotiators [ $n = 14$ ]) caused difficulties: "...when the negotiator job conflicts with your day-to-day deadlines, which sometimes you can't miss... it's really hard" (C:F:2:96). One negotiator referred to this process as a form of "role corruption" (F:M:4:111) that often resulted in negotiators experiencing stress from trying to manage both their day jobs and their role as negotiators. Some described difficulties associated with having to manage a variety of different on-call duties in addition to their day jobs: "I do get called out, and it can be more than once a night... then I've got... kidnapping/extortion cover. And all my force nights cover for a full tour of duties, for a week... and then you've got your own job to do" (O:F:9:36). One HNC referred to the logistical difficulties associated with negotiators having to keep "spinning those plates" in terms of the "double hatting" they perform (E:M:3:114); and others made reference to tension caused within the workplace and experiencing conflict with their superiors/managers who often had to find someone to cover the negotiator's duties or manage their absences in some way.

*"Yes, in that your day-to-day responsibilities rely on you being here day-to-day, generally working longer hours than you are contractually obliged... and when you're not here... being instructed to something else such as a negotiator incident that is not necessarily in your immediate line manager's area of responsibility, depending on how long you're away for, can be... not positively viewed... Um, it won't get you promoted. When you get called out in the middle of the night and you're not available to come in the following day because you've been up all night, they have to try and find somebody to try and backfill"* (E:M:3:114).



*Lack of awareness and support within the force.* Although every police force within the UK has a cadre of negotiators and force policy dictates that negotiators are consulted and deployed in certain situations (e.g. firearms incidents) (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 2011), most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] referred to a general lack of awareness about the role:

*“...I think upfront there’s still... a lack of understanding about what it [negotiation] is. Some people... watch it on Hollywood blockbuster movies and think, that looks the business that does, but the reality is somewhat different” (L:M:7:54).*

This included a lack of recognition amongst colleagues about the benefit of utilising negotiators and a lack of budgetary support from the force that combined to produce an overall feeling of a lack of organisational understanding, awareness and support in relation to the negotiator role. This was described by some [ $n = 4$ ] as having a direct impact on the utilisation and deployment of negotiators, whereby control room staff either failed to deploy negotiators when they were needed, or deployed negotiators when it was not appropriate to do so.

*“...on occasions we do miss incidents that a negotiator should have been called... and... that’s not critical against one particular person, it’s just the realities of life that sometimes there’s quite a lot of changeover, into the control rooms, and some people won’t be aware of the fact that there’s negotiators and what... role they carry out...” (A:M:1:156).*

*Lack of standardisation and professionalisation of the discipline.* Protocol in terms of how negotiators should be selected, deployed, quality assured and supported differed across forces, and was dependent on force ethos, policies and procedures (and to some extent the attitudes of the Chief Constable and Force HCN Lead). This was described by some [ $n = 5$ ] as problematic as it often meant that negotiators were operating differently across forces.

*“...it’s very much, over to you; you’re the hostage negotiation team; you know what you want; you design your package. But I’ve worked in HR in recruitment and I know... it’s probably not very standard... And then you are using assessors who are assessing new candidates who might not be... quality assured... you know, not trained... They’re just... negotiators” (C:F:2:96).*

Some negotiators suggested a need for the selection processes to be nationally standardised and for assessors to be appropriately trained and another commented on the lack of standardisation across the training courses which he felt was potentially problematic.

*“...I think we need the regional courses to be standardised... and I think there needs to be some clarity about whether or not they are a course which feeds into the national*

*[course] or not. And I think the national needs to... come out of Hendon; we need to have far more of those courses and they need to be delivered around the country"* (K:M:2:111).

One negotiator also felt that courses would benefit from having an internally and externally validated accredited status in order to enhance professionalisation of the discipline.

*"...it's mandated, pretty much accepted now that if you join, or if you become a detective or if you become a PCSO, that you'll be trained to national standards and they will be assessed, so it's all quality assured and there's internal verification, and there's external verification, it's all professionalised. I think that's a good thing, and that would be the one thing I would say... there should be in place for negotiators"* (B:M:2:195).

There were also discrepancies in the way that negotiators recorded their deployment activities across different forces; however, work was being done to try and rectify this issue: *"I was lucky enough to go last week to the national negotiator group and talk about trying to standardise... data returns following deployment"* (E:M:3:114). One negotiator (A:M:1:156) even went so far as to suggest that the discipline needed to be standardised in line with other specialisms within the police (i.e. firearms/public order).

*Negotiation as a Cinderella role.* The role of negotiation in the majority of territorial forces (with the exception of a couple of metropolitan forces) is a voluntary one that negotiators perform alongside, or in addition to their day-to-day roles within the police. The specifics of remuneration differed from force to force, with some negotiators receiving no financial remuneration, others receiving some form of small additional payment and others receiving payment in terms of "overtime" if they were below an Inspector rank. Negotiation was frequently referred to as a "Cinderella role" or a "Cinderella service"; phrases that are used within police circles to describe the nature of negotiation as a voluntary and additional role. This terminology was also used to describe a perception of the role as being less important and less valued than other police roles or disciplines.

Most negotiators [ $n = 11$ ] referred to the lack of tangible recognition and remuneration as an example of the perception of negotiation as a Cinderella role within the police organisation. Negotiators [ $n = 11$ ] consistently referred to the lack of financial remuneration they received for the role and specified that it would be nice to receive some (or more) monetary remuneration in recognition for their services. Some [ $n = 5$ ] also felt undervalued/unappreciated by the force (particularly the management), despite feeling that they

were performing a vital voluntary role that often involves deploying when they are off duty and during unsociable hours.

*“It’s not all about money at all, because anybody who’s doing negotiating for money is in the wrong place, but for example... there was a reward payment that some officers get... so that they might get called out on unsociable hours, they have bigger responsibility than most officers. And all these things that... massively tick the box for negotiators. And we never, ever got that payment, and it was just left to us doing it down to good will... they don’t understand, although the chief constable did come to our training exercise... the last one. But for me, his words were quite empty... ‘I really appreciate the good job that you do’. I thought you don’t actually have a clue what we do... There is a massive demand on the team... because I think if we weren’t there, there’d be a lot of deaths, there’d be a lot of bad, bad stuff going on. So I don’t think up that level we get appreciated. They don’t realise the disruption to our family lives; two o’clock call-out in the morning. Yeah, okay, I’ll come out. And you don’t get any money for that” (C:F:2:96).*

One negotiator described the thanks for doing the role as “*intermittent*” (E:M:3:114) and another stated “*I don’t think the force recognises negotiators much at all...*” (G:M:4:123). Others described the disappointment they felt in association with the lack of substantive recognition received from their superiors for performing the role: “*There could be... some better reward and recognition for us... I think in sixteen years I’ve had one certificate saying you’ve done ten years! Literally, because I’d done ten years...*” (B:M:2:195).

Negotiation was consistently referred to as a specialism that was considered to be a lower priority within the ‘pecking order’ of police specialist areas; for example, it was described by one negotiator as the “*poor relative*” (H:F:5:50) in relation to other specialisms/specialist divisions. This perception was linked by some [ $n = 4$ ] to the limited budgetary support gained from the force.

*“...I know that they’ve got a fairly small budget really... Sometimes the kit is a bit old. And perhaps because it’s almost an add-on, it’s not something that the force thinks, right, this... is a priority... So therefore we get a smaller budget” (N:F:8:34).*

The fact that negotiation is performed alongside officer’s core responsibilities meant that negotiators were unable to dedicate themselves fully to the role and it was often perceived as a “*secondary function*” (L:M:7:54) or a “*bolt-on*” (E:M:3:114) to their day jobs. It was described by one negotiator as an “*extracurricular activity*” (F:M:4:111) and by another as a “*hobby*” (A:M:1:156) and negotiators gave the impression that their negotiator role did not always

dovetail neatly with their core policing role “*It’s an adjunct to our everyday duties, it doesn’t fit well, at all...*” (F:M:4:111).

**Personal sacrifices.** As a result of the on-call commitments, unsociable hours and urgency of deployment, most negotiators [ $n = 11$ ] described some form of personal sacrifice and two tertiary categories were identified within this category: ‘Disruption to family life’ and ‘Impact on personal and social life’.

*Disruption to family life.* Negotiators often have to “*walk out of the door and leave family commitments behind*” (I:M:6:84) and some [ $n = 7$ ] described difficulties associated with having to renege on family commitments. Others referred to the negative feelings associated with disturbing family members when they were deployed: “*...there’s personal difficulties... you know, disturbing the family’s sleep as I’m coming and going*” (G:M:4:123) and the feeling of letting family members down due to not being able to “*go anywhere or do anything*” (J:F:6:110) as a result of being on call.

*“I’ve been in town with my family... having a meal, and having to... put them in a taxi and then go off to... help somebody out. So huge... I don’t think there’s anything that recognises the impact on the individuals”* (F:M:4:111).

*Impact on personal and social life.* Some negotiators [ $n = 5$ ] also described the adverse impact on their social lives, whereby they would often not be able to consume alcohol or would have to turn down offers to socialise to ensure that they were safe to drive if deployed to an incident: “*...when you’re on call, no we can’t go to that party, no we can’t go outside the force, I’ve got to stay dry*” (G:M:4:123). Negotiation was therefore conceptualised by some as a role which restricted them socially and therefore negatively impacted on their personal/social life.

*“It’s a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your personal life, quite a bit, when you’re on call. All your mates are down the pub and you’re sat watching East Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish”* (L:M:7:54).

**Negotiation ambivalences.** The third and final primary category that emerged from the data related to elements of the negotiator experience that contained both positive and negative aspects and as such has been labelled ‘Negotiator ambivalences’. Ambivalence was observed as a result of inconsistency both within and between categories, thereby exemplifying the mixed/contradictory feelings associated with certain elements of the negotiator experience. This

category contained two secondary categories: 'Negotiator stress/eustress' and 'The evolution of UK negotiation as an entity' and these categories are discussed sequentially below.

**Negotiator stress/eustress.** Despite having to perform a highly challenging role that often involved dealing with life or death situations, negotiators tended to display an air of ambivalence about "stress" experienced in this context. Not only were there contradictions in terms of negotiators experiencing or not experiencing stress; the stress experienced was also explained in somewhat contradictory terms, thereby demonstrating ambivalence on two levels. Some [ $n = 5$ ] felt that negotiation was not stressful; whereas others ( $n = 10$ ) reported having experienced stress during their role (albeit in different forms). The latter group tended to either conceptualise stress in the form of "Eustress"<sup>65</sup> whereby they felt that negotiation provided them with a challenge that often resulted in a combination of both positive (eustress) and negative stress, or described the emotions associated with negotiating as "a different type of stress", somehow lessening the perceived impact of this stress.

**Negotiation as non-stressful.** One third of negotiators [ $n = 5$ ] felt that negotiation did not cause them to experience any form of stress. Some were fairly "matter-of-fact" about the datum that they did not experience stress when negotiating: "*Well, I don't personally get any stress from doing the negotiating stuff...*" (N:F:8:34) and provided fairly succinct answers with little elaboration. IV: "*Do you ever kind of experience stress or anxiety as a result of actually negotiating?*" IE: "*I haven't so far*" (M:F:8:24). One negotiator described a process of reflection that he often went through after an incident had been resolved, which sometimes resulted in him questioning his actions and reflecting upon whether he could have responded differently, but was adamant that this process did not cause him any stress: "*No... I don't feel stressed*" (O:F:9:36). Another related the lack of stress he experienced to the confidence in his ability to negotiate or act as a HNC at an incident. It would appear that his confidence served to alleviate any stress that he might have experienced from negotiating if he had not felt assured of his knowledge and skills<sup>66</sup>.

*"...I don't feel any stress when I'm negotiating; I really don't. I know the tactic that I want to employ; I know the route I want to go down or I want to direct my team down;*

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<sup>65</sup> Eustress is defined as "moderate or normal psychological stress interpreted as being beneficial for the experiencer" (Eustress n.d.).

<sup>66</sup> It is worth noting here that the police service has historically been perceived as having a particularly macho culture, whereby officers want to be perceived as strong and efficient enforcers of the law. This type of environment is likely to have an impact on whether people feel able to disclose feeling stressed within the workplace within an interview setting. Social desirability and impression management may, therefore, have played a role in some negotiators' responses.

*I've got the confidence to challenge when somebody says, I want you to engage this tactic; I've also got the confidence that if they say, no, that's what I am going to do, then, I'm going to deploy that to the best of my ability... so I don't feel any stress when I'm either negotiating or supervising the team" (I:M:6:84).*

*Negotiator eustress.* Some reported experiencing stress but tended to conceptualise this as "eustress" as opposed to conventional "stress", thereby giving it a positive rather than a negative connotation. For some [ $n = 3$ ], negotiation was conceptualised as a challenge, as opposed to something that caused stress *per se*: "...it's different. No, it's a challenge. It's not a stress... No, I wouldn't say it was stressful" (C:F:2:96); and for others [ $n = 3$ ], they felt that the role involved the manifestation of a combination of both negative and positive stress; with the positive stress often counteracting the effects of the negative stress.

*"...yes, I do [experience stress]. So you're putting yourself on offer. But equally there's the argument to say that in the vast majority of situations when the matter's resolved, you're getting a lot of positive stress, so it's like a blooming cup... you've got a load of negative here, but the potential is it's actually all going to be smiles" (A:M:1:156).*

*Negotiation as a "different type of stress".* Negotiators frequently encountered highly pressurised situations that involved high risk decision-making involving potential risk of harm or fatality to those involved. These types of scenario would typically induce stress within most individuals, however, the experience was consistently conceptualised by most negotiators [ $n = 10$ ] as being "different" to the stress experienced within other domains of their lives. Some [ $n = 3$ ] described the stress experienced from negotiating as less intense/severe than the stress experienced in their day jobs.

*"...somewhat perversely, I think although negotiating is always a crisis... I don't find that it stresses me out really as much as the frustrations of any day-to-day... issues that you might come across. Poor leadership and poor management really stresses me out... sometimes the... brutality of the situation or the... sort of crisis of the situation, you go straight into dealing with that there and then, there are people standing, you know, threatening to kill you and... all the stuff that they come out with or what they're going to do to you and your families... I can absorb that a lot easier really" (B:M:2:195).*

Whereas others [ $n = 3$ ] felt that the stress was more intense than the stress experienced within their daily life/day job.

*“Oh, goodness me, poles apart, absolutely poles apart... my everyday life... at work, is busy. It's not at all stressful, not in comparison with some of the bits that I do... some of my staff think it is, right – it isn't! I've been in far more stressful situations, with people throwing knives at me... and bottles at me, while I'm trying to talk them out of a situation... so yes, I've been in more stressful situations” (G:M:4:123).*

And some negotiators [ $n = 2$ ] felt that the stress was different but equal in terms of intensity: *“I don't think one is greater than the other, I think it's just a totally different dynamic” (L:M:7:54).* These disparities are likely to reflect individual differences between negotiators, whereby they perceive and respond to stress differently in line with their experiences and individual coping mechanisms.

Negotiation was also conceptualised as different as a result of the intensity and duration of the stress experienced. Some [ $n = 4$ ] described the stress as intense but short-lived. This high intensity, low duration (i.e. acute as opposed to chronic) stress was utilised as a justification for the stress not having too much of an impact on them in terms of their emotional wellbeing and functioning.

*“It's a different kind of stress really... and bear in mind I've done a variety of roles over the last nine years... some much more stressful than others... Being a negotiator is stressful at the time you are doing the negotiation, but... realistically, I deal with fifteen to twenty incidents a year, whereby I deploy... how many of those are over fairly quickly... probably another half again. So I'm talking about three or four that can become... very emotionally intense, difficult, long running” (E:M:3:114).*

***The evolution of UK negotiation as an entity.*** Interviewees varied in terms of their length in service both as police officers and negotiators. Length of experience as a negotiator ranged from two years (M:F:8:24) to 16 years (B:M:2:195). The evolution of negotiation was discussed in a combination of both positive and negative lights, with some feeling that changes had had a positive impact on the discipline and others feeling that the changes were potentially detrimental. This category was further subdivided into three tertiary sub-categories which are discussed below: ‘Changes in deployment nature and frequency’, ‘The impact of Taser on negotiation deployment’ and ‘Broader use of communication media within negotiation’.

*Changes in deployment nature and frequency.* There was a feeling amongst some [ $n = 7$ ] (particularly those with longer service) that the nature and frequency of their deployments had changed from when they started the role. A minority [ $n = 2$ ] felt that they were now dealing with a broader range of deployments and some [ $n = 7$ ] also felt that the type of incident they

typically responded to had changed in terms of situational characteristics. Negotiators exemplified this with reference to more involvement MISPERs and public order work (i.e. protests/marches/demonstrations).

*“...I think it’s changed in that we’ve sort of really tried to promote ourselves as, if you need anything for MISPERs and the like... people that you feel are in crisis, it might be a telephone call as opposed to that come out and do a face-to-face...” (J:F:6:110).*

Negotiators had also recently started to be involved with planned protests/demonstrations/marches whereby they act as “*protest liaison officers*” (N:F:8:34) to establish rules of engagement with the protest organisers and ensure that the protest remains peaceful.

*“...the role is changing... areas of use are increasing. The actual job of negotiating... is pretty similar to how it was when I started... but, increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations... such as dealing with protesters. If we’ve got... a group we know are going to come and protest in a particular area, and we fear there’s going to be an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, we’re getting negotiators involved in that to try and facilitate... a better outcome for all parties” (D:M:3:63).*

There is no doubt that the skills possessed by negotiators can be utilised in a broad variety of settings and it may be that their skills are being underutilised to some extent. One negotiator even referred to the potential use of negotiators as “*in-force mediators to mediate for conflict resolutions*” (A:M:1:156), an idea which may gain momentum in the future. Despite a perceived increase in breadth of deployment, in terms of deployment frequency, there was a strong feeling amongst some negotiators [ $n = 6$ ] that the number of deployments had decreased and that negotiators were being called out less frequently than in previous years.

*“...there’s an anecdotal feeling that it’s dropped off a bit... we always do a full week on cover... so from seven o’clock Monday morning, till seven o’clock the next Monday morning, and anecdotally, it always felt like it was... two or three calls a week, I’d get... now, one or two, and sometimes... I’ve had some weeks with no calls, at all” (F:M:4:111).*

*The impact of Taser on negotiation deployment.* Taser<sup>67</sup> was introduced within UK police forces in 2004 for use by authorised firearms officers and was extended to use by specially trained units in 2008 (ACPO 2013). “Taser provides an additional option to resolve

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<sup>67</sup> The Taser (conducted energy device) is a single shot device designed to temporarily incapacitate a subject through use of an electrical current which temporarily interferes with the body’s neuromuscular system (College of Policing 2014a).



situations, including the threat of violence, which can come from any section of the public” (ACPO 2013) and is used as an alternative to other physical tactical options, such as physical restraint, and the use of police dogs or batons. Negotiators felt that the implementation of Taser had had a direct impact on the nature and frequency of their deployment with almost half [ $n = 7$ ] reporting having observed a decrease in the number of call outs they received: *“there’s been a big drop in incidents since Taser’s come on the scene”* (K:M:2:111); *“So with the advent of Taser, that’s seen a reduction in the number of negotiating incidents, because the police officers at the scene are able to deal with it adequately, quickly, and safely by the use of Taser”* (A:M:1:156).

Some [ $n = 5$ ] also reported a change in the nature of their deployments: *“so without a doubt, there are some... types of job, which are on the decrease”* (G:M:4:123); whereby they were less likely to be deployed to barricade or domestic siege scenarios because Taser was seen as a quicker (and sometimes more efficient/cheaper) solution to this type of incident (as opposed to a potentially lengthy and protracted negotiation): *“...two minutes after we arrive, he’s been zapped, and he’s subdued, and that’s the end of it”* (F:M:4:111).

*Broader use of communication media within negotiation.* Historically, negotiation has been conducted face-to-face or via telephone; however, advances in communication technology and equipment have resulted in negotiators having to communicate with subjects via a variety of different methods. Some [ $n = 5$ ] reported having carried out negotiations with individuals via text message, email and social networking sites (SNS) in addition to the traditional methods of communication. These developments have been attributed to the increase in these forms of communication within society and the accessibility of digital methods of communication. Individuals who experienced some form of crisis ten to twenty years ago would have been more likely to speak to somebody face-to-face or perhaps on the telephone, whereas in the current digital era, there is a plethora of online methods of communication that provide the individual with a forum for dialogue. As such, negotiators have had to “move with the times” in order to communicate with individuals-in-crisis, particularly those of the younger generation who are more likely to engage in text messaging or chatting on SNS.

*“As we sit here now, there’s probably... maybe half a dozen high-risk missing persons in [anonymised location] alone... A lot of those... we could have an intervention with them by a phone call. Or a text... Remember some of the technology’s changed as well. I’ve found that I’ve ended up carrying out part of negotiations via text... Email... Facebook... all of that is a massive change from when I started certainly”* (B:M:2:195).

One negotiator also described the way that electronic communication was perceived as a means of providing individuals who are committing a crime with a form of anonymity, whereby extortionists may believe that their actions are less traceable as a result of email (as opposed to telephone) communication. He referred specifically to an increase in deployment to/involvement with extortion cases involving threats to disclose personally damaging information via the internet and indicated that negotiators were now having to work with cases that solely involved communication via electronic/digital media.

*“Yes, we’re finding more of those internet-related now where people are engaging in sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then... This film’s going to be released; it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account... So you’re getting those types of jobs now, which we haven’t seen before” (K:M:2:111).*

### **Model Synopsis**

This model provides a synopsis of the experiences of police HCNs in the UK. It indicates that being a negotiator can be an incredibly positive experience, as the role is both personally and professionally rewarding. Some negotiators stated that being a negotiator was their core reason for coming to work, thereby demonstrating the positive attitudes associated with the discipline. As is the case with any job role or vocation, negotiators equally described some negatives associated with their role and other experiences that were not necessarily polarised as positive or negative, and as such were labelled as negotiation ambivalences. The following chapter outlines the Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Profile Model.

# Chapter 10: Qualitative Phase Results Chapter 4: The Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Model

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In this chapter the self-perceived characteristics and competencies that are required for negotiators to be successful are outlined. A conceptual model has been developed on the basis of the categories that emerged from the interviews and includes 3 primary and 18 secondary categories that can be used to depict the successful negotiator profile (as perceived by operationally active negotiators in the UK). Please refer to Figure 10.1 for details of the conceptual model. A form of framework analysis was used to cross-reference and validate the emerging themes and to identify those characteristics/competencies that demonstrated the highest concordance rates within the sample (please refer to Table 10.1 in Appendix 30 for details of the code co-occurrence frequency matrix). The negotiator profile could be clearly divided into three main categories: ‘Negotiator entry requirements’, ‘Negotiator attributes’ and ‘Negotiator skills’. Each of these categories will be discussed sequentially below.

## Negotiator Entry Requirements

HCNn is a voluntary role that is performed in addition to a police officer’s day-to-day role. In order to work as a negotiator, police officers have to apply, be selected, and successfully complete the regional or national negotiator training course. The data revealed a number of entry requirements that must be met in order for an officer to be selected to complete one of these training courses and these consisted of: a requirement for negotiators to operate “at rank”; a requirement for negotiators to demonstrate a substantial and significant commitment to the role; and for officers to be “in it for the right reasons”. These three components were perceived as the core components for an officer to be eligible to apply for the negotiator role and are discussed sequentially below.

**Minimum rank requirement.** Historically, police officers had to be, of at least, Inspector rank or above to apply for the negotiator role, however, during the five years prior to data collection, this requirement appears to have been relaxed within most rural forces, with officers being able to apply for the role once they reached the rank of Sergeant: “*And it used to be at inspector level, so you could only actually apply once you became an inspector... Actually, that’s been reduced now to a sergeant*” (N:F:8:34). There was, however, still an enhanced rank requirement within some metropolitan forces (e.g. Force 4 and Force 9), whereby police officers had to be of Inspector rank or above to apply for the negotiator role. Whilst this is an objective




Figure 10.1. Conceptual map depicting the self-perceived successful HCN profile.

*Note.* The concepts surrounded by solid borders represent competencies that were cited by at least a third of interviewees and the concepts surrounded by dashed borders represent categories that were cited by less than a third of interviewees. Frequency of citation is also represented by thickness of surrounding borders, with thicker lines representing more frequently cited categories and thinner lines representing the least frequently cited categories.

criterion that was non-negotiable, this rank requirement produced mixed feelings from participants, with some feeling that the rank requirement was important for negotiators to have the appropriate/adequate amount of operational policing experience and senior level decision-making ability, and others feeling that the requirement was too stringent and “*precludes some really good potential negotiators*” (J:F:6:110).

*“The only thing that I disagree with is that, I know a lot of people who are at constable level, who have a lot of good qualities to do that work... It certainly isn’t about rank. It’s about... an individual’s ability. And that can be any rank”* (O:F:9:36).

It is worth noting, therefore, that whilst the entry criteria stipulated that officers could only apply to become negotiators once they were of Sergeant/Inspector rank or above, this was not a criterion that was perceived by all negotiators as being necessary (or sufficient in isolation) for officers to perform the negotiator role successfully.

**Committed to the role<sup>68</sup>.** In addition to the rank requirement, negotiators described a requirement for officers to be substantially and significantly committed to the role in order to succeed and perform effectively within the cadre:

*“I’d be looking at... people who are level-headed, but who are really enthusiastic, and who are committed to the role. Sometimes, very rarely, we’ll get those people who do find it a bit of a shock to be part of a 24/7 rota when the phone goes at three o’clock in the morning”* (A:M:1:156).

Negotiation is a voluntary role that is performed in addition to daily duties and as such, negotiators would be required to drop things at a moment’s notice and respond to a call. This often impacted on negotiators’ personal lives and involved them making extensive personal sacrifices.

Senior negotiators, and those involved with the selection process (i.e. HNCs) frequently described a need for applicants to demonstrate a substantial time commitment to the role: “*We will expect you to be a negotiator for at least five years...*” (A:M:1:156); and an attitude that verified their understanding (and ability) to drop things at a moment’s notice if required. They felt that these aspects were effectively addressed within the application and selection process, part of which involved a panel interview whereby officers were asked to explain their understanding of, and commitment to, the role. There was also an acknowledgement of the cost implications for forces in terms of ensuring that investment in negotiator training provided some form of return by a commitment from the officer to remain on the cadre for a certain period of

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<sup>68</sup> This competency has also been identified within the USA literature, whereby McMains and Mullins (2001) suggest that negotiators need to be totally committed to the negotiation process.

time: “...the second part is a... more structured approach to make sure that you can commit to the on-call arrangements and to drop everything at short notice, from the... need to train people and get your value for money really” (I:M:6:84).

**In it for the right reasons.** Negotiators (particularly those involved in the selection process) felt that it was very important that officers were applying for (and performing) the role “for the right reasons”: “...you clearly don’t want people who want to get trained because there’s a tick in the box and it looks good on their promotion and all the rest of it...” (K:M:2:111). Some described incidents historically where officers had applied for the role as a means of enhancing their CV/chances for promotion without genuinely committing to the role: “...there is always a risk when you recruit people, that they’re doing it as a... sort of CV filler for a couple of years...” (J:F:6:110) and others referred to the difficulties that this type of attitude had caused for cadres:

“They have problems in other forces, of people applying for it, because it’s a good tick, it’s a good attribute to have, on the CV... their people, they’ll do it for a year or two, and they’re, no, I’m bored of this now, and they move on, and it causes a problem.” (F:M:4:111).

Negotiators felt that filtering out individuals who were applying for the role for the wrong reasons was an important part of the selection process and specified that the incorporation of questions into the traditional panel interview was a means of doing this.

### **Negotiator Attributes**

The second primary category relates to attributes that were perceived by negotiators as important for successful performance. An attribute is defined as “an inherent characteristic” (Attribute n.d.) and for the current purposes refer to characteristics that are perceived as required in order to succeed as a negotiator. These attributes emerged in the context of discussions relating to perceived successful negotiator characteristics (i.e. “what makes someone a good negotiator?”) and the characteristics that they would look for if they were selecting new negotiators for the cadre. Ten secondary categories emerged within this category, with six being corroborated by at least a third of negotiators within the sample. The categories are discussed in order of frequency below, with the most highly corroborated attributes being discussed first.

**Empathic.** The first attribute that most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] identified was the concept of negotiators needing to be empathic. Negotiators described their role as requiring an ability to

empathise with subjects, regardless of their history, background or the context of the hostage/crisis incident. Demonstration of empathy is referred to as a vital component within the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of negotiation (see Chapter 8) as a means of establishing rapport with the subject and eventually influencing behavioural change as a result of the developed relationship between the negotiator and subject. This finding, therefore, further triangulates this concept by identifying the need for negotiators to be empathic in order to succeed in their role. One negotiator described “*having some sympathy or understanding of what they’re going through*” (N:F:8:34) as her main tool when negotiating and others consistently referred to the ability to empathise as being a core attribute within the successful negotiator profile: “*...you have to be able to empathise with somebody. You’ll never fully understand what they’re going through. But how can you move forward if you don’t appreciate... what it is they’re going through?*” (O:F:9:36).

Interestingly, there was a suggestion from some negotiators that they perhaps do not need to be truly 100% empathic individuals, as long as they possess the ability to demonstrate empathy when it is needed. One negotiator, for example, alluded to an ability to switch empathy on and off as required, or to demonstrate/feign empathy when needed, even though true empathy may not have been experienced at the time. He referred to the concept of both sympathy<sup>69</sup> and empathy<sup>70</sup> and it may be that negotiators need to be able to display sympathy if they are unable to display true empathy (i.e. to genuinely share the feelings and emotions that the subject is experiencing).

*“...there are people who think that negotiating is just a waste of time... you know, why are you being nice to them? ...because there... quite frankly, there are some really unsympathetic characters, and I think they think that... this is my next best mate... we will, I speak for myself, I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily... deserving of it... and if that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is... but I’m not going to get anywhere... not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy... with the individual” (F:M:4:111).*

**Non-judgemental attitude/respect for others.** The second attribute identified by most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] related to the concept of being non-judgemental. Negotiators felt that it was vital for negotiators to be non-judgemental towards subjects, demonstrate respect for others and possess an ability to withhold judgement about subjects throughout negotiations: “*You’ve got to*

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<sup>69</sup> Sympathy is defined as “the feeling that you care about or are sorry about someone else’s troubles, grief, misfortune, etc.” (Sympathy n.d.).

<sup>70</sup> Empathy is defined as “the feeling that you understand and share another person’s experiences and emotions” (Empathy n.d.).

*be able to build a rapport whether they're a masked murderer or whether they're a ... petty shoplifter or whatever"* (C:F:2:96). Negotiators described instances whereby they had to deal with individuals who may have committed horrendous crimes in the past, or may be particularly "unsympathetic characters" (F:M:4:111), but emphasised the need to withhold judgement of these individuals in order to successfully negotiate and resolve the crisis/hostage situation.

*"I think certainly not being judgemental is one, because you deal with some people that... if they jump, some people would say, thank goodness, but you're there to do a job... I've never found that difficult, actually, I said about the one sex offender, I mean, he was guilty, and he actually did want to commit suicide for that, to save face for what he did, but you don't treat him differently. Any police officer would say to treat people the same, but I think in reality, that's not always the case. I think negotiating is such a difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what you say, and not be judgemental, and be open-minded, actively listen, and you know, try to be there, supportive, empathic, also"* (L:M:7:54).

One negotiator described the importance of being able to respect/have consideration for subjects by being able to "step out of your uniform... and talk to someone as an individual" (J:F:6:11), whereas another referred to "separating the person from what they've done" when negotiating with people who may have "done things that you find really repugnant" (K:M:2:111) as a means of demonstrating the importance of a non-judgemental attitude within the negotiation role.

**Flexible<sup>71</sup>.** The third attribute endorsed by most negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] related to the ability for negotiators to be flexible and to be able to manage both work and personal commitments whilst on call:

*"...somebody that's flexible as well. It's a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your personal life, quite a bit, when you're on call. All your mates are down the pub and you're sat watching EastEnders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish"* (L:M:7:54).

Flexibility in this sense refers to negotiators being able to drop things at a moment's notice and respond to deployment calls as and when they occur: "...flexible... in terms of being able to turn out all sorts of times and day" (G:M:4:123). One negotiator referred to the need to be flexible in terms of working with and supporting other team members: "...what we're looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team" (E:M:3:114). Whereas another negotiator

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<sup>71</sup> Flexibility has also been identified as a core competency for negotiators within the USA literature, whereby Fuselier (1981b) and Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005) both identified that negotiators need to be flexible and cope with uncertainty in stressful situations.



exemplified the importance of flexibility when describing an incident whereby she had to take on the primary negotiator role quickly when her colleague was phobic of blood and a subject had cut himself:

*“Unfortunately my number one is... not keen on blood... So whilst he's stood there starting his negotiations, he went, can you just take over for a bit? And I didn't know... And he went off... And then I just stood here and just cracked on with it...”* (N:F:8:34).

**Operational policing experience/credibility.** Some negotiators [ $n = 7$ ] felt that officers needed to have a substantial amount of operational policing experience and *ergo* police credibility in order to successfully perform the role of negotiator:

*“I think there's a degree of experience coming in here... I think it's important to have someone who has experienced these sorts of scenarios... they've experienced getting involved in the siege situation. They can understand how it works... they've got a good, wide experience of different types of policing, so I think that's important”* (A:M:1:156).

Negotiators referred to the need for officers to have the appropriate level of police experience and skills in order to know how to respond appropriately during hostage/crisis incidents and to be able to control their emotions in relation to such incidents.

*“Yeah, operational credibility, being capable to respond during a crisis incident is really key because part of... building that relationship is controlling your own emotions, and, actually, if you get really excited by the whole thing, that's difficult... and so what you need is that operational experience around just crisis incidents”* (E:M:3:114).

One negotiator also felt that it was important for negotiators to possess the appropriate level of legal/legislative/procedural knowledge (as gleaned from operational policing experience) in order to advise subjects appropriately throughout the negotiation process.

*“...having a legal knowledge around the subjects that you're talking about. Because if you don't know that you can't make the right promises. So you've got to be legally sound to... you know, not advise, but to make those promises. And procedure. You've got to know all about... the force procedures about the subject matter that you are talking about”* (O:F:9:36).

**Patient.** Interviewees described a requirement for negotiators to be patient individuals: *“I think the people who tend to do it, by and large, tend to be of that mind that... they're prepared to listen, they're prepared to take the long game, patience”* (F:M:4:111) and many [ $n = 7$ ] referred to incidents throughout the transcripts that required them to demonstrate patience

and/or perseverance: *“As is often the way, he didn’t want to engage first of all but, being persistent, perhaps, sounds a bit pushy... persevering, perhaps a better word, persevering with him, I eventually got it so he was talking to me”* (D:M:3:63). They described incidents whereby they would have to attempt to engage with subjects who were MISPERs or individuals who were at risk of self-harm/suicide and would perhaps have to continually try to make contact with the subject via telephone/in person as the subject may not be ready to engage in dialogue for some time. This could involve subjects consistently hanging up the phone, verbally abusing the negotiator or simply refusing to engage in dialogue.

*“I’ve spent two hours talking to a loft hatch, and eventually the loft hatch is opened and that’s the first noise you would have. But because the people on the ground are doing all the other work you’ve just got to trust them to say we’re ruling out all the other options so keep going, we think this person is there without any necessary confirmation... That they’re even listening or that they can hear... they might be wanting to listen but they’ve barricaded it or they’re so far away that my voice isn’t going to carry that far. The easy ones are where they shout and bawl back because at least you’ve got confirmation that they’re there... and you can then got to try and work on what... the right thing that’s going to get them engaging”* (I:M:6:84).

**Resilient.** Just under half of the sample [ $n = 7$ ] felt that resilience was a key attribute for negotiators to possess.

*“...you have to be resilient... resilience comes as a close second... Because, unless you’re personally resilient, no matter how good you are at everything else, if you’re distracted, if you’re tired... if you’re worried, if you’re stressed, the other thing is, you might be the best listener and the best communicator in the world, but when the stress is on... It robs you... some people, of the ability of... rational thought”* (G:M:4:123).

They described this need in terms of being able to cope emotionally and physically with the demanding nature of the role: *“I think the only other thing would probably be some resilience where... they’ve got to be prepared to slog it out... sometimes... in bad weather in... dodgy places”* (K:M:2:111). In addition to this, they described the need for negotiators to have a “thick skin” in order to deal with the verbal abuse that often goes hand-in-hand with such highly pressurised and emotive incidents: *“A thick skin is... crucial”* (G:M:4:123).

*“...some people, you can say, you know, why are you here? And they’ll tell you straight away. And other people can be so rude and horrendous to you, and tell you that you look like a bag of shit, and that you’re fat, and you’re this and you’re that. And you just*

*stand there, and you just take it all. And you've got to know that you don't... take any of that personally"* (O:F:9:36).

**Caring/compassionate.** A third of negotiators [ $n = 5$ ] felt that it was important to be caring and/or compassionate and to demonstrate attributes that were indicative of a desire to help or support other people: *"You've got to be there because you want to be there, because you genuinely want to help that person"* (H:F:5:50); *"I think... it's somebody who... are caring. Compassionate... a person who's willing to listen. And a person who actually cares to take it to the next level"* (O:F:9:36). It is worth noting, however, that a couple of negotiators (C:F:2:96; F:M:4:111) felt that whilst a caring and compassionate nature was important, they also felt that this needed to be balanced with psychological stability. They felt that some of their colleagues would be excellent in terms of the supporting nature of the role (due to their compassionate and caring nature) but would struggle to "leave it behind" once the incident had been resolved. One negotiator referred to the need for negotiators to balance altruism/a desire to help people with psychological stability and an understanding that not everyone can be helped/not every situation can be successfully negotiated as a means of exemplifying this balance:

*"...you've got to be altruistic to a certain degree... I want to help people, but I can't help everybody. I will do my best, but I think there are some people that are... in danger of either burnout or psychological problems themselves because it went wrong"* (C:F:2:96).

**Mentally agile.** A third of interviewees [ $n = 5$ ] felt that it was important for negotiators to be able to *"think on their feet"* (K:M:2:111) and to be mentally agile: *"They should be mentally agile..."* (E:M:3:114). The ability to think on your feet was deemed important for negotiators to be able to adapt their style/strategy of negotiation to the subject/context in order to successfully resolve the hostage/crisis situation, along with being able to engage in, follow and plan the next part of the dialogue with the subject.

*"...but it's also to multi-task because although you're still talking to them and listening to what they're saying you've also got to plan what you're going to say next... so you've just got to stay with it as well so it can be mentally quite tiring"* (N:F:8:24).

Mental agility was highlighted as being a particularly vital attribute when dealing with/responding to kidnap and extortion situations where time is particularly crucial and the response needs to be immediate, efficient and appropriate due to the high risk stakes involved in red centre incidents<sup>72</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> "Red Centre" is the term used internally within the police to describe a kidnap and extortion/ransom situation.

*“Mental agility... and that’s... particularly... plays out in kidnap and extortion, where... you’re trying to deal with a huge amount of information. You’re trying to process it very, very quickly and pass on the most pertinent points really, really quickly and do that in an environment where you potentially can’t speak or anything else”* (E:M:3:114).

In addition to more generic mental agility, one negotiator also highlighted the importance of having a good memory: *“Your memory’s got to be pretty key because if they’re giving you stuff you need to be able to show you’ve absorbed it, show you’re interested in them”* (D:M:3:63).

**Genuine/trustworthy.** Just under a third of interviewees [ $n = 4$ ] felt that it was important for negotiators to be credible, trustworthy and to portray themselves as genuine individuals who are there to help subjects in crisis/conflict: *“I think it’s important to just be yourself”* (O:F:9:36); *“You’ve got to be... somebody they can trust...”* (C:F:2:96). The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of negotiation discussed in Chapter 8 makes reference to the importance of building trust between the negotiator and subject and highlights this aspect as a vital component within the de-escalation and resolution of hostage/crisis situations. This finding therefore further validates the importance of negotiators being trustworthy and being able to foster trust on the part of the subject: *“And just being genuine... you’ve... got to be true to yourself, and true to them, really... And try and say, you know, this is how I can help you”* (H:F:5:50).

**Intuitive.** Some participants [ $n = 4$ ] felt that it was important for negotiators to be intuitive or to be able to rely on their intuition to some extent. One negotiator referred to the importance of intuition being used to identify hooks that can be focused on and used to de-escalate the crisis situation: *“Yeah, you’ve got to be intuitive to pick up on those hooks<sup>73</sup> and levers”* (C:F:2:96). Whereas another negotiator described how instinct or intuition was important and used to guide the conversation being held between the two parties and *ergo* the negotiation process.

*“So... those skills as well as communication, the non-verbal communication, if you like... the other skills. I mean it’s difficult to put a label, but when I say instinct, just sort of intuitively... it’s constantly searching for that, that common thread between the two of you, the place where you might... different as anything, one might be... you can be different genders, different ages, different life scenarios, different skills, different*

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<sup>73</sup> “Hooks” are described by Slatkin (2009) as important themes or potentially fruitful areas to pursue further with the subject. Please refer to Chapter 8 for a more detailed discussion of the “hooks” concept.

*health, but there is usually a place where you can... hook and bond with the person, and I think that's important... to get to influence..." (B:M:2:195).*

## **Negotiator Skills**

The third primary category that emerged from the data related to the perceived skills that negotiators needed to possess in order to perform as effective negotiators. Five secondary categories were identified: 'Listening', 'Communication', 'Team-Working', 'Problem-Solving' and 'Honesty'. These are discussed sequentially below, in order of the most frequently to least frequently identified skills.

**Listening**<sup>74</sup>. Listening was the most frequently identified skill [ $n = 14$ ]: *"They must be a... particularly a good listener, not so much a talker"* (E:M:3:114). To listen is defined as "to hear something with thoughtful attention" (Listen n.d.), which aptly describes the technique required within the negotiation process. Individuals who are in crisis or conflict need to be able to explain the difficulties/emotions that they may be experiencing and "to be heard" by somebody:

*"But the common theme when you're face-to-face or speaking to somebody is definitely enhanced listening... Listening with a real intent to try and understand and empathise with them; what is it that's brought them to this place on this day?" (B:M:2:195).*

As such, negotiators often form the role of *confidant* and the findings indicate that "becoming the confidant" is very much part of the negotiation process. A number of different terms were utilised throughout the transcripts to refer to listening skills, including *"enhanced listening"* (B:M:2:195), *"effective listening"* (A:M:1:156) and *"active listening"* (F:M:4:111) but the common theme running throughout relates to the ability of negotiators to listen to the subject and to demonstrate to the subject that they hear and understand what is being said to them (i.e. active listening).

*"I think the primary one is active listening, you've got to listen to what you've been told. I guess it's like what you said earlier, about having a strategy. I think if I went there with my own agenda and my own strategies, I think that I could miss the boat. So I try to really focus on what I've been told and feed off that. So for example, I said about triggers, I might talk about football, girls, nights outs, whatever... and if something is said to me, if I don't pick up on it... it could delay things or it could be quite a disaster"*

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<sup>74</sup> Listening (with an emphasis on active listening) is also an aspect that has been identified within the USA literature as playing a core role within the HNC selection process (Fuselier 1981b and Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005).

*really. So you need to listen to what you've been told and take the hook when it's given to you"* (L:M:7:54).

In addition to being the most frequently identified skill, most negotiators also described listening as the key/core/most important skill required by negotiators in order to succeed: "...probably listening is the biggest single one" (I:M:6:84); "...listening is probably the key one..." (J:F:6:110).

**Communication.** The second most frequently identified skill [ $n = 12$ ] related to communication: "Well, communication is... the trump card to any of it really" (O:F:9:36); "It's definitely got to be communication, that's got to be the main bit because that's what you are doing all the time" (N:F:8:34). Communication is defined as "the imparting or exchanging of information by speaking, writing or using some other medium" (Communication n.d.) and this process synopsis the dialogue that is exchanged between the negotiator and the subject during the negotiation process. Whilst the concept of HCNn might appear to be a complex and mysterious entity, in essence, negotiators are simply communicators engaging with individuals-in-crisis/conflict in order to try and establish why they are in the situation and to try and work collaboratively with the subject in order to resolve the incident and minimise injury or loss of life: "...what we are is we are very good communicators... Enhanced communicators, probably... I think foremost it's around your skills to communicate. That's definitely number one" (B:M:2:195). Communication skills were also identified by several negotiators involved in the selection of new recruits as one of the skills that are assessed within the selection process, thereby further validating the importance of this skill within the negotiator repertoire: "...what we're looking for is someone who's got... some natural ability to communicate. Negotiation, of course, is two ways, listening as well as talking" (D:M:3:63).

**Team-Working<sup>75</sup>.** The majority of negotiators [ $n = 9$ ] referred to the importance of team-working skills, which was the third most frequently cited skill: "... at the end of the day, it's all about teamwork" (A:M:1:156); "And teamwork is crucial... Because this thing don't work... on that individual basis... There's no such thing as a lone wolf, you know, absolutely it is the team" (G:M:4:123). HCNn incidents have extremely pressurised parameters and involve high risk situational variables and, as such, can involve negotiators dealing with highly emotive and risky situations. The nature of HCNn, therefore necessitates teamwork, with negotiators operating on a primary (i.e. communicator) and secondary (i.e. support) negotiator basis: "But

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<sup>75</sup> McMains and Mullins (2001) refer to the importance of the candidate "believing in the team" when selecting new HCNs.

*we're also looking for someone who has a team fit. I think we do work very closely and very well as a negotiators team. We're looking for someone who's going to fit in to that team...*" (D:M:3:63). In this context, "team fit" is conceptualised as the ability for an individual to fit into and effectively integrate into an already established negotiator cadre. Several negotiators also made reference to the fact that this skill was considered as part of the selection process, further validating the relevance of this skill within the negotiation arena.

*"...part of the selection process is actually around... that team fit... and what we're looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team, because we... do deal with... complex, emotionally difficult incidents where, regularly, people are very focused on harming themselves or harming somebody else. So, actually, the consequences of that can be somebody being seriously hurt or dying... and the support mechanisms we have in place; not only have we got the organisational ones, but actually that team response is a very big, big part of it"* (E:M:3:114).

**Problem-Solving.** Almost a third of negotiators [ $n = 4$ ] felt that negotiators needed to possess problem-solving skills: *"Listening... personal communication... Some problem-solving... those I would... highlight as... top [skills]"* (G:M:4:123). One negotiator described this skill as an important competency within police work generally: *"But police officers, generally, have to relate to people, they have to communicate with people, they have to problem-solve so... the majority of them should have the skills"* (K:M:2:111), thereby suggesting an extension/extrapolation of this skill from generic police work into HCNn specifically. Problem-solving is well established within the negotiation literature as a strategy that can be used to try and resolve hostage/crisis incidents (Miller 2005) and is identified as the fourth crisis intervention stage by Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005). It is a strategy that tends to be utilised once emotions have been de-escalated and the subject is considered to be thinking more rationally and according to Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano (2005), "problem solving is a multistep behavioural process in which the negotiator helps the person in crisis explore alternatives and concrete solutions".

**Honesty.** Some negotiators [ $n = 4$ ] felt that honesty was an important skill for negotiators to possess.

*"...decisions are... based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to understand... what the individual's going through, or empathise with their situation, certainly not lying to them, at all. Absolutely not... Being totally honest with the individual. If he's going to be arrested, he's going to be arrested. There isn't going to*

*be anything that's going to change that... So if you then say no, you're not, and they know that they are not being dealt with by someone who's truthful, the chances are they'll stay in there for a lot longer period of time"* (A:M:1:156).

This extended not only to being honest with subjects about what would happen to them once they had surrendered themselves or the crisis incident had been resolved but also about themselves: *"I think you've got to be very fair, very honest, not only to them, but about yourself as well"* (C:F:2:96). One negotiator described honesty as being one of the core skills that he would be looking for in a candidate when selecting officers to complete the negotiator training: *"Empathy... effective listening, clarity, honesty... rapport building"* (A:M:1:156); and others referred to the role of honesty as a tactic/strategy within the negotiation repertoire and emphasised the importance of being honest with subjects throughout the entire negotiation process:

*"...prepared to say sorry, honesty with them... there are times when I've said I got that wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family... because they're worried. You've then gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I'm sorry"* (I:M:6:84).

### **Model Synopsis**

This model outlines the characteristics and competencies that were perceived as important by operationally active HCNs. The data indicates that negotiators needed to meet a number of entry requirements, possess a number of specific attributes/characteristics and demonstrate a number of specific skills in order to perform successfully within the role of negotiator. At a glance, the model depicts an officer who has reached a certain level of seniority (as a result of operational policing experience); is genuinely committed to the role; is empathic, non-judgemental, flexible, and resilient; and has effective listening, communication and problem-solving skills. Identification of this profile should serve to validate the competencies that are sought within police officers who volunteer to be trained as negotiators in the future, but would benefit from further empirical validation in order to strengthen and triangulate the claims made within this chapter.



# Chapter 11: Discussion, Evaluation and Conclusion

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## 11.1. Overall Synopsis

This chapter synthesises the findings from the quantitative and qualitative components of this research and identifies the potential implications for both practice and policy. The findings represent one of the first empirical attempts to systematically identify whether HCNs constitute a unique group within the police population and to identify the characteristics and traits that are held by operationally active HCNs in the UK. The quantitative data revealed the existence of a “police officer profile” with both police samples differing significantly from the student sample on all five constructs; but failed to identify the existence of a unique “HCN profile”. In addition to this, the qualitative data enabled a grounded theoretical model of UK HCNn to be developed and established the existence of five micro-models that can be used to depict UK HCNn. The research provides a unique contribution to the literature by utilising the actual experiences of operationally active UK HCNs to understand: 1) the nature and characteristics of HCNn deployments; 2) the processes involved in the selection, training and support of HCNs, 3) the entire HCNn process/procedure from initial deployment to debrief (including the communication styles/strategies and techniques utilised by HCNs); 4) the experiences of HCNs and what it is like to be part of a HCN cadre; and 5) the characteristics and competencies possessed by effective HCNs. These findings have implications for police officer selection processes/identification of officer training needs and have been used to make recommendations in terms of the selection, training, operational activity and support of UK HCNs which are discussed below.

## 11.2. Methodological Considerations and Consolidation of Findings

A mixed-methodological approach was adopted to address the identified research questions as I felt that the specific gaps in the literature base in relation to HCNn could not be addressed satisfactorily via one research method alone. Whilst a quantitative research design enabled me to address the hypotheses in relation to the potential existence of a unique HCN profile via the use of a cross-sectional survey, this method would not have served to gather the more detailed/richer data required to provide an insight into the actual experiences of UK HCNs. Mixed methods approaches have been praised on the basis of their abilities to provide more comprehensive information in relation the phenomenon being investigated and studies

conducted in this vein benefit from the fact that they build upon the strengths of different methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004 and Johnson and Turner 2003). Hence, the design adopted allowed the findings to exist as complementary components addressing two distinct sets of research questions. Mixed methods approaches have been referred to as both expansive and creative (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004) and as such have enabled me to explore this phenomenon from two perspectives, which when taken as a whole, provide a more comprehensive account. Equally, this approach has contributed insight and understanding that would not have been identified on the basis of a single method alone and, as such, provides strength to the overall conclusions drawn.

It is important to note that my aim was not to triangulate the quantitative findings with the qualitative models. Instead, a mixed-methodological approach was taken to explore the phenomenon from two different angles - the first being to identify the characteristics and traits of HCNs and the second being to develop a model of HCNn. The findings, therefore, represent fairly distinct contributions and offer limited opportunities for triangulation. Nevertheless, there were some areas where the findings overlapped.

Although no quantitative evidence was found for a unique HCN profile, interviewees frequently referred to or inferred that HCNs required a distinctive set of competences/characteristics, as outlined in the “not every police officer could be a negotiator” category within the HCN journey model (Chapter 7). Similarly, the HCN profile model discussed in Chapter 10 identifies a number of specific perceived competencies that are required by HCNs in order for them to be effective within the role. As such, the qualitative and quantitative findings are contradictory. There are a number of potential explanations for these contrasting findings. Firstly, there is a possibility that the selected psychometric tests were not sensitive enough to identify subtle differences between the police sub-samples. Secondly, it could be the case that HCNs perceive a “uniqueness” that is not actually warranted/present or under-estimate how much these relevant/necessary competencies are represented in non-negotiator trained officers. In light of these contradictory findings, follow-up research is necessitated to: 1) validate the characteristics perceived to be important by HCNs, as outlined in the HCN profile model; 2) to identify if there are measures that are able to identify differences in the characteristics/constructs included in this study, 3) to establish if differences exist in terms of other characteristics/constructs; and 4) to establish whether or not most officers would make effective HCNs.

### **11.3. Research Limitations**

The findings of this study need to be understood within its methodological limitations. As outlined in Chapters 5 and 6, the quantitative findings have to be understood within the context of the sampling strategies and the socio-demographic differences between the police and student samples. A police officer profile, for example, might be less apparent when officers are compared to employees/professionals in other roles (and when utilising a matched-pairs design). It is also important to note that officers and HCNs were not assessed on their success/effectiveness within their roles, or for the police officers, their potential as HCNs. Some of the police officers included in the study, may possess the skills/competencies that were believed to be important for effective HCNs to have, and the HCNs might have varied in their levels of effectiveness, which might have masked differences between the groups. Future research could, therefore, attempt to identify whether HCNs who are more successful/effective in their role possess different profiles, i.e. levels of the characteristics/skills thought to be important, than those who are less successful/effective. However, assessing “success/effectiveness” in this context might be difficult. Use of speed of resolution as a metric, for example, may not always be a valid method of success measurement; there are an infinite number of variables that may influence how quickly an incident is resolved, or whether it is resolved at all; and the use of the number of successful deployments also poses problems as some incidents may simply be more complex/complicated than others (and this may not, for example, be related to the skill of the HCN). A potential solution may be to utilise supervisor ratings to identify those HCNs who are perceived as being more successful/effective and this could be incorporated into a future research design. In addition, comparisons should be made between officers deemed not suitable for the role of HCN and current/existing HCNs to perhaps more clearly identify the characteristics of the profiles of the two groups. One way of achieving this comparison, could be to identify the police officers who were selected to complete the HCN training but were unsuccessful in passing the training course. A direct comparison of those officers that passed the training versus those that didn’t might provide one way of identifying the attributes/competencies that differentiate successful HCN police officers from non-negotiator officers in a more nuanced manner (i.e. police officers that apply to become HCNs may “on paper” and in the assessment process, present as appropriate candidates for the role, however, the intensity of the training may filter out individuals who don’t possess the key characteristics/competencies to succeed as a HCN). Future research would, therefore, benefit from exploration of this concept by comparing successful and unsuccessful HCN trainees.

Furthermore, whilst there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to attest to the effectiveness of HCNn as a police tool, there is limited rigorous empirical research evidence that clearly and unequivocally confirms the overall effectiveness of police HCNn. This is due to a number of

factors. Firstly, there is a lack of research that specifically identifies whether HCNn is more effective than other methods of intervention, for example. This is mainly because police work generally (and HCNn, more specifically) does not lend itself to controlled research whereby direct comparisons could be made between different tactical interventions. It would be unethical, for example, to design a study whereby one individual-in-crisis received an HCNn response and another received a tactical (i.e. using force) response to compare which was most effective! Similarly, controlled laboratory experiments attempting to identify the effectiveness of HCNn would fail to recreate the reality of a HCNn scenario and as such would lack in ecological validity. In addition to this, whilst a HCN may have passed the regional/national training course, there is limited evidence to suggest/verify that this officer is an effective HCN during live scenarios, or remains to be effective due to a specific lack of re-accreditation once they have passed the initial HCN training course. More broadly, the question regarding HCN effectiveness also links to the lack of a centralised HCN deployment database within the UK (but this may also apply to other countries), without which it is incredibly difficult to measure/assess the effectiveness of HCN as a specific deployment method in hostage/crisis scenarios. The current findings should, therefore, be considered in light of this information, i.e. bearing in mind the caveat that whilst HCNn is thought to be effective, specific robust empirical evidence to confirm this perception indisputably, is currently lacking.

There are well documented issues and debates associated with the perceived lack of scientific rigour of qualitative research (Rolfe 2006), which has historically been evaluated on the basis of the criteria utilised to evaluate quantitative research (i.e. validity, reliability and generalisability) (Noble and Smith 2015). However, it is now accepted that as these two research paradigms differ so significantly in their ethea, philosophical positions and purpose, alternative frameworks for establishing rigour are necessary (Guba 1981 and Sandelowski 1993 and Schofield 2002). The findings are, of course, limited by the fact that the data represents the experiences and perceived realities of 15 HCNs from 9 forces, and therefore, cannot be taken to fully and exhaustively represent the experiences of all HCNs within the UK. Nevertheless, data collection, did, however, continue until saturation<sup>76</sup> of the data had been achieved, whereby no new categories/themes emerged from the interviews (Guest, Bunce and Johnson 2006) and as such, enhance the validity of the findings. The semi-structured nature of the interview schedule and the utilisation of both detailed and probing questions throughout the interview helped me to reach saturation of data via the creation of a state of *epoche*<sup>77</sup>, whereby all judgement was

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<sup>76</sup> Please refer to Chapter 4 (4.14.2.1.2.) for a full discussion in relation to data saturation.

<sup>77</sup> *Epoche* is a process that the researcher engages in to remove, or at least become aware of prejudices, viewpoints or assumptions regarding the phenomenon under investigation (Katz 1987: 36 cited in Patton 2002: 485).

suspended and interviewees were given “the stage” to discuss their experiences (and *ergo* perceived reality). Interestingly, this methodological ambience echoes with the state of *epoche* created by HCNs when negotiating with subjects (please see the discussion relating to the importance of remaining non-judgemental in Chapters 8 and 10).

The theoretical models were developed on the basis of the socially constructed realities of a sub-sample of the total HCN population in the UK ( $N = \sim 800$ ) and I attempted to counteract the problems associated with this by utilising HCNs from a range of both rural and metropolitan police forces, from a range of ranks/roles within the police service and with a range of lengths of experience to attempt to provide a sample that represented a broad cross-section of the population. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the current findings provide a unique insight into HCNn within the UK and as such are limited by their application to HCNn within other countries. It is, therefore, difficult to identify whether these models have cross-cultural applicability until further research has been conducted to validate these models within different countries/cultures.

Qualitative research has been criticised for its potentially subjective nature, whereby the interpretation can be inherently biased (Daly and Lumley 2002). The grounded theory process relies heavily on self-reported data which is provided by the participants and *per se*, only reflects the respondents’ interpretations, in the same way that the findings reflect the researcher’s interpretations of these interpretations. As such, there are two potential layers of bias that can be introduced to the interpretation both from the stance of the “participant/experiencer” and the “analyst/researcher”. In addition to achieving a stance of *epoche* as a means of remaining neutral and unbiased throughout the interview, coding and analysis phases of the research, I also validated interpretative meaning and *ergo* methodological rigour by allowing participants to view and comment upon the models developed. Additional methods/strategies that were adopted in order to enhance overall credibility and trustworthiness of the findings are described in Chapter 4 (4.12.2.1.15).

Lastly, as a final point worthy of note, several of the participants who were interviewed ( $n = 3$ ) were due to retire soon after taking part in the interview as a result of A19 regulations. I was cognisant that this action could have influenced the data in terms of the polarisation of the commentary and that these interviewees may have been more willing to disclose certain information or may have been more emotive in their choice of language as a result of this. This fact was borne in mind throughout the analysis and this information was used as a contextual backdrop to frame the data collected from these three HCNs.

## **11.4. Research Delimitations**

I would like to acknowledge the fact that an ideal extension to this research would have been to explore the actual narratives of HCN incidents via analysis of live audio-recorded negotiator deployments; however, access to such audio-recordings were not granted by the National Negotiator Group (NNG). An attempt to examine such data would have provided an opportunity to validate and triangulate the current findings and I feel that this is an important next step within the research process that will be explored in due course.

## **11.5. Recommendations and Implications for Policy and Practice**

### **11.5.1. Quantitative research phase: Implications and recommendations**

Whilst the findings suggest that the psychometrics used within the current study would not be suitable for negotiator selection, they do have a number of implications in relation to the selection process and the training/CPD offered to established HCNs. Taken at face value, the findings indicate that HCNs do not possess a unique profile in relation to the constructs measured within this research, when compared to their non-negotiator colleagues. This suggests that potentially all police officers (that meet the entry requirements stipulated within Chapter 10) could train as HCNs and as such, there is a large pool of officers from which to draw the next cadre of trainee HCNs, or even that there is no need for this to be a 'special' role within the force, since most officers would be capable of performing the role. Having said this, it is important to note that whilst the findings suggest that HCNs are not significantly different from their non-negotiator colleagues, this only applies to the constructs that have been measured within the current research and it may be that: 1) the psychometric tools utilised are not sensitive enough to identify differences that do exist; or 2) HCNs may differ in relation to constructs that have not been measured within the current research. As such, it is important to more clearly understand the competencies/characteristics that are currently assessed as part of the selection process and to further validate whether these competencies are in fact linked to effective performance within the HCN role (i.e. candidates are assessed on aspects such as team-working ability and communication skills but these constructs have yet to be assessed in terms of predictive validity for effective negotiation performance).

More generically, the findings indicate that police officers could utilise cognitive coping strategies that are considered to be adaptive/functional more frequently. In addition, a bespoke form of cognitive coping skills/cognitive emotion regulation training could be developed to encourage officers to utilise adaptive coping mechanisms in response to operational stress. This would be likely to have a positive impact on officer health and wellbeing, as more adaptive forms of cognitive coping tend to be associated with protection against the symptomatology

associated with certain forms of psychopathology (such as depression, anxiety and suicidality) (Garnefski, Kraaij and Spinhoven 2002). The findings also implicate the potential role of EI training for both negotiator and non-negotiator trained police officers, in light of the theoretical association between the need to be able to identify and control emotions (both in terms of self and others) and conflict resolution tasks that are often required within police work. Further research to evaluate the effectiveness of bespoke coping skills/EI training for officers would enable more specific recommendations to be made in relation to these constructs.

### **11.5.2. Qualitative research phase: Implications and recommendations**

#### ***11.5.2.1. The UK hostage and crisis negotiator journey model: Implications and recommendations.***

This model depicts the way HCNs are selected, trained and supported and provides a consensus in relation to similarities observed across different geographical regions and territorial forces. This is helpful as it indicates that whilst each force may operate individually (and have slightly different internal policies and procedures), there are aspects of selection/training processes and operational activity/support that are consistent across force boundaries.

In particular, this model identifies the perceived importance of “on-the-job training” and operational experience and suggests that new/trainee HCNs should be given as much opportunity as possible to shadow/observe qualified HCNs within live scenarios (as far as operationally possible) prior to completing the regional/national training course. This would also enable interested parties to get a “feel for the role” and to identify whether it is “right for them”. The model also highlights the concept of negotiation being a perishable skill and suggests that HCNs would benefit from more regular opportunities to practise these skills in terms of live scenario-based exercises. The UK could potentially benefit from adopting a system utilised within the USA whereby HCNs have to attend monthly training/CPD sessions and complete a full hostage/crisis incident training exercise in collaboration with the SWAT team on a monthly basis.

The findings also implicate the role of reflexivity within the discipline and the importance of being able to utilise CPD opportunities to share best practice and learn from mistakes. As such, it seems prudent to recommend that opportunities for such CPD should continue and be enhanced/increased where logistically possible. Investing in negotiator CPD in this way would enable HCNs to remain skilled and effectively equipped to respond to hostage/crisis incidents and would also provide HCNs with opportunities to learn about

academic/practice developments within the field (and remain “current”), which in turn is likely to increase negotiator skill sets and confidence within their abilities.

Lastly, and probably most importantly, the model suggests that negotiator confidence is positively correlated with negotiator deployment, with HCNs unanimously indicating that their confidence increased the more incidents they attended. Operational experience is, therefore, a vital component within the negotiator skill set and HCNs (particularly newly qualified HCNs) would benefit from more opportunities to attend live incidents (perhaps in a shadowing/observational format). Whilst HCNs can be trained to utilise the core communication skills and strategies that are deemed to be effective, it is more difficult to train HCNs in relation to incident command process and how the negotiator cell operates in relation to the silver/bronze commander etc. These dynamics are likely to differ from incident to incident and as such it is impossible to provide HCNs with an understanding of exactly how incidents are managed from a textbook perspective. This is, however, something that could be trained via observational methods and allowing newly qualified HCNs (or those interested in training as HCNs) to observe the policies/procedures adopted within the police response to hostage/crisis incidents.

#### ***11.5.2.2. The UK-centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model of hostage and crisis negotiation: Implications and recommendations.***

This model provides an insight into the processes and protocols that UK HCNs follow when they are deployed and identifies the breadth of tasks that HCNs need to complete when attempting to de-escalate and resolve such incidents. The model highlights the wider role of the negotiator in terms of identifying the tasks that fall outside of the negotiator-subject dialogue component (i.e. stages 1 and 3 within the model) and differs from many of the pre-existing models as a result of this. The majority of pre-existing negotiation models (i.e. see models described in Grubb (2010)/Chapter 2) have tended to focus on the style of communication and type of dialogue used by HCNs when attempting to de-escalate hostage/crisis incidents, as opposed to identifying the wider roles performed by HCNs which equally form part of the overall “jigsaw puzzle”. The model will enable future cross-cultural comparisons to be completed by providing a baseline model for such comparisons. The development of this model has enabled a number of recommendations to be made. Specifically, the findings:

- Identify the importance of the initial phases of the deployment process, in particular, the role of information/intelligence gathering which has been identified as a vital component within the model that directly informs the negotiation strategy. The findings



suggest that information/intelligence gathering should continue to be emphasised and that this role should commence as soon as the deployment call is received. Similarly, the model identifies the importance of risk assessment within the negotiation protocol, and highlights the need for this to be a dynamic assessment which is continuously conducted throughout the negotiation, with the intention of keeping all parties involved in the incident safe.

- Highlight the importance of entering into early communication with the subject and suggest that any communication is better than none. To some extent, this reinforces the importance of communication being initiated by early responders, until trained HCNs can reach the scene and provides support for first responders (and potentially call handlers) being trained in basic crisis intervention skills/strategies (such as the person-centred principles and active listening skills referred to in Chapter 8).
- Emphasise the importance of HCNs having access to a “toolbox” or negotiator repertoire in terms of potential techniques and strategies that can be used to de-escalate/resolve HCN incidents. Negotiators therefore need to continue to learn a breadth of techniques that can be selected or adapted in line with the subject/scenario that they encounter.
- Identify a number of strategies/stratagems that are utilised by HCNs (including those which are most frequently utilised and are deemed to be effective) and can be used to validate/inform regional/national negotiator training courses. Please refer to Table 11.1 in Appendix 31 for details of an example training document. In particular, the findings validate the importance of active listening as a core underpinning technique within negotiation, a finding which is well-established within the negotiation literature (Call 2003, Lanceley 1999, McMains 2002, McMains and Mullins 1996, Miller 2005, Noesner 1999, Noesner and Webster 1997, Slatkin 1996, 2005, Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi 2008 and Vecchi, Van Hasselt and Romano 2005); and suggest that training for both new and established HCNs should focus on enhancement of this skill, perhaps utilising the M.O.R.E.P.I.E.S. mnemonic method developed by the CNU of the FBI<sup>78</sup> (n.d. cited in Gaunt 2016). Training could also incorporate the Active Listening Skills Target<sup>79</sup> developed by the CNU of the FBI (Dalfonzo and Deitrick 2015) as an

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<sup>78</sup> M.O.R.E.P.I.E.S. is an acronym/mnemonic used to encourage the recall of the different active listening skills that can be utilised within crisis situations. M = Minimal encouragers; O = Open-ended questions, R = Reflecting/Mirroring, E = Emotional labelling, P = Paraphrasing, I = Use of “I” Statements, E = Effective Pauses and S = Summary (CNU, FBI n.d. cited in Gaunt 2016).

<sup>79</sup> The Active Listening Skills Target can be used to create a visual representation of the negotiator’s performance and helps to paint a picture of the active listening skills that have been applied. Please refer

assessment tool for evaluating the effectiveness of negotiator active listening skills within simulated or “back-to-back” training/role play scenarios.

- Highlight the importance of person-centred therapy principles within the negotiation process and validate the use of pseudo-therapeutic techniques more broadly. As such, they provide evidence to incorporate such principles into regional/national training packages and implicate the potential role of more specific bespoke training on pseudo-therapeutic techniques (i.e. such as the use of person-centred/solution focused therapy principles and motivational interviewing techniques).
- Emphasise the importance of debriefing for HCNs and their wider police colleagues and suggest that debriefing should be performed more consistently and thoroughly both as a means of CPD and for negotiator welfare purposes. Debriefing should be completed in line with the College of Policing (2013) Briefing and Debriefing Policy.
- Identify the importance of both formal record keeping and defensible decision-making within the negotiation process. Negotiators need to be accountable for their actions and their decisions may be subject to scrutiny at coroner’s court or IPCC proceedings. As such, HCNs need to ensure that they consistently record their actions and that they engage in decision-making that is both justifiable and formally recorded.
- Suggest that the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym<sup>80</sup> could be utilised as a mnemonic within negotiator training/CPD in order to highlight the key aspects within the negotiation procedural model (i.e. from deployment to debriefing) that need to be completed by HCNs when responding to and successfully resolving hostage/crisis incidents. Please refer to Appendix 32 for details of an exemplar crib sheet that could be used within negotiator training/CPD for these purposes.

### ***11.5.2.3. The UK hostage and crisis negotiator experience model: Implications and recommendations.***

This model provides a unique insight into the experiences of police HCNs in the UK from an operational, professional and personal perspective. The negotiation positives suggest that being a negotiator can be an incredibly positive experience and that the discipline is both personally and professionally rewarding. Some HCNs even identified the role as being their core reason for coming to work, thereby further attesting to the rewarding nature of the role for

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to Dalfonzo and Deitrick (2015) for more details in relation to the target and how it can be utilised within HCN training.

<sup>80</sup> The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Acronym: D = Deployment, I = Information/intelligence gathering, A = Assessment of threat/risk, M = Methods of Communication, O = Open dialogue with subject, N = Negotiator toolbox/repertoire, and D = Debriefing procedures.

some officers. Others identified the rewards associated with negotiation as being unique to the discipline and these findings implicate the benefits and added value that HCNs felt as a result of being part of the negotiator cadre. This provides justification for the existence of the negotiator role, which is mutually beneficial, both for subjects who are in crisis/conflict and the HCNs whose job it is to resolve these situations. As such, aspects of the model could be used within recruitment strategies as a means of encouraging officers to apply for the role.

In contrast, the negotiation negatives category indicates that there is scope for improvement within the discipline to enhance practice and improve negotiator experiences. As such, this allows for a number of recommendations to be made in light of HCNs' experiences, including:

- Trying to more clearly differentiate the roles of negotiator/commander via educating and training staff on the negotiator role and remit. This could be achieved by increasing and/or enhancing awareness training provided to commanders and HCNs to try to avoid operational rank/role conflict on scene (i.e., to ensure that both parties stick to the “negotiators negotiate and commanders command rule”).
- Ensuring that HCNs are deployed in pairs (where logistically possible) and trying to minimise the length of time that primary HCNs are negotiating on their own so as to reduce the pressure/stress experienced as a result of “negotiating solo”.
- Raising awareness of the benefits of using HCNs within the firearms world and trying to educate firearms commanders/teams in terms of why HCNs play the “long game” and how negotiation can successfully resolve situations without the need for tactical intervention. This should help to reduce some of the stress caused as a result of competing tactical orientations held by HCNs and firearms commanders.
- Raising awareness of the negotiator role within forces and trying to increase internal “public relations and marketing” associated with the role so that control room operators, duty inspectors and anyone else involved in the deployment of HCNs are aware of the benefit of utilising HCNs and the appropriate incidents in which to deploy them. Part of this could also involve training first responders/uniformed officers in terms of the HCNn procedures/protocol (and in particular highlighting the importance of scene control/maintenance of a sterile environment). Overall, greater publicising of the work that HCNs do may also help to enhance awareness of the role within the force and to encourage financial and general support for HCNs.
- Professionalising the discipline by standardising the procedures that are utilised to recruit, select, train and support HCNs. This would involve ensuring that the selection criteria and processes are standardised across all forces. It would also involve ensuring that all HCNs

receive a standardised accredited training course, which is (ideally) accredited and validated by an external institution/organisation, to ensure that both regional and national training courses are working to the same curriculum. Provision of more regular “refresher training” would also allow HCNs to remain accredited and ensure that the members of the cadre are appropriately skilled and equipped to deal with hostage and crisis situations. This could be performed annually, for example, and could involve a blended learning CPD course which could be delivered online initially with a face-to-face assessment component used to conduct a skills based assessment. In addition, standardisation of the deployment logs and recording processes would allow for better empirical comparison of deployments and *ergo* enable a statistical/epidemiological picture of the nature and extent of UK HCNn to be developed<sup>81</sup>. This would then have a secondary benefit in terms of being able to inform the training and CPD of HCNs using an evidence base (thereby meeting the needs of the requirement for more emphasis on evidence-based policing, as suggested by the College of Policing (2014c) Five Year Strategy document).

- Whilst it may not be financially possible/feasible to enhance the financial remuneration HCNs receive, the findings indicate that it is recognition and feeling valued by the organisation that are perceived as more important forms of remuneration by HCNs themselves. Enhancing the personal recognition by superiors of the work that HCNs do, by perhaps acknowledging the number of incidents that the cadre have successfully resolved on an annual basis may be one way to do this. Provision of a certificate for individual HCNs would also allow them to keep a formal record of their negotiation deployments and could be utilised within appraisal/personal development procedures. Simply raising awareness of the nature of the role (and the work that HCNs do on top of their daily tasks) within the higher echelons of the organisation may help to encourage greater recognition and remuneration for HCNs.
- Increasing the awareness of the negotiator role within management levels may help to avoid some of the problems associated with dual-role conflict, although the logistics associated with having to manage missed deadlines associated with their day job or problems associated with exceeding the working time directive may not be as easily resolved. Many of these problems may, in fact, be down to individual differences within management styles and, as such, may not be easily resolved by this approach.
- Whilst the nature of the role dictates that HCNs are likely to experience a negative impact on their personal, family and social lives, greater recognition of the importance of the role

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<sup>81</sup> Work is currently underway to standardise the deployment logs/record utilised by HCNs (and this work is being led by Louis Provart from Norfolk Constabulary in collaboration with the National Negotiator Group (NNG) and the author).

and greater appreciation of the work that they do within the force would help to negate some of the sacrifices that they make in relation to these aspects of their lives.

- Better budgetary/financial support for HCNs would help HCNs to feel valued and supported within their role. Whilst this does not necessarily mean increased individual financial remuneration, the provision of an increased budget would allow cadres to be provided with appropriate equipment (i.e. clothing, recording equipment etc.) and it would also enable greater opportunities for HCNs to undergo CPD and/or specific training events which are likely to have a positive impact on their negotiation performance.
- Whilst it is not feasible to suggest an alternative to negotiation as a voluntary position in the UK due to the overall lack of demand for HCNs on a full time basis, increasing awareness, recognition and remuneration for HCNs would go some way to alleviate the negativities associated with negotiation being viewed as a “Cinderella service”. The role of the HCN is an important one which deserves appropriate recognition on the basis of the excellent work that is performed by HCNs across the country on a daily basis. Without HCNs, there is no doubt that many individuals would die, or be seriously injured; as such, this role should be given more credence within the policing arena and HCNs should be credited more highly for the work that they do.

Findings in relation to the negotiation ambivalences category suggest that the discipline of negotiation has evolved over the past ten-fifteen years in terms of the nature, frequency and style of negotiation. Changes in deployment frequency and nature may be attributed to changes in police technology and equipment (such as the implementation of Taser), whereas changes in the style and method of communication are likely to be as a result of changes within society in relation to the ‘digital era’. These findings suggest the need for HCNs to be flexible in terms of adapting to the ever changing ‘terrain’ that they may be exposed to. Negotiators need to be able to adapt their styles to whatever incidents they may be deployed to and this also relates to the need for HCNs to stay up-to-date with evolving incidents so that they are equipped to deal with new and different situations that they may encounter. Negotiators also need to be able to respond to subjects utilising a variety of different communication methods (i.e. text, email, social networking/chat) and as such would benefit from specific bespoke training which addresses the use of said communication methods within negotiation contexts. Lastly, this category suggests that it might be prudent to work with HCNs further in terms of identifying whether stress is an issue and whether resiliency training/bespoke coping skills training would be beneficial for some/all HCNs.

#### ***11.5.2.4. The self-perceived successful hostage and crisis negotiator profile model: Implications and recommendations.***

This model highlights the competencies that are considered important for effective HCNs and provides a basis for the selection criteria utilised by police forces. The majority of the competencies are ostensibly assessed via the current selection processes implemented within individual forces, although the exact competency assessment/interview questions may differ slightly across forces. However, there are a number of other competencies, mostly in relation to negotiator attributes, that could be assessed more formally as part of the selection process. In the main, this applies to constructs that might be considered to be “softer skills”, such as the ability to actively listen and the ability to empathise with others; these are skills that could be measured by psychometric tests such as the Active Empathic Listening Scale (Bodie 2011 and Drollinger, Comer and Warrington 2006), for example. Similarly, psychometrics are available that measure physical and emotional resilience and could be utilised to assess the extent to which candidates possess the ability to cope with adversity/emotional stress/recover from traumatic incidents (i.e. the Resilience Test; St. Jean, Tidman and Jerabek 2001; the Resilience Quotient; Russell and Russell 2009). The latter of these, could also be used to assess the attribute of “flexibility” (i.e. a specific facet of resilience) suggested as necessary for HCNs to succeed in their role.

More generally, the profile outlined in the model could be utilised as a crib sheet to develop/inform questions used in the application process/interview to select candidates to complete the regional/national negotiator training course. Scenario-based/situational judgement questions, for example, could be developed as a means of identifying candidates who possess higher levels of the necessary/identified skills/attributes. Alternatively, the model could simply be used to validate/provide credibility to existing selection methods. Please refer to Table 11.2 in Appendix 33 for details of an exemplar assessment information sheet that could be used to inform current selection processes.

### **11.6. Future Directions**

This thesis provides a platform for further research to be conducted as a means of further validating the current findings and enhancing our understanding of HCNs as an entity. Research utilising a matched pairs design and/or more rigorously comparable control groups would address some of the aforementioned limitations associated with the comparison samples utilised and ensure that participants were more similar demographically. In addition, it would be beneficial to expand the scope of the current research to explore traits and characteristics

possessed by police officers within different specialist roles within the police (i.e. uniformed officers, Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers, Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs), dog handlers etc.) to identify whether these officers differ in their socio-psychological profiles. In light of some of the findings in relation to competing tactical orientations highlighted within the current research, one particular comparison that is of interest and has implications for selection processes concerns the comparison of the traits and characteristics possessed by HCNs and AFOs.

It would also be beneficial to explore the possibility that whilst the current findings have failed to identify a unique HCN profile, it may be the case that HCNs do differ from their non-negotiator colleagues, albeit on constructs that were outside of the remit of the current research. I, therefore, suggest that it would be beneficial to conduct follow-up research that compares these two samples in terms of “softer skills” (i.e. active listening, empathy, compassion etc.), as the findings from the qualitative research phase indicate that HCNs may in fact constitute a unique sub-group, but that it may be a different set of traits/characteristics that differentiate them from the overall police population. Research utilising the Active Empathic Listening Scale (Bodie 2011 and Drollinger, Comer and Warrington 2006), for example, could help to identify whether such differences exist. Similarly, whilst the findings have failed to identify a unique HCN profile with respect to personality (as measured by the BFI), recent developments within the field have led to the concept of the big five personality factors being expanded to include six major dimensions of personality. These dimensions consist of: Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness (versus anger), Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience (Ashton, Lee and de Vries 2014). The addition of the honesty-humility dimension may be particularly salient to the current study, with reference to the identification of honesty as both an attribute that is perceived as being required for police officers to be successful HCNs (as discussed in Chapter 10) and a skill that is used by HCNs as a HCN strategy when trying to resolve hostage/crisis incidents (as discussed in Chapter 8). Follow up research would therefore benefit from the utilisation of a psychometric personality test that measures honesty in addition to the other five personality factors, such as the HEXACO-60 (Ashton and Lee 2009) to establish whether HCNs demonstrate higher levels of trait honesty-humility than non-negotiator police officers.

In addition to this suggestion, whilst lengthier discussion of the correlations between variables was beyond the remit of the current thesis, however, it is worth noting that it is possible that the combination/constellation of certain variables may serve to differentiate between the HCN and non-negotiator trained police officer samples (as discussed in the Chapter 5/6 addendum). The initial analysis of the correlations between variables, for example, shows

differences between the HCN and police officers in terms of correlations between personality traits and cognitive emotion regulation strategies, personality traits and cognitive emotion regulation strategies, personality traits and decision-making styles, cognitive emotion regulation strategies and emotional intelligence, and coping style strategies and decision-making styles. These initial findings, therefore identify a possible direction for future research in terms of ascertaining whether HCNs possess certain constellations of the constructs/variables measured and whether these constellations constitute something that differentiates HCNs from their non-negotiator colleagues.

It would also be prudent to cross-culturally validate the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative phases of the study. A semi-replication of the quantitative phase of the research has already been completed within the USA (see: Young 2016) to identify the characteristics and traits of USA HCNs and I plan to conduct comparative follow-up research to compare the UK and USA findings and establish whether HCNs from the UK/USA differ in relation to personality, decision-making style and cognitive emotion regulation. In addition, I have started follow-up qualitative research within the USA with a sample of HCNs ( $n = 10$ ) from two police departments in Lubbock, Texas, with the intention of developing an Anglo-American model of HCNn.

Furthermore, whilst the current findings provide an insight into the types of incident that HCNs are typically deployed to within the UK, they fail to empirically validate the frequency with which these different categories of incident are encountered or to identify the specific characteristics that are associated with typical deployments (i.e., use of weapons, subject intoxication, prevalence of mental health problems/suicidal ideation etc.). To date, it has been very difficult to conduct research which identifies these characteristics due to the lack of a centrally organised database system/mutually agreed upon system for recording incidents across the 43 territorial police forces within England and Wales. More recently, however, work is underway to establish a centralised database that can be used to record HCNn deployments in a systemised and identical manner across all forces and these developments will therefore allow for future quantitative research to be conducted to empirically identify the nature and characteristics of HCNn in an epidemiological fashion. This database can be used, for example, to establish the types of incident that HCNs are typically deployed to; the characteristics of such deployments; and to identify potential “hot spots” and areas that require target hardening etc. Such findings would have immense implications for policy/practice and could be used to directly inform HCNn training/CPD and operational practice within the UK.

Similarly, aspects of the other qualitative models developed as a result of the current research could equally be empirically validated using follow-up research. For example, the



strategies, styles and techniques used by HCNs within the D.I.A.M.O.N.D. procedural model could be empirically validated via the use of live HCNn incident transcripts (however, these transcripts are difficult to access as a result of confidentiality and RIPA<sup>82</sup> regulations). Nevertheless, the author purports that if access to such data were granted, follow-up research of this nature would be beneficial to inform HCNn policy and practice<sup>83</sup>. For example, identification, in particular, of those strategies that are more successful versus those that aren't, would be particularly informative for HCNn training/CPD by providing a basis for "what works" within the HCNn arena.

## **11.7. Significance of the Study**

The findings from the current study have a number of implications and applications in terms of policy and practice for operationally active HCNs. The research was always intended to have an applied focus whereby the findings could be utilised to inform and enhance the current practice for UK HCNs. In line with this ethos, the key implications of the findings are listed below:

- Identification of the traits and characteristics possessed by HCNs can be used to inform the selection of future trainee HCNs.
- Identification of potential training needs of HCNs (i.e. whether they are utilising maladaptive/dysfunctional coping styles/strategies or could be utilising adaptive strategies more frequently) can be used to inform training/CPD for current HCNs.
- This research represents the first attempt at providing an insight into UK HCNn and understanding the experiences of UK HCNs. In particular, the findings identify positive and negative aspects of the role that can be used to inform the selection, training and operational support/welfare of HCNs.
- The research develops a process/procedural model of HCNn which identifies how HCNs respond to and resolve hostage/crisis incidents in the UK; findings that can be used to inform training/CPD of HCNs in terms of identifying best practice and what is effective when negotiating hostage/crisis incidents.
- The findings can be used to validate current best practice and to further improve, standardise and professionalise the discipline of HCNn within the UK.

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<sup>82</sup> Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

<sup>83</sup> A similar approach was adopted by Giebels and Noelanders (2004) whereby live negotiation transcripts were used to validate the "Table of Ten" content and relational strategies utilised by HCNs within 35 analysed crisis incidents.

The current thesis, therefore, makes a direct contribution to the existing literature base, thereby enhancing our understanding of the entity of police HCNn.

## **11.8. Conclusion**

The current thesis constitutes one of the first empirical academic insights into the HCNn discipline within the UK. The findings have identified 1) the characteristics possessed by HCNs, 2) the typical situational characteristics and parameters of UK hostage/crisis incidents, 3) the strategies, styles and techniques utilised by HCNs when successfully resolving hostage/crisis incidents, 4) the procedures in place for the recruitment, selection, training and operational support of HCNs and 5) the self-perceived competencies of successful/effective HCNs. These findings have been used to make recommendations in relation to current policy and practice for operationally active HCNs and as such have implications for understanding and enhancing the discipline of HCNn in the UK.

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# Appendices

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## Appendix 1. Glossary of Key Terms and Phrases

Term/Phrase	Meaning
<b>Cold Debrief</b>	refers to a debrief which takes place a period of time after the operation/event/incident has been resolved.
<b>Critical Incident Manager (CIM)</b>	refers to “a substantive or temporary Inspector who is available for immediate deployment to incidents within Local Police Authorities throughout 24 hours acting as the Duty Officer. Following notification of an incident, the CIM is to consider either assuming command as Silver as soon as possible, or to ensure the appointment of an appropriate Silver Commander with immediate effect. The CIM will have a responsibility to include Critical Incident management” (Devon and Cornwall Police 2013).
<b>Firearms Strategic Commander (Bronze)</b>	is “responsible for developing the firearms strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).
<b>Firearms Tactical Advisor (TA)</b>	“advises on the capabilities and limitations of Authorised Firearms Officers and other police resources being deployed. They are responsible for advising the Strategic or Tactical Firearms Commander on the implication of any tactical parameters which have been set and the available tactical options with the existing strategy and any tactical parameters set. They advise the Firearms Commanders on the tactical considerations, contingencies and implications for each tactical option and should be in position to assist and advise the Tactical Firearms Commander at all stages of the operation. They provide tactical advice reflecting the existing threat assessment and ensure that advice given is recorded” (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 2011).
<b>Force Incident Manager (FIM)</b>	refers to “a substantive Inspector located in one of the Control Rooms, who acts as Force Duty Officer, performing a passive GOLD Command role on behalf of ACPO ranks within the Chief Officer Group” (Devon and Cornwall Police 2013).

<b>Force Negotiator Coordinator Leads</b>	“work with the regional negotiator coordinator to support operational readiness of negotiators within the region” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).
<b>Gold Commander</b>	refers to the individual who is in overall strategic organisational control of resources in order to resolve an incident. They will be responsible for formulating a strategy to deal with the incident and tend to be off site/scene. “The Gold Commander is in overall strategic command of the operation and sets the overarching strategy that all other plans must take account of” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).
<b>Gold Negotiator Advisors (GNA)</b>	are “experienced negotiator coordinators trained to support Gold Commanders with advice on negotiation. GNAs are likely to provide support for Gold Commanders in response to more complex incidents such as criminal or terrorist sieges” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).
<b>Hooks</b>	refers to the term that negotiators use to describe areas of discussion which are worth pursuing with the subject and may prove fruitful in helping the negotiator to build a relationship with the subject. The term can be used to refer to conciliatory or de-escalatory topics of conversation.
<b>Hostage</b>	refers to a person seized or held as security for the fulfilment of a condition (Hostage n.d.).
<b>Hostage and Crisis Negotiators (HCNs)</b>	are police officers who are “trained to respond to a wide variety of incidents, which include suicide intervention and domestic barricades as well as high-risk hostage situations such as criminal or terrorist incidents” (ACPO and NPIA 2011). A negotiator is an officer trained to negotiate with subjects to resolve an operation peacefully, and to gather information which may assist as part of the intelligence-gathering process (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 2011).
<b>Hostage Negotiator Coordinators (HNCs)</b>	are “experienced negotiators trained to provide specialist support for incident commanders by advising on the development and implementation of negotiation plans and tactics. HNCs are more

	likely to provide additional specialist support for incident commanders when there is an immediate risk of serious harm or death, or in response to more complex or prolonged incidents. The HNC is also responsible for ensuring that the negotiating plan that has been agreed with the incident commander is implemented by the Negotiator Cell” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).
<b>Hostage Situation</b>	refers to an incident whereby a subject holds another person or persons for the purpose of forcing the fulfilment of substantive demands upon a third party, usually law enforcement (Noesner 1999).
<b>Hostage-Taker (HT)</b>	refers to a person who seizes or holds someone as security for the fulfilment of a condition (Hostage-Taker n.d.).
<b>Hot Debrief</b>	refers to a debrief which takes place immediately after the operation/event/incident.
<b>Individual-in-Crisis (IiC)</b>	refers to an individual who is experiencing some form of personal/ emotional/ psychological crisis and is threatening to either harm themselves or someone else.
<b>International Negotiator Cadre</b>	consists of a team of negotiators from a variety of police forces in the UK (normally high ranking and trained as HNCs) who are available to be deployed to support hostage incidents abroad.
<b>Kidnap</b>	to abduct (someone) and hold them captive, typically to obtain a ransom (Kidnap n.d.).
<b>National Negotiator Group (NNG)</b>	“is a national network of negotiators who share best practice and are able to provide mutual support in seeking to bring incidents to a successful conclusion. The group is responsible for exercising strategic oversight of police negotiation” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).
<b>National Negotiator Training</b>	refers to a two week training course that is run by the Metropolitan police and takes place at Hendon police training college. This training course equips police officers with the skills necessary to be able to respond to hostage-taking incidents. Police officers who have completed this training are often referred to as “Level 1 Trained” negotiators.

<b>Negotiation Position Papers</b>	are used by negotiation teams to help summarise and synopsis the hostage and/or crisis incident currently being dealt with. They typically include information relating to the status (an overall description of the incident), assessment (an analysis of the incident) and recommendations (guidance and strategy) in relation to the incident (Dalfonzo and Romano 2003). This information can be used to brief bronze commanders on the situation as it progresses and also acts as a method of record keeping in line with police policy and procedure.
<b>Negotiator Cell</b>	refers to the area which is dedicated for hostage negotiators to work from when negotiating an incident. In some cases, the cell would be set up in a mobile operations vehicle (if available or required) but more often than not, the cell will be set up in a room within a building or police station (or vehicle) where negotiators can set up their team and equipment (as necessary). In reality, a full negotiator cell is only set up on large and protracted incidents involving a full team of negotiators.
<b>Nonhostage Situation</b>	refers to an incident whereby an individual acts in an emotional, senseless, and often self-destructive way (Noesner 1999).
<b>POLKA (Police OnLine Knowledge Area)</b>	refers to an internal online platform which is used to disseminate information to police officers within the UK. "POLKA is a secure online collaboration tool for the policing community to network, ask questions, share insights, discuss ideas and suggest new ways of working" (The College of Policing 2015).
<b>Primary Negotiator (a.k.a. "The Number 1")</b>	refers to the individual who is directly involved in communications with the subject. Communications are initiated by the primary negotiator and all communications with the subject are conducted through the primary negotiator (however, the individual performing this role may change as practicable).
<b>Public Order Strategic Commander (Bronze)</b>	is "responsible for developing the public order strategy and ensuring that tactical plans are developed and implemented to support it" (ACPO and NPIA 2009).
<b>Red Centre</b>	is the term used internally within the police to describe a kidnap

	and extortion/ransom situation.
<b>Red Centre Negotiator (a.k.a. Red Negotiator)</b>	refers to “a crisis negotiator who is additionally trained to provide support in relation to offences of kidnap and extortion” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).
<b>Red Centre Training Force Lead</b>	refers to a negotiator who is responsible for the training and organisation of kidnap and extortion (i.e. red centre) situations within their force.
<b>Regional Negotiator Coordinators</b>	“form the membership of the National Negotiator Group exercising strategic oversight of police negotiation” (ACPO and NPIA 2011).
<b>Regional Negotiator Training</b>	refers to a one week training course within the UK run regionally which equips police officers with the skills necessary to be able to respond to crisis situations. Police officers who have completed this training are often referred to as “Level 2 Trained” negotiators.
<b>Secondary Negotiator (a.k.a. “The Number 2”)</b>	refers to the negotiator who is supporting the primary negotiator in his/her role. The secondary negotiator will be listening to the conversation and providing suggestions to the primary negotiator in terms of communication style and/or content. The secondary negotiator is also required to feed information to other members of the negotiator team and/or the firearms tactical advisor as necessary.
<b>Silver Commander</b>	refers to the individual who manages the strategic direction from the gold commander and creates a number of actions to be carried out by the bronze commander at the scene. “The Silver Commander coordinates the individual strategies developed by the Firearms and Public Order Strategic Commanders (Bronze) to ensure that they reflect and contribute to Gold’s overarching strategy” (ACPO and NPIA 2009).
<b>Subject</b>	refers to the person that the hostage and crisis negotiator is communicating with (i.e. either a hostage-taker or individual in crisis).
<b>Surrender Ritual / Exit Plan</b>	refers to the process by which the subject has agreed to

		<p>surrender/end the incident and exit the hostage/crisis situation. This process will have been mutually agreed between the subject and the HCN prior to the execution of the surrender ritual. The exit plan will also include logistical factors such as which part of the building/area the subject may need to exit from, and how they should do this to prevent any parties being injured. This may also include factors such as ensuring that all hostages have been released prior to the subject exiting the premises/area, ensuring that the subject is no longer armed when he/she exits the premises/area, specific requests by the subject to save face (i.e. covering face to avoid media coverage) etc. The term ‘surrender ritual’ tends to be utilised within hostage-taking incidents/incidents involving victims and the term ‘exit plan’ tends to be utilised within crisis incidents.</p>
<b>Third Party Intermediary (TPI)</b>		<p>is the term used to describe an individual who speaks to the hostage-taker or individual in crisis on behalf of the negotiator. TPis often include family members or friends of the hostage-taker or individual in crisis.</p>
<b>Tiger Kidnap</b>		<p>is the term used by the police to describe an incident that involves the short-term hostage-taking of family members of someone who has immediate access to cash or valuables. The captives are frequently held overnight and the aim of the criminals is to frighten their victims to such a degree that they will not contact the Police, even when they have an opportunity to do so (Police Service of Northern Ireland 2013).</p>
<b>Trauma Risk incident Management (TRiM)</b>		<p>is a welfare led process intended to assess the response of a member of staff (including certain affiliated groups such as special constables) exposed to a potentially traumatic incident (Kent Police 2014).</p>
<b>Triggers (a.k.a. Barbs; a.k.a. Hot Points/Buttons)</b>		<p>refers to the term that negotiators use to describe areas of discussion which should be avoided as they may serve to aggravate the subject or escalate the situation. The term can be used to refer to escalatory/aggravating topics of conversation.</p>

## Appendix 2. List of Key Abbreviations and Acronyms

Abbreviation/Acronym	Full Terminology
<b>ACPO</b>	Association of Chief Police Officers
<b>AFO</b>	Authorised Firearms Officer
<b>BFI</b>	The Big Five Inventory
<b>BIDR</b>	The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
<b>CERQ</b>	The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire
<b>CIM</b>	Critical Incident Manager
<b>CST-R</b>	The Coping Skills Test-Revised
<b>DFA</b>	Discriminant Function Analysis
<b>EDL</b>	English Defence League
<b>EI</b>	Emotional Intelligence
<b>FIM</b>	Force Incident Manager
<b>GDMS</b>	The General Decision-Making Style Questionnaire
<b>Genos EII</b>	The Genos Emotional Intelligence Inventory
<b>GNA</b>	Gold Negotiator Advisor
<b>HCN</b>	Hostage and Crisis Negotiator
<b>HCNn</b>	Hostage and Crisis Negotiation
<b>HCNs</b>	Hostage and Crisis Negotiators
<b>HNC</b>	Hostage Negotiator Coordinator
<b>HT</b>	Hostage-Taker
<b>IiC</b>	Individual-in-Crisis
<b>MISPER</b>	Missing Person
<b>NNG</b>	National Negotiator Group
<b>NNWG</b>	National Negotiator Working Group
<b>NPIA</b>	National Policing Improvement Agency (No longer in existence)
<b>NPP</b>	Negotiator Position Papers
<b>NSO</b>	Negotiator Support Officer
<b>PN</b>	Primary Negotiator
<b>POLKA</b>	Police OnLine Knowledge Area
<b>SN</b>	Secondary Negotiator
<b>TA</b>	Firearms Tactical Advisor
<b>TPI</b>	Third Party Intermediary



### Appendix 3. Exemplar Gatekeeper Permission Letter (Sanitised Version)

Miss Amy Rose Grubb  
Lecturer in Forensic Psychology  
Psychology Department  
Coventry University  
Priory Street  
Coventry  
CV1 5FB

Telephone: 024 7688 8795

Fax: 024 7688 8300

Email: [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk)

**Friday the 23rd of October 2009**

Dear Superintendent [Anonymised],

I am writing to request permission to carry out a piece of research relating to Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK. My research is designed to look at the use of hostage negotiation by trained hostage negotiators within the UK Police Force. The aim of the research is to devise/compile a preliminary model of British based hostage negotiation, in the absence of comprehensive UK-based research on this topic. The current research on hostage negotiation is currently heavily biased towards US based techniques and procedures for crisis/hostage situations, utilised by both police forces and the FBI in the USA. I hope that the results will provide an insight into UK-based negotiation experiences and yield direction for the development, training and selection of police negotiators in the future.

The proposed research has been discussed with both [Anonymised] and [Anonymised] Negotiators and both parties have agreed to take part in the research. The research consists of two stages:

1) A quantitative analysis comparing police hostage negotiators and police officers (non-negotiators) on the following aspects:

- a) *Personality*
- b) *Coping Style*
- c) *Decision Making Style*
- d) *Cognitive Coping Style & Emotion Regulation*
- e) *Emotional Intelligence*

2) A qualitative analysis looking at the experiences of hostage negotiators focusing on the following aspects:

- a) *Recruitment & Selection Process*
- b) *Training*

- c) *Role -Specific Skills*
- d) *Negotiation Decision Making*
- e) *Support Structures / Coping Strategies*

Stage 1 of the research would involve both negotiators and police officers completing a set of questionnaires. Stage 2 of the research would involve a sample of negotiators (approximately 5) taking part in a semi-structured interview to discuss their experiences of the role. The data gathered will be used to explore whether hostage negotiators possess different personality traits, coping styles, decision making styles, cognitive coping strategies and levels of emotional intelligence to that of police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public; and to develop a model exploring the experiences of negotiators from the initial stages of recruitment and selection through to carrying out their role and the coping strategies they employ to deal with highly stressful situations.

I would very much appreciate the opportunity to carry out such research with your current hostage negotiation team. If permission is granted, individual negotiators will be approached and asked whether they would be willing to take part in the research. If participants consent to take part in the research, a suitable time and venue will be arranged for the interview to take place. Any data gathered will be confidential with participants being allocated unique participant reference codes. All data will be stored securely during the research and any data collated electronically will be stored on a password protected computer. The raw data (i.e. questionnaires and interview tapes) will be destroyed once the research is complete. The results of the research will be written up in the form of a PhD Thesis and will be submitted to academic journals for publication. In the instance of publication, all data will be reported at a group/aggregate level and no individual officer will be identified/or be able to be identified in any written accounts. The force may also remain anonymous if you deem this appropriate. Upon completion, I would be happy to present the findings to the police at whatever level deemed appropriate in order to disseminate beneficial findings.

The research will be supervised by Dr Sarah Brown who is a Chartered Forensic Psychologist and Reader in Forensic Psychology Development at Coventry University and will be subject to approval by the Coventry University Ethics Committee. If you would like to discuss the research in more detail or ask any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via email at [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk) or telephone me on **024 7688 8795**. If you are happy for the research to go ahead please can you write a brief letter of approval and send to the address detailed above.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Kind regards,

Miss Amy Rose Grubb  
*Lecturer in Forensic Psychology*

## Appendix 4. UK Police Forces by ACPO<sup>84</sup> Region invited to Take Part in Study

Table 4.1. *Table Depicting UK Police Forces by ACPO Region*

ACPO Region		Police Forces
1.	South West Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Devon and Cornwall Constabulary</li> <li>b. Avon and Somerset Constabulary</li> <li>c. Dorset Police</li> <li>d. Gloucestershire Constabulary</li> <li>e. Wiltshire Constabulary</li> <li>f. States of Jersey Police</li> <li>g. Guernsey Police</li> </ul>
2.	South East Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Hampshire Constabulary</li> <li>b. Kent Police</li> <li>c. Surrey Police</li> <li>d. Sussex Police</li> <li>e. Thames Valley Police</li> </ul>
3.	London Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Metropolitan Police Service</li> <li>b. City of London Police</li> </ul>
4.	Eastern Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Bedfordshire Police</li> <li>b. Cambridgeshire Constabulary</li> <li>c. Essex Police</li> <li>d. Hertfordshire Constabulary</li> <li>e. Norfolk Constabulary</li> <li>f. Suffolk Constabulary</li> </ul>
5.	East Midlands Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Derbyshire Constabulary</li> <li>b. Leicestershire Constabulary</li> <li>c. Lincolnshire Police</li> <li>d. Northamptonshire Police</li> <li>e. Nottinghamshire Police</li> </ul>
6.	West Midlands Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Staffordshire Police</li> <li>b. Warwickshire Police</li> <li>c. West Mercia Constabulary</li> <li>d. West Midlands Police</li> </ul>
7.	North West Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Cheshire Constabulary</li> <li>b. Cumbria Constabulary</li> <li>c. Greater Manchester Police</li> <li>d. Merseyside Police</li> <li>e. Lancashire Constabulary</li> <li>f. Police Service of Northern Ireland</li> </ul>
8.	North East Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Cleveland Police</li> <li>b. Durham Constabulary</li> <li>c. Humberside Police</li> <li>d. North Yorkshire Police</li> <li>e. Northumbria Police</li> <li>f. South Yorkshire Police</li> <li>g. West Yorkshire Police</li> </ul>
9.	Scotland <sup>85</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Central Scotland Police</li> <li>b. Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary</li> <li>c. Fife Constabulary</li> <li>d. Grampian Police</li> <li>e. Lothian and Borders Police</li> <li>f. Northern Constabulary</li> <li>g. Strathclyde Police</li> <li>h. Tayside Police</li> </ul>
10.	Wales	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Dyfed Powys Police</li> <li>b. Gwent Police</li> <li>c. North Wales Police</li> <li>d. South Wales Police</li> </ul>

*Note:* An Garda Síochána (Ireland's National Police Service) is not currently listed as part of ACPO but were invited to take part in the current study.

<sup>84</sup> Association of Chief Police Officers

<sup>85</sup> The territorial police forces in Scotland now exist as a single police force in the form of "Police Scotland" with 13 divisions in terms of policing of the different regional areas within Scotland.

## Appendix 5. Participant Debrief Sheet (HCN Sample)

*Participant Reference Number.....*

### **Participant Debrief Sheet**

#### **(Hostage Negotiator Sample - Stage 1)**

Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage negotiation from a UK police perspective. This stage of the research involves the investigation of a number of specific factors which may help to make an “effective negotiator”. These factors include: *personality, decision-making style, coping style, emotion regulation and emotional intelligence*. Previous research indicates that these factors may help individuals to cope more effectively within stressful situations.

In line with previous research looking at coping and performance within stressful situations, it is hypothesised that hostage negotiators will be:

- a) more likely than police officers or the general public to possess certain personality traits,
- b) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain coping styles,
- c) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain cognitive coping strategies & methods of emotion regulation,
- d) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain decision-making styles,
- e) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise emotionally intelligent behaviours.

Research shows that these constructs are all important elements within coping and performance in high stress occupations, such as hostage negotiation. The data obtained from your questionnaires will be compared with data obtained from police officers (non-negotiators) and a sample of the general public. This will enable me to identify whether negotiators display certain traits and characteristics more than others and as such will provide an insight into the skills, traits and characteristics that are required in order to be a competent police negotiator.

The findings of this research will have implications in terms of police hostage negotiation recruitment, selection and training and will hopefully provide a basis for recommendations on the following aspects:

- Psychometric tools that could be used in the selection of hostage negotiators
- Psychometric tools that could be used to identify training needs of officers
- Changes in policy in terms of selection, training and support of operationally active hostage negotiators.

Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact the researcher at the following address:

Miss Amy Grubb, Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Psychology Department, Coventry University,  
Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Tel: 02476 888 795, Fax: 02476 888 300, Email:  
[amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk).

Please note that you have the right to withdraw your data from the study up to two weeks following completion of the questionnaire. If you would like to withdraw your data please contact me via email quoting your unique participant reference number (at the top right hand corner of this page).

If at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.

***I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study. Your input is very much appreciated.***

***Please return the completed questionnaire pack to the researcher at the address above using the prepaid envelope provided or hand it to the lead hostage negotiator coordinator for your force.***

***Please can you now distribute the second questionnaire pack to a colleague who is NOT a negotiator.***

## **Appendix 6. Letter Given to Negotiators for Recruiting Non-Negotiator Police Officer Colleagues**

### **Information Sheet relating to Consent (For Negotiators)**

Thank you for taking part in this study. Your input is very much appreciated.

I would now like you to pass a copy of the psychometric test battery that you have completed to a **“non-negotiator”** police officer colleague who is willing to take part in the research. Once they have completed the test battery they can return it to me in the envelope provided – or they can return it to the negotiator co-ordinator for the force.

**I must reiterate that participation in this research is completely voluntary and that no one is obliged to take part in the research if they do not wish to do so. Choosing not to take part in the study will not have any consequences in relation to your role within the police. This information is included in the Participant Information Sheet but please make sure you do not put pressure on potential participants and keep their participation in the research confidential.**

If you have any queries relating to the research please do not hesitate to contact the researcher at [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk).

This research has been designed in line with the BPS ethical code of conduct, which requires the following principles to be adhered to:

#### ***1.3 Standard of informed consent***

(ii) Seek to obtain the informed consent of all clients to whom professional services or research participation are offered.

#### ***1.4 Standards of self-determination***

(ii) Ensure from the first contact that clients are aware of their right to withdraw at any time from the receipt of professional services or from research participation.

(iii) Comply with requests by clients who are withdrawing from research participation that any data by which they might be personally identified, including recordings, be destroyed.

#### ***3.3 Standard of protection of research participants***

(vi) Inform research participants from the first contact that their right to withdraw at any time is not affected by the receipt or offer of any financial compensation or other inducements for participation.

## Appendix 7. Ethics Approval Form

### REGISTRY RESEARCH UNIT ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM

**(Please return to Registry Research Unit within 10 working days)**

Name of applicant and Faculty/School: Amy Grubb, Psychology

Research project title: An exploratory study of modern-day police hostage (crisis) negotiation within the UK

Comments by the reviewer

4. Evaluation of the ethics of the proposal:
A well written and detailed proposal which clearly explains the research to be undertaken; materials to be used; data collection techniques and participant group. There are no substantial ethical concerns identified by this research proposal that have not been addressed.
5. Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form:
Both are clear and explains the study and consent/withdrawal etc
6. Recommendation: (Please indicate as appropriate and advise on any conditions. If there any conditions, the applicant will be required to resubmit his/her application and this will be sent to the same reviewer).
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved - no conditions attached
<input type="checkbox"/> Conditional upon the following – please use additional sheets if necessary _____ _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Rejected for the following reason(s) – please use other side if necessary _____ _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Further advice/notes - please use other side if necessary  Should add on the debrief contact details for Andy Bridges for any complaints about the way the research has been conducted.

**Name and signature of reviewer: Gail Steptoe-Warren**

**Date: 29<sup>th</sup> October 2009**

## **Appendix 8. Description of Core Ethical Issues and How They Were Managed Throughout the Research**

### **Informed Consent**

All participants were provided with a participant information sheet prior to taking part in the research (please refer to Appendix 34–36). The information sheet clearly explained the aims and objectives of the research, the nature of participant involvement and how the data would be used. Participants were clearly informed that there was no obligation to take part in the research. It is worth noting that some of the negotiators may have felt obliged to take part in the research when asked by their HNC (who tended to be a higher ranking officer) to take part, however, all regional or force lead HNCs were informed that participants should take part on a voluntary basis and were not obliged to take part in the research if they did not wish to do so. It is important to note that not all negotiators from each force took part in the research which indicates that participants chose to take part of their own free will. With regards to the police officers who were recruited using snowball sampling, HCNs were informed not to put pressure on individuals to take part in the research if they did not wish to do so and were reminded that participation should be on a voluntary basis only (please see Appendix 6 for a copy of the information sheet that was provided to negotiators regarding dissemination of the second psychometric test battery to a non-negotiator colleague). All participants were required to complete and sign an informed consent form prior to taking part in the research (please refer to Appendix 37–39).

### **Deception**

No deception was utilised at any point throughout this study. All participants were made fully aware of the aims, objectives and nature of the research and what they would be required to do in order to take part. Participants who agreed to take part in the second phase of the research were provided with a brief synopsis of the themes that would be covered in the semi-structured interview prior to consenting to take part. Any participants who felt uncomfortable with certain themes were therefore provided with an opportunity not to take part in the interview prior to it taking place. Participants were therefore able to provide full informed consent to take part in both phases of the research.

### **Debriefing**

All participants were provided with a debrief sheet at the end of both stages of the research (please refer to Appendix 5, 40 and 41). The debrief sheet provided a detailed description of the aims and objectives of the research, along with details of how the data would be analysed and reported. The



researcher's contact details were also provided so that participants could contact the researcher at a later date for further information about the study or to request withdrawal of their data. Participants who took part in the second stage of the research were also provided with details of support/counselling services should they feel the need to access support after the interview as a result of discussing potentially distressing or emotive topics relating to their role as a negotiator.

### **Withdrawal from Investigation**

All participants were provided with the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any point with no negative consequences. Participants were informed that they also had the opportunity to withdraw their data from the research for a period of up to two weeks after having completed the psychometric test battery or interview. Participants in the first stage of the research were provided with a unique participant reference number which could be used to identify individual participants should they wish to withdraw their data from the research. Instructions for withdrawal were clearly outlined in the participant information sheet and debrief sheet given to participants. Participants in the second stage of the research were offered the same opportunity to withdraw their interview data from the research for a period of up to two weeks after taking part in the interview and were instructed to contact the researcher via email to request withdrawal of the data.

### **Confidentiality**

Confidentiality of data was maintained at all points throughout the research. All hard copies of the psychometric test batteries were stored in a locked filing cabinet with consent forms stored separately from the completed tests. Participants taking part in the first phase of the research were allocated a unique participant reference number and data was reported in an aggregated manner. At no point were individual scores referred to or identified. All forces involved were assured that their identities would remain anonymous throughout the execution, write up and dissemination of the research. For the purposes of the thesis, all forces remained anonymous and were allocated a numerical code in order to identify aggregated data (i.e. Force 1, Force 2, Force 3 etc.). Participants that took part in the interview were allocated an alphanumeric code<sup>86</sup> that was then used to refer to individual interviewees in the thesis and ensured anonymity of individual negotiators. All interviewees were also provided with the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the transcripts after the interview and to redact or sanitise any data which may identify themselves or their force, thereby compromising their anonymity. The dictaphone used to record the

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<sup>86</sup> Each interviewee was allocated a code which represents their interview letter, gender, force number and length of service in months as a negotiator (i.e. A:M:1:156).

interviews was stored in a locked filing cabinet at all times throughout the research and audio recordings from each interview were downloaded from the dictaphone regularly after each interview and stored on a password protected computer. Participants were informed that the audio recordings would be destroyed upon completion of the PhD but that transcribed data would be securely retained for a period of two years after submission of the PhD thesis in order to allow for potential publication of the findings and further research.


### **Protection of Participants**

Participants were informed throughout the research that they were not obliged to take part in any stage of the research and that it was completely voluntary. They were assured that they did not have to answer any questions that they did not feel comfortable answering and that they had the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any point, including for a period of two weeks after completing the psychometric test battery or taking part in the interview, respectively. Participants taking part in the interview were the nature of participant involvement and how the data would be used. Participants were clearly informed that there was no obligation to take part in the research. It is worth noting that some of the negotiators may have felt obliged to take part in the research when asked by their HNC (who tended to be a higher ranking officer) to take part, however, all regional or force lead HNCs were informed that participants should be reminded that the information they provided would be treated confidentially and that they would remain anonymous via the use of participant reference codes in the write up of the research. The researcher was also aware that the interview might involve participants discussing emotive or distressing incidents involving their role as a negotiator and participants were assured at the start of the interview that they did not have to answer any questions that they did not feel comfortable answering. The details for a number of support services were provided to participants within the debrief sheet in case negotiators felt the need to access further means of support.

### **Protection of the Researcher**

The safety of the researcher was considered at all points throughout the research and there were no significant anticipated risks posed to the researcher during either phase of the research. The interviews for the second phase of the research were conducted at the negotiator's place of work, in an interview room within the police station. As such, there was no risk of physical harm posed to the researcher. There was a potential risk of psychological harm posed to the researcher as a result of discussion of emotive or sensitive material during the interviews with negotiators but this risk was mediated by the awareness of appropriate support services and discussion with members of my supervisory team.

## Appendix 9. Power Analysis Outputs<sup>87</sup>



<sup>87</sup> Power analyses were conducted in various permutations based on the number of predictor/independent and dependent variables utilised within each MANOVA. These figures represent the power analyses performed for: 1) the BFI/GDMS measures (with five sub-scales/DVs), 2) the CST-R measure (with 18 sub-scales/DVs), 3) the CERQ measure (with 11 subscales/DVs), and 4) the Genos EII measure (with eight sub-scales/DVs). In each of these cases, the number of groups consisted of two predictor variables (i.e. Group with three levels: HCN/PO/Student; Gender with two levels: Male/Female) and six groups (i.e. 3 X 2 = 6 comparison groups in total).

## **Appendix 10. Semi-Structured Interview Schedule**

Good morning/afternoon...

Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview with me today. Your input into the research is very much appreciated. I would like you to speak as honestly and freely as you can but please note that you are not obliged to answer any questions that you are not happy answering and that you will get a chance to review the transcripts in order to sanitise or remove any information that you do not wish to be reported on.

If you are happy to continue, we will start the interview now...

### **Introduction**

- Can you tell me a bit about yourself in terms of your police role?
  - How long have you been in the police?
  - What is your current day to day role within the police?

### **Recruitment / Selection**

- Can you tell me how you came to become a negotiator?
  - How were you recruited?
  - Did you volunteer for the post? And if so why?
- What did the selection process involve?
  - Psychometric tests?
  - Role play / Interviews?
- Were you successful at your first application?
  - If no were you informed of the aspects that you needed to work on/improve in order to be successful at your next application?
- Do you think the recruitment/selection process could be improved in any way?

### **Training**

- What training did you receive once you had been selected?
  - Do you feel this training adequately equipped you to cope with crisis situations?
    - If yes, in what way do you feel it equips you?
    - If no, what do you think would improve the training?
  - Do you have continuing professional development/on-going training as a negotiator?
  - If so, what type of training and how frequent is it?

- Are there regular opportunities for you to share good practice/successful strategies etc. with other negotiators both within your force and force-wide?
- Is there any form of international training or sharing of good practice with other countries?
- How much contact do you have with others in this role?

### **Experiences as a negotiator**

- Can you describe the first incident that you were involved in as a negotiator?
  - What happened?
  - How did you respond?
  - What was the outcome?
  - How do you think the situation was dealt with?
  - How would you deal with the situation differently?
- Can you describe the most recent incident that you have been involved in?
  - What happened?
  - How did you respond?
  - What was the outcome?
  - How do you think the situation was dealt with?
  - How would you deal with the situation differently?
- Do you feel that the role has changed since you have been doing the job?
- Approximately how many incidents have you been directly involved with as a negotiator?
- Do you feel that you have grown in confidence, the more incidents you attend?
- What type of incidents are you typically involved in? What would you say is the most common type of incident you deal with?
- How do the jobs vary?
- Are certain incidents more difficult to deal with?
  - If so, which do you feel are more difficult, and why?
- How do you tend to feel during the incidents?
- How do you tend to feel once a situation has been resolved?

### **Decision making process**

- What are the decision making processes involved in negotiating crisis situations?
- Do you tend to naturally use one process more than others?
- Are there any specific strategies, styles or techniques that you use when you are negotiating?
- If so, what do you feel is the most effective strategy, style or technique?
- To what extent do you feel “in control” when negotiating at an incident?
- What are the potential problems that you encounter when negotiating?

### **Role-Specific Skills**

- What skills do you think you use whilst dealing with crisis situations?
- What skills do you think are important to be an effective negotiator?
- What do you think makes a person a good negotiator?
- What skill or attribute do you think is the most important for a negotiator?
- What would you look for in others if you were selecting people to do this role?

### **Support Structure and Coping Strategies**

- Do you suffer from stress or anxiety in your everyday life (outside of your negotiator role?)
- If so, how do you normally cope with this stress/anxiety?
- How does this compare to your role as a negotiator? Is this different to how you cope during negotiator situations?
- What aspects of the role do you find most stressful?
- How do you cope with the stress involved in crisis negotiation? (I.e. what strategies do you use to cope with stressful situations?)
- Do you feel that negotiation causes more stress than your role as a police officer generally?
- Do you feel that you are supported sufficiently in your role by the police?
  - Do you feel supported physically in terms of risk?
  - Do you feel supported psychologically in terms of emotional support?
- What sort of help & support is available to you (both in theory and realistically)?
- Have you ever utilised this support?
  - If yes, did you find this helpful?
  - If no, why? And would you ask for such help in the future if you felt you needed it?

### **Cinderella Role**

- How does your negotiator role fit in with your general role within the police force?
- Is your role accommodated by your superiors? Does it cause any tension when you have to leave other duties to attend an incident?
- How important do you feel your role is within the UK?
- What do you get out of your role as a negotiator?
- Would you recommend the role to others?
- In your opinion, is there anything that the police service or government could do to improve the role or to support negotiators within their role?

Is there anything else which we haven't covered which you feel is pertinent to your role as a negotiator?

Thank you for your time...

**Appendix 11. Demographic Questionnaire (Qualitative Phase: HCN Interview Sample)**

**Participant Reference Number.....**

**Demographic Questionnaire for Stage 2 of Hostage Negotiation Research**

Question	Answer
1. Age	
2. Gender	
3. Ethnicity	
4. Force	
5. Metropolitan/Rural Force	
6. Current Rank	
7. Title/Current Position	
8. Station/Department	
9. Uniform/CID	
10. Length of police service (Years & Months)	
11. Length of negotiator service (Years & Months)	
12. Approximate number of incidents deployed to as a negotiator	
13. Are you a Hostage Negotiator Coordinator	Yes / No
14. Are you a Hostage Negotiator Force Lead	Yes / No
15. Are you a Hostage Negotiator Regional Lead	Yes / No

## Appendix 12. Debrief Sheet (Qualitative Phase: HCN Interview Sample)

Participant Reference Number.....

### Participant Debrief Sheet

#### (Hostage Negotiator Sample - Stage 2)

Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage negotiation from a UK police perspective. This stage of the research involves the exploration of hostage negotiation from the perspective of the negotiator. I am interested in exploring the processes and procedures that are involved in the recruitment, selection, training and support of negotiators, along with experiences of operationally active negotiators in the UK.

I hope that the findings will provide an insight into the complex role of police hostage negotiators in UK-based police forces and may enable a number of recommendations to be made in order to enhance the efficacy and experiences of those individuals working as negotiators across the country.

Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact the researcher at the following address:

Miss Amy Grubb, Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Psychology Department, Coventry University,  
Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Tel: 02476 888 795, Fax: 02476 888 300, Email:  
[amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk).

Please note that you have the right to withdraw your data from the study up to two weeks following completion of the interview. If you would like to withdraw your data please contact me via email to request removal of your data. You will be provided with a copy of the transcribed interview data upon request in order to verify accuracy and request sanitisation or removal of specific content.

If at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.

***I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study. Your input is very much appreciated.***



### Appendix 13. Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for Psychometric Test Battery

Table 4.6. *Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the BFI*

Sub-Scale	Outliers (Cases)	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic
Agreeableness	217, 285, 415	3.92	3.94	.00
Conscientiousness	305, 424, 429	3.90	3.92	.00
Neuroticism	None	2.47	2.45	.00
Openness	None	3.54	3.54	.02
Extraversion	233, 297, 359, 378	3.54	3.56	.00

*Note.* There were no missing values for the BFI data so raw data was analysed in original format with all cases included.

Table 4.7. *Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the CERQ*

Sub-Scale	Outliers (Cases)	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic
Self-Blame	315, 353, 363, 368, 386, 392, 397, 400, 424, 426, 437	9.30	9.15	.00
Acceptance	None	12.21	12.16	.00
Rumination	None	10.76	10.66	.00
Positive Refocus	43, 112, 423, 438	10.07	10.00	.00
Refocus on Planning	50, 424	13.96	13.99	.00
Positive Reappraisal	359, 424	14.43	14.54	.00
Perspective Taking	268	13.79	13.81	.00
Catastrophising	36, 297, 353, 386, 425	7.27	7.01	.00
Other Blame	29, 80, 231, 281, 289, 305, 320, 331, 353, 371, 400, 406, 421, 422	8.29	8.12	.00
Adaptive Strategies	359, 423, 424	12.89	12.91	.14*
Maladaptive Strategies	23, 297, 320, 353, 386, 400, 423	8.92	8.81	.00

*Note.* \* = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution. The following cases were excluded from the analysis due to having two or more missing values: 300, 321, 341, 382 and 391.

Table 4.8. *Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the CST-R<sup>88</sup>*

Sub-Scale	Outliers (Cases)	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic
Problem Solving	315, 388, 424	70.97	71.46	.00
Information Seeking	22	55.23	55.43	.00
Negotiation	23, 301, 315, 318, 341, 388, 424, 425, 434	70.08	70.60	.00
Social Support	None	49.45	49.48	.04
PC Restructuring	287, 295, 318, 341, 424, 425	71.20	71.86	.00
Emotional Regulation	217	58.15	58.11	.00
Distraction	52, 217, 341, 425	60.89	61.56	.00
Rumination	None	41.10	40.61	.00
Avoidance	35, 301, 331, 353, 397, 423, 424	27.11	26.07	.00
Helplessness	305, 315, 359, 397, 424	23.07	21.96	.00
Social Withdrawal	296, 301, 302, 313, 359, 397, 423, 424	31.47	30.72	.00
Opposition	23, 306, 318, 424, 425	31.57	30.78	.00
Problem Focused Coping	301, 388, 424, 425	65.43	65.71	.00
Emotion Focused Coping	115, 217, 424, 425	59.87	60.08	.02
Hang Ups	23, 35, 305, 315, 353, 359, 397, 424	30.83	30.07	.00
Adaptive Coping Skills	115, 216, 217, 233, 424, 425	435.96	437.62	.13*
Maladaptive Coping Skills	35, 301, 305, 315, 353, 359, 397, 424,	154.32	150.51	.00
Overall Coping Skills	22, 115, 217, 301, 305, 315, 359, 424, 425	65.13	65.51	.00

*Note.* \* = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution. There were no missing values for the CST-R data so raw data was analysed in original format with all cases included.

<sup>88</sup> The CST-R was purchased from a test publisher and therefore the scoring algorithm was not accessible to the researcher. The completed CST-R scores were inputted into a web-based system (i.e. ArchProfile<sup>88</sup>) and the scored data was returned to the researcher in the format of an excel spread sheet. This data was then imported into the SPSS spread sheet in order for analysis to take place.

Table 4.9. *Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the GDMS*

Sub-Scale	Outliers (Cases)	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic
Intuitive	15, 163, 207, 250, 275, 350, 391	3.57	3.59	.00
Rational	65, 141, 280, 289, 331, 344, 336, 388, 422	3.90	3.92	.00
Dependent	6, 81, 411	3.30	3.30	.00
Spontaneous	336	2.70	2.68	.00
Avoidant	225, 359, 370, 414, 424	2.15	2.09	.00

*Note.* The following cases were excluded from the analysis due to having more than two missing values: 391.

Table 4.10. *Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the EII*

Sub-Scale	Outliers (Cases)	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic
Emotional Self-Awareness	381, 429	39.97	40.07	.00
Emotional Expression	336, 359, 392, 434	38.00	38.09	.00
Emotional Awareness of Others	233, 370, 429, 434	38.90	39.01	.00
Emotional Reasoning	370, 378	36.40	36.47	.00
Emotional Self-Management	43, 115, 116, 217, 326, 331, 359	36.87	36.92	.00
Emotional Management of Others	233, 336, 359, 370, 429, 434	39.13	39.25	.00
Emotional Self Control	35, 289, 296, 336, 390	38.49	38.60	.00
Total Emotional Intelligence	336, 359, 429	268.01	268.54	.07*

*Note.* \* = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution. The following cases were excluded from the analysis due to having two or more missing values: 116, 294, 297, 300, 321, 332, 342, 371, 382, 388, 397, 404, 412 and 418<sup>89</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> The EII data included a fairly large number of missing values which is likely to be caused by the length of the psychometric test and potentially the layout of questions. The questions are very close together and participants tended to confuse the answer for one question with the answer for another question. The layout/format of the questionnaire was unavoidable due to a pre-existing psychometric test being provided by a test publisher in this instance.

Table 4.11. *Details of Outliers and Testing of Parametric Assumptions for the BIDR*

Sub-Scale	Outliers (Cases)	Mean	5% Trimmed Mean	Kolmogorov- Smirnov Statistic
Overall BIDR	86, 194, 284	165.24	165.46	.20*
Social Desirability	400	88.18	88.27	.20*
Impression Management	354, 372, 423	77.06	77.27	.05*

*Note.* \* = Non-significant result indicating normality of distribution. The following cases were excluded from the analysis due to having two or more missing values: 89 and 297.

## Appendix 14. Inter-Correlation Matrices for the Psychometric Test Battery

Table 4.12. Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-Revised Sub-Scales [Table 1 of 5]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Extraversion	1	.165**	.247**	-.336**	.194**	-.164**	-.054	-.124**
2. Agreeableness		1	.426**	-.365**	.234**	-.177**	-.048	-.178**
3. Conscientiousness			1	-.440**	.155**	-.270**	-.136**	-.255**
4. Neuroticism				1	-.252**	.422**	.100*	.464**
5. Openness					1	.018	.012	.007
6. Self-Blame						1	.299**	.545**
7. Acceptance							1	.344**
8. Rumination								1
9. PR								
10. ROP								
11. PReap								
12. PT								
13. Catastrophising								
14. Other Blame								
15. Intuitive								
16. Rational								
17. Dependent								
18. Spontaneous								
19. Avoidant								
20. ESA								
21. EE								
22. EAO								
23. ER								
24. ESM								
25. EMO								
26. ESC								
27. Total EI								
28. OCS								
29. PFC								
30. PS								
31. IS								
32. Negotiation								
33. EFC								
34. SS								
35. PCR								
36. ER								
37. Distraction								
38. Hang Ups								
39. Rumination								
40. Avoidance								
41. Helplessness								
42. SW								
43. Opposition								

Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive Cognitive Restructuring; ER = Emotional Regulation; SW = Social Withdrawal. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ .

Table 4.13. Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-Revised Sub-Scales [Table 2 of 5]

	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Extraversion	.138**	.213**	.287**	.134**	-.180**	.009	.120*	.050	-.069
2. Agreeableness	.164**	.169**	.282**	.203**	-.278**	-.253**	-.031	.211**	.006
3. Conscientiousness	.010	.283**	.317**	.098*	-.343**	-.171**	-.161**	.366**	-.215**
4. Neuroticism	-.098*	-.219**	-.318**	-.230**	.495**	.122*	.095*	-.106*	.316**
5. Openness	.093	.305**	.325**	.188**	-.162**	-.025	-.002	.294**	-.111*
6. Self-Blame	.026	.069	-.026	-.024	.449**	.111*	.026	.044	.253**
7. Acceptance	.078	.188**	.203**	.288**	.227**	.144**	.157**	.095*	.184**
8. Rumination	.074	.155**	.046	-.004	.523**	.140**	.070	.110*	.335**
9. PR	1	.322**	.269**	.210**	-.020	.114*	.129**	-.038	.105*
10. ROP		1	.680**	.431**	-.194**	.037	.055	.350**	-.005
11. PReap			1	.522**	-.260**	-.014	.079	.358**	-.038
12. PT				1	-.185**	-.063	.085	.178**	-.070
13. Catastrophising					1	.384**	.026	-.122*	.242**
14. Other Blame						1	.047	-.088	.068
15. Intuitive							1	-.140**	.070
16. Rational								1	.178**
17. Dependent									1
18. Spontaneous									
19. Avoidant									
20. ESA									
21. EE									
22. EAO									
23. ER									
24. ESM									
25. EMO									
26. ESC									
27. Total EI									
28. OCS									
29. PFC									
30. PS									
31. IS									
32. Negotiation									
33. EFC									
34. SS									
35. PCR									
36. ER									
37. Distraction									
38. Hang Ups									
39. Rumination									
40. Avoidance									
41. Helplessness									
42. SW									
43. Opposition									

Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive Cognitive Restructuring; ER = Emotional Regulation; SW = Social Withdrawal. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ .

Table 4.14. *Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-Revised Sub-Scales [Table 3 of 5]*

	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
1. Extraversion	.036	-.280**	.263**	.405**	.365**	.336**	.346**	.442**	.130**
2. Agreeableness	-.202**	-.316**	.289**	.436**	.399**	.342**	.416**	.461**	.398**
3. Conscientiousness	-.394**	-.586**	.508**	.567**	.534**	.510**	.509**	.565**	.487**
4. Neuroticism	.018	.419**	-.286**	-.434**	-.311**	-.329**	-.491**	-.383**	-.440**
5. Openness	-.018	-.181**	.256**	.287**	.320**	.290**	.382**	.276**	.279**
6. Self-Blame	.075	.309**	-.151**	-.296**	-.194**	-.153**	-.240**	-.191**	-.213**
7. Acceptance	.065	.101*	-.041	-.038	-.059	-.046	.045	-.044	-.031
8. Rumination	-.038	.262**	-.087	-.190**	-.103*	-.063	-.202**	-.160**	-.176**
9. PR	.084	-.001	-.018	.090	.059	.073	.107*	.087	.064
10. ROP	-.057	-.271**	.299**	.293**	.332**	.352**	.344**	.334**	.272**
11. PReap	-.038	-.241**	.307**	.384**	.375**	.410**	.463**	.429**	.308**
12. PT	.027	-.134**	.116*	.211**	.189**	.227**	.261**	.208**	.167**
13. Catastrophising	.061	.374**	-.301**	-.371**	-.337**	-.275**	-.383**	-.325**	-.351**
14. Other Blame	.210**	.204**	-.234**	-.229**	-.187**	-.143**	-.234**	-.180**	-.196**
15. Intuitive	.461**	.121*	.042	.027	.028	-.010	.039	.070	-.076
16. Rational	-.421**	-.331**	.285**	.352**	.289**	.366**	.338**	.285**	.302**
17. Dependent	-.067	.311**	-.147**	-.112*	-.153**	-.079	-.188**	-.110*	-.148**
18. Spontaneous	1	.241**	-.211**	-.244**	-.187**	-.179**	-.142**	-.168**	-.218**
19. Avoidant		1	-.401**	-.507**	-.449**	-.445**	-.469**	-.503**	-.413**
20. ESA			1	.661**	.727**	.595**	.619**	.654**	.530**
21. EE				1	.732**	.650**	.738**	.744**	.582**
22. EAO					1	.741**	.644**	.790**	.531**
23. ER						1	.608**	.740**	.498**
24. ESM							1	.670**	.697**
25. EMO								1	.549**
26. ESC									1
27. Total EI									
28. OCS									
29. PFC									
30. PS									
31. IS									
32. Negotiation									
33. EFC									
34. SS									
35. PCR									
36. ER									
37. Distraction									
38. Hang Ups									
39. Rumination									
40. Avoidance									
41. Helplessness									
42. SW									
43. Opposition									

*Note.* PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive Cognitive Restructuring; ER = Emotional Regulation; SW = Social Withdrawal. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ .

Table 4.15. Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-Revised Sub-Scales [Table 4 of 5]

	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
1. Extraversion	.383**	.372**	.258**	.305**	.148**	.166**	.361**	.338**
2. Agreeableness	.470**	.489**	.373**	.328**	.181**	.407**	.394**	.226**
3. Conscientiousness	.624**	.536**	.439**	.461**	.176**	.440**	.309**	.111*
4. Neuroticism	-.449**	-.642**	-.324**	-.365**	.013	-.476**	-.463**	-.037
5. Openness	.361**	.328**	.347**	.320**	.226**	.294**	.297**	.008
6. Self-Blame	-.236**	-.358**	-.050	-.073	.126**	-.210**	-.170**	-.015
7. Acceptance	-.036	-.110*	.043	-.042	.101*	.042	.000	.030
8. Rumination	-.159**	-.307**	.017	-.030	.204**	-.180**	-.139**	.155**
9. PR	.086	.219**	.182**	.167**	.168**	.091	.325**	.254**
10. ROP	.376**	.433**	.548**	.553**	.371**	.389**	.389**	.158**
11. PReap	.457**	.516**	.559**	.541**	.357**	.451**	.489**	.193**
12. PT	.237**	.314**	.277**	.261**	.134**	.287**	.334**	.075
13. Catastrophising	-.390**	-.545**	-.303**	-.289**	-.069	-.408**	-.348**	-.026
14. Other Blame	-.233**	-.215**	-.087	-.069	-.049	-.100*	-.116*	-.045
15. Intuitive	.017	-.016	.024	-.020	.030	.055	.053	.069
16. Rational	.377**	.288**	.410**	.428**	.281**	.266**	.197**	.066
17. Dependent	-.162**	-.148**	.033	-.020	.229**	-.178**	-.021	.288**
18. Spontaneous	-.224**	-.191**	-.201**	-.219**	-.168**	-.081	-.104*	-.075
19. Avoidant	-.542**	-.536**	-.379**	-.388**	-.126**	-.429**	-.335**	-.135**
20. ESA	.816**	.468**	.417**	.410**	.191**	.417**	.318**	.081
21. EE	.872**	.605**	.503**	.513**	.254**	.456**	.420**	.237**
22. EAO	.882**	.508**	.464**	.471**	.218**	.449**	.363**	.183**
23. ER	.826**	.503**	.474**	.493**	.212**	.457**	.368**	.180**
24. ESM	.842**	.609**	.463**	.486**	.181**	.477**	.487**	.137**
25. EMO	.878**	.567**	.469**	.486**	.234**	.423**	.426**	.229**
26. ESC	.743**	.512**	.356**	.388**	.096*	.402**	.350**	.021
27. Total EI	1	.642**	.539**	.556**	.241**	.524**	.467**	.189**
28. OCS		1	.776**	.729**	.445**	.711**	.835**	.423**
29. PFC			1	.857**	.782**	.744**	.679**	.467**
30. PS				1	.489**	.560**	.606**	.346**
31. IS					1	.302**	.471**	.573**
32. Negotiation						1	.555**	.147**
33. EFC							1	.539**
34. SS								1
35. PCR								
36. ER								
37. Distraction								
38. Hang Ups								
39. Rumination								
40. Avoidance								
41. Helplessness								
42. SW								
43. Opposition								

Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive Cognitive Restructuring; ER = Emotional Regulation; SW = Social Withdrawal. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ .



Table 4.16. *Table Depicting the Inter-Correlations between the BFI, CERQ, GDMS, EII, and CST-Revised Sub-Scales [Table 5 of 5]*

	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43
1. Extraversion	.247**	.165**	.255**	-.310**	-.280**	-.197**	-.292**	-.357**	-.161**
2. Agreeableness	.424**	.298**	.137**	-.443**	-.314**	-.358**	-.310**	-.363**	-.477**
3. Conscientiousness	.369**	.278**	.092	-.541**	-.429**	-.547**	-.459**	-.353**	-.429**
4. Neuroticism	-.488**	-.431**	-.333**	.698**	.713**	.523**	.668**	.337**	.580**
5. Openness	.318**	.332**	.168**	-.222**	-.172**	-.171**	-.257**	-.074	-.233**
6. Self-Blame	-.139*	-.179**	-.143**	.510**	.522**	.411**	.430**	.325**	.379**
7. Acceptance	.105*	-.096*	-.034	.221**	.219**	.182**	.181**	.102*	.218**
8. Rumination	-.146**	-.197**	-.210**	.474**	.571**	.372**	.412**	.168**	.374**
9. PR	.244**	.204**	.199**	-.097*	-.066	.005	-.077	-.183**	-.092
10. ROP	.453**	.283**	.181**	-.252**	-.132**	-.228**	-.308**	-.200**	-.179**
11. PReap	.560**	.339**	.266**	-.333**	-.241**	-.287**	-.341**	-.236**	-.268**
12. PT	.516**	.156**	.180**	-.214**	-.173**	-.188**	-.227**	-.142**	-.146**
13. Catastrophising	-.383**	-.335**	-.231**	.600**	.547**	.485**	.565**	.378**	.476**
14. Other Blame	-.135**	-.101*	-.032	.268**	.188**	.237**	.213**	.179**	.283**
15. Intuitive	.045	-.051	.096*	.073	.071	.101*	.057	-.023	.083
16. Rational	.302**	.150**	.017	-.180**	-.071	-.246**	-.185**	-.108*	-.142**
17. Dependent	-.120*	-.132**	-.105*	.269**	.357**	.220**	.286**	-.050	.242**
18. Spontaneous	-.114*	-.127**	.040	.172**	.099*	.224**	.128**	.134**	.131**
19. Avoidant	-.349**	-.287**	-.155**	.556**	.463**	.530**	.507**	.375**	.399**
20. ESA	.381**	.276**	.141**	-.426**	-.347**	-.432**	-.404**	-.239**	-.311**
21. EE	.439**	.332**	.150**	-.563**	-.469**	-.548**	-.483**	-.412**	-.395**
22. EAO	.383**	.271**	.169**	-.445**	-.359**	-.424**	-.419**	-.303**	-.320**
23. ER	.411**	.268**	.158**	-.424**	-.340**	-.386**	-.394**	-.294**	-.320**
24. ESM	.471**	.443**	.301**	-.548**	-.493**	-.454**	-.508**	-.315**	-.459**
25. EMO	.418**	.324**	.205**	-.507**	-.406**	-.455**	-.446**	-.386**	-.384**
26. ESC	.399**	.392**	.149**	-.521**	-.432**	-.457**	-.481**	-.246**	-.502**
27. Total EI	.503**	.390**	.210**	-.582**	-.476**	-.538**	-.528**	-.376**	-.455**
28. OCS	.724**	.695**	.476**	-.871**	-.728**	-.711**	-.773**	-.664**	-.700**
29. PFC	.628**	.495**	.290**	-.449**	-.278**	-.401**	-.403**	-.425**	-.364**
30. PS	.576**	.469**	.285**	-.486**	-.330**	-.448**	-.490**	-.358**	-.387**
31. IS	.292**	.298**	.139**	-.095*	.060	-.079	-.028	-.325**	-.071
32. Negotiation	.681**	.430**	.282**	-.542**	-.450**	-.475**	-.497**	-.334**	-.456**
33. EFC	.734**	.801**	.710**	-.528**	-.452**	-.332**	-.479**	-.492**	-.420**
34. SS	.171**	.180**	.146**	-.182**	-.020	-.066	-.063	-.662**	-.011
35. PCR	1	.517**	.339**	-.516**	-.445**	-.433**	-.487**	-.295**	-.445**
36. ER		1	.526**	-.496**	-.469**	-.349**	-.459**	-.239**	-.499**
37. Distraction			1	-.269**	-.324**	-.063	-.326**	-.169**	-.207**
38. Hang Ups				1	.878**	.859**	.880**	.666**	.805**
39. Rumination					1	.687**	.775**	.414**	.664**
40. Avoidance						1	.692**	.542**	.598**
41. Helplessness							1	.477**	.645**
42. SW								1	.373**
43. Opposition									1

Note. PR = Positive Refocusing; ROP = Refocus on Planning; PReap = Positive Reappraisal; PT = Perspective Taking; ESA = Emotional Self-Awareness; EE = Emotional Expression; EAO = Emotional Awareness of Others; ER = Emotional Reasoning; ESM = Emotional Self-Management; EMO = Emotional Management of Others; ESC = Emotional Self-Control; Total EI = Total Emotional Intelligence; OCS = Overall Coping Skills; PFC = Problem Focused Coping; PS = Problem Solving; IS = Information Seeking; EFC = Emotion Focused Coping; SS = Social Support; PCR = Positive Cognitive Restructuring; ER = Emotional Regulation; SW = Social Withdrawal. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$ .

Table 4.17. Table Depicting Correlations between Personality Traits and Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies used by the HCN and Police Officer Samples

	HCNs					Police Officers				
	E	A	C	N	O	E	A	C	N	O
<i>Self-Blame</i>	-.178	-.031	-.218 <sup>*S</sup>	.425 <sup>**M</sup>	.017	.008	.013	-.140	.209 <sup>*S</sup>	.096
Acceptance	-.017	.079	-.052	.025	-.121	-.052	.033	-.045	.081	-.017
<i>Rumination</i>	-.148	-.075	-.257 <sup>**S</sup>	.422 <sup>**M</sup>	-.069	.013	-.018	-.003	.269 <sup>**S</sup>	.028
Positive Refocusing	-.005	.172	.003	.004	-.025	.131	.217 <sup>*</sup>	-.032	-.131	.283 <sup>**S</sup>
Refocus on Planning	.132	.171	.088	-.112	.052	.191 <sup>*S</sup>	.191 <sup>*S</sup>	.299 <sup>**M</sup>	-.196 <sup>*S</sup>	.331 <sup>**M</sup>
Positive Reappraisal	.204 <sup>*S</sup>	.234 <sup>*S</sup>	.226 <sup>*S</sup>	-.168	.138	.329 <sup>**M</sup>	.394 <sup>**M</sup>	.343 <sup>**M</sup>	-.304 <sup>**M</sup>	.279 <sup>**S</sup>
Putting into Perspective	-.052	.137	.015	.018	-.031	.303 <sup>**M</sup>	.277 <sup>**S</sup>	.062	-.391 <sup>**M</sup>	.200 <sup>*S</sup>
<i>Castastrophising</i>	-.178	-.025	.001	.277 <sup>**S</sup>	-.071	.090	-.058	-.021	.237 <sup>**S</sup>	-.015
<i>Other Blame</i>	-.083	-.048	.035	.139	.224 <sup>*S</sup>	.025	-.160	-.097	.088	.017

Note. \* Significant at  $p < .05$  level; \*\* Significant at  $p < 0.01$  level. Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = Large Effect. Effect sizes as described by Cohen (1988). Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are represented by italicised font.

Table 4.18. Table Depicting Correlations between Personality Traits and Coping Styles used by the HCN and Police Officer Samples

	HCNs					Police Officers				
	E	A	C	N	O	E	A	C	N	O
Overall Coping Skills Test Score	.291**S	.360**M	.257**S	-.513**L	.261**S	.455**M	.508**L	.471**M	-.599**L	.338**M
Problem Focused Coping	.128	.292**S	.238**S	-.229*S	.233*S	.435**M	.426**M	.472**M	-.368**M	.353**M
Problem Solving	.138	.236*S	.292**S	-.252**S	.266**S	.388**M	.357**M	.508**L	-.374**M	.302**M
Information Seeking	.087	.151	.150	-.071	.111	.352**M	.212*S	.312**M	-.153	.321**M
Negotiation	.085	.362**M	.120	-.268**S	.196*S	.319**M	.551**L	.340**M	-.439**M	.226*S
Emotion Focused Coping	.251**S	.355**M	.142	-.328**M	.172	.461**M	.471**M	.336**M	-.426**M	.331**M
Social Support	.287**S	.220*	.052	-.177	-.104	.498**L	.287**S	.223*S	-.157	.175
Positive Cognitive Restructuring	.084	.373**M	.073	-.230*S	.264**S	.376**M	.496**L	.294**S	-.498**L	.352**M
Emotional Regulation	.065	.294**S	.166	-.254**S	.328**M	.225*S	.362**M	.331**M	-.349**M	.262**S
Distraction	.282**S	.116	.113	-.282**S	.000	.247**S	.266**S	.142	-.276**S	.202*S
<i>Hang Ups</i>	-.279**S	-.230*S	-.230*S	.588**L	-.214*S	-.303**M	-.415**M	-.412**M	.699**L	-.217*S
<i>Rumination</i>	-.195*S	-.155	-.159	.624**L	-.227*S	-.266**S	-.320**M	-.332**M	.673**L	-.079
<i>Avoidance</i>	-.093	-.103	-.350**M	.311**M	-.233*S	-.174	-.195*S	-.366**M	.495**L	-.106
<i>Helplessness</i>	-.234*S	-.136	-.142	.517**L	-.138	-.178	-.200*S	-.316**M	.575**L	-.277**S
<i>Social Withdrawal</i>	-.392**M	-.158	-.053	.224*S	.077	-.397**M	-.285**S	-.243**S	.317**M	-.193*S
<i>Opposition</i>	-.158	-.304**M	-.207*S	.485**M	-.283**S	-.118	-.503**L	-.295**M	.530**L	-.177

Note. \* Significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* Significant at  $p < .01$ . Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = Large Effect. Effect sizes as described by Cohen (1988). Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are represented by italicised font.

Table 4.19. *Table Depicting Correlations between Personality Traits and Decision-Making Styles used by the HCN and Police Officer Samples*

	HCNs					Police Officers				
	E	A	C	N	O	E	A	C	N	O
Intuitive	.220 <sup>*S</sup>	.053	-.174	.138	-.200 <sup>*S</sup>	.096	.025	-.149	.128	.020
Rational	-.141	.051	.331 <sup>**M</sup>	-.129	.250 <sup>**S</sup>	.020	.156	.350 <sup>**M</sup>	-.227 <sup>*S</sup>	.133
Dependent	-.018	.068	-.061	.176	-.103	-.052	.010	-.192 <sup>*</sup>	.165	-.019
Spontaneous	.253 <sup>**S</sup>	.021	-.312 <sup>**M</sup>	-.066	-.079	-.059	-.204 <sup>*S</sup>	-.487 <sup>**M</sup>	.183 <sup>*S</sup>	.073
Avoidant	-.248 <sup>**S</sup>	-.042	-.315 <sup>**M</sup>	.143	-.146	-.308 <sup>**M</sup>	-.252 <sup>**S</sup>	-.546 <sup>**L</sup>	.429 <sup>**M</sup>	-.133

*Note.* \* Significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* Significant at  $p < .01$ . Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = Large Effect. Effect sizes as described by Cohen (1988).

Table 4.20. Table Depicting Correlations between Cognitive Emotion Regulation Strategies and Emotional Intelligence in the HCN and Police Officer Samples

	Self-Blame	Acceptance	Rumination	Positive Refocusing	Refocus on Planning	Positive Reappraisal	Putting into Perspective	Castastrophising	Other Blame
HCNs									
<b>Emotional Intelligence</b>									
<i>Emotional Self Awareness</i>	-.087	-.002	-.004	.040	.234* <sup>S</sup>	.326** <sup>M</sup>	-.057	-.202* <sup>S</sup>	.012
<i>Emotional Expression</i>	-.178	.051	-.105	.079	.298** <sup>S</sup>	.359** <sup>M</sup>	.059	-.134	.044
<i>Emotional Awareness of Others</i>	-.187** <sup>S</sup>	.023	-.045	.133	.231* <sup>S</sup>	.268** <sup>S</sup>	-.005	-.078	.027
<i>Emotional Reasoning</i>	.018	-.004	.104	.054	.228* <sup>S</sup>	.261* <sup>S</sup>	.073	.048	.029
<i>Emotional Self-Management</i>	-.291** <sup>S</sup>	.141	-.203** <sup>S</sup>	.109	.258** <sup>S</sup>	.454** <sup>M</sup>	.084	-.169	.089
<i>Emotional Management of Others</i>	-.175	.007	-.058	.130	.237* <sup>S</sup>	.346** <sup>M</sup>	.026	.026	.111
<i>Emotional Self Control</i>	-.149	-.079	-.134	.112	.160	.295** <sup>M</sup>	.004	-.079	.033
<i>Total Emotional Intelligence Score</i>	-.185* <sup>S</sup>	.024	-.077	.117	.295** <sup>M</sup>	.413** <sup>M</sup>	.033	-.104	.061
Police Officers									
<b>Emotional Intelligence</b>									
<i>Emotional Self Awareness</i>	-.062	-.052	-.074	.008	.167	.203*	.101	-.038	-.264**
<i>Emotional Expression</i>	-.156	.042	-.111	.190*	.183*	.334**	.299**	-.120	-.283**
<i>Emotional Awareness of Others</i>	-.062	-.108	-.067	.071	.179	.302**	.247**	-.189*	-.186*
<i>Emotional Reasoning</i>	.049	.020	.126	.153	.266**	.401**	.233*	-.070	-.081
<i>Emotional Self-Management</i>	-.168	-.058	-.121	.219*	.236*	.399**	.215*	-.197*	-.233*
<i>Emotional Management of Others</i>	.008	.025	.082	.175	.298**	.469**	.308**	.016	-.131
<i>Emotional Self Control</i>	-.176	.015	-.083	.169	.269**	.335**	.179	-.256**	-.063
<i>Total Emotional Intelligence Score</i>	-.092	-.021	-.046	.189*	.256**	.426**	.277**	-.137	-.223*

Note. \* Significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* Significant at  $p < .01$ . Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = Large Effect. Effect sizes as described by Cohen (1988). Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are represented by italicised font.

Table 4.21. Table Depicting Correlations between Coping Styles and Decision-Making Styles in the HCN and Police Officer Samples

	HCNs					Police Officers				
	I	R	D	S	A	I	R	D	S	A
Overall Coping Skills Test Score	-.029	.213* <sup>S</sup>	-.059	-.067	-.343** <sup>M</sup>	.002	.273** <sup>S</sup>	.029	-.224* <sup>S</sup>	-.460** <sup>M</sup>
Problem Focused Coping	.049	.274** <sup>S</sup>	.167	-.090	-.314** <sup>M</sup>	.057	.375** <sup>M</sup>	.143	-.192* <sup>S</sup>	-.374** <sup>M</sup>
Problem Solving	.022	.283** <sup>S</sup>	.043	-.112	-.343** <sup>M</sup>	-.015	.393** <sup>M</sup>	.094	-.240** <sup>S</sup>	-.390** <sup>M</sup>
Information Seeking	.046	.168	.241** <sup>S</sup>	.117	-.207* <sup>S</sup>	.042	.262** <sup>S</sup>	.169	-.118	-.231* <sup>S</sup>
Negotiation	.062	.217* <sup>S</sup>	.098	.051	-.210* <sup>S</sup>	.133	.262** <sup>S</sup>	.062	-.110	-.314** <sup>M</sup>
Emotion Focused Coping	.081	.130	.002	.006	-.228* <sup>S</sup>	.035	.231* <sup>S</sup>	.169	-.125	-.363** <sup>M</sup>
Social Support	.220* <sup>S</sup>	-.097	.225* <sup>S</sup>	.051	-.119	.120	.151	.232* <sup>S</sup>	-.100	-.273** <sup>S</sup>
Positive Cognitive Restructuring	.089	.283** <sup>S</sup>	.042	.090	-.288** <sup>S</sup>	.047	.296** <sup>M</sup>	-.004	-.115	-.349* <sup>M</sup>
Emotional Regulation	-.121	.132	-.142	-.118	-.154	-.083	.144	.066	-.182* <sup>S</sup>	-.220* <sup>S</sup>
Distraction	.061	.089	-.137	.015	-.121	.018	.093	.179	.036	-.236* <sup>S</sup>
<i>Hang Ups</i>	.158	-.130	.231* <sup>S</sup>	.080	.265** <sup>S</sup>	.070	-.132	.204* <sup>S</sup>	.251** <sup>S</sup>	.432** <sup>M</sup>
<i>Rumination</i>	.166	-.086	.342** <sup>M</sup>	.014	.168	.142	-.015	.254** <sup>S</sup>	.262** <sup>S</sup>	.331** <sup>M</sup>
<i>Avoidance</i>	.192* <sup>S</sup>	-.258** <sup>S</sup>	.066	.211* <sup>S</sup>	.232* <sup>S</sup>	.004	-.116	.209* <sup>S</sup>	.155	.372** <sup>M</sup>
<i>Helplessness</i>	.160	-.133	.197* <sup>S</sup>	.072	.243** <sup>S</sup>	.136	-.157	.176	.131	.379** <sup>M</sup>
<i>Social Withdrawal</i>	-.122	.026	-.043	-.022	.203* <sup>S</sup>	-.169	-.145	-.087	.056	.303** <sup>M</sup>
<i>Opposition</i>	.206* <sup>S</sup>	-.090	.234* <sup>S</sup>	.066	.182* <sup>S</sup>	.113	-.090	.179	.293** <sup>S</sup>	.259** <sup>S</sup>

Note. \* Significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\* Significant at  $p < .01$ . Superscript S = Small Effect; Superscript M = Medium Effect; Superscript L = Large Effect. Effect sizes as described by Cohen (1988). Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies are represented by italicised font.

## Appendix 15. Example of Line-By-Line Coding Taken from Interview Transcript A

1081 IE Right. Okay. [Sighing]. So with decision-making process. So the, the crucial  
 1082 one is... so I think the first thing I would say would be about the conflict management  
 1083 model. That's absolutely crucial to, to... So it gives you some rationale as to what  
 1084 you're doing.  
 1085  
 1086 The second thing is, is that I would work to a particular strategy. And the strategy has  
 1087 to be agreed by the Gold Commander.  
 1088  
 1089 IV Okay.  
 1090  
 1091 IE And I have a choice of words the I use, and hopefully I'll have time before I  
 1092 get actually to physically negotiating that I'll be able to put it on the computer, send it  
 1093 to the commander to say, this is what I think the negotiating strategy is for this  
 1094 incident. Are you happy to approve it? And they very often come back and say, looks  
 1095 good to me. Crack on. Which I'd expect them to. That then is a generic set of  
 1096 comments that, um, would give me the chance to then get on with that negotiating, so  
 1097 that's, that's the key thing.  
 1098  
 1099 And then you're really then going down to... you'll go back to your training. So it's  
 1100 being, decisions are, are based upon the principles of being totally open and honest,  
 1101 trying to understand the, what the individual's going through, or empathise with their  
 1102 situation, certainly not lying to them, at all. Absolutely not. Um, being robust and  
 1103 pragmatic with them, however, telling them, and, and, and saying that, look, you  
 1104 know, this is going to [unclear], how are we going to resolve this? It's a lot about that  
 1105 empathy and rapport building, and understanding their situation, and the trust  
 1106 scenario.  
 1107  
 1108 Sometimes I'm guilty of veering too much into a, what the commander should be  
 1109 doing, but that's, but that's just me. It's a learning thing for me, because I can see how  
 1110 it's going, and I done it before, and, but I, I have got to put my hands up. Sometimes I  
 1111 do that. And I know how this is going to work out, and so I tend to take it, sometimes  
 1112 I do get accused of taking on some command roles, which I probably have done, too.  
 1113  
 1114 IV And that's potentially linked to your rank, I suppose, and your, your  
 1115 experience as a police officer.  
 1116  
 1117 IE Yes. Because I don't want to be hanging around there all night, when there's  
 1118 no need to. That's not just for a personal thing, but I'm thinking about the community.  
 1119 And the, the, um, um, the precedents that that could set for other situations, because  
 1120 very often the individual that we are dealing with will unfortunately get themselves  
 1121 into the same situation again, two, three years down the line.  
 1122  
 1123 IV Okay, no, that's great. Thank you. Okay, so, again, this is probably a bit of a  
 1124 strange question, but to what extent do you feel in control when you're negotiating an  
 1125 incident?  
 1126  
 1127 IE No, that's a good question. Um, I, I think it, I think it varies, um, according to  
 1128 how well the incident has been set up. So, for example, I've given you the, the  
 1129 example of the, not having the cordon on properly, so clearly you're not in control of  
 1130 the situation if other people are talking to that individual. So it is very much incident

Conflict Management Model informs decision making

Ratification / approval of negotiating strategy by gold commander.

Negotiation Strategy:

- ① Open + honest
- ② Never lying
- ③ Empathising with the individual
- ④ Being robust + pragmatic with them
- ⑤ Rapport building
- ⑥ Building trust.

Problems / Dilemmas  
 Dual roles - Taking on command roles whilst negotiating

Lack of sterile environment / scene control

Conflict as a result of rank?



1131 specific, um, but generally, um, what we're talking about here is moving the control  
1132 from the individual to the place, so it's about, I think, creating the impression initially  
1133 that... bolstering what they think that they're in control of it. That's, I'm quite happy to  
1134 go along with that, but then gradually as the incident goes along I think they realise  
1135 that actually, the sands appear to be slipping below their feet, and, um, that their  
1136 options are starting to come down a bit, and so it's about a pendulum of change in  
1137 perception about control. Um, I don't know however I'm [overtalking].  
1138

*Pendulum of  
change in perception  
about control.*

*Moving  
control  
from individual  
to the place -  
make them  
think they  
are in  
control  
but really  
the negotiators  
are in  
control.*

1139 IV No, no. That's okay. But the key thing for you is procedure? The initial point,  
1140 so you get the right procedures in place, you get the scene cordoned off...

1141  
1142 IE Absolutely. Absolutely.

1143  
1144 IV ...sterile, and then you've got more control as a negotiator?  
1145

1146 IE Absolutely. So what I, what I think about, and perhaps this is being a bit  
1147 defensive, but I think to myself, right, okay, in this situation, if we play that tape back  
1148 to a coroner, if this goes horribly wrong, have, have I adhered to policies and  
1149 procedures? And that's the absolutely key thing. If you have a very fancy, fresh  
1150 negotiator, and you come out with all some wonderful words and things, but if they  
1151 don't actually adhere to what the training says, then they're on a slippery slope. And  
1152 that's, that's what it's always about. Sometimes you have to cut corners, because you  
1153 can't fill in your formal log as you're speaking to someone, because you're the only  
1154 person speaking. Or you've only got you and one other, and you've got to be a little  
1155 bit practical, so you know you're cutting corners in any case, because you have to.  
1156 And, but, but as you quite rightly say, it's about trying to ensure that you adhere to all  
1157 the policies and procedures that we should be doing.  
1158

*Reliance on  
policy +  
procedure  
↳ Defensible  
decision  
making.*

1159 IV Okay. That's great. Thank you. Okay, um, what about any potential problems  
1160 that you've encountered when negotiating?

1161  
1162 IE In terms of what? The police, or with...?

1163  
1164 IV With anything. With, with the individual that you're negotiating with, or...

1165  
1166 IE Right. Okay. Yeah, okay. So, one of the problems would be when the  
1167 individual is talking to you, they want to speak to their girlfriend. You say, you can't  
1168 speak to your girlfriend, and then they pick up their own mobile phone and start  
1169 speaking to their girlfriend. Or there's people shouting up from the street, saying,  
1170 jump, or there's people telling him to stick, stay on the roof. So all, it's all to do with  
1171 other parties, um, intervening in the situation, so you're not being in control of the  
1172 scenario.  
1173

*Lack of  
control  
over situation  
Lack of  
scene  
control/  
sterile  
environment.*

1174 IV Okay. And what can you do to try and rectify that?

1175  
1176 IE Okay, so you're going to look at [unclear] physical, um, sterile zone, in which  
1177 there will be proper cordons, you can look at, in certain situations, get the  
1178 assistance of technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries. Um,  
1179 you can try and get them to... You can use an element of subterfuge, um, so it might  
1180 be that they're on the phone to you, um, um, but that, ah, you can actually work it out

*Strategies?  
Element of  
subterfuge.*

*Importance of  
sterile environment*



1181 that, um, your phone's not working, and the only way that it's going to work is that  
1182 you chuck in a field phone into that individual, so they're speaking to you on the field  
1183 phone. So those are some of the problems that you will experience.

Strategies  
Use of  
field  
phones  
(only incoming  
calls).

1185 IV Okay. That's great. Thank you. Okay, so moving on now to looking at some of  
1186 the role specific skills, um, that are required for negotiating, what skills do you think  
1187 that you actually utilise, mainly, when you're dealing with crisis situations?

1189 IE Okay. Empathy. Um. Effective listening, clarity, honesty, um, rapport  
1190 building. I think those communication skills, um, respecting the individual, all those  
1191 things I think come together to try and actually get quite a good, polished negotiating  
1192 performance. So real clarity, ah, not making any assumptions, so we'll get the call that  
1193 there's apparently a man wanting to do this, or doing that, and we think it's to do with  
1194 this and that, but actually, when you get there, it's actually something that's very, very  
1195 different, and so it's not making assumptions, and just working through things very  
1196 logically and carefully, and I think it's also about the establishment of roles and  
1197 responsibilities. That's a very key thing, and again that's about setting out the stall, the  
1198 police stall, correctly, so you get to a scene, and it's... but sometimes I don't do this.  
1199 Um, but it's really important to try and establish, right, you're doing that role, I'm  
1200 doing this role, and you're doing that role, so everybody understands. Once you get  
1201 that clear, and sometimes we don't do that, um, it does tend to make things a little bit  
1202 clearer.

Negotiator  
Skills  
① Empathy  
② Effective listening  
③ Clarity  
④ Honesty  
⑤ Rapport building  
⑥ Communication skills  
⑦ Not making assumptions  
⑧ Working methodically (logically + carefully)  
⑨ Establishment of roles + responsibilities  
⑩ Respecting the individual

1204 IV Okay, okay. That's great. Thank you. Okay, and if you had to pick one  
1205 essential skill that you felt that your negotiators should have, or you as a negotiator  
1206 should have, what would it be?

1208 IE Effective listening.

1210 IV Okay, great. Thank you. Okay, so you've told me about what you think, what  
1211 aspect of what skills you think make a person a good negotiator, um, is there anything  
1212 else that you feel that might be important? Rather than a skill, maybe an attribute,  
1213 or...?

1215 IE Yeah. I think there is, ah, I think there's a degree of experience coming in here.  
1216 I think experience is an issue, um, but I can't, ah, [unclear] I'm worried about the  
1217 interview, because [unclear], but formally, I've never been able to say that, because of  
1218 course I'd then be getting into age discrimination and all this lot, but nevertheless I do  
1219 think that is important. I think it's important to have someone who has experienced  
1220 these sort of scenarios, not because of themselves, but sometimes they haven't been  
1221 [unclear]. But they've, they've, um, they've experienced getting involved in the siege  
1222 situation. They can understand how it works, and they've got a good... Perhaps a  
1223 better way of phrasing it, they've got a good, wide experience of different types of  
1224 policing, so I think that's important. Ah, and I think that there's a really importance  
1225 here about being relatively forthright, and not too humble in the presence of senior  
1226 officers. You know, I'll want people there who are able to say, well, actually, I think  
1227 we should do this, and have we thought about doing that? Brilliant. So I think  
1228 teamwork is a crucial thing that comes in here as well.

Negotiator  
attributes  
① Experience of different types of policing  
② Forthright and not too humble in presence of senior officers  
③ Teamworking abilities

1230 IV Yes. Great. No, that's great. Thank you very much. [Sighs]. Okay, so again,  
1231 this, this question you've probably answered in many ways, but if you've got anything  
1232 to add, please do. Um, what would you look for, if you were actually selecting people  
1233 to do this role, in terms of your, your officers, what would you look for specifically?  
1234

1235 IE Yeah, okay. So I'd be looking at those core competencies of communications,  
1236 of empathy, of decision-making, of clarity, logic, etc, etc, but I suppose, me,  
1237 personally, I'd be looking at, at people who are level-headed, but who are really  
1238 enthusiastic, and who are committed to the role. Sometimes, very rarely, we'll get  
1239 those people who do find it a bit of a shock to be part of a 24/7 rota when the phone  
1240 goes at three o'clock in the morning. Um, and what I'd also like is to know that we've  
1241 got a... and I think we've got, I think we've got a really good group of negotiators  
1242 here. No one ever feels, if they're dealing with a negotiator, it's that they're not out of  
1243 control. If it feels like they're getting out of control, or they're out of their depth, or  
1244 they've got problems, or they're getting psyched up about something, it's just not...  
1245 The most important thing is if they've got the ability to phone somebody else, and  
1246 somebody else can then come out and assist them, advise them of, because it's, at the  
1247 end of the day, it's all about teamwork.  
1248

1249 IV Mm. So it's a bit of insight into their own ability and how they cope, for  
1250 example, themselves. That's good.

1251 IE Absolutely.

1252 IV Okay.

1253  
1254  
1255 IE So what we want the individuals to do is we want the individuals to perhaps be  
1256 aware of their own, um, areas of, of development, and their own weaknesses and the  
1257 things that are going to get them worried, or concerned, or the things that they're not  
1258 very good about doing. So I can tend to... sometimes I tend to rush through  
1259 negotiations to get there quickly, and, because I can foresee how it's going. Other  
1260 people are a lot better than I am, and they're really a little bit slower, and they can  
1261 work it through. They'll eventually get there, probably, a bit quicker than I will, if  
1262 they've done a more of the effective listening, where some people can be too waffley  
1263 and they're too... they're not able to say, bring, they're not able to bring themselves to  
1264 say, yes, when you come out of this address, because you asked me, I'm telling you,  
1265 you are going to be arrested.  
1266

1267  
1268 IV Arrested.

1269 IE And they cannot do that. They just mumble it, and it just goes on and on, and  
1270 that is not what you want to negotiate.

1271  
1272 IV Right. So it's a balance between understanding and empathy, but also being  
1273 forthright and direct, to some extent.

1274  
1275 IE Right. That's totally right.

1276  
1277 IV Okay.

1278  
1279

Core Competencies

- ① Communication
- ② Empathy
- ③ Decision-making
- ④ Clarity
- ⑤ Logic
- ⑥ Level-headed
- ⑦ Enthusiastic
- ⑧ Committed to the role
- ⑨ Insight into own abilities
- ⑩ Teamwork / Camaraderie
- ⑪ Honesty

Model Negotiator  
↳ Experience  
Negotiator as a team discipline  
"identities"  
"features"

To the point / honest.

Negotiation Strategies

- A balance between being understanding and empathetic and forthright and direct.



1280 IE Being totally honest with the individual. If he's going to be arrested, he's going  
 1281 to be arrested. There isn't going to be anything that's going to change that. We're not  
 1282 going to say, well, if you come out, we won't arrest you, and then we arrest you. It,  
 1283 it's, you know, that, it's, um, it's... if they're going to be arrested they need to be told  
 1284 that, because otherwise, because they know the answer.  
 1285  
 1286 IV Yes [laughing].  
 1287  
 1288 IE If they're saying, am I going to be arrested, they know the answer all the time,  
 1289 and they're just testing you. So if you then say, no, you're not, and they know that they  
 1290 are not being dealt with by someone who's truthful, the chances are they'll stay in  
 1291 there for a lot longer period of time.  
 1292  
 1293 IV Right. No, that's very interesting. Okay, thank you very much. Okay. So, if we  
 1294 move on now to looking at the support structure that's in place, really, for negotiators,  
 1295 and coping strategies, or how you and other negotiators may cope with the situations  
 1296 you deal with, um, I've already touched upon this, but do you suffer from stress or  
 1297 anxiety at all, outside of your negotiator role, let's say?  
 1298  
 1299 IE Um, sometimes I do. Sometimes, because, you know, every day goes perfectly  
 1300 well.  
 1301  
 1302 IV Really?  
 1303  
 1304 IE So, ah, but stress in the formal sense, in terms of a capital S, no, I don't. Um,  
 1305 and what we do do is we have a system in place that, as I said earlier, where we have  
 1306 a formal 12-month check, but it was, outside of that check, you know, I, I, it's really  
 1307 important, I think, to enthuse and, and to encourage people, if they've got a very, very  
 1308 busy workload, for example, then if they want to step off the rota for six months, or a  
 1309 year, we've done that in the past, very successfully.  
 1310  
 1311 IV Right. Flexibility as well.  
 1312  
 1313 IE Yeah, and some of my colleagues have done that. And they've said, look, I  
 1314 could really do with a year off. And that's a fantastic thing to be able to say, and we've  
 1315 certainly been able to accommodate it. Um, so, so I think we've got that. I think, I  
 1316 don't know whether or not you may ask me questions about it, but I'll say it.  
 1317  
 1318 IV That's okay.  
 1319  
 1320 IE I think sometimes what we're not very good at doing, and then you won't be  
 1321 surprised by me saying this, is that sometimes we'll go from job to job to job. We will  
 1322 always have a debrief, um, of the incident. Or we should have a debrief of the  
 1323 incident. It's rare that we don't, although it's dependent upon certain partners. But  
 1324 sometimes that debrief doesn't quite pick out all the issues, and I remember, we had a  
 1325 gentleman a few years ago, who became a negotiator, and who was extremely  
 1326 unlucky, because I think it was the first two incidents that he went to each ended up in  
 1327 a death, and it was obvious he hadn't properly been debriefed. Ah, and that's  
 1328 something we're not very good at doing.  
 1329

Honesty

12 months health check


Options to have time out / time off the rota.

Flexibility


Need for a break from negotiating situations.

Importance of a proper Debrief

Appendix 16. Example Memo/Clustering Diagram 1



Appendix 17. Example Memo/Clustering Diagram 2





Appendix 18. Example Memo/Clustering Diagram 3




Figure 4.1. Memo/clustering diagram for the hostage and crisis negotiator experience model

**Appendix 19. Table Depicting the Number of Concepts and Categories Initially Identified Within Each of the Micro-Models Developed and Exemplars from Each Category**

Table 4.22. *Table Depicting the Number of Concepts and Categories Initially Identified Within Each of the Micro-Models Developed and Exemplars from Each Category*

Micro-Model	Concepts	Quaternary Categories	Tertiary Categories	Secondary Categories	Primary Categories
1	22	0	12	4	2
Example	Sad people on bridges	~~~~~	Suicide intervention	Spontaneous negotiation deployment	Crisis negotiation
2	103 (5)	0	32 (0)	12 (1)	5 (1)
Example	It's all about saving lives	~~~~~	Desire to help people	Externally-orientated motivations	Why? Reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world
3	92 (17)	23	15 (4)	8 (3)	3 (3)
Example	Establishing contact with subject early is important	Initiate communication with subject as soon as possible	Initiation of communication/dialogue with subject	Engaging with the subject	Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident resolution
4	51	0	23	7	3
Example	We all watch each other's back	~~~~~	The negotiator cadre as supportive	The negotiator family	Negotiation positives
5	30	0	0	18	3
Example	Requirement for negotiators to be of Sergeant rank or above	~~~~~	~~~~~	Minimum rank requirement	Negotiator entry requirements
Total	320	23	86	53	20

*Note.* Micro-Model 1 = The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation; Micro-Model 2 = The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey; Micro-Model 3 = The UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation. Micro-Model 4 = The UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience; Micro-Model 5 = The Self-Perceived Successful UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile. The numbers in brackets represent the concepts and categories identified as part of the model underpinning mechanisms.

## Appendix 20. Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Model

Table 4.23. Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Journey Micro-Model

Interview Transcript Excerpts		Concepts		Tertiary Categories		Secondary Categories		Primary Categories
<p>"I find it very, very interesting work, because it's about what policing should be. It's about saving lives" (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>"Why do I do it? Um, I make a difference. I, I get the opportunity to resolve a situation, whereas other times I arrange for other people to go and resolve that situation. Um, I genuinely care about people who are in crisis... Ah, and sometimes they're there because they can't help themselves and need a helping hand out... Um, I don't mind being that helping hand, to help people out" (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>"Um, I think it is genuinely to, to kind of try and help people... (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>"That genuine personal satisfaction that you've done the right thing, that you've done something really positive and changed somebody's direction in life. Stopped them ruining not just their life, but many others', people they sort of know and love them and whatever, it's a huge buzz" (L:M:7:54).</p> <p>"...then there's the really, you know, the real positive things, as I say, that sometimes you come away and you think, gosh, I really did make a difference today. Um, and that's... that's a great feeling" (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>"I also then get to be involved in incidents whereby I'm saving people's lives, um, I'm preventing serious harm to individuals, protecting vulnerable people, ah, which is incredibly rewarding" (E:M:3:114).</p>	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	Genuine desire to help people Desire to protect people and safeguard them (both individuals and the community) "It's about saving lives and catching villains" Police oath to serve and protect the public Vicarious/masked altruism (protecting individuals/community is personally rewarding/feeling of elation/importance from helping someone out of a difficult situation/to make a difference) To make a difference/to give something back (removal from the frontline due to rank/position results in less ability to make a difference)		1. Desire to help people 2. Vicarious pseudo-altruism (helping other people is personally rewarding)		1. Externally-orientated motivations		1. Why? Reasons for entering into (and remaining within) the negotiator world
<p>"...I thought, yes, I would and I'd like to do something because I do find my training role, um, lacking in... I deal with the police officers – I don't deal with the public anymore and I do miss that side of policing, actually, so it seemed to be a natural thing for me to do, which I did" (M:F:8:24).</p> <p>"...well first of all, I get to deploy operationally, periodically, um, which takes me away from the managerial role that I do" (E:M:3:114).</p> <p>"...it's the only time I see fresh air these days [Laughter]" (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>"...I get a lot of satisfaction from specialising in a bit of business" (G:M:4:111).</p> <p>"You get a lot of satisfaction, um... I genuinely feel for someone like...well, for me, I'll just speak for me, it's almost like a vocational thing in it. I sort of, as I've referred to before, I do enjoy a job that goes well. Um, when... I...I think there's possibly a bit of, um, self-aggrandisement, if you like, in that you've been called out in the middle of the night to a situation that a bunch of other bobbies have found really difficult, and I turn up with my colleague, and sometimes, quite quickly, we've sorted it all out, you know, and... You know, so...because then you get...there's probably, if I'm totally honest,</p>	7. 8. 9. 10.	"Down the coalface" - Provides non-operational officers with public interface/more hands on policing Provides senior officers/those with more managerial roles an opportunity to get their hands dirty/get involved with operational policing Short term positive reinforcement/reward (adrenalin rush/buzz/thrill seeking) Long term positive reinforcement/reward (enhanced self esteem from doing a good		3. Negotiation as an opportunity to be "down the coalface" 4. Self-aggrandisement/Ego-boosting		2. Self-orientated motivations		1. Why? Reasons for entering the negotiator world



there's a bit of an ego thing there, I'll...I'll admit to that. Uh, it doesn't work very well when it all goes badly, uh, but you know, so there's a double edged sword there, but you know, uh, I...I've always enjoyed, in the police, getting involved in the big jobs. So I can't deny that, you know, if there's a picture, a job in the front page of the [Anonymised Local Newspaper], you know, ah, my that, you know, that...that was... You know, uh, you know, when...when my son says, what...what were you doing banging around at three in the morning? Well, it's that one there, front page of the [Anonymised Local Newspaper], that was me!" (F:M:4:111).

"Um, but, again, that real satisfaction that you've played a significant role in what is really complex and difficult in policing terms" (E:M:3:114).

"...it's not for everybody" (A:M:1:156).

"Um, a lot of police officers could. Not any police officer. There are some I know who, who, God bless them, good people for certain roles, but they wouldn't do this role very well... Some of them rub people up the wrong way when they talk to them... And some of them don't think quickly enough on their feet to be able to, to, to, adapt their style to what's needed" (D:M:3:63).

"...because a lot of people come on the rota and then think, perhaps think this isn't for me... And they'll get off the rota..." (H:F:5:50).

IV: "Okay. And I mean would you recommend the role to others, for example?"

IE: "I do, if I... if I judge that they're sort of the kind of people who'd be, uh, who'd enjoy it, and bring benefit to it, you know, it's not for everybody" (F:M:4:111).

"...it's not for the sort of up and at them, biff, bash, boom, bosh" (L:M:7:54)

"...there are a few [police officers] that I wouldn't allow anywhere near the team" (K:M:2:111).

IV: "...Would you recommend the role to others?"

IE: "Only some [laughs]. I have... a couple of my colleagues, I've said, you need to look at this team. I've got one officer who's working with me at the moment. She's thought about it for a while, but she'd be really good. You can just see it in people; people that talk and people that can communicate; people that can get information from others that other people would never have extracted; your deep thinkers really" (C:F:2:96).

IV: "...And would you recommend the role to others?"

IE: "Yes."

IV: "Okay. To everyone?"

IE: "No [chuckles]."

IV: "Just to certain people?"

IE: "Um, no, because people are more direct and some people will want that quick solution. Some people are not necessarily more physically threatening but are certainly more imposing in their need to get things done and get things done quickly. I absolutely recognise those skills, and in the majority of cases that's exactly what we

job/helping others)

11. Feeling of fulfilment/self-importance/satisfaction from being involved in something that big/being pivotal in resolving crisis situations

12. Ego boosting

13. Self-aggrandisement

14. Negotiation conceptualised as a "craft"/art-form/special skill within the police

15. It is not for everyone

16. Not every police officer is right for the role

17. Some officers lack the right mind-set/characteristics/attitude to be a negotiator (i.e. not patient/empathic enough; lack ability to reserve judgement; lack compassion; rub people up the wrong way/ you don't want a hero)

18. Ability of negotiators to recognise other negotiators/Negotiators as "tuned in" to what a negotiator looks like/can recognise a negotiator from the way they speak/how they behave and how they present themselves

19. Negotiators as a certain type of person

20. Negotiators as born and not made

5. "It isn't for everyone"

6. Negotiators are a "certain type of person/police officer"

3. Not every police officer could be a negotiator

2. Who and how? Negotiator profile and selection

want for a quick and safe resolution. But where it doesn't work they are the last people that you would want in a protracted negotiation" (I:M:6:84).

"It's a, sort of, three tier process, where there's a written application form, there is a, um, an exercise – a scenario to deal with – and then finally, there's an interview" (D:M:3:63).

"...when we select them in [Anonymised Force] we have a selection process where we mark... we ask them for, to look at the role profile and put in a, an application, it's actually an application book now. So you look at effective communication, um, decision-making, um – what are the other areas? Problem solving; um, there's nothing in there about strategy; um, flexibility; um, and resilience. So all of those... they put in their written application against those headings... and then we mark them between, um, nought and three, depending on how much evidence for each one. And there's a weighting, and then we total it all up. And, um, the top... depending on how many we need, depends on how many we call for interview" (B:M:2:195).

"And then we will, then, invite those individuals along to a practical exercise, and typically that will be a simple, a very simple scenario of, you, you've got 30 minutes to negotiate with someone who is behind that door, but really simple, so it will be like a domestic incident, or an easy role play" (A:M:1:156).

"You're given no other preparation, you know, the time... the time is now, uh, you are a negotiator, the phone's going to ring, and they took you through a role-play scenario with an actor playing somebody who was in crisis or was threatening harm to somebody" (F:M:4:111).

"...and then the second stage was a sit down sort of formal interview" (L:M:7:54).

"So once you get through the shortlisting process, and then I came on an assessment day where I had various scenarios that I needed to deal with, um, and then that resulted in the end in an interview, and that's when I knew that I'd passed the selection procedure" (M:F:8:54).

"Um... was it just those two? And then we had the interview after that... The main questions of, why do you want to do this? What skills have you got? What would you do in these circumstances? That sort of thing" (N:F:8:34).

"A week's course, regional course in [Anonymised Place]. I think there were about twelve of us, um, from the region. Um, there was a lot of, um, lectures initially and then there was practical role-plays and you rotated your roles. And then very much after a week's course, you know, you're now... you are qualified as a level two negotiator..." (C:F:2:96).

"My initial training, ah, was a, a regional negotiator's course – which is a one week intensive course, starting on a Sunday night, finishing on a Friday afternoon – and that's, um, classroom-based for some of the day and then you go, um, out of the classroom environment and actually practise your skills in a scenario-based, ah, learning exercise. And that's pretty consistent for the week, sort of, a morning in the classroom an afternoon learning scenario" (D:M:3:63).

21. Paper-based application / expression of interest	7. Paper-based application	4. Three tier selection process	2. Who and how? Negotiator profile and selection
22. Why do you want to be a negotiator?	8. Role play scenario based assessment		
23. Assessment of core competencies required for the role	9. Traditional panel interview		
24. Scenario based role play to assess potential negotiator skills/see how they cope under pressure			
25. Role play as realistic representation of likely deployment situations (suicide/crisis intervention via telephone)			
26. Formal panel interview (interviewed by senior members of the negotiator cadre)			
27. Context of training as a means of combining academic theory with practice (i.e. combining academic inputs/lectures with practical exercises)	10. Combining theory with practice	5. Nature and context of negotiation training	3. Negotiator training
28. Theory of active listening, communication methods, crisis intervention, models of negotiation Practical exercises used to test negotiation skills (assessed by qualified negotiators)	11. Training as intense and incremental in nature		

“...on that course [regional course] would be a variety of theoretical inputs, and also practical inputs, where you’ll be tested and scored against certain criteria and given feedback” (A:M:1:156).

“So the course, straight to Hendon, fortnight residential at Hendon, structure of the course very gruelling, in that you’re in the classroom from half eight having inputs all day, short break for tea, and then you’re straight back, uh, in the evening, uh, for six o’clock, for exercises that will run through till they finish. And then at ten, eleven, midnight, you’ll then have a debrief process, where you’ll go, in an informal setting with a beer, uh, but have a formal debrief of the, uh, the event, get individual feedback, and then, you know, you... you’; go to bed about midnight, one o’clock, and then you’re back in class the next morning. Yes, I think there’s an element of machismo about that, to be honest, you know, because it’s a tough course” (F:M:4:111).

“...so it will build up from a very simple domestic violence incident.. to a more complicated incident where there’s perhaps two people that you’ve got to negotiate with, so the complexity of negotiations, um, develops as you go through the course...” (A:M:1:156).

“You know, they, they got you out of bed very early in the morning and... um, got you working on the theory and knowledge leading towards some sort of demonstration of the, ah, that, that you understood what you’d been given and then could apply it... There was some, some quite intensive debriefing... And gradually as the two weeks went on, the scenarios that we used, ah, become slightly more intense... More towards the serious end... Or not serious, um, on a scale they would be the, the serious end of that scale... So for instance, you start with the basic suicide intervention... And we would finish with a massive terrorist hijacking at, um, Heathrow Airport” (B:M:2:195).

“...it started off, again, with suicide intervention and domestic siege, er, and then over the course of the two weeks, built up so that the scenarios were more complex and the, um, type of negotiation was slightly different as well in as much as you’re also dealing with more hostage incidents” (K:M:2:111).

“...phenomenally long hours...the most intensive course I’ve ever dealt with, in the Police Service” (L:M:7:54).

“...a four weeks course, crammed into two” (G:M:4:123).

“And then to be given the skills of unpicking that and to put those skills into practice of an exercise, um, and then to sit through it the following day, tired and more tired and more tired... Ah, four weeks ago, I ended up doing 21 hours at work, because we had a kidnap running. And all of that took place after my day job had, finished. I was tired, um, but you learn techniques of resilience. And one of the... I’m certain it; it was an unintentional objective of the course. Maybe it wasn’t, but you learn the techniques of being resilient... and rising to the challenge when you’re tired... And that’s quite important... Three o’clock in the morning when that phone goes off, you’re awake and you’ve got to operate straight away” (G:M:4:123).

29. Role play used to test negotiator skills and assess abilities in relation to different potential scenarios
30. “Back to backs” used frequently within training
31. Role play as a vital component within negotiator training/Role play at the heart of negotiator training
32. Training scenarios increase in severity as the training progresses (i.e. from suicide/crisis intervention to a terrorist siege)
33. Training as intense in nature

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|--|--|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>34. Training scenarios as extreme/OTT/farfetched – designed to test you (if you can deal with this then you can deal with anything)</li> <li>35. Training designed to see whether you can cope under pressure/test your resilience/teach resilience</li> <li>36. Training designed to simulate the</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12. Training designed to test resilience</li> <li>13. Training designed to simulate the reality of negotiating</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Negotiator training objectives</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Negotiator training</li> </ol> |
|--|--|---|--|

<p>“Yes, sleep deprivation, getting cold out during the night, it’s all part of the psychology, behind the scenes I guess, to make sure that you are, you know, not somebody that performs nine to five and then you go home. In fact, I can count on one hand the amount of times I’ve been called out during the working day, it’s always in the evening or weekend” (L:M:7:54).</p> <p>“Uh, so yes it does; it simulates that long day, the tiredness, and if you like, you’ve done your day job in class, and then you’ve been called out in the evening to do something for real, you know” (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>“So they are probably fourteen to fifteen hour days in any event to try and simulate the tiredness. They just don’t do the small o’clock phone call to go with it” (I:M:6:84).</p>	<p>reality of negotiating (i.e. when you have done a full day at work and then get called to a job)</p>				
<p>“Ah, yes well experience is a great thing. Um, it certainly contributes towards you, um, developing some expertise around it...” (E:M:3:114).</p> <p>“Especially when you are new to it. Because, um, like everything in the police, as, as soon as you, um, qualify, there’s an assumption by the public that you’re an expert at what you do. You’re far from it. And it takes years, you know, to learn it really” (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>“My view is, um, no matter what role I am, my junior, ah, colleague is going to speak... And I’ll always put them in to bat... Because I’m at the stage now, where I feel comfortable enough to do that and I want them to have the exposure... Because they... I’ve got two years left doing the job, before I go and find something else; they are the future beyond that... And unless we give them that exposure and that experience... Then they’re going to feel uncomfortable and unready for it... Sometimes it’s a brutal, brutal, ah experience” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“I was very fortunate that once I’d been, done the initial course and gone onto a rota we went through a busy period, so I had a lot of early jobs to allow me to practise those skills in a live situation without having to rely on the theory side of it solely” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“Um, I think it’s very powerful to learn, actually on the job and do the scenario” (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>“When you get that first one out of the way, because it’s a difficult one, because then you’ve got, you know, you feel all right, I now know what to do” (N:F:8:34).</p>	<p>37. Importance of operational negotiator experience in negotiating/on-the-job training</p> <p>38. Need for negotiators to be of sergeant/inspector rank or above to reflect operational experience</p> <p>39. Experience/live deployment builds confidence/reaffirms belief in ability</p> <p>40. Baptism by fire</p> <p>41. Learning by doing</p>	<p>14. On-the-job training/experience as increasing negotiator ability and skills</p> <p>15. Learning by doing/Baptism by fire</p>	<p>7. No substitute for the “real thing”</p>	<p>3. Negotiator training</p>	
<p>“It’s a perishable skill though. Unless you actually do the do, then... it does die off” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“...you go through periods where you get quite a few calls, and then you kind of have sort of four, five months with nothing, and you then find yourself on call, and you think, I’m just going to have a look through my bag, and just refresh my mind, so actually, it does, um... The more you’re doing it, the more comfortable and confident you feel” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“...there’s no substitute for actually getting back and getting in there and start using it... Or else you’ll lose it” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“So between forces what happens is that, and this is mandated nationally, each region,</p>	<p>42. Importance of regular utilisation of skills</p> <p>43. Negotiation as a perishable skill</p> <p>44. “If you don’t use it you lose it”</p> <p>45. Formalised CPD opportunities</p> <p>46. Force-specific/In-force quarterly team meetings</p> <p>47. Regional quarterly meetings to share best practice</p> <p>48. Annual/bi-annual/tri-annual call</p>	<p>16. Negotiation as a perishable skill (“If you don’t use it, you lose it”)</p> <p>17. Use of formal/informal CPD opportunities to reflect upon performance and share best practice</p>	<p>8. Continuing Professional Development</p>	<p>55. Negotiator training</p>	

<p>so we're in the [Anonymised Region], must hold quarterly meetings, and that's where you get each force coordinator in the role there... The emphasis there is, we have a continuous development plan, in terms of how negotiating within the [Anonymised Region] develops, and how you learn. And at each of those meetings again, similar to the force meeting, we will go round the table and say, right, lessons learned" (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>"Yes. What we have is... again, those training days always include, er, a team meeting. Separate to that, we also have, er, regular meetings of the coordinators on the force where we share, um, good and bad practice and lessons learnt. Um, we also have our own, er, site on the force intranet and that includes, um, a list of incidents of note where negotiators have been deployed and also includes a deployment form where, after every deployment, we submit a form to say we've been deployed, what the outcome was, what lessons there were, if any, what issues there were... Um, I should mention also we've got the POLKA website, which is national" (K:M:2:111).</p>	<p>out training exercises with firearms</p> <p>49. Regional negotiator conferences/seminars/forums/annual international conference for negotiators</p> <p>50. Informal CPD opportunities</p> <p>51. Use of in-force deployment records (intranet) as learning tools</p> <p>52. Self-directed learning / reading / CPD (up to the individual to recognise need for CPD and hone skills)</p> <p>53. Use of the Police OnLine Knowledge Area (POLKA)</p> <p>54. Peer-to-peer mentoring/buddying/observation/learning from other negotiators</p>			
<p>"...the selection is geared mainly towards selecting people to go on the regional course and join the team at that level; dealing mainly with domestic sieges or suicide interventions" (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>"I certainly think the regional was a good introduction, um, but the, obviously, the caveat with the regional course is that they wouldn't expect you to go and start dealing with a hostage situation anyway, that you'd be... you could go in as support, but you wouldn't be the number one or two negotiator" (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>"...traditionally you've got, if you get called out, you've got your national and you've got your NSO [Negotiator Support Officer]" (N:F:8:34).</p> <p>"Um, [Anonymised Force] insists on a regional course followed by a national course. National policy is you can go straight to a national course, but there aren't enough spaces. So a lot of forces, us included, will have a, a regional training, ah, which is an eight-day course that deals with everything short of international terrorism, negotiating via intermediaries – normally because of the language barrier – ah, but isn't approved for hostage real hostage scenarios; it's persons in crisis" (I:M:6:84)</p> <p>"I would respond to anything I get called out to, really. Um, but I would say, having not done the National Course, that if there was a hostage, ah, well anything really I would probably, um, I'd let the National, the National chaps then, yeah, sort of take the lead, really..." (M:F:8:24).</p> <p>IV: "Okay, great, thank you. Once you'd actually been selected, what training did you receive?"</p> <p>IE: "Um, a week's course for the regional, um, or the... not the regional, well it's a regional course but it was the support officer, the negotiating support officer role."</p>	<p>55. Negotiators within the cadre trained to different levels</p> <p>56. Regional (Level 2) Trained Hostage Negotiator is trained to respond to crisis incidents</p> <p>57. National (Level 1) Trained Hostage Negotiator is trained to respond to crisis and hostage incidents</p> <p>58. Hostage Negotiator Coordinator has completed HNC training and takes a supervisory/management role</p> <p>59. "Red" Negotiator has completed Red Centre Training and is trained to respond to kidnap and extortion situations</p> <p>60. Force Lead Negotiator Coordinator is the lead for the negotiator cadre within the force</p> <p>61. Regional Lead Negotiator Coordinator is the regional hostage negotiator lead and</p>	<p>18. Level 1 negotiator</p> <p>19. Level 2 negotiator</p> <p>20. Hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC)</p> <p>21. Red negotiator</p>	<p>9. Negotiator cadre roles</p>	<p>4. Operational negotiator roles</p>

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IV: "Okay.

IE: "Which is what I do at the moment."

IV: "So is that basically you're, you're number two, as it were? So you're a secondary negotiator?"

IE: "Yes, yeah, yeah. Doesn't always work like that, you quite often end up being number one because you get there first, but, but, yes, it's traditionally you've got, if you get called out, you've got your national and then you've got your NSO [Negotiating Support Officer]" (N:F:8:34).

"I'm also red centre trained for kidnap..." (B:M:2:195).

"There's something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a kidnap or a hostage environment. Um, because effectively, in an overt world, the subject in crisis knows that you're there and knows that you're working for the cops. In a kidnap world where there's a threat to life, very often they can't know that the police are involved, so there's different techniques in how you deal with them... So that's the Red Centre world" (I:M:6:84).

"Yes, I did, the Red Centre course, um, about 18 months ago... And it's, it's for kidnap and extortion... Um, so it's, you have, you obviously take the person that someone's trying to blackmail, or... The victim communicator, we call them. And you kind of, they act as the, they're the number, you're their number one... But they do the talking... And obviously the, the aggressor doesn't know... The police are in the room with them, and the set up and everything" (H:F:5:50).

"And then moving on again, you then have the coordinator training which is again separate, which is another... I think it was three or four days, three days I think" (K:M:2:111).

"I was the coordinator, on for the day and, um, my number one rang me and she said, um, I've got this issue. In fact she said; I had a strange call. Well go on, what's the call? Well this detective has rung me and said, um, if you had somebody who was involved in a kidnap, where would you take them to? Where would you put them so it's safe? She said, ah, I'd probably take them to such and such a hotel. Oh, that's fine, thank you very much indeed... So, she thinks no more of it until she gets a call back, about an hour later to say, um, I've been to the hotel, they know nothing about police facilities here and I'm here with the family of the person who's, who's been taken hostage. And she says; who's been taken hostage? Oh there's a guy... a job running? What do you mean there's a job running? Well there's a job running. Well, you didn't tell me that. Well there is and we've now blown our, our safe house... So what do we do? So she went, stay there don't go anywhere, I'll ring you back. And she's one of our more junior negotiators, so she rings me and she goes, oh, what do I do? I say, okay, calm down. So there's a bit of mentoring and a teaching... You make your way. We, we agreed where the new safe house was going to be, you make your way to, to there, ah and I will, ah, put arrangements in place for that. But for goodness sake, take control, of, of that family" (G:M:4:123).

usually represents the region at the National Negotiator Working Group

62. Gold Negotiator Advisor has been trained specifically to be able to advise gold commanders in large scale/protracted incidents

*"We have a line management structure... So for instance I line manage at the moment one, two, three active negotiators. So there's an opportunity there to discuss one-on-one with them the learning points or significant points that have come out of an incident" (B:M:2:195).*

*"I'm one of six coordinators, so at any one time we have a coordinator on-call, ah, and two other people on-call to go as a team of three" (I:M:6:84).*

*"...my colleague was the number one negotiator, so talking; and he was talking to him as we were driving down" (C:F:2:96).*

*"Um, the team worked well though. [Anonymous Negotiator] was talking. Um, I, ah, I was in there and a fellow called [Anonymous Negotiator] was, was in there and we dropped into our roles really quickly of, of supporting and keeping the boards and the logs running... And the intelligence feed backwards and forwards and, and so on and so forth" (G:M:4:123).*

*"...if you turn up, and the first responder, to use the jargon is doing well, has established a good rapport, well, you... we have the number one, number two, and number three roles, in an ideal world, actually, you assume number two then, and you support the untrained responder. Because if they're doing well, why disrupt it all?" (F:M:4:111).*

*"...I was the supporting person; I was the number two, so the main role was – stand by my colleague" (C:F:2:96).*

*"...our operating procedure that we, we have a duty number one who's, who is the on call, has a fast vehicle that they keep with them all week... And we have a 40 minute response time to anywhere in the force... So we're hurtling around in blues and twos... In that thing... Um, the number two may vary during the week, but the number one always knows who his number two is... Um, now... and, and generally the number one goes in to speak and the number two comes on behind, picks up the pieces and supports him" (G:M:4:123)*

*"...I was working with one other negotiator, and also a coordinator. So my role was to back up that number one negotiator..." (A:M:1:156).*

*"It's one of the reasons we try to always have the, um, a secondary negotiator there sort of monitoring for that. There are certain situations, um, I've certainly felt it myself and I've certainly pulled other negotiators for it where they reach a point where actually, they get really annoyed with the person they're talking to, and so, um, one of the roles really is to, is to look for that in the primary, pull them away, engineer a bit of development time and say to them look, this is what's happening... Um, if necessary change them. But usually, pull them and say right, this is what it is, he's getting under your skin and this is why. Then it's okay and they can go back in. They recognise it and they deal with it" (K:M:2:111).*

*"It's easier when you've got a second negotiator with you because you can sotto voce, you can just, just, um, exchange a few views, get a, get a triangulation on what's going on and, on occasion, swap negotiator as well" (D:M:3:63).*

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|--|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 63. The negotiation process as a machine (with each team member acting as a cogwheel)  | 22. Primary negotiator ("Number 1"/"The communicator")                          | 10. Negotiator cell roles | 4. Operational negotiator roles |
| 64. Minimum of two negotiators deployed to any call out (never negotiate alone/avoid negotiating alone)  | 23. Secondary negotiator ("Number 2"/"The supporter and advisor")               |                           |                                 |
| 65. Importance of matching negotiators in terms of personality (i.e. so that they can operate effectively as a team)   | 24. Hostage negotiator coordinator (HNC) ("The supervisor and command liaison") |                           |                                 |
| 66. Two/Three main actors within the negotiation process and each have different roles within the negotiating cell   |   |                           |                                 |
| 67. Primary negotiator as the Number 1   |   |                           |                                 |
| 68. Primary negotiator is in direct communication with the subject and does the talking (or may advise first responder/TPI if a relationship/rapport has already been established) |   |                           |                                 |
| 69. Secondary negotiator as the Number 2/Negotiator Support Officer (NSO)  |   |                           |                                 |
| 70. Secondary negotiator as the support role – advises/supports the primary negotiator/used as a sounding board  |   |                           |                                 |
| 71. Secondary negotiator monitors negotiations and makes suggestions (i.e. Post-it notes)  |   |                           |                                 |
| 72. Secondary negotiator will liaise with bronze command in the absence of a Hostage Negotiator Coordinator (i.e. takes  |   |                           |                                 |

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*"I'm one of six coordinators, so at any one time we have a coordinator on-call, ah, and two other people on-call to go as a team of three. And, predominantly, I will go to the scene with the two members of staff and I'll set the tactics that I'll want them to employ" (I:M:6:84).*

*"Er, the idea of the coordinator, really, is to provide advice to the silver commander. So there's a little bit of cross over with the team leader role, but, um, the coordinator really should be, er, assessing the progress of negotiation, making recommendations to the silver and, er, ideally, er providing written updates to the silver as well" (K:M:2:111).*

*"Position papers are effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw up a position paper which says, at this time this is what's happening, these are the considerations, these are the issues that seem to escalate it, these are the issues that de-escalate it, this is the way that I think that the negotiation strategy should go, um, that kind of thing. And we also do things like mood charts; so whereby we'll plot time against mood, um, that sort of thing... Ah, what else have we got? Ah, then we look at welfare of staff..." (E:M:3:114).*

- requests/updates them on the status of the negotiation)
73. Secondary negotiator acts as an emotional check point (monitors primary negotiator's emotions)
  74. Secondary negotiator monitors risk to primary negotiator and perform dynamic risk assessment (i.e. checks the primary negotiator isn't getting sucked in/drawn in/too close to the subject)
  75. The Hostage Negotiator Coordinator performs a supervisory/line management role
  76. The Hostage Negotiator Coordinator is responsible for monitoring the content/progress of negotiations/The HNC oversees/informs negotiation strategy
  77. The HNC liaises with silver command/firearms commander (HNC acts as a conduit to the commander who makes the decisions – i.e. HNC acts as the bronze commander of the negotiators)
  78. HNC advises bronze/silver command on use of strategies/tactics that can be offered by negotiators
  79. HNC will sometimes complete position papers to provide a synopsis of key parties involved
  80. HNC monitors and is responsible for the welfare of the primary and secondary negotiators
  81. HNC may have to obtain permission/authorisation for tracking of phone calls etc.
  82. HNC is often the first point of
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	contact for the control room and has to deploy/turn out primary/secondary negotiators				
<p><i>“We always insist that the negotiators themselves after an incident, always actually have their own little debrief, because sometimes you might get a little bit of conflict between two negotiators dealing with it, so you might have dealt with a certain something, I would have disagreed with the way that you dealt with it, so we need to make sure that, okay, yeah, the person came down safely; are we okay between ourselves? So we always do that... We always then have the part of the formal command debrief” (A:M:1:156).</i></p> <p><i>“She fell probably 25, 30 foot and got some quite serious injuries, that obviously all the team had witnessed. Um, the first part that... we’d already told them that would happen was that their recording sticks would have to be seized and so on to make sure that they were open to scrutiny. They did the hot debrief on the night; they had a follow-up debrief the following day” (I:M:6:84).</i></p> <p><i>“Um, whereas, the people who just dealt with that situation, if they’ve got a supervisor, if there’s anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she’ll regroup everybody, and they’ll talk through the process. One is a debriefing for, for learning. And the other one, just to check that everybody’s behaving as they normally do [Laughs]” (O:F:9:36).</i></p> <p><i>“Okay, well the way we do it, we basically get paired up with somebody of more experience, and whenever there’s a job on, we try to go out and get involved, learning from the more experienced person” (L:M:7:54).</i></p> <p><i>“...we had one [a newly qualified negotiator] work with us on Tuesday. We called her... she said, oh thanks for calling me. I said, it wasn’t me, it was the control room! She said, it’s great to listen, because she’d done her regional course but it was nothing like the live scenario. She’s eyes open, ears open, and she was looking at me and [Anonymised Negotiator]; what we were doing; how we did it; what we were thinking about. She was able to listen, read the log, give her opinion on things” (C:F:2:96).</i></p> <p><i>“The process now is that you would, first of all, go on a week-long regional course, which means that you can, um, deploy as soon as you come back. But what we do not is a mentoring scheme, whereby you’re effectively shadowed by an operational negotiator, who will deploy with you on a number of occasions and then make an assessment whether or not you are ‘match fit’, and able to deploy individually” (E:M:3:114).</i></p> <p><i>“...if I needed... if I ...if I had a particularly traumatic incident or something, you know, I know I have utter confidence that the senior negotiators would, uh, be in touch to see if I need... If, for example, tonight, I got called out and there was a fatality at an incident, I... you know, and this has happened to somebody else quite recently, I know, the... the very next day, if not at the time, you know, I’d have... my phone would be going, and it’d be, you know, is everything okay, is there anything you need? You</i></p>	<p>83. Debriefing process (differs across forces)</p> <p>84. TRIM (Trauma Response Incident Management) panel</p> <p>85. Use of Hostage Negotiator Coordinator/Mentors as support</p> <p>86. Buddying/shadowing system between experienced/new negotiators in some forces</p> <p>87. In-house welfare /counselling services</p> <p>88. Specialist independent counselling services in some forces</p> <p>89. Occupational health provision /Access to Force Medical Advisor</p> <p>90. Post Incident Management Trained team members</p> <p>91. Employer assistance programme</p> <p>92. Mandated annual psychological welfare checks in some forces</p> <p>93. Access to psychologists in advisory role/negotiator welfare capacity in some forces (Force Psychologist Advisor)</p> <p>94. Stepping off the rota</p>	<p>25. Debriefing procedures</p> <p>26. Buddying/shadowing system</p> <p>27. Occupational health/welfare provision</p> <p>28. “Stepping off the rota”</p>	<p>11. Force-specific formalised support mechanisms</p>	<p>5. Negotiator welfare and support</p>	

know, they'd point me in the direction of occupational health, and the critical incident debriefing and all the rest of it... So I... you know, I've got a lot of confidence that there would be people coming to me from all sides, checking that I had everything I needed" (F:M:4:111).

"...in those situations, we would have a debrief and if it's one, um, where it's required, there is also... we have a procedure called TRiM which is, um, I think most forces use it now, the trauma risk management... And it comes from the Royal Marines and all the forces use it now. Um, so that is just basically making sure people are okay, really. Um, but then separate to that, what you've got is if, for example, that somebody's been killed, then, um, there are set post incident procedures and as part of them, they've, they've... we now have something called post incident manager, um, we've made sure we've got a couple of people in the force who are, um, post incident managers and who are aware of who the negotiator was and what they're doing... They basically effectively become your welfare officer... Um, we've got all the.. as I said, the TRiM is your basic, um, and then obviously you could be referred into occupational health or what have you" (K:M:2:110).

"Ah, mandated, we should go, ah, once every 12 months to see occupational health; we don't have to talk to them when we get there, but we do have to go" (I:M:6:84).

"Um, we've got our yearly, our annual, um, sort of welfare assessment with a mental health nurse, um, which we go to as negotiators..." (J:F:6:110).

"Um, some of my colleagues have been off the rota for one reason or another, for a period of time, and we'll put them back into the rota when they're ready and we will give them support" (D:M:3:63).

"...one of them, when she first qualified, uh, she had a job which was putting an awful lot of pressure on her, so she was working long hours, it was in an area of work to do with, um, where there was a high stress level to do with child protection issues and so on, and she was taking her work home, married to a, an officer, serving officer as well, and there were concerns about her performance at work from her own day job, if you like, so this was fed to me. I spoke with her, um, and we agreed mutually that she wouldn't get deployed just for then, and then we made some further contact, things had improved greatly, her workload had reduced. Um, I was being put under pressure to say that's she'd still got problems, she shouldn't be deployed, but she was coming to me saying I want to be deployed, why am I not being deployed? So we ended up... we went by, by mutual agreement she went to the force medical advisor, the FMA who works here on behalf of the force. Uh, he looked at the issues and said no, from what she says and from what I can observe she is deployable, in fact it would do her good, so she has been deployed a couple of times and she's coming on quite well. So we have a flexible, reactive system to that..." (B:M:2:195).

"Um, and usually, after a job, you know, if there are a couple of you, you'll sit down and have a cup of tea together and talk it through, and that helps a lot" (J:F:6:110).

"Often, within the negotiator group we support each other straightaway anyway..."

95. Peer support	29. Peer support from other members of the cadre	12. Self-directed negotiator coping strategies	5. Negotiator welfare and support
96. Obtaining support/mentoring/coaching from			

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(E:M:3:114).

*"We've got our own, like, mentor, which is one of the... um, coordinators... So if I've got any issues, I know I can go and speak to them"* (N:F:8:34).

*"I know when we did have one [a fatality] that other team members sent those colleagues, um, supportive messages; text messages or emails or picked up the phone... Yeah, and I think that made them feel not isolated; not on their own and that they could talk if they needed to"* (C:F:2:96).

*"The big, um, coping strategy, as far as negotiating is concerned, is the team. Uh, they all know what we go through when things have been difficult. Talking to other team members, ring you up, you ring them up. That's, that's the best way of coping"* (D:M:3:673).

*"Yes, probably just go home and speak to my other half and that, really... Um, because you can't speak to the people that you work with especially being an inspector"* (N:F:8:34).

*"Talk about it with other colleagues. Sometimes the wife, sometimes not, depends on the situation"* (L:M:7:54).

*"Um, but my wife is absolutely great. I will offload to her and she'll sit down and nod, make a cup of tea if it needs it, tell me not to be stupid if I'm getting things out of proportion, you know... So I think just kind of having somewhere to offload and not bottle-up"* (G:M:4:123).

*"I'm private, I'm quite a private person... But I wouldn't keep things inside like that... I'd be saying to one of my mates, even... Even mates not in the job, I'd be saying I had an absolutely horrendous job today... You know. Somebody jumped, or somebody did this, or... you know... Just to talk about it..."* (H:F:5:50).

*"I cope with stress by talking it through with my wife, uh, sport, walking in the countryside, things like that, you know"* (F:M:4:111).

*"Yeah, I do sport as my number one, ah, really; exercise to blast out the adrenalin"* (C:F:2:96).

*"...I've got two black Labradors, and I do a lot of mountaineering and hiking... And I've got, I go out and bike with my boys..."* (O:F:9:36).

*"Yeah, I go for a really long run... It just lets you think things through, let's a bit of fresh air around you, and I find it personally, apart from the health benefits, it's really good for clearing your brain out"* (I:M:6:84).

*"I've had a number of coping strategies over the years, including drinking far too much..."* (E:M:3:114)

*"Again, they say you should never do it, but me, I go to the pub, have a beer"* (L:M:7:54).

*"Um, yes, I mean, there's the... there's the classic of going home and having a drink. Well, I will do that, you know. Um, I hate having headaches, so it won't be too much [Laughter]"* (J:F:6:110).

*"Um... I'd better not say drinking, had I? No... It, it is nice, sometimes, to have a*

colleagues/team members and or more senior/experience negotiators/HNCs

97. Use of POLKA discussion forums (support from other negotiators in the country)

98. Social support (from family/friends/colleagues)

99. Verbalising / talking about issues with family/friends/colleagues

100. Hobbies (i.e. going out on the boat; getting away from it all and switching off)

101. Exercise / Playing sport / Going for a run

102. Walking the dogs / Walking in the countryside

103. Drinking alcohol/going to the pub

30. Social support from family/friends/colleagues

31. Exercise and/or sport

32. Drinking alcohol

*drink and just talk about it, as in have a... Have a beer or a glass of wine, and to... To talk about it, which is nice*" (H:F:5:50).

Total number of concepts and categories identified:	103 Concepts	32 Tertiary Categories	12 Secondary Categories	5 Primary Categories
<p>“Probably, mm, about 20 a year for the last nine years, give or take; so probably between 150 – 200 incidents... Ah, yes well experience is a great thing. Um, it certainly contributes towards you, um, developing some expertise around it...” (E:M:3:114).</p> <p>“Especially when you are new to it. Because, um, like everything in the police, as, as soon as you, um, qualify, there’s an assumption by the public that you’re an expert at what you do. You’re far from it. And it takes years, you know, to learn it really” (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>“My view is, um, no matter what role I am, my junior, ah, colleague is going to speak... And I’ll always put them in to bat... Because I’m at the stage now, where I feel comfortable enough to do that and I want them to have the exposure... Because they... I’ve got two years left doing the job, before I go and find something else; they are the future beyond that... And unless we give them that exposure and that experience... Then they’re going to feel uncomfortable and unready for it... Sometimes it’s a brutal, brutal, ah experience.” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“Um, I think it’s probably part of my own personality, but I think there absolutely would have been some stress, but that would have been a lack of confidence stress rather than anything else. And I think I... I was very fortunate that once I’d been, done the initial course and gone onto a rota we went through a busy period, so I had a lot of early jobs to allow me to practise those skills in a live situation without having to rely on the theory side of it solely” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“When you get that first one out of the way, because it’s a difficult one, because then you’ve got, you know, you feel all right, I now know what to do” (N:F:8:34).</p> <p>“...the more you do, the more comfortable... You feel” (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>“...it’s always, um, a challenge, um, because people are always slightly different but you... the situation itself doesn’t faze you as much as perhaps it might have done in the past” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“Absolutely. Absolutely... I mean, the first time you get a call about a kidnap; your stomach just falls completely, from the sky... Crime in action, fact of life, massive, massive, massive risk. Now, okay, I can see clearly, exactly where it is we’re going with this one, what it is that we’re doing... Um, there’s always an adrenalin rush when they, when they come in and there’s always that initial, ah, flipping heck, what are we dealing with? Um, but I guess what the experience does, is it calms that more quickly” (G:M:4:123).</p>	<div><div>1.</div><div>Positive correlation between number of deployments and negotiator confidence</div></div> <div><div>2.</div><div>The more jobs you do the more confident you become</div></div> <div><div>3.</div><div>You become more robust the more incidents you deal with</div></div> <div><div>4.</div><div>Risk assessment ability improves with time/operational experience</div></div> <div><div>5.</div><div>Importance of on the job training/observation/operational negotiator experience for building confidence as a negotiator</div></div>	<div><div>1.</div><div>Confidence enhancement as a result of increased negotiator deployment</div></div>	<div><div>1.</div><div>Entire model underpinning mechanism</div></div>	
Total number of concepts and categories identified:	5 Concepts	0 Tertiary Categories	1 Secondary Category	1 Primary Category

## Appendix 21. Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Nature and Characteristics of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Model

Table 4.24. *Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Nature and Characteristics of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Micro-Model*

Interview Transcript Excerpts	Concepts	Tertiary Categories	Secondary Categories	Primary Categories
<p>“...sad people on bridges...” (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>“...people who are suicidal, on a high rise, or bridges, or tops of buildings” (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>“I got a call basically saying that it was a girl on a bridge, and, um, she would only speak to police women... She was going to throw herself off the bridge” (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>“Um, generally crisis intervention, really, people at height, um, some sort of personal, ah, situation that... in, in their lives... And/or aggravated by mental health and/or drugs... Um, seen a fair bit of psychosis, brought about by cannabis. Particularly skunk. Um, that’s causing people to get things out of proportion, a fair bit” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“I had one the week before last where it was not an enviable scenario where somebody is threatening... it was a high risk missing person threatening to kill themselves and very, um, you know, depressed...” (C:F:2:96).</p> <p>“We’ve got someone today who’s, um, a high risk, um, missing person... this 14 year old girl has gone off with a new boyfriend who they met on Facebook...” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“The typical incident that we deal with is someone refusing to come out of a premises, ah, after having committed some form of criminal offence... or they’re then to be questioned about an offence. So that tends to be an individual in a house, perhaps we want to execute a filed warrant, and we need them out of the house, or they’ve committed a domestic violence incident” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“The one that always sticks in my mind is a guy that was in a flat... He’d just smashed up the place but it was covered in blood and his girlfriend managed to leave the flat... And he was refusing to come out, and he’s cutting himself and there was, um, fuel all over the place... And he was threatening to set light, light to himself” (N:F:8:34).</p> <p>“...that was a barricade situation where a lady had, um, domestic, she chased her husband out with a knife, and then was threatening to assault anyone else who sort of came in” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“...the next category is the firearms operation where very much it’s part of the tactics in the planning for how you can resolve it, whether it’s spontaneous or pre-planned... And a negotiator team will be put in there to, um, as a part of a tactical option. So you end up putting in an early call to try and persuade the person to, you know, look out the window, you’re surrounded, come out with your hands held high, type thing.” (B:M:2:195)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Suicide/self-harm intervention</li> <li>2. Individuals in personal/emotional/psychological crisis</li> <li>3. “Sad people on bridges”/jumpers</li> <li>4. Mental health/substance abuse precipitated crisis</li> <li>5. High risk MISPERs (young/vulnerable missing persons)</li> <li>6. Criminals evading apprehension (wanted individuals/barricade after commission of an offence – i.e. domestic assault)</li> <li>7. Dwelling based barricade (<u>without</u> victims)</li> <li>8. Individual-in-crisis barricades self within a dwelling</li> <li>9. No victims involved in barricaded scenario (just the individual-in-crisis)</li> <li>10. Threat is to individual-in-crisis as opposed to any victims/hostages</li> <li>11. Facilitating execution of high risk warrants</li> <li>12. Firearms operational support</li> <li>13. Use of negotiators as protest liaison officers</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Suicide intervention (“Sad people on bridges”)</li> <li>2. Mental health/substance abuse precipitated crisis</li> <li>3. High risk MISPERs</li> <li>4. Criminals evading apprehension</li> <li>5. Dwelling based barricade (without victim(s))</li> <li>6. Provision of tactical operational support</li> <li>7. Protest demonstration liaison and</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Spontaneous negotiation deployment</li> <li>2. Pre-planned negotiation deployment</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Crisis negotiation</li> <li>1. Crisis negotiation</li> </ol>

<p>“Um, the role is changing, um, in as much as I think, ah, areas of use are increasing. The actual job of negotiating, I think, is pretty similar to how it was when I started, ah, but, increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations, um, such as dealing with protesters. If we’ve got, um, a group we know are going to come and protest in a particular area, and we fear there’s going to be an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, we’re getting negotiators involved in that to try and facilitate, um, a better outcome for all parties” (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>“And sometimes, for pre-planned operations, we miss negotiators out. So for example, recently we had a very large EDL march in [anonymised place], and there, I was a bit surprised that negotiators weren’t even consulted as part of the planning process...” (A:M:1:156).</p>	<p>14. Protest/demonstration liaison &amp; management (to ensure adherence to terms of engagement and ensure protest remains peaceful)</p> <p>15. Use of negotiators to support pre-planned marches (i.e. EDL)</p>	management				
<p>“Well, the specific one that’s most memorable would be in [Month, Year], being called out to two police officers who, who’d been taken hostage in [Anonymised] by an armed man” (E:M:3:114).</p> <p>“...it was a fellow who was mentally ill, lived in, ah, in [Anonymised Place]. Um, he had previously been in treatment for Schizophrenia and, um, had failed to maintain his regime and his contact with his physicians, to the point that, on, on a home visit, the CPN said, this guy is now dangerously unstable; we need to get control of him again... The psychiatrist decided that he knew better than the risk assessment and picked up one of his nurses and went to the house...where he was admitted by the man’s wife, shown into the lounge where the man said, excuse me a minute, disappeared and came back with a 9mm, ah, turned on the video camera and pointed the 9mm at the doctor... The CPN managed to get away and run away and raised the alarm. And then there were a series of demands that went in, from him, via his solicitor and from them to, to the cops. Um and we ended up with a fairly major siege, that ran for 48 hours” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“...domestic, household family-based crises where they end up in some sort of siege. Where they might not be threatening to kill themselves, but they’re threatening to do all sorts of things to all sorts of people. Often they don’t actually have a hostage but sometimes they do, you know. It’ll be partner, girlfriend, wife, children, whoever” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“...the majority of times where there’s been a hostage/victim there, it’s tended to be, um, a domestic siege type of thing where he’s also grabbed the kids or grabbed the wife. Or it’s been, um, something like a mental health assessment where he’d grabbed hold of whoever... Or it could be a friend, who just happens to be in there” (K:M:2:111).</p>	<p>16. Hostage-taking incidents (police officers taken hostage)</p> <p>17. Domestic siege incidents (<u>involving</u> victims)</p> <p>18. Domestic barricades (where family members/medical professionals prevented from leaving the premises)</p>	<p>8. Hostage-taking</p> <p>9. Domestic siege (involving victim(s))</p>	2. Overt negotiation	2. Hostage negotiation		

<p>“There’s something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a kidnap or a hostage environment. Um, because effectively, in an overt-world, the subject in crisis knows that you’re there and knows that you’re working for the cops. In a kidnap world where there’s a threat for life, very often they can’t know that the police are involved, so there’s different techniques in how you deal with them” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“It was probably about, my first deployment was not for about four months actually, and it was a kidnap, and it was international. Basically what had happened, we had a family in the north of the country, and demands were coming in from the hostage-takers in Indonesia, and the brother, who we had to negotiate through. Quite often, on those occasions, it turned out to be false previously, but that one was a genuine kidnap” (L:M:7:54).</p> <p>“So it’s not one where someone’s threatening, or is required to hand over £1 million and they’ve got the bank manager’s wife. It’s not that type of thing. It’s a drug deal for £150 that’s gone wrong” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“Um, that was a kidnap, about... A member of an organised crime group, um, who was of interest to us, in any case, had been snatched from outside his house, by, um, gangsters, bundled into a car, his mobile phone was thrown out of the car, before they sped off and he disappeared. And the intelligence picture was such that this was likely to become a murder. This was a significant incident of high risk and threat... it was without a doubt, a criminal vendetta.. a sum of money had exchanged hands somewhere, that had not gone through the family; it certainly hadn’t touched the police anywhere. Um, more likely to be that your victim, your hostage has been encouraged to do some electronic bank transfer of money whilst he was held. Um, and he turned up at about three o’clock in the morning, battered and bruised... in the local hospital” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“Um, and the guy had received a letter that said, um, that they can make some threats towards his business; that they’d got some compromising photographs of him, which they had, which were going to destroy his family life. Um, and this guy wanted a specific payment of £146,000” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>IE: “Most of the time, um, it can be a product contamination but they’re more rare. Most of the time, it tends to be they’re threatening to expose somebody.”</p> <p>IV: “Right, for something that could be potentially damaging, personally damaging to them perhaps?”</p> <p>IE: “Yes, we’re finding more of those internet related now where people are engaging in sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then... this film’s going to be released, it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account” (K:M:2:111).</p>	<p>19. Kidnap and Extortion Situations (i.e. “Red Centre” situations)</p> <p>20. Extortion/blackmail scenarios (product contamination threats; threats to discredit individual personally/professionally)</p> <p>21. Pseudo/fake kidnappings (i.e. Crime in Action)</p> <p>22. “Bad on Bad” kidnappings (gang/criminal vendettas, drug dealer conflict)</p>	<p>10. Kidnapping and Extortion</p> <p>11. Pseudo-kidnapping</p> <p>12. Extortion</p>	<p>4. Covert negotiation</p>	<p>2. Hostage negotiation</p>
Total number of concepts and categories identified:	22 Concepts	12 Tertiary Categories	4 Secondary Categories	2 Primary Categories

## Appendix 22. Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model

Table 4.25. Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Experience Model

Interview Transcript Excerpts	Concepts	Tertiary Categories	Secondary Categories	Primary Categories
<p>“Yeah, I, I think you’re right. Um, but I also think that this is where the, the family of negotiating comes in, that we all watch each other’s back” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“Within our own team, we’re quite supported... And there’s a, almost like a separate camaraderie that, ah, is lacking in lots of other areas I think at the moment” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“It’s quite close... it seems to be quite a close little team actually” (M:F:8:24).</p> <p>“They’re [my colleagues] brilliant, yeah. I think... one of the first things they say on your national course is this... have we got any individuals here? If we’ve got any individuals, you might as well get up and leave, because it’s not about you; it’s about the team thing. I don’t think we’ve really got anybody that I’ve worked with who... on our team who I think is not going to look after you as number one. You know, rule... making sure people have got drinks, people have got something to eat, people are warm enough; do they need a break? Yeah, it’s very supportive” (C:F:2:96).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. We all watch each other’s back</li> <li>2. We all support each other</li> <li>3. Camaraderie/comradeship within the cadre</li> <li>4. A team ethos</li> <li>5. Closely knit cadre</li> <li>6. Negotiation as a team discipline</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The negotiator cadre as supportive</li> <li>2. Camaraderie/comradeship</li> <li>3. Negotiation as a team discipline</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The negotiator family</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Negotiation positives</li> </ol>
<p>“And you don’t know... at that point in time, you don’t know how close you can get to the individual... and what that’s going to do. Um, and I guess that’s where the thrill of negotiating comes in, because you have to be mentally agile. It’s like a constant battle of wits. And that, that, I find very rewarding, very exciting, very draining” (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>“What I personally get out of it is... on the odd occasion I’ll be down the coalface, and it’s a great feeling to, to deal with it. That’s absolutely fantastic. I love that, and everyone gets a massive high on it. Um, but I suppose what I get out of it, I mean, I find it very, very interesting work, because it is, it’s about what policing should be. It’s about saving lives” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“Um, I’ve usually got a bit of an adrenalin rush going for several hours. Um, and you know, if it’s been one way, you’ve spoken to people, and it’s all ended happily, it’s a real, like, oh, yes! You know, and literally go bouncing home...” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“I think in general, I think at the end of it, it’s like when you’re a police officer, and you’re arresting people, and you’re putting them in court, it’s a nice feeling and you think, great, I’ve done a good job today. But when you actually can say, genuinely you’ve saved somebody’s life, it’s like a whole new level, so it’s a buzz that you can’t get in any other area of business I don’t think.” “You get, well for me, you get a fantastic buzz from it, it’s so unique, that there’s nothing that can compare to it, nothing, in the police service” (L:M:7:54).</p> <p>“...as soon as I rock up, someone says, thank God you’re here boss and what do</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Negotiation conceptualised as a challenge</li> <li>8. Negotiation conceptualised as interesting</li> <li>9. “At the coalface” (i.e. provides non-operational officers with public interface/interaction)</li> <li>10. “Massive high”/“Great feeling”/Adrenalin Rush/Buzz/Excitement/Thrill/Elation (i.e. short term positive reinforcement)</li> <li>11. Great feeling from saving lives/helping people (i.e. pseudo-altruistic)</li> <li>12. Vicarious reward from helping others</li> <li>13. Sense of achievement/reward from making a difference in a person’s life</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Negotiation as challenging</li> <li>5. Opportunity for public interface and interaction</li> <li>6. Negotiation as emotionally rewarding</li> <li>7. Feeling good from helping others</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Negotiation as personally and professionally rewarding</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Negotiation positives</li> </ol>
<p>“...as soon as I rock up, someone says, thank God you’re here boss and what do</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>14. Conflict between negotiators and</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Operational rank /</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Operational</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Negotiation</li> </ol>



<p><i>I do? Well hold on, I'm not the ground commander, I'm the negotiator; I work for you in these circumstances... And there is always, and I guess that's something to do with the fact that we only negotiate at rank. Um, and there is always, kind of, that tension. Um, there's only one occasion really, that I've had to intervene, to, ah, overturn the ground commander's actions okay?... So sometimes it gets... it can get a bit messy round the edges... But there is this, this role, role rank issue" (G:M:4:123).</i></p> <p><i>"I'm an inspector. I could turn up at an incident being run by a sergeant, and he or she would then look to me to then command the incident. And negotiators negotiate; commanders command. You've probably heard that several times. Ah, and it's just not helpful, so the first thing I do now is, if I am on duty, is actually put my civvy jacket on and go down and go down as... with badges of rank covered up. Very often, people will know who I am anyway, but it, it somehow takes the edge off the situation" (D:M:3:63).</i></p> <p><i>"And I was on my own... Nobody had really arrived and her... you could hear... initially she was in a café, so I was... that was fine; I was quite happy to carry on talking to her about that. Um, but then I heard the stream outside and she was walking and she was on her way to the edge of the river and she was going to go. That was really hard... and I could... you could feel your stress level rising, because I'm thinking, where are my... where's my support? How do I... you're speaking to somebody on the phone; how do you then give that information to, um, the inspector or the units out there?" (C:F:2:96).</i></p> <p><i>"...it may be that they [the subject] pick up on stuff from... police officers on the cordon who maybe aren't as... careful as they should be about what they say or do" (K:M:2:111).</i></p> <p><i>: "...sometimes there will be increasing pressure for the negotiators to be used and then withdrawn, because commanders want to get the situation resolved quickly" (A:M:1:156).</i></p>	<p>commanders (i.e. Negotiators negotiate and commanders command)</p> <p>15. Dual role conflict (i.e. commanders wanting negotiators to make command decisions/senior negotiators taking on command roles)</p> <p>16. Negotiating alone/solo</p> <p>17. Lack of team/colleague discipline</p> <p>18. Conflict between negotiators</p> <p>19. Lack of scene control/non sterile environment</p> <p>20. Pressure to resolve situation quickly but negotiators want to play it long/conflict between tactically minded commanders and "play it long" negotiators</p>	<p>role conflict</p> <p>9. Negotiating solo</p> <p>10. Lack of operational discipline</p> <p>11. Competing tactical orientations</p>	<p>issues</p>	<p>Negatives</p>
<p><i>"...sometimes when the negotiator job conflicts with your day-to-day deadlines, which sometimes you can't miss... it's really hard" (C:F:2:96).</i></p> <p><i>"...but I think upfront there's still a bit of a lack of understanding about what it [negotiation] is. Some people, like me, watch it on Hollywood blockbuster movies and think, that looks the business that does, but the reality is somewhat different" (L:M:7:54).</i></p> <p><i>"Um, I think we need the regional courses to be standardised. Um, and I think there needs to be some clarity about whether or not they are a course which feeds into the national [course] or not. And I think the national needs to, um, come out of Hendon; we need to have far more of those courses and they need to be delivered around the country" (K:M:2:111).</i></p> <p><i>"There could be, perhaps, also some better reward and recognition for us... Because we're not... I think in sixteen years I've had one certificate saying you've done ten years! Literally, because I'd done ten years..." (B:M:2:195).</i></p> <p><i>"Um, I know that they've got a fairly small budget really. Um, sometimes the kit is a bit old. And perhaps because it's almost an add-on, it's not something that</i></p>	<p>21. Conflict with day job/Double hatting conflict</p> <p>22. Lack of awareness about the role within the force</p> <p>23. Lack of recognition of the benefit of using negotiators</p> <p>24. Lack of budgetary support from force</p> <p>25. Inappropriate utilisation of negotiators i.e. Not called when needed/called when not needed</p> <p>26. Lack of professionalisation /standardisation of the discipline</p> <p>27. Lack of tangible recognition/reward/substantial remuneration for the role</p>	<p>12. Dual role conflict</p> <p>13. Lack of awareness and support within the force</p> <p>14. Lack of professionalisation and standardisation of the discipline</p> <p>15. Negotiation as a Cinderella role</p>	<p>3. Organisational issues</p>	<p>2. Negotiation negatives</p>

*the force thinks, right, this is... is a priority, yes. So therefore we get a smaller budget*" (N:F:8:34).

*"...walk out of the door and leave family commitments behind"* (I:M:6:84).  
*"...there's personal difficulties... you know, disturbing the family's sleep as I'm coming and going"* (G:M:4:123).

*"I've been in town with my family, you know, having a meal, and having to sort of put them in a taxi and then go off to a... a... the docks to help somebody out. So huge... you know, I don't think there's anything that recognises the impact on the individuals"* (F:M:4:111).

*"It's a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your personal life, quite a bit, when you're on call. All your mates are down the pub and you're sat watching East Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish"* (L:M:7:54).

*"You know, when, when you're on call, no we can't go to that party, no we can't go outside the force, I've got to stay dry"* (G:M:4:123).

*"Well, I don't personally get any stress from doing the negotiating stuff..."* (N:F:8:34).

IV: *"Do you ever kind of experience stress or anxiety as a result of actually negotiating?"*

IE: *"I haven't so far"* (M:F:8:24).

*"No... I don't feel stressed"* (O:F:9:36).

*"Um, I don't feel any stress when I'm negotiating; I really don't..."* (I:M:6:84).

*"What I would say to that is, yes, I do [experience stress]. So you're putting yourself on offer. But equally there's the argument to say that in the vast majority of situations when the matter's resolved, you're getting a lot of positive stress, so it's like a blooming cup. You know, you'll get, you've got a load of negative here, but the potential is it's actually all going to be smiles"* (A:M:1:156).

*"Um, it's different. No, it's a challenge. It's not a stress. Um... No, I wouldn't say it was stressful"* (C:F:2:96).

*"...somewhat perversely, I think although negotiating is always a crisis, um, I don't find that it stresses me out really as much as the frustrations of any day-to-day, uh, issues that you might come across. Poor leadership and poor management really stresses me out. Um, sometimes the, the sort of brutality of the situation or the, the, um, sort of crisis of the situation, you go straight into dealing with that there and then, there are people standing, you know, threatening to kill you and if, you know, all the stuff that they come out with or what they're going to do to you and your families, that, um, I can absorb that a lot easier really"* (B:M:2:195).

*"Oh, goodness me, poles apart, absolutely poles apart... Um, I... my, my everyday life, at, at work, is busy. It's not at all stressful, not in comparison with some of the bits that I do. Ah, some of my staff think it is, right – it isn't!*

28. Negotiation as an add-on/adjunct to/bolt on the day job/

29. Negotiation as "the poor relative"

30. Negotiation as a voluntary position / adjunct to the day job

31. Disruption to family life

32. Disruption to social and personal life

33. Having to "stay dry"

34. Having to stay local if on call

35. Missing out on family events etc., due to being on call

16. Disruption to family life

17. Impact on social and personal life

4. Personal sacrifices

2. Negotiation negatives

36. Stress as a result of potential or actual negative operational outcomes / due to high stakes of situation

37. Stress due to decisions constantly being under scrutiny

38. Stress due to the on-call commitment ("on tenterhooks"; "up and down like a yo-yo")

39. Stress induced by conflict between negotiators and commanders

40. Negotiation conceptualised as a challenge rather than as stressful

41. Negotiation as a combination of "negative and positive stress"

42. Negotiation as not stressful

43. Negotiation as a different type of stress

44. Negotiator stress as intense but short lived

18. Negotiation as non-stressful

19. Negotiator eustress (Negotiation conceptualised as a challenge/combination of positive and negative stress)

20. Negotiation as a different type of stress (different type/intense but short lived)

5. Negotiator stress/eustress

3. Negotiation ambivalences

*I've been in far more stressful situations, with people throwing knives at me, and, and bottles at me, while I'm trying to talk them out of a, a, situation... It's not, um, so yes, I've been in more stressful situations"* (G:M:4:123).  
*"I don't think one is greater than the other, I think it's just a totally different dynamic"* (L:M:7:54).

*"Um, I think it's changed in that we've sort of really tried to promote ourselves as, if you need anything for MISPERs and the like, you know, people that you feel are in crisis, it might be a telephone call as opposed to that come out and do a face-to-face. Um, yes"* (J:F:6:110).

*"Um, the role is changing, um, in as much as I think, ah, areas of use are increasing. The actual job of negotiating, I think, is pretty similar to how it was when I started, ah, but, increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations, um, such as dealing with protesters. If we've got, um, a group we know are going to come and protest in a particular area, and we fear there's going to be an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, we're getting negotiators involved in that to try and facilitate, um, a better outcome for all parties"* (D:M:3:63).

*"...there's an anecdotal feeling that it's dropped off a bit, and we, you know... I've had some weeks with no calls, at all"* (F:M:4:111).

*"...there's been a big drop in incidents since Taser's come on the scene"* (K:M:2:111).

*"It is interesting, however, that in the last two to three years... the number of day-to-day negotiating incidents appears to be on the decrease, and the reason for that is because the police now have other tactical options to deal with the scenario, but the big one there is Taser. So with the advent of Taser, that's seen a reduction in the number of negotiating incidents, because the police officers at the scene are able to deal with it adequately, quickly, and safely by the use of Taser"* (A:M:1:156).

*"As we sit here now, there's probably, um, maybe half a dozen high-risk missing persons in [anonymised place] alone... Who a lot of those, you know, we could have an intervention with them by a phone call. Or a text. And that's, that's... Remember some of the technology's changed as well. I've found that I've ended up carrying out part of negotiations via text. Yeah. Email. Yeah. Facebook. You know, it's... all of that is a massive change from when I started certainly"* (B:M:2:195).

*"Yes, we're finding more of those internet related now where people are engaging in sexual activity, it's being filmed on the internet and then... This film's going to be released; it's going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account, it's going to be... So you're getting those types of jobs now, which we haven't seen before"* (K:M:2:111).

Total number of concepts and categories identified:

45. Changes in deployment frequency/nature (decrease in number of deployments)
46. Broader range of deployments (i.e. Use of negotiators in pre-planned as well as spontaneous incidents)
47. Use of negotiators in public order management (protests/demonstrations/marches)
48. Impact of Taser on nature/frequency of deployment (i.e. Less deployments as a result of Taser – "Taser instead of negotiators")
49. Less use of negotiators within barricade/domestic siege scenarios due to Taser
50. Use of negotiators to facilitate Taser
51. Broader use of communication mediums (i.e. use of email/text/social networking etc. to negotiate)

21. Changes in deployment frequency and nature
22. Impact of Taser on negotiator deployment
23. Broader use of communication mediums within negotiation scenarios

6. The evolution of negotiation as an entity

3. Negotiation ambivalences

51 Concepts

23 Tertiary  
Categories

7 Secondary  
Categories

3 Primary  
Categories

## Appendix 23. Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation

Table 4.26. *Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the UK-Centric D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation*

Interview Transcript Excerpts	Concepts	Quaternary Categories	Tertiary Categories	Secondary Categories	Primary Categories
<p>“Whereas actually what you need and what I often try and seek is what do we know about this person. Let’s speak to their family, let’s speak to their doctors, let’s speak to their, ah carers to find out about what we call intelligence – I’d say it was just information really... So I suppose I, kind of, use those techniques to try and find out as much as possible about the person before engaging with them” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“Um, and then get more details when I’m on the way” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“So I go over my introduction, usually en route I try to get details about any background on them” (L:M:7:54).</p> <p>“Um, you’re able to draw on other things from his life and other detail which often in negotiating situations we completely don’t have because there’s no Intel on the system. So we rely on our negotiators if we can. If we’ve negotiated with him before... for future... for colleagues to have put in what worked last time; what didn’t work” (C:F:2:96).</p> <p>“Usually they’ve done intelligence checks. I dealt with one who had actually recently been arrested for sex offending, so obviously, so initially it’s a no go area, you wouldn’t say, are you wanted by the police for anything? See you later...” (L:M:7:54).</p> <p>“Um, yes, he could commit suicide. There’s always that possibility, but I think you get a feeling reasonably early on from, ah, his demeanour, his actions, and his comments as to whether or not this is someone who is, who is actually going to carry out that threat. You obviously look at their criminal past, and all their past, you’ll obviously try to find out um, from associates or friends or family, has he done this before? And how does he react to drink, etc., etc.” (A:M:1:156).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Intelligence gathering as vital to negotiation/used to inform the negotiation strategy and approach Intelligence gathering starts as soon as negotiator is deployed/Gathering intelligence on the way to the scene</li> <li>2. Identify how subject has presented and the situational circumstances</li> <li>3. Analyse what the subject has said to call handlers/first responders/witnesses to provide context to situation</li> <li>4. Identification of existing mental health problems/history of substance abuse (liaise with mental health teams/GPs etc.)</li> <li>5. Identification of subject criminal history or outstanding warrants Identification of family history (and</li> </ol>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Information/intelligence gathering as immediate</li> <li>2. Information/intelligence gathering as a vital component used to inform negotiation strategy</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Information/intelligence gathering</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Stage 1: Initial deployment tasks and roles</li> </ol>

	conciliatory/aggravating parties)				
	6. Identification of form/previous call outs/repeat subjects etc. Identification of precipitating factors/causes/triggers for the situation				
<p>“You assess it yourself so you don’t put yourself at immediate risk” (N:F:8:34). “It is better to be able to talk with someone if there’s no barriers, but you’ve got to balance it with your own safety” (B:M:2:195). “My initial thing is safety of myself, that’s the primary thing. Safety of other officers that are there, and then safety of, I’m talking about incidents of people in crisis here, safety of them. My training and whatever has taught me that if they’re going to jump, they jump anyway, and what I don’t want to be doing is grabbing somebody and them taking me with them. Luckily, I mean, I’ve never done that, I’ve never grabbed anybody, but you have to, you look for an area where you can talk to them safely, where you know that you’re not going to be harmed. So that’s the first thing I do” (L:M:7:54). “I feel that you can really get drawn into that dialogue, and you can put yourself in danger, you know, you get that creeping, and you move closer and closer... if you’ve got someone who’s going to jump, actually, you don’t want them to take you off, as well” (J:F:6:110). “I mean, the, the first thing is, is there a threat to life? If so, whose life; how can that be mitigated against? Am I the right person to be doing this? Is there somebody else who should be with me? Um, are there any other tactics that the ground commander might want to consider to keep the public safe? To keep me safe? To keep his staff safe? Um, so those are kind of the initial dynamic risk assessment” (G:M:4:123).</p>	<p>7. Risk assessment of self, subject and others (wider community) 8. Continuous dynamic risk assessment (i.e. iterative risk assessment process) 9. Risk of harm/life of subject Risk of harm to public 10. Risk of harm to negotiator 11. Personal safety of negotiator as priority</p>	<p>3. Assessment of risk of harm to negotiator 4. Continuous dynamic risk assessment of subject, colleagues and wider community</p>	<p>2. Risk/threat assessment and management</p>	<p>1. Stage 1: Initial deployment tasks and roles</p>	
<p>“...if you’re then having to set up a negotiating scenario. By that you’re set, having to set up a sterile environment, and by that you will, may well be evacuating people... Okay, so you’re going to look at a physical, um, sterile zone, in which there will be proper cordoning’s, you can look at, in certain situations, getting the assistance of technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries” (A:M:1:156). “So the considerations that I would make are all around what the primary response, um, what the primary functions of a negotiation are, um, and also containing that incident; um, administration and logistics...” (E:M:3:114). “And there’s different controls and pressures on us depending on how wide the</p>	<p>12. Creation of a sterile environment (to keep subjects in and third parties out) 13. Importance of scene control and maintaining a sterile environment 14. Importance of proper/effective cordoning</p>	<p>5. Incident scene control, containment and management 6. Creation and maintenance of a sterile environment</p>	<p>2. Scene control/sterilisation and management</p>	<p>1. Stage 1: Initial deployment tasks and roles</p>	

<p>police need to close down the immediate area for us to be able to do out bit.” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“The actual, ah, atmosphere that you’re, um, negotiating in can be a problem. It needs to be kept sterile. I’ve had negotiations going on where there’s... the chap’s mates are all across the back, there, shouting the odds, which aren’t helping. Or we get people, um, perhaps, who may not know the individual, but are, are fed up with the inconvenience being caused to them, shouting jump or whatever” (D:M:3:63).</p>	<p>15. Negotiators may have to initially control the scene or direct others to control the scene</p> <p>16. Adverse impact of poor scene control/management on negotiation</p> <p>17. Third party interference as diluting negotiator efforts/derailing negotiation</p>					
<p>“Er, and so if we’re going to do that, if there’s two of us for instance, we decide who is going to lead, who’s not... who’d going to be number two and if there’s a third one, obviously who’s going to provide that link” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“...I think it’s also about the establishment of roles and responsibilities. That’s a very key thing, and again that’s about setting out the cell, the police cell, correctly, so you get to a scene, and it’s... but sometimes I don’t do this. Um, but it’s really important to try and establish, right, you’re doing that role, I’m doing this role, and you’re doing that role, so everybody understands” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“...the decision-making is usually around, um, what your initial response is going to be to the situation that’s developing; um, what role do you play, are you actually playing an advisory role, um, or are you playing an actual negotiating role; ah, and, again, that depends on the incident. Then it also depends which role I’m taking on; am I taking on a negotiator role or am I taking on a negotiator coordinator role?” (E:M:3:114).</p> <p>“Er, the first thing you usually do is, um, find out who’s in charge, um, which isn’t always as obvious as it should be and, er, have a word with them, find out what it is they want, um, what they need and, um, usually give them some advice about what we’re going to do” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“...you just have to feed in your view and then accept the decision” (C:F:2:96).</p> <p>“Again, decision, what does the commander, whether it be silver or whether it be the senior PC on the ground, what do they want from the negotiator? So you’ve probably heard this about negotiators negotiate, commanders command, so at least get a feel for the way... the direction we’re going in” (J:F:6:110).</p>	<p>18. Identification of primary/secondary negotiator</p> <p>19. Identification of roles within the negotiator cell</p> <p>20. Identification of wider operational roles</p> <p>21. Liaison with/provision of advice to Bronze/Silver command (Incident manager/firearms commander)</p> <p>22. Negotiators negotiate and commanders command</p> <p>23. Negotiator/wider team positioning</p>	<p>7. Identification of roles within the negotiator cell</p> <p>8. Liaison with bronze/command</p>	<p>2. Negotiator cell setup</p>	<p>1. Stage 1: Initial deployment tasks and roles</p>		
<p>“And when you get there the first thing I want to do is just to find out exactly what this is about and try and get a little bit of background so we’ve got something to start off with. And then it’s just, I want to get on with it and start talking to these people” (N:F:8:34).</p> <p>“...if you’re going to a job you need to communicate on the way” (C:F:2:96)</p>	<p>24. Establish/initiate some form of communication/dialogue with the subject</p> <p>25. Any communication/</p>	<p>1. Initiate communication with subject as soon as</p>	<p>9. Initiation of communication/dialogue with subject</p>	<p>2. Engaging with the subject</p>	<p>2. Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident resolution</p>	

<p>“...I was on call and it was a job that was at the opposite end of the country, but needed to be done by a phone because we didn’t know where this lady was. So all I say is, to the control room, if need be, you’ll need to get the other two that are on-call to come to my home, and they will join me and do it that way, because otherwise you’ve got an hour of somebody in crisis who just isn’t going to get the contact...” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“Just by being there and talking is better than not being there at all... So get in there, start talking, see what you’re dealing with” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“...suddenly you get asked to put an early call in, and you put an early call in and you make contact... And the job goes live and it’s, like, two hours away. What do you do? Do you abandon that contact and continuity for two hours until you get there? Do you get a team up there? Do you maintain contact? Really we need to do... do the rapport building by the time... we get there” (C:F:2:96).</p> <p>“I was called out to a bloke who was sat on top of a car park in [Anonymised Place], threatening to jump. I was given a quick briefing by the uniformed officer who was there, who did his best, he’d obviously done a good job, because he hadn’t jumped” (L:M:7:54)</p> <p>“Um, so you’ve probably been woken up out of bed so the first thing I usually do is go out to the kitchen and, um, I’ll speak to whoever’s in the control room, and, er, I will just establish some, um, key details really about what type of incident it is, where it is, who’s in charge of it, um, and also, we just give some basic advice to start with because what we sometimes find is we’ll turn up at an incident and nobody’s even tried to engage with the person... Because they think, well we’re coming and that’s their job” (K:M:2:111).</p>	<p>dialogue is better than none</p> <p>26. Establishing contact with subject early is important</p> <p>27. Just being there can be enough</p> <p>28. Initial first responder contact as important</p> <p>29. The “golden hour” concept</p> <p>30. Putting calls in from the kitchen table</p> <p>31. Immediacy of contact as important</p>	<p>2. Any communication/dialogue is better than none</p>				
<p>“...we’d tried, um, communicating ourselves by phone with him. Um, there were family members and so on that turned up on the cordon and we tried going through their phones, um, and then we tried going face-to-face” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“So once I’ve got that all set up and my kit set up, sometimes I’ve got some detailed information, sometimes I’ve got real vagaries and the bunches of five will be around those two things. And then it’s either put the call in or if it’s face-to-face, do that approach as well to just get close enough and try and open up some dialogue” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“When it actually comes down to the, um, you know, I’m at the scene, well, okay, what are my methods of communication? You know, am... and I going to holler through a door, you know, a letter box, have we got mobile phones, etc? And again, a lot of the time, it’s going to be my choice, but depending on the job, it might be an instruction about, this is the way we want it done” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“I don’t like the phone call ones, I like, for me personally, I prefer face-to-face” (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>“...if you’re face-to-face that’s best of all. If you’re doing it over a phone that’s</p>	<p>32. Establish dialogue with subject using a variety of methods/forms of communication</p> <p>33. Adapt method of communication in line with situational/logistical and risk parameters</p> <p>34. Face-to-face conversation (as ideal scenario)</p> <p>35. Use of telephone (i.e. Mobile/Landline/Field or Throw Phone) to communicate with subject</p>	<p>3. Face-to-face</p> <p>4. Telephone</p> <p>5. Loudhailer/megaphone</p> <p>6. Text message</p> <p>7. Email/inter net/social networking website</p>	<p>10. Utilisation of a variety of communication mediums as necessary</p>	<p>3. Engaging with the subject</p>	<p>2. Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident resolution</p>	

<p>difficult but it's second best sort of thing... Ah, and therefore another step further removed to some sort of electronic communication via email or text is even harder" (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>"Yeah, all via the phone. A lot of ours are, to be honest. Because one, the geography of the force... you know, it's really difficult" (C:F:2:96).</p> <p>"Face-to-face is good, but obviously, if there's any threat or risk, close to the proximity, you know, it is, you know, a problem. Um, so mobile phones are used often" (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>"Okay, so you're going to look at a physical, um, sterile zone, in which there will be proper cordonings, you can look at, in certain situations, getting the assistance of technical support units, and draining certain phones of batteries... You can use an element of subterfuge, um, so it might be that they're on the phone to you, um, but that, you can actually work it out that your phone's not working, and that the only way that it's going to work is that you chuck in a field phone into that individual, so they're speaking to you on the field phone" (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>"Um, I know a colleague had to, um, go, you know, up the gas towers, and around those. Somebody was up there, at the top of one of those. And he went up. But I think he quickly realised, you know, if he decides to come flying down here, I'm off. Um, or, if he starts throwing stuff at me, or whatever. Uh, and he came down, and then communicated through a loudhailer" (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>"Um, my most recent callout was last Saturday, which was just a callout asking to put a phone call in to a person who'd been reported missing, and was believed to be implying that they were going to take their own life through some text messages, but I didn't actually do any negotiation with them, so... and that, for me, over the last year, has been an increasing trend that a lot of callouts seem to be either resolved by the time we get there, or because it's text message or, um, phoning people who won't necessarily respond to you, so it's about leaving messages, hoping that they'll tend pick up and phone someone else, or come back to us" (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>"I've found that I've ended up carrying out part of negotiations via text. Yeah, email. Yeah, Facebook. You know, it's... all of that is a massive change from when I started certainly" (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>"Um, the most recent one actually was blackmail which is still running yesterday and today. But it's, um, it's an odd one in the sense that it, um, all the communication's through the internet. And through email and so on and we're just getting at the stage, hopefully today, where we'll move to phone contact" (K:M:2:111).</p>									
<p>"Let's start listening to what you're saying; tell me what's going on. And when the venting comes out, let him vent. Some good elective questioning to active listening, some good open questioning, just to facilitate some sort of understanding" (G:M:4:123).</p>									
36.	Use of loudhailer/megaphone/bullhorn to communicate with subject								
37.	Use of text message to communicate with subject								
38.	Use of email to communicate with subject								
39.	Use of the internet/Social networking to communicate with subject								
40.	Use/importance of effective /enhanced listening	8.	Use of active listening principles	11.	Employment of pseudo-therapeutic communication	3.	The negotiator toolbox/repertoire	2.	Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident
41.	Use of active listening								



<p>“...you will actually say to them, you know, to me, you sound really angry, um, because they’ll either come back and say, what are you on about? Or it’ll be like, too bloody right. Um, and you, so you get your confirmation or whatever, but also, it’s part of your trust building, because it’s showing that you’re listening to them and you’re understanding what’s going on with them” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“I think the main skills are listening – listening and sort of summarising...” (M:F:8:24).</p> <p>“And kind of mirroring them, I suppose, their energy levels, and... You know, trying to kind of lift them and... If they are low, you know, just try to mirror, a little bit, of how they’re talking” (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>“I personally give quite a lot of “I” messages to the person...” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“I think it’s important to just be yourself” (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>“So even if someone’s sort of... you know, will happily spit in your face when they come down off the roof, they’ve at least got that trust that when you say, okay, we’re going to put a ladder up, or we’re going to send the fire brigade, that you... that they can trust what you’re going to say, and that when they come down, what you say is going to happen will happen” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>IV: “...if you had to choose one skill, or attribute, what would you say is the most important for a negotiator?</p> <p>IE: I suppose it’s, it’s that listening, and not being judgemental... Um, and, and being a bit, being genuine... If someone’s talking to you, and you’re, you’re at your wit’s end, or it’s the worst thing that’s ever happened to you, and you’ve got someone that’s not on the wavelength, or not there...</p> <p>IV: Doing it for the wrong reasons?</p> <p>IE: Yes... and it’s all a bit false.</p> <p>IV: You can see...</p> <p>IE: They’ll see right through you, won’t they?</p> <p>IV: Right through it, yeah... You’ve got to be there because you want to be there, because you genuinely want to help that person” (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>“Um, prepared to say sorry, honesty with them. Um, there are times when I’ve said I got that wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family because of, because they’re worried. You’ve then gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I’m sorry” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“And as you go from the, sort of, active listening up, you maybe start to disclose a little about your own situation, your own life experience – what’s up with your children or in your relationship or your health and stuff... So, ah, I don’t mind personally doing that; it is a personal preference... So occasionally I’ll, um, disclose something just to try and help things along. So I, sort of, try to, try to really build that empathy with the person as quickly as possible” (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>“Okay. Empathy. Um. Effective listening, clarity, honesty, um, rapport building. I</p>	<p>42. Open questioning to encourage story telling</p> <p>43. Reflective Listening (Repeating or rephrasing/paraphrasing/ reflection of feeling)</p> <p>44. Reflection of feelings/emotional tones</p> <p>45. Mirroring</p> <p>46. Paraphrasing/summarising</p> <p>47. Labelling emotions</p> <p>48. Use of “I” messages</p> <p>49. Use of motivational interviewing principles</p> <p>50. Support self-efficacy by empowering/instilling confidence in subject</p> <p>51. Use of person-centred therapy principles</p> <p>52. Demonstration of congruence/genuineness/ being yourself</p> <p>53. Being prepared/able to say sorry</p> <p>54. Personal/self-disclosure</p> <p>55. Demonstration of unconditional positive regard and respect for others</p> <p>56. Importance of demonstrating a non-judgemental attitude</p> <p>57. Express/demonstrate warmth</p> <p>58. Express/demonstrate empathy</p>	<p>and techniques</p> <p>9. Us of person-centred therapy principles</p>	<p>techniques</p>	<p>resolution</p>
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think those communication skills, um, respecting the individual, all those things I think come together to try and actually get quite a good, polished negotiating performance" (A:M:1:156).

"I think, I would say yes, you are always trying to build up some sort of relationship, and with rapport, you tend to think of, you know, some sort of warmth..." (J:F:6:110).

"...it's a large amount of listening, and it's very little talking. And it's to make sure, try and get them to talk as much as possible and offload it all. And, and that's all I've tried to do now. And don't judge" (O:F:9:36).

"It's all about active listening and feeling, of whatever you've been told. It's trying to understand what's brought them to that position where they're on top of a roof, top of a bridge, whatever, and they're going to jump, and then being empathetic is a big thing. Like not shouting, being empathetic, telling them that you understand... I think negotiating is such a difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what you say, and not be judgemental, and be open minded, actively listen, and you know, try to be there, supportive, empathic, also" (L:M:7:54).

"Listening with a real intent to try and understand and empathise with them; what is it that's brought them to this place on this day?" (B:M:2:195).

"You're, you're, as I said, you're trying to find the buttons to press. You're trying to find what's made them where they are, and if you can find that, you can generally help them find a solution" (D:M:3:63).

"It's about trying to establish a rapport, uh, you know, uh, and using the active listening, reflecting back, uh, trying to get to the bottom of what is really happening here, uh, you know, and then exploring with the individual, you know, ways of... other ways of doing, you know, other courses of action" (F:M:4:111).

"Um, I think it's just listening and understanding why they've actually got to that point and sort of just talking it through with them. Being truthful – always be truthful, um... yeah" (M:F:8:24).

"And I've got some slight regrets with that one, because they tell us not, not to lie, on them, the Red Centre, you, you know, you... You're away. Yeah. You're away on it for the Red Centre you can tell them anything you want... That'll work basically. So it's a different tactic" (H:F:5:50).

"It was trying to establish what his issue was, what his problem was, who he was, why he was there, trying to establish what the big issues were for him, you know, um, and you're looking for the hook, then, all the time, aren't you? The thing that he... he's actually interested in, the thing that's at the heart of his problem" (F:M:4:111).

"...I didn't really get onto the girlfriend side of things because obviously I think that might have antagonised him" (N:F:8:24).

"We've actually got a formal record of them doing it on this first occasion, and we can, on the return it basically says, you know, issues that you should never raise with

59. Disassociation from the police/portrayal as someone affiliated with the police	10. Establish why subject is in the situation	12. Use of specific negotiation strategies and techniques	7. The negotiator toolbox/repertoire	2. Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident resolution
60. Metaphorical removal of rank/authority/operational police officer status	11. Honesty			
61. Identification of "hooks" (i.e. de-escalators) and "triggers" (i.e. aggravators) /aggravating parties/conciliatory parties	12. Identification of hooks and triggers			
62. Matching of the negotiator to the subject (personality/gender/background)	13. Matching of negotiation and subject			
63. Adapting strategy/style of communication /narrative/language/approach/non-verbal	14. Adapt strategy in line with situation/subject			
	15. Use of concessions and positive police actions			

this individual, and issues that you did raise with the individual, which helped you resolve it" (A:M:1:156).

"It's easier when you've got a second negotiator with you because you can sotto voce, you can just, um, exchange a few views, get a, get a triangulation on what's going on, and on occasion, swap negotiator as well. There've been times when you're just getting nowhere; the person's getting right fed up with you. So, let's give someone else a go. Swap over" (D:M:3:63).

"Um, there's only one thing that I haven't really mentioned and that's a gender issue, um, because you have to have... I think you have to have that in your toolkit. So if you've got a woman who hates women, why are you then putting a woman negotiator or a... if you've got a domestic situation then the bloke might not want to speak to a woman" (C:F:2:96).

"You know, if you were negotiating... with a male in, um, and in a very strict Muslim country, then you need to know your way around, a little bit around the culture... And just think about how you're, um, listening and how you're communicating with that person" (B:M:2:195).

"I've known a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone who was ex-services. He might come across as likeable, as well, but his eventual resolution was reached about because the, um, my colleague was a sergeant, he'd got stripes on and he actually ordered the guy to come down. And that worked, in the end. So, there are, there are times when other strategies work. There's no fixed rule" (D:M:3:63).

"I mean, I can be on a bridge with a girl of 19, or I can be on a bridge with a male who's in his sixties, from a far greater academic background than I am, you know? And the same style will not work with both of them. So that rapport building, straight away, um, I wouldn't go in straight away and say, right, lovey, what's wrong with you? Because, you know, you'll sort of, they'll look at me as if I'm a bit deranged, really" (O:F:9:36).

"Um, and you're trying to just build on that rapport, trying to get agreement on things, trying to build trust, maybe do deliveries, um, maybe give them a drink, maybe give them a cigarette, um, and then you're looking at basically using some influence really, in terms of reciprocity, scarcity, those types of things to try and influence that change" (K:M:2:111).

"You know, and it's like, come on, let's have a cigarette. You know, yes, I can get one to you, but, you know, if I get one to you now, I want you to promise me, so a lot of this, I've done this for you. You do this for me" (H:F:5:50).

"I've spent two hours talking to a loft hatch, and eventually the loft hatch is opened and that's the first noise you would have... The easy ones are where they shout and bawl back because at least you know that you've got confirmation that they're there... and you can then, got to try and work on what the, the right thing that's

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| behaviour to the situation/subject  | 16. Perseverance/persistence  |
| 64. Use of concessions and positive police actions to encourage reciprocity or build rapport            | 17. Use of time as a tactic/"playing it long"                           |
| 65. Use of weapons of influence (i.e. reciprocity and ingratiation)                                     | 18. Disassociation from the police                                      |
| 66. <i>Quid pro quo</i> (i.e. if I do something for you will you do something for me?)                  | 19. Generate options available to the subject/encourage problem solving |
| 67. Identifying commonalities/common ground between the negotiator and subject                          | 20. Identify commonalities/common ground                                |
| 68. Perseverance/persistence Generation of options available to the subject/encouraging problem solving | 21. Encourage dialogue/allow subject to vent                            |
| 69. Concept of "bunches of fives"   |   |
| 70. Honesty/genuineness /never lie to the subject   |   |
| 71. Keep promises you make (with Red Centre scenarios as exception to the rule)                         |   |
| 72. Play it long /Use of time as a tactic/Bore people into submission/Allow subject to sober up         |   |
| 73. Encourage dialogue/keep them talking/allow them to talk/verbalise/vent                              |   |
| 74. Try to establish why they are in the situation/get to the root                                      |   |

<p>going to get them engaging" (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>"Um, but at this place I was negotiating with this woman, ah, for about four hours we were there and she barely said a word in the whole four hours – and that was a new one for me... I'd never had... that was quite, ah, challenging. And so I suppose it's hard talking to people who don't want to communicate... But you have to... you have to just always focus on the fact that they're listening... they can hear what you're saying" (B:M:2:195).</p> <p>"Generally speaking, once you've got the communication, um, most of the time, in the most common forms of negotiation, crisis negotiation and what have you, the first thing you do is once you've established communication, you're really, um, trying to buy time and let them diffuse the anger really, the emotion" (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>"And a lot of it is alcohol-fuelled. You know. Uh, where, you know, for that period of time, there's some distorted thinking. And sometimes, it's just about spending a bit of time with them until they've got sober" (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>"I remember it very clearly, the first one I, I, I dealt with. Um, I turned up in uniform, which is something I learnt, quite quickly, is not helpful for a number of reasons. Firstly, it, it, it may influence the view of the person you're trying to negotiate with because you're just another cop..." (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>"...introduce yourself just by name and then really, never say I'm a police officer. And generally I turn up not in police uniform; I wouldn't turn up in uniform ever actually" (M:F:8:24).</p> <p>"I'm not going away, and there are two choices. You're, you know, the reality is you jump or you're coming with us. You know, I really don't want you to jump, and this is why..." (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>"Um, and so, and then, from that rapport building, then you, you've got to try and get to the crux of the problem, and then you've got to try and get them to come to some conclusion about how they're going to deal with that problem" (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>"And you know, obviously, it depends on the person, but I don't have a problem with a certain amount of self-disclosure as well, so if there are things that I think link in, um, and I can genuinely relate to, I will use that, and it tends to be on really sort of innocuous stuff like, you know, I love walking, or I've got dogs, or, you know, those sorts of things, I will... I will use those, relentlessly just to try to build up that sort of, um, common ground" (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>"So he was a bit incoherent, very rambling. Um, we went through, what I've now come to understand is, the first hour of nothing, but venting. And in such a situation, I fully expect just to be abused verbally, for the first hour or two and a half. Don't expect anything less. Um, my belief is that people can't stay angry forever, because they're tired... And they burn themselves out" (G:M:4:123).</p> <p>"At that point, he'd, he'd stopped talking to me. He'd had enough. He didn't want to talk. So, cooling off period, back in on another call and, by that time, he was..."</p>	<p>of the problem</p> <p>75. Negotiators as exerting behavioural</p>	<p>13. Use of enhanced persuasion</p>	<p>3. Incident resolution</p>	<p>2. Stage 2: The negotiation</p>
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<p>we were on first name terms, as we try to establish, and he was, um, tiring and more amenable to, ah, to discussion and I persuaded him to turn around, go back and give himself up to the officers, which he did” (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>“...because the people we’re dealing with are beyond that suicidal moment, they’ve got to get past that suicidal moment on the way back, and I... I think that is, for me, it seems to be my bread and butter, you know, just sort of persuading people...” (F:M:4:123).</p> <p>“Because even though you go to a house and maybe you’re not getting in because they’ve barred their way or you want to contain it with firearms, you’re still calling and asking them, look... Trying to convince them to come outside... And explaining to them the reasons why they should be doing that and what’s in their best interests...” (N:F:8:34).</p> <p>“Um, the strategy you will take is always going to be the same: It’s build their confidence, influence their views and get them to do what you want them to do. That’s the strategy, as simple as that really” (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>“...I would say yes, you are always trying to build up some sort of relationship, and with rapport, you tend to think of, you know, some sort of warmth... so you built up trust, and you can influence the behaviour...” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“Um, once you’ve done that, really what you’re then looking to do is influence the behaviour. And you won’t always gain rapport, um, but ideally that’s what you’re working towards. But in any case, you’re then trying to move to a point where you can influence the behaviour” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“I’m concentrating on you; you’re the most important person. I’ve heard what you’re saying; I’m interested in what it is that you do. We’ve got this rapport, so you can move through rapport, into influence. So you get to a stage, you say well look, we’re all cold out here, why don’t you come down off there and let’s go and talk about it, somewhere warm” (G:M:4:123).</p>	<p>influence/change</p> <p>76. Negotiators as “professional persuaders”</p> <p>77. Use of enhanced persuasion to change subject’s behaviour</p> <p>78. Encouraging subject to change behaviour in a positive manner</p>	<p>14. Positive facilitation of subject behavioural change</p>	<p>process and incident resolution</p>		
<p>“Um, we ended up having to get to get the fire service out, uh, because eventually he agreed to come down, uh, we had to negotiate how he was going to get down, uh, and eventually, we used a fire service cherry picker, and went up and... and got him medical attention, uh, and he went back to hospital with his mother” (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>“We have a few of those as well, where we’ve got somebody that we think’s got a, a gun in the house, and we talk them out, you know, I want you to come out. The surrender plan basically... And that’s all sorted out beforehand... So we say to the bronze commander on the ground, what’s, what’s your surrender plan? And they’ll say to us, well, okay, well, we’ll do the, want you to come out the front door... Arms in front of you, like a blind man. Not carrying anything. No baggy clothing, and... the... And I’ll talk you right out...” (H:F:5:50).</p> <p>“Sometimes it’ll just be a face-saving thing, so I might think well actually, he’s ready to surrender but you don’t want to lose face, um, if I agree to let him have a fag or if</p>	<p>79. Discuss how the subject is going to “come down”/“come out from premises/building”</p> <p>80. Discuss how the subject can surrender peacefully</p> <p>81. Mutually agree surrender ritual/exit plan with subject or plan for release of hostages</p> <p>82. Importance of surrender ritual</p> <p>83. Importance of allowing</p>	<p>22. Discuss and mutually agree surrender ritual/exit plan with subject</p> <p>23. Allow subject to save face</p>	<p>15. Liaison with operational teams and subject to orchestrate exit plan or surrender ritual</p>	<p>8. Incident resolution</p>	<p>2. Stage 2: The negotiation process and incident resolution</p>

<p><i>I agree that he isn't going to be taken to the ground or, you know, things like that, then he'll come on board" (K:M:2:111).</i></p> <p><i>"...sometimes it's just literally got to be, um, well I might hate your guts, but that is a reasonable solution out of here, you know, so you're offering them the least embarrassing option out, you know, the keep... keep your pride and all the rest of it" (J:F:6:110)</i></p>	<p>subject to save face</p> <p>84. Promotion of face-honouring</p> <p>85. Minimise embarrassment for subject to encourage resolution/surrender</p>				
<p><i>"I think sometimes what we're not very good at doing, and you won't be surprised by me saying this, is that sometimes we'll go from job to job to job. We will always have a debrief, um, of the incident. Or we should have a debrief of the incident. It's rare that we don't, although it's dependent on certain partners. But sometimes that debrief doesn't quite pick out all the issues, and I remember, we had a gentleman a few years ago, who became a negotiator, and who was extremely unlucky, because I think it was the first two incidents that he went to each ended up in a death, and it was obvious he hadn't been properly debriefed. Ah, and that's something we're not very good at doing... We're not very good. So just a small example of that was that, as I say, we dealt with this long siege back in 2004. I got all the.. We had a media debrief, and we had a debrief, so that was, it was quite well done, but we never actually debriefed with any of the Firearms officers. They then subsequently came to one of our further debriefs, and they were talking to us about some of the things that they found in this gentleman's house, such as the fact that there was a shotgun cartridge strategically placed on each step of the staircase. That was an amazingly important thing for us, as negotiators, to know about so sometimes we're a bit rubbish at debriefing" (A:M:1:156).</i></p> <p><i>"Um, whereas the people who just dealt with that situation, if they've got a supervisor, if there's anything about them, he will regroup everybody, or she'll regroup everybody and they'll talk through the process. One is a debriefing, for learning. And the other one, just to check that everybody's behaving as they normally do" (O:F:9:36).</i></p> <p><i>"So we then got the, the closedown process for me then, which is about extracting my team, bringing them back here, debriefing them. Ah, making sure that they're in a fit state to drive home, because their adrenalin... Will have sapped a lot of energy... Um, so in terms of that, kind of the welfare stuff, a lot of that was taken care of by where we set it up, but there was still that debriefing and learning and they had concerns that we needed to unpick" (G:M:4:123).</i></p>	<p>86. Debrief as important component of negotiation process</p> <p>87. Debriefing of hostages/subjects/negotiators/wider team</p> <p>88. Debriefing as inconsistent/inadequate</p> <p>89. Good at debriefing when things go wrong but not so good when they go well</p> <p>90. Different types of debrief (hot debrief, operational debrief etc)</p> <p>91. Debriefing as a means of CPD and learning from mistakes or highlighting good practice</p> <p>92. Debriefing as a therapeutic process for negotiators</p>	<p>16. Debriefing as an important component of negotiation</p> <p>17. Debriefing as a means of CPD/therapeutic process/welfare check</p>	<p>3. Operational debriefing procedures</p>	<p>3. Stage 3: Post-incident protocol</p>	
Total number of concepts and categories identified:	92 Concepts	23 Quaternary Categories	17 Tertiary Categories	9 Secondary Categories	3 Primary Categories
<p><i>"...decisions are based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to understand the, what the individual's going through, or empathise with their situation, certainly not lying to them, at all. Absolutely not... It's a lot about that empathy and rapport building, and understanding their situation, and the trust</i></p>	<p>1. Demonstration of empathy in order to build trust and develop rapport/therapeutic</p>	<p>1. Express/demonstrate empathy</p> <p>2. Establish trust between</p>	<p>1. Rapport building/development of the pseudo-</p>	<p>1. Stage 2: Underpinning mechanism</p>	

<p>scenario” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“Um, because, you know, part of the training is that if you believe that you identify, you know, you will actually say to them, you know, to me, you sound really angry, um, because they’ll either come back and say, what are you on about? Or it’ll be like, too bloody right. Um, and you... so you get your confirmation or whatever, but also, it’s part of your con... trust building, because it’s showing that you are listening to them, and you’re understanding what’s going on with them” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“It’s all about active listening and feeling, of whatever you’ve been told. It’s trying to understand what’s brought them to that position where they’re on the top of a roof, top of a bridge whatever, and they’re going to jump, and then being empathic is a big thing. Like not shouting, being empathic, telling them that you understand...” (I:M:6:110).</p> <p>“There was a job where there was a young lad on the roof of a building. Um, in fact there’ve been two jobs just like that, lad on the roof of a building. He was clearly just intent on causing disruption. Ah, it’s hard to build up sympathy for that particular individual when you’re dealing with that. Um, they, they’re, um, in both cases they were either teenagers or young twenties, um, quite an arrogant attitude towards the police, towards society and trying to build up that, that rapport with them is a challenge. Ah, it’s a challenge, not only physically doing it, it’s also a challenge, to some extent, in getting the enthusiasm to do it because what you want to do is grab them by the scruff of the neck and, and tell them not to be so stupid... You can’t do that. That’s not effective. You’ve got to bite your tongue and you’ve got to play the game” (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>“Uh, you know there are people who think that negotiating is just a waste of time, uh, you know, why are you being nice to them? You know, because there... quite frankly, there are some really unsympathetic characters, and I think they think that, you know, this is my next best mate, you know, um, and I speak for myself, I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily, uh, deserving of it, you know, uh, and it that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is. Uh, but I’m not going to get anywhere, um, not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy, you know, with the individual” (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>“You need to keep that person focused on you. You’re the one that’s going to help them, you’re going to build up that trust with them and then you can try and influence their behaviour” (D:M:3:63).</p> <p>“...negotiation is entirely based on emotions. It’s about being able to, um, build up enough of a rapport to be able to, um, exert some influence, which in turn would change behaviour. Ah, and the only way that you can do that is by building a trusting relationship between the two parties” (E:M:3:114).</p> <p>“Um, so I think the confidence and the trust is what we work on during this whole tactic every time, but you really can’t be in a rush to get there” (I:M:6:110).</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>alliance</li> <li>Feign/fake empathy if not truly felt (i.e. empathy may not be genuine but needs to be demonstrated in order to build relationship between negotiator and subject)</li> <li>Importance of establishing trust between negotiator and subject</li> <li>Establish relationship between subject and negotiator</li> <li>Development of a pseudo-therapeutic alliance between the negotiator and subject</li> <li>Negotiator/subject relationship aligns with that of the therapist/client</li> </ol>	<p>negotiation and subject</p>	<p>therapeutic alliance</p>
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<p>“Um, and you’re trying to just build on that rapport, trying to get agreement on things, trying to build trust, maybe do deliveries, um, maybe give them a drink, maybe give them a cigarette, um, and then you’re looking at basically using some influence really, in terms of, um, reciprocity, scarcity, those types of things to try and influence that change” (K:M:2:111).</p>					
<p>“...um, some of the external scrutiny, um, in terms of the, um, recording what we do, showing an audit trail and what we’ve done and why we’ve done it, that’s changed” (K:M2:111).</p> <p>“Um, policy logs; so we’ll keep a record, particularly as a coordinator, of decisions that have been made, but also... are you aware of position papers? Position papers are effectively at a point in time; a negotiator coordinator would draw up a position paper which says, at this time this is what’s happening, these are the considerations, these are the issues that seem to escalate it, these are the issues that de-escalate it, this is the way that I think that the negotiation strategy should go, um, that kind of thing” (E:M:3:114).</p>	<p>7. Importance of formal record keeping</p> <p>8. Electronic record keeping (deployment logs etc.)</p> <p>9. Written record keeping (position papers, logs etc.)</p> <p>10. Audio record keeping (i.e. use of dictaphones to record negotiations)</p> <p>11. Evidential recovery as a concern</p> <p>12. Nature of the role/high risk scenarios denote need for record keeping</p> <p>13. Need for an audit trail of decisions and actions taken throughout the negotiation</p>	<p>3. Written</p> <p>4. Electronic</p> <p>5. Audio</p>	<p>2. Formal record keeping</p>	<p>2. Entire model underpinning mechanism 1</p>	
<p>“That’s what I say to all my negotiators. I say to them, whatever, however you do it, and I’ll give them some suggestions as to how they do it, you need to be able to say, at any one point, how, what your negotiating career is about, because if I go to my 84<sup>th</sup> incident tomorrow, and someone falls off that building, and they die, and I’m held liable for what I said, I need to go through those 83 incidents, and depict my experiences as a negotiator, and that is absolutely crucial” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“Um, so I think you do worry about negative consequences and, oh my God, there might be an inquest later and, have I done everything that I should have done? Have I got records that I can take and people can read and they can understand? Will I be able to justify the decisions that I make?” (C:F:2:96).</p>	<p>14. Requirement for defensible decision-making</p> <p>15. Decisions/actions may be questioned in court</p> <p>16. Need to be able to justify actions</p> <p>17. Negative outcomes will be subject to scrutiny in coroner’s court/IPCC procedures/acting as an expert witness in court</p>		<p>3. Defensible decision-making</p>	<p>3. Entire model underpinning mechanism 2</p>	
Total number of concepts and categories identified:	17 Concepts	0 Quaternary Categories	5 Tertiary Categories	3 Secondary Categories	3 Primary Categories



## Appendix 24. Qualitative Data Coding Matrix for the Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile Model

Table 4.27. *Grounded Theory Coding Table Depicting Excerpts, Concepts and Categories for the Self-Perceived Successful Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Profile Model*

Interview Transcript Excerpts	Concepts	Secondary Categories	Primary Categories
<p>“And it used to be at inspector level, so you could only actually apply once you became an inspector... Actually, that’s been reduced now to a sergeant” (N:F:8:34).</p> <p>“The only thing that I disagree with is that, I know a lot of people who are a constable level, who have a lot of good qualities to do that work... It certainly isn’t about rank. It’s about, um, a individual’s ability. And that can be any rank” (O:F:9:36).</p> <p>“...there is always a risk when you recruit people, that they’re doing it as a... as a sort of CV filler for a couple of years, yes” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“...you clearly don’t want people who want to get trained because there’s a tick in the box and it looks good on their promotion and all the rest of it...” (K:M:2:111).</p> <p>“I’d be looking at, at people who are level-headed, but who are really enthusiastic, and who are committed to the role. Sometimes, very rarely, we’ll get those people who do find it a bit of a shock to be part of a 24/7 rota when the phone goes at three o’clock in the morning” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“...we’ve just established a thing in [Anonymised force], I don’t know why, that the people who’ve opted to do it, looking around all the individuals, genuinely seem to be simpatico that way. They have problems in other forces, of people applying for it, because it’s a good tick, it’s a good attribute to have, on the CV, I think partly because of the fact we’ve long learnt there’s no advantage to you, career wise, that’s sort of never been a motivator for people in this force. [Anonymised force] where, you know, they... their people, they’ll do it for a year or two, and they’re, no, I’m bored of this now, and they move on, and it causes a problem. Nobody from our cadre has stepped off the rota. They’ve been taken off because they’ve got promoted and stuff, but everybody is still there. So you know, we... we all sort of enjoy what we do, that way” (F:M:4:111).</p> <p>“...the second part is a, a more structured approach to make sure that you can commit to the on-call arrangements and to drop everything at short notice, from the, the need to train people and get your value for money really” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“We will expect you to be a negotiator for at least five years...” (A:M:1:156).</p> <p>“...the second part is a, a more structured approach to make sure that you can commit to the on-call arrangements and to drop everything at short notice, from the, the need to train people and get your value for money really” (I:M:6:84).</p> <p>“I think certain people are good negotiators in different ways, and by that I’ll go back to, you know, the fact that I feel my strength is with people who are in crisis, because, you know, I think possibly, personally, whatever, I genuinely do feel some empathy there, and I think that comes across...” (J:F:6:110).</p> <p>“I think, um, you have to be able to empathise with somebody. You’ll never fully understand what they’re going through. But how can you move forward if you don’t appreciate what, what it is they’re going</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Requirement for negotiators to be of sergeant/inspector rank or above</li> <li>2. Need for operational policing experience</li> <li>3. Demonstration of commitment to the role</li> <li>4. “In it for the right reasons” (i.e. trying to filter out the people who are simply trying to add it to their CV/use it as a tool to get promoted)</li> <li>5. Willing to drop things at a moment’s notice</li> <li>6. Flexible enough to be able to respond on call/when needed</li> <li>7. Expected time frame for commitment (not just a short term commitment)</li> <li>8. Listening/active listening skills/ability to listen (14)</li> <li>9. Communication skills (12)</li> <li>10. Ability to empathise/demonstrate empathy/empathic (9)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Minimum rank requirement</li> <li>2. Commitment to the role</li> <li>3. In it for the right reasons</li> <li>4. Ability to demonstrate empathy</li> <li>5. Non-judgemental attitude/respect for</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Negotiator entry requirements</li> <li>2. Negotiator attributes</li> </ol>

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through?” (O:F:9:36).

“Uh, you know, there are people who think that negotiating is just a waste of time, uh, you know, why are you being nice to them? You know, because there... quite frankly, there are some really unsympathetic characters, and I think they think that, you know, this is my next best mate, you know... we will, I speak for myself, I will be very nice to some people, who are not necessarily, uh, deserving of it, you know, uh, and if that’s just being cynical and being a means to an end, then possibly it is. Uh, but I’m not going to get anywhere, um, not achieving any degree of sympathy, or empathy or, you know, with the individual” (F:M:4:111).

“You’ve got to be able to build a rapport whether they’re a masked murderer or whether they’re a, you know, petty shoplifter or whatever” (C:F:2:96).

“Somebody that’s quite open minded really, and not judgemental... I think certainly not being judgemental is one, because you deal with some people that are going to jump, they can be, if they jump, some people would say, thank goodness, but you’re there to do a job and whatever. I’ve never found that difficult, actually, I said about the one sex offender, I mean, he was guilty, and he actually did want to commit suicide for that, to save face for what he did, but you don’t treat him differently. Any police officer would say to treat people the same, but I think in reality, that’s not always the case. I think negotiating is such a difficult area of business, that you need to actually do what you say, and not be judgemental, and be open minded, actively listen, and you know, try to be there, supportive, empathic, also” (L:M:7:54).

“...flexible, um, in terms of being able to turn out all sorts of times and day” (G:M:4:123).

“...what we’re looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team” (E:M:3:114).

“Um and flexibility in terms of you clearly don’t want people who want to get trained because there’s a tick in the box and it looks good on their promotion and all the rest of it, but, actually, I’m flexible enough to be available out of hours and to come and to do the job and to be available at short notice” (K:M:2:111).

“...somebody that’s flexible as well. It’s a huge demand on you, negotiating, and it impacts on your personal life, quite a bit, when you’re on call. All your mates are down the pub and you’re sat watching East Enders or whatever, it can be a bit rubbish.” (L:M:7:54).

“I think there’s a degree of experience coming in here... I think it’s important to have someone who has experienced these sorts of scenarios... they’ve experienced getting involved in the siege situation. They can understand how it works, and they’ve got a good... Perhaps a better way of phrasing it they’ve got a good, wide experience of different types of policing, so I think that’s important” (A:M:1:156).

“Yeah, operational credibility, being capable to respond during a crisis incident is really key because part of controlling... building that relationship is controlling your own emotions, and, actually, if you get really excited by the whole thing, that’s difficult. And, and so what you need is that operational experience around just crisis incidents” (E:M:3:114).

“...having a legal knowledge around the subjects that you’re talking about. Because if you don’t know that you can’t make the right promises. So you’ve got to be legally sound to, um, you know, not advise, but to make those promises. And procedure. You’ve got to know all about, um, the force procedures about the subject matter that you are talking about” (O:F:9:3).

“I think the people who tend to do it, by and large, tend to be of that mind that hey... they’re prepared to

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| 11. Non-judgemental attitude towards others/respect for others/ability to withhold judgement/care about/concern for others (9) | 6. Flexibility                                 |
| 12. Team working ability/team player/”team fit” (9)  | 7. Operational policing experience/credibility |
| 13. Flexibility (9)  | 8. Patient                                     |
| 14. Operational policing experience/credibility/skills/legal knowledge (7)   | 9. Resilient                                   |
| 15. Perseverance/Patience (7)  | 10. Caring/compassionate                       |
| Resilience/Thick skin (7)  | 11. Mentally agile                             |
| 16. Mental agility/Good memory/Ability to think on your feet (5)   | 12. Genuine/Trustworthy                        |
| 17. Care about people/desire to help people/supportive/compassionate (5)   | 13. Intuitive                                  |
| 18. Intuition/Intuitive (4)  |  |
| 19. Problem solving ability (4)  |  |
| 20. Genuine/Trustworthy/Credible/Be Yourself (4)   |  |
| 21. Ability to persuade / manipulate/ exert influence over others (3)  |  |
| 22. Level headed/calm/methodical (3)   |  |
| Knowledge of mental disorders/Interest in psychology of human behaviour (3)  |  |
| 23. Ability to make decisions /decisive (3)  |  |
| 24. Emotional Intelligence/Awareness/Ability to regulate emotions (3)  |  |
| 25. Ability to stay calm/operate well under pressure (3)   |  |

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*listen, they're prepared to take the long game, patience"* (F:M:4:111).

*"As is often the way, he didn't want to engage first of all but, being persistent, perhaps, sounds a bit pushy, but, but, but..., persevering, perhaps a better word, persevering within him, I eventually got it so he was talking to me"* (D:M:3:63).

*"I've, I've spent two hours talking to a loft hatch, and eventually the loft hatch is opened and that's the first noise you would have. But because the people on the ground are doing all the other work you've just got to trust them to say we're ruling out all the other options so keep going, we think this person is there without any necessary confirmation, um... That they're even listening or that they can hear. You know, they might be wanting to listen but they've barricaded it or they're so far away that my voice isn't going to carry that far. The easy ones are where they shout and bawl back because at least you've got confirmation that they're there... and you can then got to try and work on what the, the right thing tat's going to get them engaging"* (I:M:6:84).

*"Well you've got to... you have to be resilient... resilience came as a close second... Because, unless you're personally resilient, no matter how good you are at everything else, if you're distracted, if you're tired, if you're... if you're worried, if you're stressed, the other thing is, you might be the best listener and the best communicator in the world, but when the stress is on... It robs you... some people, of the ability of, of rational thought"* (G:M:4:123).

*"I think the only other thing would probably be some resilience where, um, you know, they've got to be prepared to slog it out... Um, sometimes in, in bad weather, in, um, dodgy places"* (K:M:2:111).

*"A thick skin is, is crucial"* (G:M:4:123).

*"I mean, some people, you can say, you know, why are you here? And they'll tell you straight away. And other people can be so rude and horrendous to you, and tell you that you look like a bag of shit, and that you're fat, and you're this and you're that. And you just stand there, and you just take it all. And you've got to know that you don't, um, you don't take any of that personally"* (O:F:9:36).

*"You've got to be there because you want to be there, because you genuinely want to help that person"* (H:F:5:50).

*"I think it's, it's somebody who, um, are caring. Compassionate. Um, a person who's willing to listen. And a person who actually cares to take it to the next level"* (O:F:9:36).

*"...you've got to be altruistic to a certain degree; like, I want to help people, but I can't help everybody. I will do my best, but I think there are some people that are... in danger of either burnout or psychological problems themselves because it went wrong"* (C:F:2:96).

*"I've had many a situation with people in crisis, where, you know, they're quite pathetic characters with really sad stories and all the rest of it, and not necessarily somebody I'd instinctively take home to meet my missus, but you know, at the time, I really feel that I do care what happens to them, and I genuinely... I genuinely feel that I care what happens to them, and I want the best result, and I want them to come down, and all the rest of it"* (F: M:4:111).

*"They should be mentally agile and they should have a natural ability to calm people down in conflict situations"* (E:M:3:114).

*"Um, but it's also to multi-task because although you're still talking to them and listening to what they're saying you've also got to plan what you're going to say next. Um, so you've just got to stay with it as well*

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so it can be mentally quite tiring” (N:F:8:24).

“Mental agility, yeah, and that’s, that’s particularly... plays out in kidnap and extortion, where, ah, you’re trying to deal with a huge amount of information. You’re trying to process it very, very quickly and pass on the most pertinent points really, really quickly and do that in an environment where you potentially can’t speak or anything else” (E:M:3:114).

“You’re memory’s got to be pretty key because if they’re giving you stuff you need to be able to show you’ve absorbed it, show you’re interested in them” (D:M:3:63).

“I think it’s important to just be yourself” (O:F:9:36).

“You’ve got to be somebody who can talk through lengthy, obviously, times and come up with new things. Somebody they can trust...” (C:F:2:96).

“And just being genuine... You know, you’ve kind of got to be true to yourself, and true to them, really... And try and say, you know, this is how I can help you” (H:F:5:50).

“So those, those skills as well as communication, the non-verbal communication, if you like. Um, the other skills. I mean it’s difficult to put a label, but what I say instinct, just sort of intuitively... Um, it’s constantly searching for that, that common thread between of the two of you, the place where you might... different as anything, one might be, you know, you can be different genders, different ages, different life scenarios, different skills, different health, but there is usually a place where you can, uh hook and book with the person, and I think that’s important to get, uh... To get to influence...” (B:M:2:195).

“Yeah, you’ve got to be intuitive to pick up on those hooks and levers” (C:F:2:96).

“Well, the key one is obviously communication, but not so much talking. It’s much more about listening... They must, first of all, be a good communicator. They must be a... particularly a good listener, not so much a talker” (E:M:3:114).

“But the common theme when you’re face-to-face or speaking to somebody is definitely enhanced listening... Listening with a real intent to try and understand and empathise with them; what is it that’s brought them to this place on this day? So definitely that really enhanced, um... well it’s communication, isn’t it... But it, part... it’s the part of communication that involves you shutting down with the old mouth and just letting the ears do the work, sort of thing” (B:M:2:195).

“I think the primary one is active listening, you’ve got to listen to what you’ve been told. I guess it’s like what you said earlier, about having a strategy. I think if I went there with my own agenda and my own strategies, I think that I could miss the boat. So I try to really focus on what I’ve been told and feed off that. So for example, I said about triggers, I might talk about football, girls, nights outs, whatever whatever, and if something is said to me, if I don’t pick up on it, you know, it could delay things or it could be quite a disaster really. So you need to listen to what you’ve been told and take the book when it’s given to you” (L:M:7:54).

“Um, probably listening is the biggest single one” (I:M:6:84).

“I think listening is probably the key one, I really do” (J:F:6:110).

“Listening skills. Uh, without a doubt, I think, you know, more than what you say, it’s what you... the active listening” (F:M:4:111).

“Well, communication, is, uh, is the trump card to any of it really” (O:F:9:36).

“Um, what we’re looking for is someone who’s got the, some natural ability to communicate. Negotiation,

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26. Enhanced listening skills/active listening skills/ability to listen/good listener (14)	14. Listening skills	3. Negotiator skills
27. Communication skills (12)	15. Communication skills	
28. Team working ability/team player/”team fit” (9)	16. Team working ability	
29. Honesty/ability to be honest (4)	17. Problem solving	
30. Problem solving ability (4)	18. Honesty	

of course, is two ways, listening as well as talking” (D:M:3:63).

“It’s definitely got to be communication, that’s got to be the main bit because that’s what you are doing all the time” (N:F:8:34).

“...what we are is we are very good communicators... Enhanced communicators, probably... Um, I think foremost it’s around your skills to communicate. That’s definitely number one” (B:M:2:195).

“...at the end of the day, it’s all about teamwork” (A:M:1:156).

“But we’re also looking for someone who has a team fit. I think we do work very closely and very well as a negotiators team. We’re looking for someone who’s going to fit in to that team...” (D:M:3:63).

“And teamwork is crucial... Because this thing don’t work on, on that individual basis... There’s no such thing as a lone wolf, you know, absolutely it is the team” (G:M:4:123).

“...part of the selection process is actually around your communication style, but also that team fit. Um, and what we’re looking for very much is flexibility, support, help within that team, because we, we do deal with, um, complex, emotionally difficult incidents where, regularly, people are very focused on harming themselves or harming somebody else. So, actually, the consequences of that can be somebody being seriously hurt or dying, um, and the support mechanisms we have in place; not only have we got the organisational ones, but actually that team response is a very big, big part of it.” (E:M:3:114).

“But police officers, generally, have to relate to people, they have to communicate with people, they have to problem solve so, um, the majority of them should have the skills” (K:M:2:111).

“So you look at effective communication, um, decision-making, um – what are the other areas? Problem solving; um, there’s nothing in there about strategy; um, flexibility; um, and resilience” (B:M:2:195).

“I think certain people are good negotiators in different ways, and by that I’ll go back to, you know, the fact that I feel that my strength is with people who are in crisis, because you know, I think, possibly, personally, whatever, I genuinely do feel some empathy there, and I think that comes across, um, whereas, other people are very good at the problem solving aspect of it” (J:F:6:110).

“Listening... Um, personal communication... Some problem solving... Um, those I would, I would highlight as, as top [skills]” (G:M:4:123).

“I think you’ve got to be very fair, very honest, not only to them, but about yourself as well” (C:F:2:96).

“So it’s being, decisions are, are based upon the principles of being totally open and honest, trying to understand the, what the individual’s going through, or empathise with their situation, certainly not lying to them, at all. Absolutely not...Being totally honest with the individual. If he’s going to be arrested, he’s going to be arrested. There isn’t going to be anything that’s going to change that... So if you then say no, you’re not, and they know that they are not being dealt with by someone who’s truthful, the chances are they’ll stay in there for a lot longer period of time” (A:M:1:156).

“Um, prepared to say sorry, honesty with them. Um, there are times when I’ve said I got that wrong; you told me not to mention family – I need to mention family because of, because they’re worried. You’ve then gone mad at me, I clearly got that wrong, I’m sorry” (I:M:6:84).

Total number of concepts and categories identified:	30 Concepts	18 Secondary Categories	3 Primary Categories
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*Note.* Number in brackets represents the number of interviewees that corroborated the concept.

## **Appendix 25. Contextual Scene-Setting Chapter and the Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Model**

### **Contextual Scene Setting: Negotiator Bread and Butter**

Every situation that is encountered by a negotiator is likely to be unique (McMains and Mullins 1996 and Miller 2005, 2006), with no two deployments matching in terms of the characters, characteristics and context. It became clear from the transcripts that negotiators were deployed to a breadth of crisis incidents and utilised their skills within a variety of contexts, but that there were a number of core categories/scenarios that negotiators consistently encountered, enabling a picture of the breadth of HCNn deployment in the UK to be developed. The twelve categories encountered by UK negotiators are described below and include: 'Provision of tactical operational support', 'Protest/demonstration liaison and management', 'Suicide intervention ("Sad people on bridges")', 'High-risk MISPERs', 'Criminals evading apprehension', 'Dwelling-based barricade (without victims)', 'Hostage-taking', 'Domestic siege (involving victims)', 'Kidnap and extortion', 'Pseudo-kidnapping' and 'Extortion'.

The interview transcripts revealed a core underpinning characteristic of negotiation that dominated the deployment context. This involved negotiators responding to individuals who were in some form of personal/emotional or psychological crisis. As such, negotiators reported that their "bread and butter" involved responding to "crisis", as opposed to "hostage", incidents. Although the official title for police negotiators in the UK is "*Hostage and Crisis Negotiators*" (A:M:1:156), negotiators have historically been referred to (particularly within the media) as "Hostage Negotiators". It became clear from the transcripts that the day-to-day work of negotiators typically reflected that of the latter term, as the majority of the deployments tended not to meet the criteria for true or genuine "hostage scenarios"<sup>90</sup>. Domestic siege scenarios that were encountered typically involved a subject (or individual-in-crisis) preventing a "victim" from leaving the premises, as opposed to the subject specifically using the victim as a means to fulfil a substantive demand (such as a ransom). Although negotiators were involved with situations that involved hostages, the frequency of this scenario was incredibly low in comparison to the frequency of deployments involving crisis incidents. Many negotiators specified that they had never dealt with a true hostage incident (i.e. M:F:8:24). One negotiator reported that his force encountered true hostage-taking incidents approximately once a year (L:M:7:54) and two other negotiators described having only dealt with this type of situation once in five/ten years of service as a negotiator, respectively (H:F:5:50; G:M:4:123). Hence,

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<sup>90</sup> According to Noesner (1999), a hostage situation refers to an incident whereby a subject holds another person or persons for the purpose of forcing the fulfilment of substantive demands upon a third party, usually law enforcement.

there was limited reference to what would be perceived as “true” hostage incidents throughout the transcripts.

The transcripts revealed that spontaneous deployments<sup>91</sup> most frequently involved responding to individuals who were encountering some form of personal, emotional or psychological crisis. The majority of deployments, according to negotiators, tended to involve suicidal individuals, or those who were attempting to harm themselves in some way. One negotiator, for example, stated that *all* deployments involved “*dealing with people in some sort of emotional crisis*” (E:M:3:114)<sup>92</sup> and another stated: “*Yes, bread and butter, I’d say, would be that kind of desperate person on a roof or a bridge or something*” (F:M:4:111). As such, the majority of the negotiators’ experiences were contextualised by a backdrop of dealing with subjects who were encountering some form of crisis.

### **The Nature and Characteristics of UK Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Model**

As outlined in Figure 4.2, 2 primary, 4 secondary and 12 tertiary categories were identified as a means of depicting the key characteristics and categories of HCNn deployment within the UK. Negotiators described two main categories of deployment, those that could be categorised as crisis negotiation scenarios and those that could be categorised as hostage negotiation scenarios. This dichotomy aligns sympathetically with the FBI’s categorisation of critical events as either hostage or nonhostage situations (Noesner 1999) and these themes are discussed in more detail below.

**Categories of crisis negotiation.** Crisis negotiation scenarios constituted by far the majority of deployments and could be further subdivided into ‘Spontaneous negotiation deployments’ or ‘Pre-planned negotiation deployments’ as elucidated below.

*Spontaneous negotiation deployments* formed a large proportion of the work that negotiators carried out and could be categorised into five sub-categories of reactive negotiator deployment: ‘Suicide intervention/“sad people on bridges”’, ‘Mental health or substance abuse precipitated crisis’, ‘High risk missing persons (MISPERs)’, ‘Criminals evading apprehension’ and ‘Dwelling-based barricades (without victims)’.

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<sup>91</sup> Spontaneous deployments refer to deployments that are not pre-planned and for which negotiators have no prior warning.

<sup>92</sup> Each interviewee is depicted by a code which represents their interview letter, gender, force number and length of service in months as a negotiator (i.e. A:M:1:156).




Figure 4.2. Conceptual map depicting the primary, secondary and tertiary categories of HCNn deployment in the UK



*Suicide intervention* (“*Sad people on bridges*”) was the most frequently cited scenario encountered by negotiators. Negotiators often described this situation colloquially as “*sad people on bridges*” (F:M:4:111), referring to “*people who are suicidal, on a high rise, or bridges, or tops of buildings*” (O:F:9:36). They often got deployed to incidents involving subjects encountering some form of crisis that had precipitated suicidal ideation: “*I got a call basically saying that it was a girl on a bridge, and, um, she would only speak to police women... She was going to throw herself off the bridge*” (H:F:5:50).

*Mental health/substance abuse precipitated crisis.* Negotiators also described having to respond to incidents involving individuals experiencing some form of crisis that had either been precipitated (or exacerbated by) mental health problems and/or substance abuse. Whilst there is limited published data in relation to the specific involvement of psychoactive substances within negotiation deployments, Scottish data from Alexander (2011) indicated that 64% of the deployments dealt with by negotiators within a three year period involved suspected use of alcohol and/or other substances, thereby highlighting the potential role of intoxication within hostage/crisis incidents.

*“...generally crisis intervention, really, people at height... some sort of personal... situation... in their lives... And/or aggravated by mental health and/or drugs... seen a fair bit of psychosis, brought about by cannabis. Particularly skunk... that’s causing people to get things out of proportion, a fair bit”* (G:M:4:123).

One of the problems encountered with some of these incidents involved the accidental risk of harm to subjects as a result of the intoxication, as opposed to the suicidal intent *per se*. Many scenarios involved subjects who were located at height and as such risked injury as a result of falling rather than jumping: “*I was worried, because I was thinking, this is my first job, the guy’s under the influence of something, and he’s going to fall off this crane...*” (H:F:5:50).

*High risk MISPERs* involved attempting to engage with missing persons (MISPERs), particularly those who were considered to be high risk (in terms of harm to themselves) or particularly vulnerable: “*I had one the week before last where it was not an enviable scenario where somebody is threatening... it was a high risk missing person threatening to kill themselves and very, um, you know, depressed...*” (C:F:2:96). This often involved negotiators trying to contact younger subjects who had run away from home or had potentially placed themselves in a risky situation: “*We’ve got someone today who’s, um, a high risk, um, missing person... this 14 year old girl has gone off with a new boyfriend who they met on Facebook...*” (B:M:2:195). One negotiator described the most common incident that he had dealt with as “*the*

*high risk suicidal MISPER*” (B:M:2:195) and another agreed that “...*suicide intervention, stroke, MISPERs is... the biggest... area of... work.*” (D:M:3:63), further attesting to the frequency with which negotiators deal with missing persons who are at risk of self-harm or suicide. Other scenarios involved negotiating with individuals who had experienced some form of domestic conflict or crisis situation that had resulted in them “*disappearing off with the intent of self-harm*” and “*effectively becoming high-risk missing persons*” (I:M:6:84).

*Criminals evading apprehension.* The fourth category of spontaneous crisis negotiation deployment related to a crisis situation that typically involved individuals who were wanted by the police (i.e. there was a warrant out for their arrest) and were evading apprehension, or individuals who had barricaded themselves in to a building/premises after the commission of an offence.

*“The typical incident that we deal with is someone refusing to come out of a premises, ah, after having committed some form of criminal offence... or they’re then to be questioned about an offence. So that tends to be an individual in a house, perhaps we want to execute a filed warrant, and we need them out of the house, or they’ve committed a domestic violence incident”* (A:M:1:156).

The negotiator’s role in these types of scenario is to facilitate the execution of the warrant/arrest and to encourage the subject to come out of the premises without causing injury to themselves or any other party.

*Dwelling-based barricade (without victim(s))* is a scenario that involves negotiators being deployed to an individual who is experiencing some form of personal/emotional or psychological crisis and has barricaded him/herself into a premises.

*“The one that always sticks in my mind is a guy that was in a flat... He’d just smashed up the place but it was covered in blood and his girlfriend managed to leave the flat... And he was refusing to come out, and he’s cutting himself and there was, um, fuel all over the place... And he was threatening to set light, light to himself”* (N:F:8:34).

This category involves risk of potential harm to the barricaded subject, and does not involve any victims (i.e. individuals who are prevented from leaving the barricaded premises). Negotiators described this type of barricade scenario as typically being precipitated by domestic disputes that had escalated into threats of, or, actual violence: “...*that was a barricade situation where a lady had, um, domestic, she chased her husband out with a knife, and then was threatening to assault anyone else who sort of came in*” (J:F:6:110).

***Pre-planned negotiation deployments.*** In addition to spontaneous negotiator deployments, another secondary category emerged in terms of pre-planned or scheduled deployments that involved either supporting firearms operations to try and facilitate the peaceful arrest of a wanted individual with an outstanding warrant, or liaising with protest/demonstration organisers to agree terms of engagement and ensure that the event remains a peaceful one. The two tertiary themes relating to this secondary category were entitled: ‘Provision of tactical operational support’ and ‘Protest/demonstration liaison and management’ and are discussed sequentially below.

*Provision of tactical operational support.* Negotiators are often utilised within pre-planned firearms operations/deployments as a means of additional tactical support (i.e. “*we always deploy a negotiator as well*” (K:M:2:111)) with the intention of trying to avoid harm to the person of interest and any other parties who may be involved. The national firearms manual mandates that negotiators are consulted in firearms operations (ACPO, ACPOS and NPIA 2011), which refer to instances whereby the police have received some form of intelligence that indicates that a person poses a threat and/or possesses a firearm and the police execute a planned raid in order to remove the threat that this individual poses. The role of the negotiator in this deployment is to try and convince the person of interest to vacate the premises without having to use tactical force (such as Taser and/or firearms). Negotiators, in this sense, are there to “*facilitate the arrest*” (K:M:2:111).

“*...the next category is the firearms operation where very much it’s part of the tactics in the planning for how you can resolve it, whether it’s spontaneous or pre-planned... And a negotiator team will be put in there... as a part of a tactical option. So you end up putting in an early call to try and persuade the person to, you know, look out the window, you’re surrounded, come out with your hands held high, type thing*” (B:M:2:195).

*Protest/demonstration liaison and management.* The findings indicated that negotiators were increasingly being used within some forces as public order or “*protest liaison officers*” (N:F:8:34), whereby they were required to liaise with the organisers of protests, marches or demonstrations as a means of trying to ensure that the event remained peaceful and that rules of engagement were agreed and adhered to. Normally, these events were pre-planned and as such, negotiators communicated with organisers prior to and during the event to establish where the demonstration was going to take place, where they could and could not march and any other logistical issues that may have been pertinent to ensuring the safety of the public. Whilst this is

not a perceived typical role for a negotiator, this role utilised many of the skills required within negotiation and was seen as more of a preventative/pro-active form of policing to avoid potential escalation of a peaceful protest or march into something that may result in violence or harm to the public.

*“...the role is changing... in as much as I think, ah, areas of use are increasing. The actual job of negotiating, I think, is pretty similar to how it was when I started, ah, but, increasingly now, looking to be used in other situations, um, such as dealing with protesters. If we’ve got, um, a group we know are going to come and protest in a particular area, and we fear there’s going to be an adverse reaction, one way or another, because of that protest, then, increasingly, we’re getting negotiators involved in that to try and facilitate, um, a better outcome for all parties” (D:M:3:63).*

Not all forces utilised negotiators in this format, and some utilised negotiators more in this remit than others, dependent on the frequency with which they experienced protests/demonstrations and marches. One force lead HNC described disappointment that his cadre’s skills had not been utilised effectively in this way:

*“And sometimes, for pre-planned operations, we miss negotiators out. So for example, recently we had a very large EDL<sup>93</sup> march in [anonymised place], and there, I was a bit surprised that negotiators weren’t even consulted as part of the planning process...” (A:M:1:156).*

Another senior negotiator also felt that negotiators in his force were not being utilised enough for this type of scenario: *“I’ve never been deployed to... negotiating in a protest situation. But I think we should be used more in that area...” (B:M:2:195).*

**Categories of hostage negotiation.** These infrequent deployments were further sub-categorised into secondary categories of ‘Overt negotiation’ and ‘Covert negotiation’ as a means of depicting the contrasting nature of the hostage negotiation scenarios encountered.

**Overt negotiation.** Overt negotiation refers to a process of negotiation that was completed openly via visible processes of communication between the subject (i.e., the hostage-taker) and the police negotiator(s). Two tertiary sub-categories of overt negotiation emerged from the data, in the form of ‘Hostage-taking’ and ‘Domestic sieges (involving victim(s))’.

*Hostage-taking.* Some negotiators outlined incidents that involved individuals who had been taken hostage and were being held against their will: *“Well, the specific one that’s most*

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<sup>93</sup> English Defence League

memorable would be in [Month, Year], being called out to two police officers who, who'd been taken hostage in [Anonymised] by an armed man" (E:M:3:114).

*"...it was a fellow who was mentally ill, lived in... [Anonymised Place]... he had previously been in treatment for Schizophrenia and... had failed to maintain his regime and his contact with his physicians, to the point that, on, on a home visit, the CPN said, this guy is now dangerously unstable; we need to get control of him again... The psychiatrist decided that he knew better than the risk assessment and picked up one of his nurses and went to the house...where he was admitted by the man's wife, shown into the lounge where the man said, excuse me a minute, disappeared and came back with a 9mm... turned on the video camera and pointed the 9mm at the doctor... The CPN managed to get away and run away and raised the alarm. And then there were a series of demands that went in, from him, via his solicitor and from them to, to the cops... and we ended up with a fairly major siege, that ran for 48 hours" (G:M:4:123).*

It is worth noting, however, that this type of deployment was reported by negotiators as being an infrequent occurrence within their typical deployment history.

*Domestic siege (involving victim(s)).* Negotiators more frequently described overt hostage negotiation scenarios that involved "victims" as opposed to "hostages". In this sense, victims refer to individuals who have been prevented from leaving a premises by the subject (i.e. there is no direct threat to the victims but they are being prevented from leaving the premises or are too frightened to leave because the person in control does not want them to leave). Infrequently, threats may be made to the safety of the victims but this is not typically perceived as a hostage-taking scenario as the victims are not used as leverage to obtain some form of specific demand. The most commonly described scenario involved:

*"...domestic, household family-based crises where they end up in some sort of siege. Where they might not be threatening to kill themselves, but they're threatening to do all sorts of things to all sorts of people. Often they don't actually have a hostage but sometimes they do, you know. It'll be partner, girlfriend, wife, children, whoever" (B:M:2:195).*

Victims typically included the subject's partner or children and the event tended to represent the culmination of either a domestic conflict or precipitated crisis event, whereby the presence of other parties was potentially incidental, as opposed to planned:

*"...the majority of times where there's been a hostage/victim there, it's tended to be... a domestic siege type of thing where he's also grabbed the kids or grabbed the wife. Or*

*it's been... something like a mental health assessment where he'd grabbed hold of whoever... Or it could be a friend, who just happens to be in there"* (K:M:2:111).

**Covert negotiation** refers to negotiation that is carried out without the hostage-taker(s)' knowledge of police involvement. This type of deployment is typically referred to within the police as a "Red Centre" and is frequently utilised within "crime in action"<sup>94</sup> cases.

*"There's something called a Red Centre Course which specifically deals around a kidnap or a hostage environment... because effectively, in an overt-world, the subject in crisis knows that you're there and knows that you're working for the cops. In a kidnap world where there's a threat for life, very often they can't know that the police are involved, so there's different techniques in how you deal with them"* (I:M:6:84).

Covert negotiation is typically utilised when hostage-takers have contacted the family of the hostage(s) in order to obtain a ransom or other instrumental demand. In this scenario, HCNs are required to negotiate using the family member/third party as an intermediary (i.e. a victim communicator). The core principle will be to coach the third party intermediary (TPI) or victim communicator to communicate with the hostage-taker in a manner that does not convey the police's involvement. The data revealed three tertiary sub-categories of covert negotiation: 'Kidnap and Extortion', 'Pseudo-kidnapping' and 'Extortion'.

*Kidnap and extortion.* Negotiators described a number of scenarios that involved a form of kidnap and extortion, whereby an individual had been taken hostage and then used as leverage to obtain a ransom or some form of instrumental demand. These types of incidents are infrequent, with some negotiators having never been deployed within a Red Centre scenario and others having limited experience of kidnap deployments. One negotiator described having *"dealt with two or three kidnappings... or alleged kidnappings, over the [five year] period"* (D:M:3:63). Kidnap and extortion scenarios were more frequently reported by negotiators from Metropolitan forces, a finding that was to be expected when considered in line with the type and frequency of crime experienced within cities as opposed to rural areas.

*"It was probably about, my first deployment was not for about four months actually, and it was a kidnap, and it was international. Basically what had happened, we had a family in the north of the country, and demands were coming in from the hostage-takers in Indonesia, and the brother, who we had to negotiate through. Quite often, on those*

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<sup>94</sup> Crime in action cases include kidnap, abduction and product contamination (Essex and Kent Police 2014).

*occasions, it turned out to be false previously, but that one was a genuine kidnap*” (L:M:7:54).

*Pseudo-kidnapping.* Negotiators also described having responded to a number of pseudo-kidnappings that constituted “crime in action” situations and often involved what they referred to colloquially as “bad-on-bad kidnappings”. These types of kidnappings tended to involve gang or criminal vendettas, organised crime or drug dealer conflict/disputes: “*So it’s not one where someone’s threatening, or is required to hand over £1 million and they’ve got the bank manager’s wife. It’s not that type of thing. It’s a drug deal for £150 that’s gone wrong*” (A:M:1:156). Negotiators described this scenario as somewhat complicated as, although the situation was treated as a true Red Centre deployment, negotiators were conscious that the individuals (i.e. victims and victim communicators) that they were dealing with, could potentially be reversed in role (i.e. they could be the kidnappers in a future situation). As such, they were cognisant not to give away strategy or tactics which could potentially benefit the victim in any way should they become the kidnapper in the future.

*“...that was a kidnap, about... A member of an organised crime group... who was of interest to us, in any case, had been snatched from outside his house, by... gangsters, bundled into a car, his mobile phone was thrown out of the car, before they sped off and he disappeared. And the intelligence picture was such that this was likely to become a murder. This was a significant incident of high risk and threat... it was without a doubt, a criminal vendetta.. a sum of money had exchanged hands somewhere, that had not gone through the family; it certainly hadn’t touched the police anywhere... more likely to be that your victim, your hostage has been encouraged to do some electronic bank transfer of money whilst he was held... and he turned up at about three o’clock in the morning, battered and bruised... in the local hospital”* (G:M:4:123).

*Extortion.* Extortion is defined as “the practice of obtaining something, especially money, through force or threats” (Extortion n.d.). Negotiators described dealing with situations that involved direct extortion/blackmail of individuals but no associated kidnapping: “...and what we’re finding is that we’re having *more and more* extortions rather than kidnaps” (K:M:2:111). This particular category of incident was described by three negotiators (I:M:6:84; J:F:6:110; K:M:2:111) and the scenarios tended to involve product contamination threats or threats to discredit someone either professionally or personally, if money wasn’t paid to the

extortionist. Many of these scenarios could be classed as “sextortion”<sup>95</sup> as HCNs referred to an increasing number of deployments that involved individuals being blackmailed by somebody threatening to expose sexually-compromising material/information.

*“...the guy had received a letter that said... that they can make some threats towards his business; that they’d got some compromising photographs of him, which they had, which were going to destroy his family life... and this guy wanted a specific payment of £146,000” (I:M:6:84).*

IE: *“Most of the time... it can be a product contamination but they’re more rare. Most of the time, it tends to be they’re threatening to expose somebody.”*

IV: *“Right, for something that could be potentially damaging, personally damaging to them perhaps?”*

IE: *“Yes, we’re finding more of those internet related now where people are engaging in sexual activity, it’s being filmed on the internet and then... this film’s going to be released, it’s going to be sent to everyone on your Facebook account” (K:M:2:111).*

## **Model Synopsis**

This model provides the first systematic attempt to qualitatively describe the nature and characteristics of UK HCNn. It exemplifies the diversity of the incidents to which negotiators are deployed by identifying 12 categories of incident that are typically encountered and serves to dispel some of the myths/preconceptions about ‘typical’ incidents, highlighting the inadequacy of the term ‘hostage negotiator’. This model will serve as the backdrop to the remainder of the qualitative models that will be discussed in the following chapters. It can also be used to inform negotiator training and continuing professional development by highlighting the typical scenarios encountered and the contextual and situational characteristics of negotiator deployments in the UK.

## **Model Implications and Recommendations**

This model has implications for the training of new negotiators and the CPD of established negotiators, as it provides a unique insight into the nature and characteristics of negotiation within the UK, an aspect which to date has not been subject to empirical research. Whilst the observations are based on the experiences of a specific sub-sample of negotiators (and therefore require further follow up/quantitative validation), the model can be used to

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<sup>95</sup> Sextortion is “also known as webcam blackmail. It refers to criminals deceiving webcam users into unclothing and performing a sexual act. This footage is recorded and then used to blackmail victims for money” (BBC One Crimewatch, n.d.).



inform the training of negotiators and other police staff that may be involved with the deployment of negotiators (i.e. call handlers, for example, could be provided with training in relation to the types of incident that may require negotiators and the most appropriate time to deploy negotiators).

This model (and the contextual scene setting relating to negotiator “bread and butter”) provides an insight into the nature and situational context of negotiation deployments within the UK. The findings indicate that the majority of scenarios to which negotiators are deployed, involve ‘crisis’, as opposed to, ‘hostage’ incidents. Negotiators described their “bread and butter” as involving somebody who is in some form of crisis (whether that be personal, emotional or psychological), with the majority of these incidents involving suicide/self-harm intervention. Negotiator training, whilst equipping negotiators to deal with both hostage and crisis scenarios would perhaps benefit from an emphasis on suicidal individuals, or those experiencing mental health or substance abuse precipitated crisis, due to the frequency with which these situations are encountered.

The model also highlights that negotiators are utilised within pre-planned deployments involving firearms operations or protest liaison and there is perhaps scope for negotiators to be utilised to greater effect within pre-planned scenarios, such as protests/demonstrations/marches and the potential for negotiators to be used as in-force mediators for conflict resolution within the workplace. The latter suggestion, for example, could be piloted within some forces initially to see whether there is scope for this type of work and whether it is effective. The model demonstrates the diversity of negotiator deployments in the UK and as such, highlights the need for negotiators to be able to adapt their styles of negotiation in line with the scenarios encountered, an aspect that should be focused on within new and existing negotiator training/CPD. This highlights the fact that whilst negotiator training could potentially be guided with an emphasis on crisis negotiation, negotiators need to be equipped to be able to respond to any circumstance involving an infinite number of situational and contextual variables.

## Appendix 26. Table Synopsising Research Conducted to Identify the Personality and Socio-Psychological Characteristics of Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiators

Table 5.1. *Table Synopsising Research Conducted to Identify the Personality and Socio-Psychological Characteristics of Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiators*

Research Study	Variables Measured	Measures	Findings	Study Limitations*
Gelbart (1979)	Psychological & Personality Characteristics	CPI (Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale) & MMPI (Psychopathic Deviate Scale)	Highly adequate social skills; communications ability; self-assurance; social presence; intelligence; ability to manipulate others; ambitious; active; forceful; insightful; resourceful; versatile.	Lack of comparison/control group Small sample size ( $N = 44$ )
Gettys and Elam (1988)	Psychological & Personality Characteristics	CPI & MMPI	Good verbal skills/verbal fluency; positive self-image; good reasoning abilities; high sensitivity to others.	Lack of matched pairs comparison/control group Small sample size ( $n = 39$ HCNs; $n = 30$ entry level police officers)
Allen, Fraser and Inwald (1991)	Psychological & Personality Characteristics	CPI & MMPI	Insightful; intelligent; rational; clear-thinking; logical; self-controlled; self-confident; decisive; able to make concessions; assertive; determined; persistent; trustful; tolerant of ambiguity; values success; expresses frustration appropriately; has the ability to empathise and use insight to either help or hurt others.	Lack of comparison/control group Small sample size ( $N = 12$ )
Tatar (1982) Regini (2002)	Personality & Motivation Desirable negotiator competencies/characteristics	Unknown Self-report/qualitative data identified through discussions with crisis negotiation team members	Emotional stability; extraversion; instinctual gratification; liberal orientation. Adept criminal investigator; non-confrontational; non-judgemental; exceptional interview & interrogation skills; good self-control; ability to maintain voice control.	Exact method of data collection unknown Lack of empirically robust methodology Limitations associated with self-report data
Slatkin (2010)	Desirable negotiator competencies/characteristics	Unknown	Patience; sincerity; down-to-earth manner; non-judgemental/tolerant of others; flexibility; aplomb; verbal expressiveness.	Lack of empirically robust methodology
McMains and Mullins (2010)	Desirable negotiator competencies/characteristics	Unknown	Ability to remain calm, cool and collected in the most stressful environments (primary negotiator); ability to control emotions; ability to control voice; ability to multi-task (secondary negotiator).	Lack of empirically robust methodology
San Jose State University Administration of Justice Bureau (1995, 2004 cited in Strentz 2012)	Desirable negotiator competencies/characteristics	Self-reported perceived characteristics of effective negotiators (using a modified version of the 300-item Adjective Check List)	<i>Demographic/occupational variables:</i> Male/Female aged 35 – 50; Variety of law enforcement assignments; at least 5 years' experience as a police officer; good ability to relate to people; training in suicide prevention; a good listener. <i>Specific personality characteristics:</i> Adaptable; alert; calm; capable; clear thinking; mature; patient; sociable; tactful (90% agreement); clever; confident; conscientious; intelligent; wide interests; logical; persistent; practical; reasonable; reliable; understanding (75-89% agreement)	Limitations associated with self-report data (i.e. measured <i>perceived</i> as opposed to <i>actual</i> characteristics)
Fuselier (1981a)	Desirable negotiator competencies/characteristics	Unknown	Emotional maturity; credibility; good listening ability; good verbal ability; practical intelligence; ability to think clearly under stress.	Lack of empirically robust methodology
Birge, A. and Birge, R. (1994, 2011 cited in Strentz 2012)	Behavioural responses likely to predict effective negotiators	Self-reported operational behavioural responses	Use of non-physical response (i.e. talking/listening) to resolve past incidents involving conflict as opposed to the use of force.	Lack of empirically robust methodology Limitations associated with self-report data

*Note.* \*All studies are subject to the limitation that they are specific to a USA context and cannot necessarily be applied to international law enforcement settings. MMPI refers to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory; CPI refers to the California Personality Inventory.

## Appendix 27. Demographic Questionnaire (HCN Sample)

Participant Reference Number .....

### Demographic Questionnaire for Hostage Negotiator Sample

*Please can you answer the following questions:*

How old are you? .....

Are you male or female? Male / Female

Were you born in the UK? Yes / No

If no, in which country were you born? .....

What is your ethnicity? Please select from the following list:

- |                 |                          |
|-----------------|--------------------------|
| White British   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other White     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Indian          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Pakistani       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Bangladeshi     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Asian     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Black African   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Black     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Chinese         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other ethnicity | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Which police force do you currently work for? .....

Which OCU/Station are you currently based at? .....

Which department do you work in? .....

- |  |                           |                          |
|--|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| What is your current rank within the police? | Police Constable          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Sergeant                  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Inspector                 | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Chief Inspector           | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Superintendent            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Chief Superintendent      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Other (please state)..... |                          |

In years and months, how long have you been in the police? .....

In years and months, how long have you been a police hostage negotiator? .....

Approximately how many crisis/hostage incidents have you been involved with since becoming a negotiator? .....

Would you be willing to take part in an interview to discuss your role as a negotiator?

Yes / No

If yes, please provide a contact email address here.....

**Please now complete the attached questionnaire**

## Appendix 28. Demographic Questionnaire (Police Officer Sample)

Participant Reference Number .....

### Demographic Questionnaire for Police Officer (NON-NEGOTIATOR) Sample

*Please can you answer the following questions:*

How old are you? .....

Are you male or female? Male / Female

Were you born in the UK? Yes / No

If no, in which country were you born? .....

What is your ethnicity? Please select from the following list:

- |                 |                          |
|-----------------|--------------------------|
| White British   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other White     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Indian          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Pakistani       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Bangladeshi     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Asian     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Black African   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Black     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Chinese         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other ethnicity | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Which police force do you currently work for? .....

Which OCU/Station are you currently based at? .....

Which department do you work in? .....

- |  |                      |                          |
|--|----------------------|--------------------------|
| What is your current rank within the police? | Police Constable     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Sergeant             | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Inspector            | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Chief Inspector      | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Superintendent       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Chief Superintendent | <input type="checkbox"/> |
|  | Other .....          | <input type="checkbox"/> |

In years and months, how long have you been in the police? .....

**Please now complete the attached questionnaire**

## Appendix 29. Demographic Questionnaire (Student Sample)

Participant Reference Number .....

### Demographic Questionnaire (Student Sample)

*Please can you answer the following questions:*

How old are you? .....

Are you male or female? Male / Female

Were you born in the UK? Yes / No

If no, in which country were you born? .....

What is your ethnicity? Please select from the following list:

- |                 |                          |
|-----------------|--------------------------|
| White British   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other White     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Indian          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Pakistani       | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Bangladeshi     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Asian     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Black African   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other Black     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Chinese         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Other ethnicity | <input type="checkbox"/> |

What course are you currently studying at Coventry University? .....

If you are a Psychology Student please provide details of your university email address below so that you can be awarded research credits in line with the research participation scheme:

Coventry University Email address: .....

**Please now complete the attached questionnaire**

## Appendix 30. Table Depicting Framework Analysis and Cross-Referenced Self-Perceived Successful HCN Characteristics and Competencies

Table 10.1. *Code Co-Occurrence Frequency Matrix Depicting Cross-Referenced Self-Perceived Successful HCN Characteristics and Competencies*

Interviewee	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
A	X	X	X	X		X			X	X	X		X						X													
B	X	X	X	X		X				X				X	X	X	X	X	X													
C	X		X			X			X	X				X							X	X	X	X								
D		X		X	X	X	X	X		X			X																			X
E	X			X		X	X			X							X							X								
F			X	X									X	X			X	X						X		X	X	X				
G				X		X	X			X					X	X	X	X														
H			X	X		X				X								X		X												
I		X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X				X				X									X	X	
J	X	X	X	X	X	X										X									X					X		
K	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X		X			X	X	X	X						X							
L		X		X							X	X					X				X			X					X		X	
M				X		X			X		X		X											X								X
N		X		X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X			X	X						X								X
O	X	X	X	X		X									X		X	X						X								
Total	7	9	9	14	3	12	5	2	4	9	6	3	7	4	3	4	9	7	3	4	1	1	1	5	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	3

1. **Operational policing experience (B)**

2. **Ability to empathise/empathic/empathy/compassion (C)**

3. **Non-judgemental/respect for others (C)**

4. **Listening skills (B)**

5. Ability to persuade/manipulate/exert influence over others (B)

6. **Communication skills (B)**

7. Mental agility (C)

8. Likeable/personable/able to get on with people (C)

9. Honesty (B)

10. **Team working ability/team fit/team player (B)**

11. **Ability to work logically and methodically/common sense (B)**

12. Level headed (C)

13. **Perseverance/patience (C)**

14. Intuition (C)

15. Knowledge of mental disorders/psychology of human behaviour (A)

16. Problem solving ability (B)

17. **Flexibility (C)**

18. **Resilience/thick skin (C)**

19. Ability to make decisions/decisive (C)

20. Genuine/trustworthy (C)

21. Interest in people/human psychology (C)

22. Investigation/interrogation skills (B)

23. Ability to build rapport (B)

24. Care about people/supportive/desire to help people/altruistic (C)

25. Emotional intelligence/awareness (C)

26. Ability to blend into the background/be invisible (C)

27. Easy to talk to (C)

28. Ability to think before you speak (C)

29. Open minded (C)

30. Prepared to say sorry/humility (C)

31. Voice control/ability to control voice tone and pitch (B)

32. Ability to stay calm/operate well under pressure (C)

*Note.* Competency key: A = Knowledge; B = Skills; C = Characteristics/Attributes; Bold text represents the ten most highly corroborated/frequently cited competencies.

## Appendix 31. Table Depicting the Most Frequently Cited Strategies/Stratagems Cited by Hostage and Crisis Negotiators<sup>96</sup>

Table 11.1. Table Depicting the Most Frequently Cited Strategies/Stratagems Cited by Hostage and Crisis Negotiators

Strategy/Stratagem	Interview Transcript Excerpt	Pointers to Inform Use of Strategy
<b>1. Establish why the subject is in the situation</b>	<i>"You're trying to find what's made them where they are, and if you can find that, you can generally help them find a solution."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Try to understand why the S is in crisis/conflict</li> <li>• Establish what the precipitating event was for the subject</li> <li>• What has been going on for the S in their life to get them to this point?</li> </ul>
<b>2. Honesty</b>	<i>"Being truthful – always be truthful...."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Always be truthful and honest</li> <li>• If asked a direct question, don't lie!</li> </ul>
<b>3. Identification of hooks and triggers</b>	<i>"...trying to establish what the big issues were for him, you know, um, and you're looking for the hook, then, all the time, aren't you? The thing that he... he's actually interested in, the thing that's at the heart of his problem."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify what is at the "heart of the problem" and focus on that aspect.</li> <li>• Identify the topics/subjects that are de-escalating/conciliatory (i.e. hooks) and focus on those.</li> <li>• Identify the topics/subjects that are escalating/aggravating (i.e. triggers) and veer away from those topics of conversation.</li> </ul>
<b>4. Matching of negotiator and subject</b>	<i>"...if you get on better with that individual, then you end up being the number one."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Think about matching of HCN and S in terms of: 1) Personality, 2) Gender, 3) Culture/Language, and 4) Background.</li> <li>• Try to match the HCN and S in a way that is likely to result in the greatest level of rapport between the two parties (i.e. if a S has had negative experiences with men in the past, she may engage better with a female HCN; if a S has a military history, it may be better to use a HCN who has knowledge/experience of the military).</li> </ul>
<b>5. Adapt strategy in line with situation /subject</b>	<i>"I've known a friend of mine who was negotiating with someone who was ex-services. He might come across as likeable, as well, but his eventual resolution was reached about because the, um, my colleague was a sergeant, he'd got stripes on and he actually ordered the guy to come down. And that worked, in the end. So, there are, there are times when other strategies work. There's no fixed rule."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No fixed rule about which strategy to employ. Try one and if it doesn't work, try something else!</li> <li>• Adapt your style of language in line with the S (i.e. you are likely to communicate slightly differently/use different language when speaking to a young person, when compared to an adult).</li> <li>• Adapt strategy in line with situational context/S background (i.e. a more direct approach from an authority figure may be appropriate for a subject who is ex-services/military).</li> </ul>
<b>6. Use of concessions and positive police actions</b>	<i>"...I've done this for you. You do this for me."</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Quid Pro Quo</i> concept (I.e. I'll do something for you, if you do something for me).</li> <li>• Parallels with the Cialdini's (1984) "Reciprocity" weapon of influence.</li> <li>• Sometimes provision of basic concessions (i.e. cigarettes, food, water etc.) can be used as a demonstration of "positive police action" (i.e. this is what we are doing for you, now you need to help us by doing x, y, z...)</li> </ul>

<sup>96</sup> Document prepared for use at CEPOL Crisis Hostage Negotiation Training Event held at the Swedish Police Academy in Stockholm on 15<sup>th</sup> March 2016



Strategy/Stratagem	Interview Transcript Excerpt	Pointers to Inform Use of Strategy
<b>7. Perseverance/Persistence</b>	<i>“...he didn’t want to engage first of all but, being persistent, perhaps sounds a bit pushy, but, persevering, perhaps a better word, persevering with him, I eventually got it so he was talking to me.”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Persevere with the S and don’t give up!</li> <li>• They may not want to talk initially but demonstrate that you are listening to them and that you want to help and eventually they will start to talk to you.</li> <li>• Ignore verbal abuse which may be directed at you and persevere with dialogue.</li> </ul>
<b>8. Use of time as a tactic/“Playing it long”</b>	<i>“...you’re really, um, trying to buy time and let them diffuse the anger really, the emotion.”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Time is on the HCN’s side.</li> <li>• Play the long game (i.e. you have all the time in the world and aren’t going anywhere!).</li> <li>• Use time as a tactic to allow for: 1) de-escalation of arousal/emotion levels, 2) detoxification from drugs/alcohol, 3) S to become fatigued/bored and “run out of steam”.</li> </ul>
<b>9. Disassociation from the police</b>	<i>“...introduce yourself just by name and then really, never say I’m a police officer. And generally I turn up not in police uniform; I wouldn’t turn up in uniform ever actually.”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Try to dissociate yourself from the police as far as possible as association with the police can act as a barrier to developing a rapport with some Ss.</li> <li>• Never lie about not being a police officer but try to separate yourself from the police by wearing civilian clothing and introducing yourself by your first name (as opposed to rank/role).</li> <li>• State “my name is X and I am with the police”, as opposed to “I am a police officer”.</li> </ul>
<b>10. Generate options available to subject/Encourage problem-solving</b>	<i>“I’m not going away, and there are two choices...”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Make it clear to the S that there is more than one option available to them.</li> <li>• Emotion clouds/distorts rational thinking and it is difficult for someone in crisis/conflict to see that there is another way out to their situation (i.e. a more positive one).</li> <li>• Point out the potential options available to the S and try to encourage problem-solving (by the S). I.e. “What do you think would help you to feel better about this situation? “What could we do together to try to resolve things?”</li> </ul>
<b>11. Identify commonalities/common ground</b>	<i>“...trying to find that little thing that’s going to give you some kind of rapport, uh, with somebody who you otherwise might have nothing to... in common with at all”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Try to find the “common thread” between the HCN and S.</li> <li>• Identify things that you have in common with the S.</li> <li>• Use commonalities to build rapport/develop relationship with S.</li> </ul>
<b>12. Encourage dialogue/allow subject to vent</b>	[encourage the S to] <i>“...talk as much as possible and offload it all.”</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourage the S to offload and ventilate.</li> <li>• The more they engage in dialogue, the more likely you are to identify hooks to work with/understand why they are in the crisis/conflict state.</li> <li>• You want the S to feel that they are being listened to, heard and understood so utilise active listening skills during this ventilation process.</li> </ul>

## **Appendix 32. Exemplar Crib Sheet that can be used to inform Training/CPD for Hostage and Crisis Negotiators<sup>97</sup>**

### **The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. Procedural Model of Hostage and Crisis Negotiation**

The following document is designed to be used by negotiators as a crib sheet when responding to hostage/crisis incidents. The D.I.A.M.O.N.D. acronym offers a quick and easy mnemonic mechanism for reminding negotiators to complete the key tasks involved in resolving hostage/crisis incidents successfully. It is hoped that this document will be used to inform both the training of new negotiators and the continuing professional development of existing hostage and crisis negotiators internationally.



#### **STAGE 1 = INITIAL NEGOTIATOR DEPLOYMENT TASKS:**

- **D**eployment
- **I**nformation/Intelligence gathering
- **A**ssessment of risk/threat

#### **STAGE 2 = THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS & INCIDENT RESOLUTION:**

- **M**ethods of communication
- **O**pen dialogue with subject
- **N**egotiator toolbox/repertoire to resolve incident

#### **STAGE 3 = POST INCIDENT PROTOCOL:**

- **D**ebriefing procedures

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<sup>97</sup> Document prepared for use at CEPOL Crisis Hostage Negotiation Training Event held at the Swedish Police Academy in Stockholm on 15<sup>th</sup> March 2016

## Appendix 33. Table Depicting Potential Assessment Criteria Rubric to be used for Selection of Trainee Hostage and Crisis Negotiators

Table 11.2. *Table Depicting Potential Assessment Criteria Rubric to be used for Selection of Trainee Hostage and Crisis Negotiators*

Competencies	Specific Aspect Being Measured	Method of Assessment	Score/Rating	Relative Importance
1. Entry Requirements	a. Sergeant/Inspector <sup>98</sup> Rank	Application Form	Yes/No	Essential
	b. Committed to the Role	Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	c. In it for the Right Reasons	Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
2. Negotiator Skills	a. Listening Skills	Role-Play Assessment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	b. Communication Skills	Role-Play Assessment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	c. Team-Working Ability	Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	d. Honesty	Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Desirable
	e. Problem-Solving	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Desirable
3. Negotiator Attributes	a. Empathic	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	b. Non-Judgemental	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	c. Flexible	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	d. Operational Policing	Police Employment	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	Experience/Credibility	Record/Application Form/Interview		
	e. Patient	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	f. Resilient	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	g. Caring/Compassionate	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	h. Mentally Agile	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Essential
	i. Genuine/Trustworthy	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Desirable
	j. Intuitive	Role-Play Assessment/Interview	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Desirable

<sup>98</sup> Amend as necessary in accordance with current individual force policy

## Appendix 34. Participant Information Sheet (HCN Sample)

Participant Reference Number.....

### Participant Information Sheet – Hostage Negotiator Sample (Stage 1 & 2)

#### Study Title: Hostage / Crisis Negotiation from a UK Police Perspective

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information sheet and discuss it with others if you wish. Please feel free to ask me questions if there is anything which is not clear or you would like me to explain further or in more detail.

#### ***What is the purpose of this study?***

The aim of this study is to explore police hostage/crisis negotiation within the UK. It is envisioned that this research will provide an insight into the role of the police hostage negotiator within the UK and to identify the characteristics, traits and skills that distinguish negotiators from others. In order to identify these factors, negotiators will be compared with both police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public.

#### ***Why have I been chosen?***

The study is utilising a sample of police hostage negotiators from a variety of forces within the UK. Permission for this research to be conducted has been obtained from the lead hostage negotiation coordinator for each force. You have been asked to take part in this research because you are a trained hostage negotiator working within one of these police forces.

#### ***Do I have to take part?***

No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you do consent to take part in the research, you are free to withdraw at any time, without any consequences, if you decide you no longer want to be involved in the research. There will be no negative consequences to you or your employment if you choose not to take part in the study.

#### ***What will happen to me if I take part?***

The study consists of two sections. The first requires the completion of a psychometric test battery which should take no more than 60 minutes. Some participants will only be required to complete this initial section of the research. A smaller sample of participants will be randomly selected to take part in the second section of the research, which will require you, if you are selected, to take part in an interview lasting approximately 1 hour. This interview will involve being asked questions relating to your role as a police hostage negotiator. The interview will be digitally recorded using a dictaphone in order for the transcribed data to be analysed. Once the interview has been transcribed, you will be given the opportunity to check the transcript and verify that the information is accurate. You will be informed by the researcher if you have been selected to take part in both parts of the research.

#### ***What do I have to do?***

If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete the psychometric test battery initially and if you are selected to take part in the second section of the research, you will then be asked to arrange a convenient time for the interview to take place. You will be asked to respond to the questions in the test battery and the interview as honestly and accurately as possible.

#### ***What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?***

There is no physical risk from taking part in the study. It is important to note however that some of the questions in the interview may ask you to discuss crisis situations which may have resulted in negative consequences, however, please note that you are not obliged to discuss anything you do not wish to discuss. You will be debriefed fully at the end of the interview and the researcher will provide an opportunity to discuss any issues that may have arisen during the interview. Participants who feel they need further support will be referred on to counselling services provided by the Force. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study.

#### ***What are the possible benefits of taking part?***

Your participation in this research will contribute to furthering our understanding of crisis/hostage negotiation in the UK and help to inform training procedures within police hostage negotiation programmes.

***What happens when the research study stops?***

When you have completed the psychometric test battery and the interview you will be debriefed regarding the purpose of the research and any questions or concerns you have can be addressed.

***What will happen if I don't want to continue with the study?***

You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be penalised in any way for doing so. You will be allocated a unique participant reference code to provide a means of identifying your data should you wish to withdraw from the study. Please contact the lead researcher to request that your data be withdrawn quoting your participant number at the time. Any information collected about you will then be destroyed by the researcher and none of the information that you provide will be used in the research without your consent. You have the option to withdraw your data from the research up to 6 weeks after the completion of the psychometric test battery and interview, respectively. All data will be kept in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed upon completion of my PhD.

***What if there is a problem?***

It is unlikely that there will be a problem during the course of your participation in this research study. However, in the unlikely event that something goes wrong or if at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.

***Harm***

There is no anticipated risk of harm involved with participation in this study. It is important to note however that some of the questions in the interview may ask you to discuss crisis situations which may have resulted in negative consequences, however, please note that you are not obliged to discuss anything you do not wish to discuss. You will be debriefed fully at the end of the interview and the researcher will provide an opportunity to discuss any issues that may have arisen during the interview. Participants who feel they need further support will be referred on to counselling services provided by the Force. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study.

***Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?***

Your participation will be kept entirely confidential. You will be allocated a unique participant reference number at the point of starting the study ensuring that interview transcripts remain anonymous. The interview will be digitally recorded using a dictaphone and then transcribed in order for qualitative analysis to be conducted. You will be offered the opportunity to view and check the transcribed interviews once this process has been completed. Once the transcript has been checked and you have verified the accuracy of the verbatim, the interview tape (digital file) will be erased and therefore any means of identifying individual interviewees will be removed. Data obtained during the interviews will be reported at a group level with some extracts used to illustrate key points. Names of individuals will not be given and care will be taken not to use extracts that may enable individuals to be identified. All data resulting from the completion of the psychometric tests will also be analysed at a group level and no individual scores will be identified. Completed psychometric tests will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from these tests will be stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher. All anonymised data will be stored for five years after the completion of the PhD thesis, to allow time for publication. All data will then be securely destroyed (i.e. paper data will be shredded and electronic data will be erased) once this time period has elapsed.

***What will happen to the results of the study?***

The results will be typed up in the form of a formal PhD thesis and submitted for assessment at Coventry University. The research will also be written up in the form of academic papers and submitted for publication in academic, peer-reviewed journals and presentation at conferences. In these instances, data will be presented as a group rather than individual data and individual participants will remain anonymous. The police forces involved will not be named unless approval is given by the ACC of the force and individual participants' identities will remain protected.

***Contact details:***

Lead researcher's name: **Miss Amy Grubb** (*Lecturer in Forensic Psychology*)

Telephone number: **0247 688 8795**; Email: [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk) – preferred method of contact.

Director of studies supervising PhD: **Dr Sarah Brown** (*Reader in Forensic Psychology Development*) Telephone number: **0247 688 7024**; Email: [sarah.brown@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:sarah.brown@coventry.ac.uk)

## **Appendix 35. Participant Information Sheet (Police Officer Sample)**

*Participant Reference Number.....*

### **Participant Information Sheet – Police Officer (Non-Negotiator Sample)**

#### **Study Title: Hostage / Crisis Negotiation from a UK Police Perspective**

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information sheet and discuss it with others if you wish. Please feel free to ask me questions if there is anything which is not clear or you would like me to explain further or in more detail.

#### ***What is the purpose of this study?***

The aim of this study is to explore police hostage/crisis negotiation within the UK. It is envisioned that this research will provide an insight into the role of the police hostage negotiator within the UK and to identify the characteristics, traits and skills that distinguish negotiators from others. In order to identify these factors, negotiators will be compared with both police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public.

#### ***Why have I been chosen?***

The study is utilising a sample of police hostage negotiators from a variety of forces in the UK and a sample of police officers (non-negotiators) from these forces. Permission for this research to be conducted has been obtained from the lead hostage negotiation coordinator for each force. You have been asked to take part in this research because you are a police officer (non-negotiator) working within one of these police forces.

#### ***Do I have to take part?***

No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you do consent to take part in the research, you are free to withdraw at any time, without any consequences, if you decide you no longer want to be involved in the research. There will be no negative consequences to you or your employment if you choose not to take part in the study.

#### ***What will happen to me if I take part?***

The study involves the completion of a psychometric test battery which should take no more than 60 minutes.

#### ***What do I have to do?***

If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete a number of psychometric tests. You will be asked to respond to the questions in the test battery as honestly and accurately as possible. You will then be asked to return the completed psychometric tests to the researcher within a sealed envelope.

#### ***What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?***

There is no physical risk from taking part in the study. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study.

#### ***What are the possible benefits of taking part?***

Your participation in this research will contribute to furthering our understanding of crisis/hostage negotiation in the UK and help to inform training procedures within police hostage negotiation programmes.

***What happens when the research study stops?***

When you have completed the psychometric test battery you will be debriefed regarding the purpose of the research and any questions or concerns you have can be addressed by contacting the researcher directly via one of the methods detailed below.

***What will happen if I don't want to continue with the study?***

You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be penalised in any way for doing so. You will be allocated a unique participant reference code to provide a means of identifying your data should you wish to withdraw from the study. Please contact the lead researcher to request that your data be withdrawn quoting your participant number at the time. Any information collected about you will then be destroyed by the researcher and none of the information that you provide will be used in the research without your consent. You have the option to withdraw your data from the research up to 6 weeks after the completion of the psychometric test battery and interview, respectively. All data will be kept in a locked cabinet and will be destroyed upon completion of my PhD.

***What if there is a problem?***

It is unlikely that there will be a problem during the course of your participation in this research study. However, in the unlikely event that something goes wrong or if at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.

***Harm***

There is no anticipated risk of harm involved with participation in this study. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study.

***Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?***

Your participation will be kept entirely confidential. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study. You will be allocated a unique participant reference number at the point of starting the study and this will be used to identify participants anonymously. All data resulting from the completion of the psychometric tests will be analysed at a group level and no individual scores will be identified. All data resulting from the completion of questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from the psychometric test will be stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher. Completed psychometric tests will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from these tests will be stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher. All anonymised data will be stored for five years after the completion of the PhD thesis, to allow time for publication. All data will then be securely destroyed (i.e. paper data will be shredded and electronic data will be erased) once this time period has elapsed.

***What will happen to the results of the study?***

The results will be typed up in the form of a formal PhD thesis and submitted for assessment at Coventry University. The research will also be written up in the form of academic papers and submitted for publication in academic, peer-reviewed journals and presentation at conferences. In these instances, data will be presented as a group rather than individual data and individual participants will remain anonymous. The police forces involved will not be named unless approval is given by the ACC of the force and individual participants' identities will remain protected.

***Contact details:***

Lead researcher's name: **Miss Amy Grubb** (*Lecturer in Forensic Psychology*)

Telephone number: **0247 688 8795**; Email: [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk) – preferred method of contact.

Director of studies supervising PhD: **Dr Sarah Brown** (*Reader in Forensic Psychology Development*)

Telephone number: **0247 688 7024**; Email: [sarah.brown@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:sarah.brown@coventry.ac.uk)

## Appendix 36. Participant Information Sheet (Student Sample)

Participant Reference Number .....

### Participant Information Sheet (Student Sample)

#### Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK"

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you agree to participate, it is important that you understand the purpose and nature of the study and what it will involve. Please take time to read this information sheet and discuss it with others if you wish. Please feel free to ask me questions if there is anything which is not clear or you would like me to explain further or in more detail.

#### ***What is the purpose of this study?***

The aim of this study is to explore police hostage/crisis negotiation within the UK. It is envisioned that this research will provide an insight into the role of the police hostage negotiator within the UK and to identify the characteristics, traits and skills that distinguish negotiators from others. In order to identify these factors, negotiators will be compared with both police officers (non-negotiators) and the general public.

#### ***Why have I been chosen?***

The study is utilising a sample of police hostage negotiators and police officers from a number of UK Police forces. You have been asked to take part in this research because you are a member of the general public. The data you provide will be compared with data obtained from police hostage negotiators and police officers (non-negotiators) in order to help identify characteristics, traits and skills that are specific to the role of hostage negotiation.

#### ***Do I have to take part?***

No. You are under no obligation to take part. If you decide to participate, then you may keep this information sheet and you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you do consent to take part in the research, you are free to withdraw at any time, without any consequences, if you decide you no longer want to be involved in the research. There will be no negative consequences to you or your studies if you choose not to take part in the study.

#### ***What will happen to me if I take part?***

The study involves the completion of a number of psychometric tests which should take no more than 45 minutes.

#### ***What do I have to do?***

If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete a number of psychometric tests. You will be asked to respond to the questions in the test battery as honestly and accurately as possible. You will then be asked to return the completed psychometric tests to the researcher within a sealed envelope.

#### ***What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?***

There is no physical risk from taking part in the study. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part.

#### ***What are the possible benefits of taking part?***

Your participation in this research will contribute to furthering our understanding of crisis/hostage negotiation in the UK and help to inform training procedures within police hostage negotiation programmes. If you are a Psychology student you can obtain 45 research credits in line with the Research Participation Scheme. In order to claim your credits please provide your university email address on the demographic questionnaire.



***What happens when the research study stops?***

When you have completed the psychometric test battery you will be debriefed regarding the purpose of the research and any questions or concerns you have can be addressed by contacting the researcher directly via one of the methods detailed below.

***What will happen if I don't want to continue with the study?***

You are free to withdraw from the study at any time and you will not be penalised in any way for doing so. You will be allocated a unique participant reference code to provide a means of identifying your data should you wish to withdraw from the study. Please contact the lead researcher to request that your data be withdrawn quoting your participant number at the time. Any information collected about you will then be destroyed by the researcher and none of the information that you provide will be used in the research without your consent. You have the option to withdraw your data from the research up to 2 weeks after the completion of the psychometric test battery. Please contact the researcher via email quoting your unique participant reference code if you would like to withdraw your data from the study. All data will be kept in a locked cabinet or on a password protected computer and will be destroyed upon completion of my PhD.

***What if there is a problem?***

It is unlikely that there will be a problem during the course of your participation in this research study. However, in the unlikely event that something goes wrong or if at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.

***Harm***

There is no anticipated risk of harm involved with participation in this study. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study.

***Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?***

Your participation will be kept entirely confidential. Any information discussed will remain confidential and all data will be anonymised to protect your identity and the identity of all others who take part in the study.

You will be allocated a unique participant reference number at the point of starting the study and this will be used to identify participants anonymously. All data resulting from the completion of the psychometric tests will be analysed at a group level and no individual scores will be identified. All data resulting from the completion of questionnaires will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and data from the psychometric test will be stored in a password protected file accessible only to the lead researcher. All anonymised data will be stored for five years after the completion of the PhD thesis, to allow time for publication. All data will then be securely destroyed (i.e. paper data will be shredded and electronic data will be erased) once this time period has elapsed.

***What will happen to the results of the study?***

The results will be typed up in the form of a formal PhD thesis and submitted for assessment at Coventry University. The research will also be written up in the form of academic papers and submitted for publication in academic, peer-reviewed journals and presentation at conferences. In these instances, data will be presented as a group rather than individual data and individual participants will remain anonymous. The police forces involved will not be named unless approval is given by the ACC of the force and individual participants' identities will remain protected.

***Contact details:***

Lead researcher's name: **Miss Amy Grubb** (*Lecturer in Forensic Psychology*)

Telephone number: **0247 688 8795**; Email: [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk) – preferred method of contact.

Director of studies supervising PhD: **Dr Sarah Brown** (*Reader in Forensic Psychology Development*)

Telephone number: **0247 688 7024**; Email: [sarah.brown@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:sarah.brown@coventry.ac.uk)

## Appendix 37. Consent Form (HCN Sample)

Participant Reference Number.....

### Consent Form: *Hostage Negotiator Sample*

**Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK"**

**Please read the following statements and complete the form below to indicate that you consent to taking part in the research.**

**Name of researcher: Amy Grubb**

**Please initial box**

- |   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 1. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential and that my identity will be kept anonymous.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. I understand that the data will be treated according to the British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and the study will be reviewed by Coventry University's ethics committee.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. I understand that that the information I provide will be used and analysed for research purposes, and the findings may be published in an academic journal, presented at academic conferences and disseminated to police forces and the participants of the study. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. I understand that I may be asked to take part in an additional component of the research project, an interview, and that I am under no obligation to take part.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. I understand that I can request that any information I provide will be destroyed upon request.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. I agree to take part in the above study.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

## Appendix 38. Consent Form (Police Officer Sample)

Participant Reference Number.....

### Consent Form: *Police Officer (NON-NEGOTIATOR) Sample*

**Project: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK"**

**Please read the following statements and complete the form below to indicate that you consent to taking part in the research.**

**Name of researcher: Amy Grubb**

**Please initial box**

- |   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential and that my identity will be kept anonymous.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. I understand that the data will be treated according to the British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and the study will be reviewed by Coventry University's ethics committee.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. I understand that that the information I provide will be used and analysed for research purposes, and the findings may be published in an academic journal, presented at academic conferences and disseminated to police forces and the participants of the study. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. I understand that I can request that any information I provide will be destroyed upon request.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. I agree to take part in the above study.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

## Appendix 39. Consent Form (Student Sample)

Participant Reference Number .....

### Consent Form (Student Sample)

**Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK"**

**Name of researcher: Amy Grubb**

**Please initial box**

- |   |                          |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these questions answered satisfactorily.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential and that my identity will be kept anonymous.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. I understand that the data will be treated according to the British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and the study will be reviewed by Coventry University's ethics committee.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. I understand that that the information I provide will be used and analysed for research purposes, and the findings may be published in an academic journal, presented at academic conferences and disseminated to police forces and the participants of the study. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. I understand that I can request that any information I provide will be destroyed upon request.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. I agree to take part in the above study.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

## Appendix 40. Participant Debrief Sheet (Police Officer Sample)

*Participant Reference Number.....*

### Participant Debrief Sheet

#### (Police Officer Sample)

Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage negotiation from a UK police perspective. This stage of the research involves the investigation of a number of specific factors which may help to make an “effective negotiator”. These factors include: *personality, decision-making style, coping style, emotion regulation and emotional intelligence*. Previous research indicates that these factors may help individuals to cope more effectively within stressful situations.

In line with previous research looking at coping and performance within stressful situations, it is hypothesised that hostage negotiators will be:

- a) more likely than police officers or the general public to possess certain personality traits,
- b) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain coping styles,
- c) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain cognitive coping strategies & methods of emotion regulation,
- d) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain decision-making styles,
- e) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise emotionally intelligent behaviours.

Research shows that these constructs are all important elements within coping and performance in high stress occupations, such as hostage negotiation. The data obtained from your questionnaires will be compared with data obtained from police hostage negotiators and a sample of the general public. This will enable me to identify whether hostage negotiators display certain traits and characteristics more than others and as such will provide an insight into the skills, traits and characteristics that are required in order to be a competent police negotiator.

The findings of this research will have implications in terms of police hostage negotiation recruitment, selection and training and will hopefully provide a basis for recommendations on the following aspects:

- Psychometric tools that could be used in the selection of hostage negotiators
- Psychometric tools that could be used to identify training needs of officers
- Changes in policy in terms of selection, training and support of operationally active hostage negotiators.

Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact the researcher at the following address:

Miss Amy Grubb, Lecturer in Forensic Psychology, Psychology Department, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Tel: 02476 888 795, Fax: 02476 888 300, Email: [amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk).

Please note that you have the right to withdraw your data from the study up to two weeks following completion of the questionnaire. If you would like to withdraw your data please contact me via email quoting your unique participant reference number (at the top right hand corner of this page).

If at any point you have any complaints about the conduct of any aspect of this research, please feel free to contact Professor Ian Marshall in writing at the following address: AB124, Alan Berry Building, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. Professor Marshall is independent of the research team and is responsible for overseeing research reviewed by the Coventry University Ethics Committee.

***I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study. Your input is very much appreciated.***

**Please return the completed questionnaire pack to the researcher at the address above using the prepaid envelope provided or hand it to the lead hostage negotiator coordinator for your force.**

## Appendix 41. Participant Debrief Sheet (Student Sample)

Participant Reference Number .....

### Participant Debrief Sheet (Student Sample)

#### Project Title: "An Exploratory Study of Modern-Day Police Hostage (Crisis) Negotiation within the UK"

Thank you for completing this research study. The aim of the study is to investigate crisis/hostage negotiation from a UK police perspective. This stage of the research involves the investigation of a number of specific factors which may help to make an "effective negotiator". These factors include: *personality, decision-making style, coping style, emotion regulation* and *emotional intelligence*. Previous research indicates that these factors may help individuals to cope more effectively within stressful situations.

In line with previous research looking at coping and performance within stressful situations, it is hypothesised that hostage negotiators will be:

- a) more likely than police officers or the general public to possess certain personality traits,
- b) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain coping styles,
- c) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain cognitive coping strategies & methods of emotion regulation,
- d) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise certain decision-making styles,
- e) more likely than police officers or the general public to utilise emotionally intelligent behaviours.

Research shows that these constructs are all important elements within coping and performance in high stress occupations, such as hostage negotiation. The data obtained from your questionnaires will be compared with data obtained from police hostage negotiators and police officers (non-negotiators). This will enable me to identify whether hostage negotiators display certain traits and characteristics more than others and as such will provide an insight into the skills, traits and characteristics that are required in order to be a competent police negotiator.

The findings of this research will have implications in terms of police hostage negotiation recruitment, selection and training and will hopefully provide a basis for recommendations on the following aspects:

- Psychometric tools that could be used in the selection of hostage negotiators
- Psychometric tools that could be used to identify training needs of officers
- Changes in policy in terms of selection, training and support of operationally active hostage negotiators.

Should you want further information regarding any component of this study, please contact me via one of the following methods:

Postal address:

Miss Amy Grubb  
Lecturer in Forensic Psychology  
Psychology Department  
Coventry University  
Priory Street  
Coventry  
CV1 5FB

Tel: 02476 888 795

Fax: 02476 888 300

Email: [Amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:Amy.grubb@coventry.ac.uk) – preferred method of contact

***I would like to thank you again for taking part in this study. Your input is very much appreciated.***